

MANIPUR IMBROGLIO



Lt. Col. T. Hem Singh

The dynamics of crisis and conflicts in the North Eastern region of India is really mind boggling, pathetic, lamentable and unfortunate in political terms. During the British rule in India, the region was kept inside the genie's bottle, never allowed to see the ray of hope—Democracy. The various ethnic groups, sub-groups, communities, clans etc. were left to fight each others and finish off gradually. In 1947, when India became Independent, they came out from the genie's bottle disoriented, dishevelled, disinformed (misinformed), glazed and out of touch with the outside world.

Manipur Imbroglia tries to highlight some of the critical issues and problems faced by the inhabitants in the region which contributed handsomely to the rise of Insurgency movement, ethnic crisis and conflict, religious dogmatism, socio-economic fiasco and complex political gun-battles in the context of south East Asia. The people in the region: the Assamese, the Arunachalese, the Manipuris, the Mizos, the Meghalayese, the Nagas, the Tripuris and many other minority groups have been cursed by destiny and their socio-cultural life have been shattered by history. Every ethnic groups have got their aspirations, own way of life, which gives excellent opportunity to be exploited by external forces.

The people of the region have to find out a viable political strategy and approaches to solve the perennial imbroglia of the region. It should not be allowed to remain in a continuum mode which might be led to a breeding pond for global terrorist players, power brokers, fundamentalists and International drug warlords. The ethnic Insurgent outfits should not be a pawn into the hands of global terrorism or converted themselves into global or regional terrorist organizations. The solution for imbroglia in Manipur and in the North Eastern region of India should be based on a holistic political strategy and approaches; an assured participation by the general public and the Intelligentsia, and a self-appraisal from the various Insurgent outfits.

MANIPUR IMBROGLIO
INSURGENCY, ETHNIC POLITICS,
SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

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**Insurgency, Ethnic Politics,
Socio-cultural Dimensions**

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
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
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MANIPUR IMBROGLIO
NORTH EAST INDIA



Sketch Map
(Not to scale)

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PREFACE

In early 1950's, if you happened to ask someone in New Delhi, Bombay, Madras or Rajasthan, where is Manipur, his answer would be a curt, uninterested and unsophisticated reply: *'why you want to test my geographical knowledge on the name of a ubiquitous village, tucked-in somewhere in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh border'*. If you continued your enchanted voyage, put the same question to someone in London, Washington, Singapore and Bangkok, who got some knowledge of World War II, his answer will be an instantaneous one: Oh! Yes. I believe it is one of the most beautiful places in the world, situated on the North Eastern region of India, where the Japanese Samurai met their Waterloo. It is a 'flower on a lofty height'.

In the middle of 1950's, New Delhi started induction of its Armed forces to the North Eastern region of India, to subdue the tom-tom sound of Naga insurgency movement led by the legendary Naga insurgent leader A.Z. Phizo, in Naga Hills (Nagaland) and the Mizo insurgency tremors in Mizo Hills (Mizoram), led by a young and firebrand Mizo youth, named Laldenga. All posting and assignments to the region were considered as bad luck, bad omen and a journey into the thick and dark jungle, inhabited only by the wild animals and naked people. One young Lieutenant of the Indian Army, who belonged to Western desert of India, got a sudden posting order, came back to his house with a sullen, tiring, and morose looking face. Seeing the condition of her son, as tired as Napoleon Bonaparte, after the battle of Waterloo, who was expecting a prize posting to New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta or Lucknow, the valiant mother offered him a cup of tea and quietly asked: where you have been posted? The son, after a long pause, retorted like a good General: 'to Hell, Manipur'. Later on, he became a high ranking officer in the Armed forces of India and accepted, without having any inhibition that Manipur is "A paradise on the earth".

In 1960's, North East India remained as the forbidden region for posting and services of many young IAS (Indian Administrative Services) and IPS (Indian Police Services) officers. To beef-up the administration of the region, gradually, New Delhi posted a few officers to the region with a baggage tag of *'punishment posting'* for correction of their fundamental ideas. A young IAS officer from South India got the shock of his life when he got his posting order to Mizo Hills (Mizoram), a district of Assam, inhabited by the Chin-Lushai people, famous for its 'Mautam' famine and the galaxy of green mountain tops. With a dejected heart, he packed up his luggage, ready to move for the looming battle of his administrative career. As a morale boosting drill, his mother advised him to carry sufficient tooth-pastes and toothbrushes, as he won't get those precious items of health-

care in those wild uncharted hilly and jungle areas. The same trend blazing effort was followed by a young IPS officer, who just got married, expecting his posting to New Delhi, Bombay or at the worst South India, was completely shaken when told to move to Nagaland. When he announced the 'Breaking News' to his family and his wife, a cyclonic storm of 'Naked Naga Head-Hunters', dancing with spears and shields, accompanied by the monochromatic sound of Naga drum-beat, yelling and rejoicing for the kill, devastated the serenity, tranquility and happiness of the entire family and North India.

The North Eastern region of India, which is a part of tropical rain forest, stretches from the foothills of the Himalayas to the region of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Malaya, and the fertile Vietnam peninsula. The entire region shares a similarity in demographic, cultural, social, linguistic and anthropological behaviours. The people have got great affinity amongst themselves under the Tibeto-Mongoloid and the Tibeto-Burman shadow, with little regards to the Dravidian and the Aryan stocks. The region came into the world political scene during the Allied Forces war efforts in 'Far East Asia' and the tenacious dream of the Imperial Japanese forces to control the Eastern horizon where the sun rises. The politico-military upheaval in the entire region, which includes river Tsangpo, the Brahmaputra, the Irrawaddy, the Chinwin, the Salween, the Mekong, right upto the Gulf of Tonkin, inhabited by people of 5 feet to 5 feet 4 inches, carried an assymetric eastern oriental cultures and common psychological bearings. In early 1950's, many countries in the region became independent from the British yoke. However, the region of the North East India, vaguely and unwittingly known as 'Assam', 'Assam Areas' or 'Assam sides', was left high and dry to the mercy of nature when India was rejoicing the fruit of Independence at the Red Fort, New Delhi.

The North Eastern region of India comprises the seven states of India: Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura, popularly known as seven sisters of India. It occupies one-seventh of the land masses of India, with a total population of 39 millions (2001-2002 AD). 98% of its borders formed India's international boundaries in the region. It has got long international border with Burma (1644 kilometres); 4031 kilometres with Bangladesh, 1100 km with China; 410 with Bhutan. River Brahmaputra and the Barak formed the major important navigational waterways in the region. There are three important National languages which included in the 8th Schedule of the Constitution of India (Assamese, Bengali and Manipuri) and a number of dialects. During 19th Century, the British authorities, who ruled India, unwittingly called, the old religious rites practiced by the tribal peoples as 'Animism'. Hinduism flourished in Manipur, Assam and Tripura; Christianity conquered the tribal peoples; Islam spread in quick speed; and Buddhism and Jainism followed in slow speed. By 1960's, the sound of insurgency movement was heard by New Delhi in the region: Naga insurgency movement; Mizos uprising; political revolution in Manipur; politico-social upheavals in Assam; and call for the formation of Twipara in Tripura. By 1970s, North East India came into the National and International limelight, not by any political designs or acts but by virtue of the international political paradox of India, concerning the Bangladesh Liberation war of 1971. By 1980s, a number of insurgent organisations raised their heads in the general areas, demanding sovereignty, independence, self-determination, self-rule and autonomy. New Delhi applied the military means, the counter-insurgency warfare, to subdue the violent and volatile acts of those insurgents, militants, terrorists, guerillas and the anti-national elements. By 1990s, ethnic and sub-

ethnic crisis and clashes; politico-religious warfare; and influences by external agencies and elements, devastated the political environment of the region, affecting India's national interest.

Manipur, described by many writers, as a 'paradise on earth', covering an area of 22,327 square kilometres, protruding towards South East Asia, as the Eastern fuselage of India, remained as a tiny independent state till 1949. The state, inhabited by the Manipuri: Manipuri Meiteis, the Tangkhuls, the Kuki, the Mao, the Maram, the Kabuis, the Khongjais, the Meitei Pangals (Manipur Muslims) and many other sub-communities, absorbed into the insurgency movement due to the prevailing politico-social environment. Though the people in the state had many political grievances against Mainland India, they never disowned India and Indian democracy. Gradually, a large number of educated unemployed youths were attracted towards insurgency movement due to the politico-strategic faultline of New Delhi and their's overall policy of North East India. Till 1980, the Central Government, used only the stick (the Armed forces of India) to solve the politico-social problems of the State, which led to the breeding of more and more insurgent outfits.

Insurgent outfits raised on the soil of the state which included the People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA); the United National Liberation Front (UNLF); the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK); the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP); the Kangleipak Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL); the Kuki insurgent outfits; the Peoples United Liberation Front (PULF) and other minor groups seriously affected the socio-political environment of the state. The atmosphere became murkier when insurgent outfits from Nagaland like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Isak-Muivah group (NSCN-IM) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang group (NSCN-K) ensured that the Naga tribes from Manipur joined the Naga insurgency movement. Insurgent outfits operating in Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Tripura also directly and indirectly affected the politico-ethnic problem of the state. Burmese (Myanmarese) insurgent outfits which included the Kachin Independent Army (KIA); the Shan State Army (SSA); the Arakanese Revolutionary Army (ARA); the Chin National Army (CNA); the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO), the Karen National Army/Union (KNA/KNU) etc. also affected the politico-strategic interest of India along the Indo-Burma International Border. The Islamic Jehadi groups operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand, Burma, Central Asia and South East Asian countries had already touched the soil of North East India and Manipur. The terrorist group, the Al Qaeda, had already established its network modules in Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, Mizoram, and Sikkim.

Manipur, in particular and the North Easterners, in general, have got many genuine problems and grievances against the Central Government of India. They include political, social, economic, development, and demographic contours and structures. The region, which was nicknamed as 'Excluded Areas', was neglected by the British Authorities as far as they could and the same policy was followed by New Delhi in letters and spirit. Ethnic and sub-ethnic politics has damaged Manipur and other states in an unprecedented manner and the same had been exploited by the insurgents and the Anti-social elements. The people were heavily sandwiched and caught into the cross-fire between the security forces and the insurgents in counter-insurgency operations launched by the Central Government. The economy of the state has been put in shattered condition; socio-economic development remained in standstill; communication with the outside world remained in doldrums; and industrialisation a dream illusion for the inhabitants.

There is a conflict situation in Manipur involving the state; the insurgent outfits; the security forces; and many other stakeholders. There is a crisis of confidence among the various stakeholders leading to different negative political approaches and failure to involve the general intelligentsia for a positive solution. People do not believe the act of commission and omission of the State (the security forces) and the state political apparatus failed to understand the psychological perception of the general public in such a conflict situation. The state as a part of the North Eastern region of India, is affected by the wind of insurgency, terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism blowing across the globe. Any violent turmoil in South East Asia will automatically disturbed the politico-strategic environment of the Eastern fulcrum of India and further aggravated the conflict situation in Manipur. From a close platform, Manipur's imbroglio can be classified as a socio-political crisis rather than reading as an exclusive insurgency movement by a few misguided brothers and sisters. Upto early 1960's, the people in the state did not revolt and raised the Anti-India flag like in other parts of the region. They demanded statehood in the most democratic fashion, which was neglected by New Delhi. At a late stage, the ex-princely independent state was upgraded to the status of a state only in 1972.

For peace and tranquility, there is a need that the socio-economic standard; communication and transport, tourism industry, industrialisation at macro- and micro-sectors, banking system, rural upliftment programmes, and health-care sectors be paid immediate attention. National and regional political parties and politicians needs to discard the ethnic and the sub-ethnic political caps which bring more human tragedy rather than any social benefits.

Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism always involved blood, tears, slaughters, fear and illusion. So long there is insurgency movement, terrorism, fundamentalism and fanaticism, there has to be some counterweight to subdue the same. Some stakeholders will call their movement as revolutionary, patriotic, freedom movement, so on and so forth. Such type of psychological warfare in conflict environment in a small state like Manipur does not help the general public who were caught in the cross-fire. There is no doubt that the Armed forces of India have to play a pivotal role to remove the fear psychosis raised by the insurgents against the general public. However, the security forces have to keep in mind that the law of the land is applicable to all the general public, the Armed forces, the insurgents and other stakeholders. In North East India the insurgents, the terrorists and the militants are the biggest human rights violators. But the state and the security forces should not follow their footsteps and turned around with a tag of 'State Terrorism'. During counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, the security forces have to uphold the dignity of the individual and ensure the protection of basic human rights. The conflict environment has to be brought to an end by all.

The socio-political imbroglio in Manipur cannot be solved by military means. The problem of the people of the state is not a military matter but a political one. So the solution has to be a political one. Socioeconomic development is the primary agent to bring peaceful environment in the state. The same can be achieved in optimum if the insurgents, militants, terrorists and the anti-national elements did not derail the developmental programmes of New Delhi and Imphal. Thus, the need of having a holistic dialogue comes into play. Dialogue is an important element to bring understanding

and appreciation of each other's points of view. There is a need that the entire insurgent outfits which included the Manipuri Meiteis, the Nagas, the Kukis and the Manipuri Muslims come to the negotiating table; discussed the various core issues; and arrived to the converging point. Peace process, peace talk and dialogue will always involved roadblocks and setbacks which are not of permanent nature. There is no doubt that the people of Manipur want peace, tranquility, socio-economic development with full dignity of basic human rights; rights to liberty and freedom of speech. This can be achieved when the National political parties; ethnic political parties; politicians of all colours, the public; and the various insurgent outfits play a constructive role to usher in peace in the state and in the region. Manipur insurgency is soluble.

LT.-COL. (Retd.) T. HEMO SINGH

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing a book about Insurgency movement in North East-India!! Be a Napoleon but not the faith of Napoleon Bonaparte.

Why ??

Comments detrimental to the politics and policy of New Delhi, Guwahati, Kohima, Imphal, Agartala, and Shillong; you are bound to be painted as biased. Any writing unpalatable and bitter to the insurgent outfits, scare-crow ethnic and sub-ethnic politicians, religious flag-bearers and NGOs will be denounced as: Anti-Revolutionary; agent of Imperialist Indian Government; Anti people and saitan. Simple, holistic and judicious comments and suggestions on the 'Greater politico-ethnic Land warfare' (Greater Nagaland, Greater Manipur, Greater Mizoram, Greater Assam, Greater Chinland etc.) will put a common citizen of this country to the politico-ethnic alter (Rostrum) of South East Asia for final cruxification.

Then !!

The dirty political bag of the region, which contained the archaic politico-ethnic doctrine of an old Home Guard, with an over-sized trench-coat, a red cap on the head, holding a rusted gun, and unshaven face, sitting on a sand-bag with a play-card 'Sovereignty', should not be handed over to the young children of the region as a divine gift.

So !!

Hence, this book.

1. I am thankful to my colleagues, friends and other peoples who encouraged me to write this 'piece of paper'. I am thankful to my wife Mrs. Indira Devi, LSEO, Education Department, Government of Manipur, my daughters, Doctor (Miss) T. Nimmi, MBBS, PGDMCH, DNB; Miss T. Sangeeta, TV Journalist (INX New Delhi); and Miss T. Ranita, TV Journalist (Star News, New Delhi) for proof-reading and their valuable comments. I am also thankful to my son, T. Rohit Sagar Singh (Student, B.E., Civil) for his assistance in computer works.
2. Finally, I sincerely dedicate this book to you, to the young, smiling, courageous and brave children of the region, who have suffered/suffering severely and miserably due to the conflict imbroglio in the region.

LT.-COL. (Retd.) T. HEMO SINGH

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	:	Arakanese Army
ACP	:	Arakanese Communist Party
AASU	:	All Assam Students Union
AGP	:	Asom Gana Parisad
AMSU	:	All Manipur Students Union
ANVC	:	A' Chick National Volunteer Council
ANLP	:	Arakanese National Liberation Party
ARIP	:	Arakanese Rohingya Islamic Party
ARA	:	Arakanese Revolutionary Army
ARNO	:	Arakanese Rohingya National Organisation
ATTF	:	All Tripura Tiger Forces
ATPLO	:	All Tripura People's Liberation Organisation
AFSPA	:	Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958
AICC	:	All India Congress Committee
BCP	:	Burmese Communist Party
BNLF	:	Bodo National Liberation Front
BLT	:	Bodo Liberation Tiger
BJP	:	Bharatiya Janata Party
CNA	:	Chin National Army
CHT	:	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CI Ops	:	Counter Insurgency Operation

CIA	:	Central Intelligence Agency
CNLP	:	Chin National Liberation Pary
CrPC	:	Criminal Procedure Code
DHD	:	Dima Haram Daoga
ENRC	:	Eastern Naga Regional Council
CILF	:	East India Liberation Front
FGN	:	Federal Government of Nagaland
GPRN	:	Government of the Peoples Republic of Nagaland
HNLC	:	Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council
HPC	:	Hmar People's Convention
IBRF	:	Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front
ILAA	:	Islamic Revolutionary Army of Assam
KCP	:	Kangleipak Communist Party
KIA	:	Kachin Independent Army
KIO	:	Kachin Independent Organisation
KYKL	:	Kangleipak Yawol Kanna Loop
KNA	:	Kuki National Army
KNF	:	Kuki National Front
KLA	:	Kuki Liberation Army
KRA	:	Kuki Revolutionary Army
MLTA	:	Muslim Liberation Tiger of Assam
MPA	:	Manipur People's Army
MPLF	:	Manipur People's Liberation Front
MNF	:	Mizo National Front
MSC	:	Meitei State Committee
NEMLA	:	North East Muslim Liberation Army
NLFT	:	National Liberation Front of Tripura
NDFB	:	National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NSCN	:	National Socialist Council of Nagaland

NUPA	:	National United Party of Arakan
PLA	:	People's Liberation Army of Manipur
PREPAK	:	People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
PULF	:	People's United Liberation Front
RJC	:	Revolutionary Joint Council
RPF	:	Revolutionary People's Front
UKLF	:	United Kuki Liberation Front
ULFA	:	United Liberation Front of Assam
UNLF	:	United National Liberation Front
ZRA	:	Zomi Revolutionary Army
ZLF	:	Zomi Liberation Front

PART I

BRIEF HISTORY, GENESIS OF INSURGENCY AND
INSURGENT OUTFITS


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INTRODUCTION

Manipur is a small state surrounded by hill ranges from all sides. Manipur lies between 23° 43' N and 25° 68' N latitude and between 93° 3' E and 94° 78' E longitude covering an area of 22,322 square kilometres. In the east, it touches the international border of Myanmar, to the south Mizoram, to the west Assam and to the north Nagaland. In ancient time, the state covered a larger area than the present one. The state popularly known as the "Jewel of the East" is located strategically to the easternmost corner of India and played an important role of a buffer zone during the British rule in India. Topographically it is a hilly terrain. One-third of the total area is plain and the rest is covered by hills and jungles. Primary jungles are still available in large parts of the hilly region. As per census of 2001, the population of the State was 22,94,000. It has got a literacy rate of 70.5% and per capita income of Rs 3,602. The climate throughout the year is temperate—quite pleasant and tempering. The maximum temperature reached up to 34.3°C (14 May, 1995) and the minimum temperature of 00.0°C (25 January, 1995). The rainy season in Manipur covers from the month of May to mid-September.

Imphal is the capital of the State. The State has got nine districts. The valley region consists of four districts and the hill region with five districts. The population distributions show a heavy concentration of inhabitants in the valley region with 65% and the hill districts with 35%. Area, districts and the population dispersion of the State is shown in Table 1.1.

Manipur is connected with the outside world by two National Highways—National Highway NH 39 and the National Highway NH 53. Another National Highway NH 150 has been added as the third lifeline. NH 39 link-up with the railroad at Dimapur (Nagaland) and the NH 53 with the railroad at Jiribam (Manipur) and Silchar (Assam). The NH 150 has converted the old existing State Highways



from Jessami to Tipaimukh through Imphal. Most of the major roads pass through the capital city Imphal, which acts as the main centre of all economic and institutional activities. The NH 39 and the NH 53 are the only available lifeline of the state. Manipur had total road length of 8648 km in 2004-05. The Rail Map of India touches Manipur at Jiribram, which is 225 km away from Imphal and 64 km from Silchar (Assam). The Jiribram-Tupul Railway line has been declared as a National Project. During feasibility study, it has been found feasible to extend the railway line from Tupul to Imphal. Manipur has got one airport at Imphal, which presently serves only domestic routes, connecting Imphal with Delhi, Calcutta (Kolkata), Guwahati, Silchar, Aizawl, etc.

TABLE 1.1: Area, Population and Headquarters of Districts

Sl. No.	District	Area	Population	Headquarters
1.	Senapati	3,271	2,83,621	Senapati
2.	Ukhrul	4,544	1,40, 778	Ukhrul
3.	Chandel	3,313	1,18,327	Chandel
4.	Churachandpur	4,570	2,27,905	Churachandpur
5.	Tamenglong	4,391	1,11,499	Tamenglong
6.	Imphal (West)	519	4,44,382	Lamphel
7.	Imphal (East)	709	3,64,876	Porompat
8.	Thoubal	514	3,64,140	Thoubal
9.	Bishnupur	496	2,08,368	Bishnupur

Source: *India 2009*, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.

The District-wise Annual Rainfall in Manipur (in cm) for different year is given in Table 1.2.

Manipur has been described by many writers as "a flower on a lofty height". It is a state of natural beauty and splendour. Mrs. St Clair Grimwood, wife of the British Political Agent of Manipur in 1890, was so much inspired by the beauty of the state that she described it as a "pretty place more beautiful than many of the show places of the World". Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru paid a befitting tribute by describing it as a "Jewel of India". Manipur's surpassing attractions include its superb panorama of evergreen hill ranges, the green valley of Imphal, Kangla—the historical sacred place, the wonderful Loktak Lake, the natural habitat of brow-antlered Deer at the Keibul Lamjao National Park, the INA Memorial at Moirang, the world famous Siroy Lily, grown only on the Siroy Hill in the Ukhrul District. Manipur offers good scope for the development of tourism industry, which can benefit socio-economic development, diversification of economy, generation of employment and raising the standard of life. Some important sites of tourist interest in the state is given in Table 1.3.

TABLE 1.2: Districtwise Annual Rainfall in Manipur (in cm) for different years

Important Centres	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Imphal (Lamphelpat)	203.91	206.09	101.14	134.49	66.07	66.70	54.25	94.98
Imphal (Jiribam)	222.31	383.46	259.35	291.52	-	150.08	-	-
Thoubal	139.53	158.75	94.17	118.95	96.45	112.81	90.79	101.44
Chandel	254.07	230.32	103.60	128.73	-	-	-	-
Tamenglong	160.35	313.50	229.10	340.00	142.30	154.30	80.70	135.49
Churachandpur	264.69	294.91	135.11	150.64	132.64	114.08	89.25	16.49
Senapati	151.75	156.37	148.09	110.27	-	204.69	180.50	-
Ukhrul	158.58	201.74	120.96	89.57	-	128.34	112.67	-

Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Manipur, 1997-98

TABLE 1.3: Sites of Tourist Attraction in Manipur

Place	Importance
Loktak Lake	Largest freshwater lake in Eastern India with floating forest.
Koubu Ching	A sacred place with scenic beauty.
Nongmaiching hill (Baruni hill)	Scenic beauty and potential pilgrimage place.
Tharon Cave	Large cave with water fall, scenic beauty.
Khankhui Caves	Hundung limestone region, a num of caves and tunnels with stalactite and stalagmites and other associated feature.
Mao	Highest peak with elevation of about 2000 m, health resort and place of historical importance.
Bishenpur (Bishnupur)	The historical temple of Vishnu built in 1467 A.D., pilgrimage importance.
Moirang	An ancient village at the bank Loktak Lake, historical and pilgrimage importance Temple of Thangjing, INA Memorial.

Source: Government of Manipur, Directorate of Tourism, Manipur, 1997-98.

The exquisite handloom and handicraft products of the state are known throughout the world. The state is famous for its gold domed Shree Shree Gobindajee Temple; the Saheed Minar at Imphal; the Tharon Cave at Tamenglong; the Khangkhui cave at Ukhrul; the symmetrical two (World War II) War Cemeteries at Imphal. The state has got a unique identity of its own blessed with salubrious climate, famous for its distinctive cultural pattern and its evergreen scenic beauty. Manipur extends a cordial invitation to the tourists. Manipur is a land of festivities, merriments and mirths all the

year round. A year presents a cycle of festivals; hardly a month passes without festival or two. Some of the festivals are Yaoshang (Holi); Lai Haraoba (Joyous festival of God and Goddess); Rath Yatra (Chariot Festival); Ningol Chakkouba of the Meiteis; Gang-Ngai (Kabui Naga festival); Kut (Chinthe-Kuk group festival), Christmas, Ramjan, Id, etc.

In olden days, Manipur was known by the neighbouring states by different names. In Rennell's *Accounts and Map of India*, it was called "Mecklay". In the narrative of Symess and in map of that period, it was called "Cassy". To the Shan in Burma (Myanmar), who invaded the region repeatedly, it was known as "Kase" and to the Burmas "Kathe". At one time the Ahoms called them as Mekeli and the Cacharies as Magli.¹ It may be difficult to come to a concrete conclusion the exact age of the Manipuri civilization. But it is an old one as indicated by many direct and indirect evidences. Colonel Gerini in his *Research on Ptolemy's Geography* states: "According to Burmese Royal Chronicles (*Maharaja Vamsa*) Dhajaraja, a King of the Sakya race, settled at Manipur, about 550 B.C. and later on conquered, old or upper Pagan".² The Chinese businessmen with long caravans used to pass through Manipur for their onward journey to Afghanistan where silk of China was exchanged with the gold of Europe. The routes normally followed were the Irrawaddy, the Salween and the Chindwin river and then through Manipur and Assam which took almost three months. At later stages, the reconstruction of the history of Manipur has begun first by the British Officers who came to Manipur from time to time and served in the region in various capacities. Though the civilization of Manipur was very old, yet for want of systematic history on the basis of accurate chronology, the period before the eighth century A.D. was considered as the Puranic Age. It may be difficult to prove the authenticity of the stories of the Puranic Age. But their importance in literatures, religion, cultures and the society will always carry a deep recognition.

The modern Manipuri race can be considered as a composite one formed out of several tribes, castes and creeds. The fertile valley of Manipur has witnessed a number of invasions from different tribes or ethnic groups since time immemorial. At different period, the Nagas, the Kukis, the Shan, the Chinese etc. came and settled down in the valley region and the surrounding hill areas and at later stages assimilated with the already existing Manipuris.

FLORA AND FAUNA

Manipur is a land rich in flora and fauna and a paradise for anthropologists. It is covered with thick jungle forests, criss-crossed by rivers, tributaries, *nallahs*, gorges, wonderful water springs. The hill ranges surrounding the Imphal Valley presents a unique picture to the viewers. With the increase in heights from the valley area, the green agricultural fields, particularly the paddy field, present a uniform greenish landscape, spreading along the vast landmasses, the riverbanks, the sloping hillsides and sometimes on the hilltops. Different types of wild animals, birds, domestic animals and wild species are found in the state.

FOREST

Forest plays one of the most important roles in maintaining ecological balance in our societies. The whole of the hill features lying between the valley of Cachar (Assam) and Manipur, and far to the north and south were densely clothed with thick undergrowth of jungle normally called jungle

forests. At one stage the entire state was covered with thick jungle forest except the Imphal valley and the hill slopes adjacent to the valley. These hill slopes were steadily cleared as late as 1950's. By 1970's, the entire valley area and the hill slopes presented a denuded look. An area of 17,418 sq. km formed the total forest cover of the state, which constituted almost 79% of the total geographical area of the state. On the basis of the legal status, the forests have been classified as Reserved, Protected and Unclassified. The classification, coverage and percentage of the coverage to the total areas are given in Table 1.4.

TABLE 1.4: Legal Status of Forest of Manipur

Type of Forests	Area (sq km)	% of Total Forest Area
Reserved Forest	1,467	8.3
Protected Forest	4,171	23.7
Unclassified	11,780	68.0
Total	17,418	100

Source: Government of Manipur, Department of Forests (2005-06 Report).

The State Government of Manipur is the custodian of the protected and the reserved forests, which formed almost 32% of the total forest area. The remaining area of 68% are treated as unclassified and remained under the control of tribal population. Due to ambiguity of ownership and lack of social awareness the unclassified forests are subjected to widespread injudicious exploitation. The forest in Manipur can be broadly classified as given in Table 1.5.

TABLE 1.5: Broad classification of Forests of Manipur (base year 1993)

Type of Forest	Area in sq.km.	Percent to Total	
		State Geographical area	Total forest area
Semi-evergreen forest	645	2.89	3.68
Teak gurjan forest	611	2.74	3.48
Wet hill forests	9,057	40.56	51.40
Pine forest	2,443	10.94	13.86
Wet temperate forest	1,451	6.50	8.23
Bamboo brakes	3,268	14.64	18.55
Grass brakes	146	0.65	0.82
Total	17,621	78.92	100

Source: Government of Manipur, Department of Forest (1996-97 report).

(The State Government has adopted the Manipur Forest Rule 1971. The Indian Forest Act 1972 is applicable to whole of the forest areas of Manipur.)

The forest produces a variety of trees e.g., Negeshwar (*Mesua ferrea*), Jarul (*Lagerstræmia flos reginae*), Talo (*Castanopsis indica*), Satras, Caddam (*Anthocephalus cadamba*), etc. Teakwood is also available in the border areas with Burma, Nagaland and Assam. One of the most common wood *Uningthou* (*Bonsam*) is available in various parts of the state. Bamboo of the common kind is available in abundance throughout the state. In the valley area, it is now almost extinct except a few areas in rural villages. Rhododendrons are common fruit trees available in the jungle forest as well as in valley area. Dwarfish stature Rhododendrons are available mostly in the hill areas. The forest trees presented a new look during the rainy season from May to October. From November to January, most of the hilltop and ridgelines area covered with light snow. Till night the chilly winds passes through the forest with whipping sound. The monsoon rainfall from the Bay of Bengal touches the state. The forest of Manipur provides home to various wild lives that in turn plays an important role in ecological balance.

ETHNICITY OF MANIPUR

GENERAL

In the early age of the 'Purans', it was believed that the Northeastern region of India, a land of mystery and magic, was inhabited by the Kiratas, a Mongoloid race, an ethnic non-Aryan group. That was mentioned in *Mahabharata*. In the history of India, particularly of the Northeastern region, mention had been made about the Ahoms (the Assamese), the Garrows (Garos), the Khasi, the Manipuris, the Tripuris, the Kacharis, etc. Mention is also found of the Chin, the Lushais; the Aos, the Sema Naga, the Angami, the Tangkhul, the Mizos, the Bodos, the Kukis, the Dimassas, etc. However some writers claim that no systematic records of study and writing were found so far the pre-6th century period are concerned. Most of the information trickle down from generation to generation, chronicles related to kingdom and ethnic historical records etc.



UNITY BOND: ALL COMMUNITY GROUP OF MANIPUR

In the 18th century, systematic and recorded study of the ethnology of the Northeastern region of India was started by many British administrators, explorers, British Army Officers during their forays into the region. In 1972, E.T. Dalton studies the ethnic configuration of the region and published his book, the *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*. In 1844, the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* brought out research works carried out by Mr. Yule about the Khasis of Meghalaya. In 1870-75, the journal of the Royal Anthropological and the Royal Geographical Societies brought out some of the research works on the ethnic groups of North East India written by Godwin Austen (H.H Godwin Austen, reports on the survey operations in the Naga Hills and Manipur during the field season, 1872-73, general report on the topography survey of India for the season 1872-73). Many writers have presented accounts, reports and journals of the regions. Prominent among them are by Mr. G.H Damant (*Reports on the Administration of the Naga Hills for the year 1878-79, Shillong*); A Mackenzie (*Memorandum on the Northeast frontier of Bengal, Calcutta, 1869*); Mr. C.S. Soppit (*A Short Account*

of the Kuki-Lushai Tribes on the North East Frontier Districts, Shillong, 1887); Colonel J. Johnstone (*My experience in Manipur and Naga Hills*, London, 1895); W.J. Allen (*Reports of the Administration of the Khasis and Jaintia Hill Territory*, Calcutta, 1858).

Northeast India formed the gateway to the incessant invasion to India from the Mekong Delta, the Salween basin, the Yangtze basin, the Chindwin river belt, the Irrawaddy valley area, passing through the valley of Manipur, the Brahmaputra and the Barak valley of Assam and the hilly terrain of Mizoram, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh. The region presents an array of ethnic diversity never found anywhere in the world; cultural and linguistic varieties, which were amazing and tempting to many scholars. The people in the region were identified with Mongoloid stock with flat noses, short and medium height, small eyes, white and reddish complexion, long and dark hair, white teeth with martial characters. Ethnic and minority groups used to settle down in areas where sufficient land and water were available for cultivation, the prime ingredient for survival, cultivation, ethnic domination, cultural progression etc. At later stages occupation of land became the most important ingredient for the ethnic domination, ethnic domination to ethnic clashes and killings, directly and indirectly responsible for the emergence of many insurgent, militant and guerilla outfits and anti-social elements. The extremely large number of ethnic groups and ethnic minorities sandwiched by a number of ethnic insurgent outfits could be identified as one of the prime factors for the turbulent and turmoil politico-insurgent scenario in Manipur and many other parts in the region. There are more than one thousand ethnic minority groups, sub-groups, tribal groups, sub-tribes, scheduled castes etc. in the region with strong ethnic aspirations, cultures, age-old tradition and religion.

The unique geographical location and terrainic features divided Manipuris into two groups—the plain inhabitants popularly known as the Manipuri Meiteis and the hill people who inhabited the hill areas. The ethnic groups of Manipur are:

- | | | |
|--|---|----------|
| (a) Manipuri Meiteis | : 70% | |
| (b) Scheduled Tribes (33 in numbers) | : 23% | |
| Aimol | Kom | Ralte |
| Anal | Lamsang | Sema |
| Angami | Mao | Simte |
| Chiru | Marring | Suhte |
| Gangte | Lushai | Tangkhul |
| Mhar | Mongsang | Thadou |
| Kabui | Moyon | Tarao |
| Katcha Naga | Paite | Vaiphei |
| Koirao | Purum | Zou |
| Koireng | Paomai Naga | |
| Kharam Recognised in 2003 | Any Kuki tribe | |
| (c) Scheduled Castes | : 5% | |
| Dhobi (Dhupi), Muchi, Namasudras, Patri, Sutra Dhar and Yaithibi | | |
| (d) Others | : 2% (Outsiders (Foreigners) and Mobile populations.) | |




Imphal (East and West):

The cultural centre of South East Asia

Area	: 1228 Square kilometres
Population	: 8,39,258
Density	: 683 per square kilometre.
Road	: NH-39, NH-53 and NH-150.

Senapati District, Manipur

Area	: 3,271 Square kilometres
Population	: 2,83,621
Density	: 86 per square kilometre.
Road	: NH-39.



Tamenglong District, Manipur

Area	: 4,391 Square kilometres
Population	: 1,11,499
Density	: 25 per square kilometre.
Road	: State highway.

Chandel District, Manipur

Area	: 3,313 Square kilometres
Population	: 1,18,327
Density	: 35 per square kilometre
Road	: NH-39



**Ukhrul District, Manipur**

Area : 4,544 Square kilometres
Population : 1,40,778
Density : 30 per square kilometres.
Road : NH-150.

Churachandpur District, Manipur

Area : 4,570 Square kilometres
Population : 2,27,905
Density : 49 per square kilometre
Road : NH-150.



BRIEF HISTORY OF MANIPUR

Sir James Johnstone wrote, "*The early history of Manipur is lost in obscurity but there can be no doubt that it has existed as an independent kingdom from a very early period. In the days when the Indian branch of Aryans was still in its progressive and colonising stage, this district was repeatedly passed over by one wave after another of invaders intent on penetrating into the remotest part of Burma*". Like another other country, Manipur has a long and compact history, full of folklore, mythological and archeological stories. In early days, the state was known as Meitei Leibak (Land of the Meitei) or "Kangleipak". The name Manipur is also related to the existence of jewels and pearls ("Mani" means jewels in Manipur). It is a common belief that the history of Manipur and its inhabitants started before Christ (BC), which lacked substantial historical documents and proofs. The records of the early history of the state contained a long list of chiefs, kings, Maharajas and various rulers, sometimes unaccompanied by any proof of existence. In the year 33 AD, Nongda Lairen Pakhangba, the snake-king God ruled the state for 120 years from 33 AD to 153 AD. Before him it is believed that, though of academic interest, many chiefs ruled the state, from the time of Babrubahon, son of Arjuna of the great epict *Mahabharata* down to the period of Pakhangba. In *Mahabharata*, the area of the North East India, the mighty Himalaya Hill ranges, West Bengal, Orissa etc, were mentioned. The period to a reasonable degree, might be considered, somewhere between 500 BC to 400 AD. According to the Royal chronicles of Burma known as 'Maharaja Vamsa', Dhajaraja, a king of Shakya race, settled at Manipur, about 550 BC and later on conquered, old or upper Pagan. Upper Burma lay in inaccessible condition and it is more nearer to China. The Chinese used the trade route through Burma and Manipur for their caravans to Afghanistan, where the Chinese silks were exchanged with the gold of western countries. The trade route was used quite extensively as early as 300-200 BC. Various folk tales recorded the arrival of Arjuna to Manipur or somewhere to the border of Manipur, for his ventures to Assam to subdue its king Vaghyadatta. The existence of one clan known as 'Khaba' also recorded in mythological history of Manipur. They used to rule the state from its capital 'The Kangla' at Imphal. A reasonable period, considering the various existing mythological, interesting stories, might be reckoned as in between 150-100 BC to 20-25 AD. Then came Pakhangba, the snake-king God of Manipur, who took the form of human being at night and God (Snake) during daytime. He ruled Manipur from 33 AD to 153 AD, for a period of 120 years.

Nongda Lairen Pakhangba was considered as a semi-God king by the Manipuris – particularly by the Meiteis's. He also established his capital at 'The Kangla' (the Fort of Manipur). It is a common belief that all the kings of Manipur were descendants of Pakhangba and the 'Ningthouja clan' (Royal family/clan) was descendant of Pakhangba. The Royal clan used to wield much political and military power from the Capital, the Kangla, a permanent royal seat for most of the future kings of Manipur.

The various chronicles of Manipur and other allied documents mentioned a long list of kings who ruled the state after Pakhangba till 20th Century. One ruler known as king Nouthingkhong was on the throne of the state from 663 AD to 763 AD for a period of 100 years. He contacted the ruling clan of Pong in the Shan Kingdom (Burma). By a Shan account of the Shan kingdom in Burmese history, it was presumed that the king of Pong, Sufanfa, sent his brother Samlong for expedition towards the direction of Manipur, Cachar, Tipperah (Tripura or Chittagong Hill Tract Area) and Assam. Samlong, while returning from his expedition, probably sometimes in 777 AD, descended to the valley of Manipur on his way home to Burma. He first went to Moirang, one of the most advanced, well organized and properly settled village and then proceeded to Imphal, the land where the Meitei established their capital. He found the Meitei and the Moirang kingdom very poor and excused them from paying tributes to the king of Pong. He instructed the Meitei that they should dressed more decently than they did, eat pawn instead of masticating bits of dried fish, which continued even today. During that period the Shan kingdom was of considerable importance in the Burmese history. After king Nouthingkhong, the history of Manipur runs a long list of rulers upto 1467 AD, where king Kiamba came to the scene. In between, mention had been made of king Yanglou Keifaba (969-984 AD). During his time the embroidery on the famous Manipuri 'Fanek' (A piece of cloth worn by women with a thousand stitches on its border) took the stitching style on its border. Another was king Loitongba (1122-1150 AD) where the famous Manipuri game of 'Kang' started. By 1467, king Kiamba came to the throne after the death of king Nouthingkhong. During his time, the Meitei supremacy started and spread over surrounding areas including the Shan kingdom of Pong. He was hardly 28 years old when he came to the throne of Manipur. The Burmese history, mythological stories also reckoned and agreed the existence of a powerful Meitei clan during early 1470, which coincided with the chronicles in Manipur". King Kiamba after annexing the Kabaw Valley tried to settle the boundary of Manipur with king Choufakhekhomba of Pong. The king of Pong presented one silver mounted *dao* and a '*dooli*' (litter) and a golden *paundan*. All the future king of Manipur used to keep all these precious stuff, alongwith one spear as a sign of royal insignia till the time of King Marjeet (1813-1819). It was also probable that King Kiamba, strengthened the state boundaries by establishing a chain of defensive posts to thwart any attack by the Shan Kingdom. Within a short period, the Imphal Valley and its surrounding areas attracted a large number of invasions by stronger group and races from east and northeast, due to its material prosperity. Not only Manipur, most of the North East India were affected by such invasions. Most of the Burmese historians feel that, the first invasion of the North East India by the Ahom (Burmese Shan) Kings could be sometimes in 15th century, as a most probable period. They came into contact with the Cacharis (people of Cachar), which they subdued. It was logical that any king or ruler after Kiamba must had affected by the turmoil situation during the period. Mention had been made of various rulers and kings after Kiamba by various historians and chronicles and mythological books till the time of King Khagemba.

KHAGEMBA

King Khagemba came to the throne of Manipur in 1597 on the death of King Mungyamba. He was 28 years old when he ascended the throne. During this period, in neighbouring Burma, most of the areas of Pong Kingdom were absorbed to Ava Kingdom, another powerful clan who ruled the land for century. It was believed that the rules of modern polo were made during the time of Khagemba, though the origin of the same was claimed by the Manipuris since the time of Pakhangba". It was most probable that the royal gate at the palace was constructed during that time. He ruled Manipur right up to 1652 AD, a long innings of 55 years. During his period, the Chinese army invaded Manipur, sometimes in 1625-30 AD. The ruler of China was not happy and could not pull on well with his general Moyodana and really wanted to destroy him. He sent Moyodana to invade Manipur with a limited force. In the meantime, he sent a special communication to the king of Manipur regarding the invasion and his intension to destroy Moyodana. When Moyodana and his forces reached Manipur, he was easily defeated and killed by the king of Manipur. The Chinese prisoners were settled at a place called Khagempali. In Manipur, Khagi means China and 'Ngamba' means victory. Colonel Johnstone put the most probable year as 1250 AD, when the Chinese prisoners were settled at a place called Kameng, 31 miles away from Imphal, by the side of Imphal-Dimapur road. The Chinese prisoners introduced for the first time silk weaving and brick making/laying in the state. It was during this period that the Mughal expedition against Assam took place to subdue its King Chakradhraj. The expedition ended to an abortive. It is inferenced that the king of Assam sought help from its neighbouring countries including Manipur to defeat the strong Mughal forces. On the death of Khagemba, his son, King Khunjaoba, came to the throne (1652-1666 AD). King Paikhomba ruled Manipur for 32 years after Khunjaoba, from 1666 AD.

GARIBNAWAZ

The history of the Manipur took an interesting turn with the appearance of King Pamheiba alias Garibnawaz, who appeared to be a Naga boy and considered to be adopted by Charairongba who ruled the state from 1697 to 1709. It was recorded that, Pamheiba shot dead his father, Charairongba, in a hunting incident. A beautiful folklore is still maintained by the Manipuris about the intense 'love-lost relation between the father and the son and the unfortunate hunting incident. He invaded his neighbouring countries and resisted their repeated attack, which was aimed to subjugate Manipur. The identification of Garibnawaz from the Naga parentage was not unanimous. According to a very popular anecdote, he was really the son of Maharaja Charairongba born by one of the queens named Nungshel Chaibi. An important custom prevailed during the time was that in the royal family of Manipur, no other queen was allowed to born a male child except the chief queen. Nungshel Chaibi was not the chief queen and wanted to save the life of her child. When the child was born, she sent him secretly to the house of a Naga Chief in Laisangkhong, a beautiful village situated to the south of Imphal Valley. The king was informed that the queen had given birth to a stone. When Pamheiba was four years old, the chief queen came to know of his existence and secretly sent assassins to murder him. The boy's maternal uncle escaped with the boy to another Naga village known as the Thangal Village. One day Charairongba visited the village and noticed a beautiful boy amongst the company of other boys. He expressed his desire to adopt him and the villagers agreed willingly. When he was grown up, the king proposed to one of his councilor to give his daughter in marriage

with Pamheiba. The Councillor did not digest the proposal, as Pamheiba's parentage history was not clear. One day Pamheiba's mother disclosed the secret to the king and the Councillor, and Pamheiba got married with great pomp and show. When he came to the throne, Pamheiba took the title, Garibnawaz. During that period, King Rudra Singh of Assam, embraced Hinduism which was followed by the followers of Chaityana (1486-1553) and he became an orthodox Hindu. His successor, King Sib Singh (1714-44) also embraced Hinduism, and spread the same throughout his state under the Hindu preacher Shanti Dass Gosai. From Assam, it was spread to Manipur through the same Brahmin family who went to Nabadwip (West Bengal), the sacred place of Hindu religion. With the help of those converted family, the religion overpowered King Pamheiba, who was not having an organized, properly laid down religious system, except the old religious system. Though systematic, Hinduism could not penetrate into the wild hill tribes inhabiting the hill areas of Manipur. The Kangla, the royal palace was strengthened with new defensive posture. Various additions in the structure of the capital were made. The walls of the fort, the exit and entry into the forts and the location of various weapon pits were strengthened. All these actions were taken by the king considering Manipur's strain relations with its neighbouring countries, particularly Burma. He carried out an expedition to Burma in 1749, which ended to an abortive.

BHAGYACHANDRA

Chingthankhomba, alias Jai Singh ruled Manipur independently from 1764 to 1798. The period of King Chingthankhomba related with a series of fights with the Burmese king. In 1764-65, he sent a strong force against the Burmese king up to Tamu. The forces were defeated by the strong Burmese army. He took another force and tried to revenge and punish the king of Burma but it also ended in an abortive. In the bargain, the Burmese King attacked Manipur, and Jai Singh fled to the neighbouring country Cachar which was known as Tekhao. By 1777-78 Chingthankhomba (Jai Singh) collected a strong force and returned to Manipur. One interesting phenomenon of the Burmese invaders were that, they did not occupy, in most of the cases, the areas where they captured. The same phenomena occurred during their invasion of Manipur leading to the dethronement of King Chingthankhomba (Jai Singh). King Chingthankhomba's (Jai Singh) loyalists who took shelter in the neighbouring state of Moirang, on hearing of his arrival, came to join him. The ruler of Moirang, who proceeded to Burma, when Chingthankhomba was in trouble, was killed when he came back from Burma. It was believed that the use of firearms was introduced during his time, though no recorded contact was established with the British East India Company or any French or Portuguese element. The king also introduced a modern system of coinage. The oblong coin, which was reasonably believed to be introduced during the period of King Paikhomba, the successor of King Khagemba (1597-1652), was divided into parts for smaller decimal. The currency system was introduced with the general name 'Sel'. He despatched expert personnel to Burma to learn the technique of minting coins. The writing of an important book in Bengali '*Bijay Panchali*' by Shri Kritichandra and Shri Sitaram (Tulsi Narain) was completed during his period. The book gave a literal account of the period of King Garibnawaz (1714-44), and the various improvements made particularly in the Royal Capital—the Kangla. The reign of King Bhagyachandra (1764-1798) is considered as one of the brightest and successful period of the Manipur history. He maintained a strong defence forces, though suffered heavily in the hands of stronger Burmese forces. He helped his neighbouring countries like Assam

whenever and whatever the situation called for. King Gourinath Singh of Assam had a perennial problem with the Maomariah tribes, who inhabited the Lakhimpur district in upper Assam. The Maomariah revolted against the king of Assam in 1770 AD and 1774 AD. In 1774 revolt, the king lost his throne. In 1778, he made a desperate effort to restore his lost throne but with little success. He then requested the king of Manipur for help in men and materials. Bhagyachandra sent a strong force of 1500 men out of his 4500 standing forces to help King Gourinath Singh. The troops were sent after the visit of the general of King Gaurinath Singh to Manipur in 1778 and most probably, after working out all details. Assam remained in turmoil atmosphere till 1792. In 1772, the first Sanjenthong Bridge was constructed linking the present Imphal East and Imphal West. In 1784, the hill tribes in Ukhrul and surrounding areas of Burma revolted against the supremacy of the king of Manipur. The revolt was subdued immediately. Then came the great epidemic in the state in 1785-86 AD, which affected the whole population. A large number of people died and it continued for 2 years.

SEVEN YEARS DEVASTATION

On the death of King Bhagyachandra, his son Robinchandra alias Labeinachandra came to the throne of Manipur. The period from 1798 to 1823, where the sons of Bhatgyachandra succeeded one after another, were full of internal conflicts of the most savage and revolting type, where brothers murdered brothers and others. The act of succession and murder carried on without a single trail of heroism, reflected the dark scene of bloodshed and treachery. King Labeinachandra ruled the state for 3 years (1798-1801) and he was succeeded by his brother Modhuchandra, for a period of 3 years (1801-1803). Modhuchandra was succeeded by his brother Chourjeet Singh. He managed to rule for a period of 10 years (1803-1813). It was during his time that the Meitei tried to make double barrel local gun, which was already initiated by King Modhuchandra. In 1806-1807, his brother Marjeet Singh tried to overthrow him but could not do so and fled to Burma. By 1813, Marjeet requested the king of Burma to give him help to throw out his brother. The Burmese king, in the initial stage, advised him to make compromise with his brother, for lasting peace. But Marjeet Singh did not agree, as he was preparing for the invasion of Manipur. Marjeet came with a strong Burmese army and throw out his brother from the throne. King Chourjeet fled to Cachar. Marjeet became the king of Manipur with the blessings of the Burmese king. By a previous understanding, King Marjeet was supposed to give tributes to the king of Burma, as a sign of supremacy of Burmese king. Marjeet did not bother to pay tributes to the Burmese king as per understanding made before.

The Burmese sent their forces and king Marjeet had to leave the country. The Burmese forces looted all available houses, materials, killed a large number of men, women and children. Various precious items were taken to Burma. They installed one person named Hirachandra Singh as the king of Manipur for one year. The period (1816-1823 AD) was known as Seven Years Devastation (*Chahi Taret Khuntakpa*), in the history of Manipur. That was the darkest spot in the history of Manipur, full of intrigue, misery, hunger and famine, all around. Hirachandra was replaced by King Yumjaoba (1820) for 1 year. Then came Gambhir Singh for six months, to consolidate his position. But he had to flee to Cachar, replacing by Jai Singh (1822), in turn by Jadu Singh, who claimed the blessing of the Burmese king. Jadu Singh was replaced by Raghava (1823-24) and then by Bhadra Singh

(1824), till the arrival of Gambhir Singh again with the British forces. The complete political, economic and cultural structure were destroyed. The Burmese refused to vacate Manipur. Not only Manipur, the same faith also rolled down to the peoples of Assam. King Chandrakant Singh, who ruled the state, was forced to ask for help from the British.

TREATY OF YANDABO, 1826

One interesting turn of the history of Manipur was its first contact with the British authorities. In 1821, King Chandrakant of Assam sought British help for Assam. During that period, all the three brothers, ex-kings of Manipur, Gambhir Singh, Chourjeet and Marjeet took shelter in Cachar kingdom, ruled by Gobind Chandra. One day all the three brothers met, forgetting their past history, worked out a solution, to throw out the Burmese forces from Manipur. They collected all those Manipuris, who fled away from Manipur, formed a Manipuri forces, and started separate training for the impending invasion. They sought help from the British authority. Surprisingly, King Gobind Chandra himself had problem in his own country and could not give much help to the Manipuris. In the meantime, the Meitei brothers conspired and usurped a large area of Cachar kingdom and put Gobind Chandra on a very embarrassing and precarious defensive position. The situation was marred by the coming Anglo-Burmese war cloud. The British assembled a large force at Goalpara and entered the plain of Assam. By 1823, Gambhir Singh opened communication with the British Government. A troop consisting of 500 Manipuris were raised under him, which was known as the 'Manipur Levy'. These troops were taken into the pay of the British Government and co-operated in preparation of driving out the Burmese from Assam and Manipur. A direct invasion of Burma was on the card of the British plan, by a strong force, from the Bengal and the Madras army, under Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell. It was decided to attack Burma at two vital points: one at Rangoon and the other at the Arakan Front, consisting Arakan and Assam which could be termed as one (similar operations were carried out by Field Marshal Sir William Slim during World War II). The war took almost two years. During the war period, the strength of the Manipur Levy were increased to 2000 personnel and put under the command of Captain Grant. It was paid with full accountrees, and all ammunitions were supplied by the British. After two difficult years, the Burmese sued for peace and agreed to the proposal of treaty enunciated by the British. Assam was handed over to the British and Manipur to Maharaja Gambhir Singh. On 24th February 1826, a treaty was signed between the British authority and the Burmese at a place called Yandabo, 45 miles away from Ava. At the end of the treaty, the British strengthened its policy on the frontier of North East India. A gist of the treaty was as under:-

- (a) The British Government offered back all areas of Assam to King Purinder Singh of Assam except the districts of Nowgong, Darrang, Kamrup and Goalpara.
- (b) With regards to Manipur, it was stipulated that, should Gambhir Singh desire to return to that country, he should be recognised by the king of Ava as Raja of Manipur thereof.
- (c) The Kabaw Valley, a fertile teak-wooded area, which belongs to Manipur, and forcibly occupied by the Burmese king before 1824, to be given back to Burma as a good gesture of the British Empire.
- (d) The Burmese king to renounce their claims on Assam and the surrounding hill areas, which affected the policy of the frontier defence of the British Empire.

- (e) Maharaja Gambhir Singh, who helped the British authorities, during the Anglo-Burmese war, to be recognized as the Rajah (King) of Manipur, without any corresponding obligation so far as the British Empire was concerned.

THE KABAW VALLEY AFFAIRS

The Kabaw Valley comprised of an area of approximately 1500 square miles (941,000 hectares) between Manipur and Burma lying between latitude 22.45°N and longitude 94.05°E and 94.37°E. To the east lies the present township of Thangthut, Phaungbyin, Mawlaik, Mingin and Kalewa; to the west Chin state and India and to the north and northwest Manipur. The northern and western portions are higher than the southern and eastern portion. The valley is watered and criss-crossed by small rivers and streams. The entire valley area is covered with thick forests of teak and other valuable trees and infested with malaria.

The ownership right of Burma and Manipur to the Kabaw valley became a disputed subjected after signing the Treaty of Yandabo in February 1826. The Commissioner of Sylhet remarked in 1826 that River Ningthee was no doubt the natural and original boundary between Manipur and Burma. Before the Yandabo Treaty, the Burmese king drove the Manipuri king to Cachar and conquered Manipur. While signing the Treaty, the British officials kept silence of the rightful ownership of the valley. On 15th June 1827, the British authorities gave instruction to Major General Sir. A. Campbell that the Northern and Middle portion of Kabow valley should be given to the ownership of Maharaja Gambhir Singh. However, the Burmese officials fabricated a map showing the Burmese frontier right up to the capital of Manipur. The British official detailed Mr. Crawford as British envoy to negotiate the boundary between Manipur and Burma, with the Burmese Ministers and officials. Captain Grant and Lieutenant (later on Captain) Pemberton were also appointed as Commissioners to negotiate the boundary issue. In April 1828 they met the Burmese Ministers and officials on the bank of River Ningthee. The Burmese officials produced a map showing River Kyendwen (River Chindwin) to the west of River Ningthee. They put up their claim that both were different rivers and not the same as claimed by the Manipuris. Sir A. Campbell instructed the Commissioner in Manipur to find out if any river known as Kyendwen existed, west of river Nigthee. The British Commissioner was told to put up his opinion. Lieutenant Pemberton who had a long experience in the area clearly understood the deceptive method of the Burmese officials. He went to Kabaw valley, reconnoitered the whole area. He informed the British authorities that the Burmese Government misunderstood a small river to the west as river Ningthee. Both Captain Grant and Lieutenant Pemberton reported that river Ningthee and river Kyendwen (Chindwin River) was the same and it should be the boundary between Manipur and Burma as both countries could not invade each other without crossing the river. That could also check the culpability of the aggressor. The Burmese officials refused to accept the British version of demarcation of boundary and even refused to discuss the matter.

In January 1829 the Burmese Government expressed the inability of their officials to meet the British officials to discuss the boundary issue between Manipur and Burma. Captain Grant and Lieutenant Pemberton were instructed to proceed to the bank of River Ningthee and fix the boundary line. Sir A. Campbell instructed the British Commissioner to fix River Ningthee as the Boundary on the west. A Map and a minute sheet was prepared and the same were transmitted to the court in Ava, the

Capital of Burma. Maharaja Gambhir Singh was told to establish his Police Post (Thana) along River Ningthee as per instruction of the British Commissioners.

On 10th July 1829, the British Government informed the Burmese officials the decision taken by the representative of the British Government on the boundary issue of the Kabaw Valley. On 17th November 1829, the Burmese Government suddenly expressed their willingness to meet the British officials in January 1830. They accepted the fact that the British authorities captured the Kabaw Valley from the Burmese king during the Anglo-Burmese War of 1824-26, which the Burmese conquered from Manipur during 1820 invasion. But the Treaty of Yandabo did not clarify the ownership and retention of the valley either by the Manipuris or by the British authorities. It was silent if the Burmese king would have the right of ownership. The British officials were in a dilemma. They considered the fact that Maharaja Gambhir Singh, who was in exile in Silchar had got his throne, except the Kabaw Valley. The Burmese accepted the Treaty of Yandabo, thereby removing a great headache from the British authorities. They did not want to spoil such a good gesture for accepting the Treaty of Yandabo, the British Government decided to give the right of ownership of the Kabaw Valley to the Burmese Government, as a dependent to the Burmese crown. In January 1830, Major Henry Burney was appointed British resident at Ava, capital of Burma. He was told to settle the boundary issue as early as possible. The Burmese officials should be informed of the inaccuracy of their map and the British intention to settle the same amicably.

Though the British authority decided to hand over the Kabaw Valley to the Burmese officials, they took into account the finer logical argument put up by the Manipur officials. They transmitted the points raised by the Manipur state to the Burmese Capital as under:

- (a) The Chief of Khampat, in the Kabaw Valley, was defeated by the king of Manipur as early as 1474 and the valley was annexed to the Manipur state.
- (b) Since ancient time, river Ningthee (Chindwin) was considered as the boundary between Manipur and Burma. River Ningthee or Kyenden was the same with different names given by the Manipuris and the Burmese.
- (c) In 1812, when King Marjeet captured the throne of Manipur with the help of Burma, the Kabaw valley was found to be a part of Manipur and not a part of Burma. The argument of the Kabaw Valley forming a part of Burma before the Treaty of Yandabo, could not be advanced logically and historically.
- (d) The British authorities proved that as late as 1809-10, the towns of Khambat, Koktong, Tummo (Tamu), Mungsa, Sumjok, comprising the Kabaw Valley were with the Thanas (Police post) of Manipur.
- (e) Captain Pemberton proved the inaccuracy of the Burmese map, which showed one river Kyendwen to the west of river Ningthee. The Burmese officials accepted the mistake as an 'oversight'.
- (f) The argument advanced by the Burmese officials that at no time Manipur exercised any authority on the Kabaw Valley was proved wrong by various facts and figures. The Burmese officials accepted the mistake when confronted by British officials.

The Burmese did not accept the grounds advanced by the British officials and the Manipuris. They adopted various political methods and advanced their own reasons for ceding the Kabaw Valley to the Burmese empire:

- (a) A map of Burma drawn up by the Burmese officials as an official record showed Kabaw Valley as a part of Burma.
- (b) Old Burmese chronicle mentioned the land North of Kale belongs to the Burmese king. It was believed that the area is part of Kabaw Valley.
- (c) The Kabaw Valley was alternately conquered by various kings of Burma and Manipur. In 1812, it was conquered by the Burmese during the time of King Marjeet Singh.

It was Major Henry Burney, the British Resident in Burma, who advanced his argument to the British authorities, to give the Burmese king the 'Abstract Right' over the Kabaw Valley. He pointed out that keeping in unhealthy and depopulated, malaria infested stretch of area, which divided Manipur by a series of ranges would not give any advantage to the king of Manipur. The communication problem from Manipur to Kabaw Valley was also in terrible state. The court of Ava, should not be disgusted by a rigid and inflexible British attitude. In case of hostility, the British Government had to spend in men, material and money which would be disadvantageous to its frontier policy. This was the reply given by Henry Burney when the British authorities queried why the Kabaw Valley should not be given to Maharaja Gambhir Singh of Manipur. The British authorities accepted an undeniable fact that the valley was occupied alternately by the Burmese and the Manipuri kings. The Treaty of Yandabo was signed hurriedly and nothing was decided about that Kabaw Valley. After a prolonged perusal, the British authorities, on 26th February 1833, gave its final decision. The Government signed the agreement paper, to be transmitted to Burma and Manipur, ceding the Kabaw Valley to Burma. Thus ended the affairs of the Kabaw Valley, leaving only the boundary issue to be decided and demarcated by the British authorities. The news of ceding the Kabaw Valley reached Maharaja Gambhir Singh and he could not stand the loss. He died on 09 January 1834.

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENT

The British Political Agent system was first introduced in Manipur in 1835. The British started this system for preservation of a friendly intercourse and as a medium of communication with the Manipur Government and as occasion may require, with the Burmese authorities on the frontier and more specially to prevent border feuds, which might lead to hostilities between the Manipuris and the Burmese. It was evident that the duty of the Political Agent in Manipur was like that of an Ambassador. The power and responsibilities were further increased by the declarations of the British Government of India in 1851 and in 1852. It has given more punches by strong personalities of incumbents like Captain Gordon, Colonel McCulloch and Colonel J. Johnstone (later on Sir James Johnstone). However, it was seen that the system did not run smoothly at all times. Colonel M. McCulloch retired in 1867. Since his retirement till the appointment of Colonel J. Johnstone in 1876, within this period of 9 years, the Political Agents who came to Manipur were mostly inefficient and failed to maintain friendly relationship with the Government of Manipur. From 1835 till 1874, the Political Agent was under the control of the Government of India. When the Assam Chief

Commissionership was formed in 1874, the Agent and the British officers of Manipur were placed directly under the control of the Chief Commissioner. However, the functions of the Political Agent were not static at all time. Captain Durand, who officiated as Political Agent after the death of Dr Brown had to say.

"The Political Agent is dependent on the will and pleasure of the Maharaja of everything. His very word and movement are known to the maharaja. He is in fact a British officer under Manipur surveillance. If the Maharaja is not pleased with the Political Agent, he cannot get anything, he is ostracized, from bad coarse black atta, which the Maharaja sells him as a favour, the dhobi who washes his clothes and the Nagas who work in his garden; he cannot purchase anything at any price. The Court is almost openly hostile, though they have pliancy enough to pretend to a great for the Political Agent and the Sirkar."

The British Government always had the problem to find suitable person for the post of Political Agent in Manipur. Nobody was willing to go to Manipur after the retirement of Colonel M. McCulloch. Manipur—the inaccessible country was called by one of the British Indian Secretary the Cinderella among political agencies.

THE ANGLO-MANIPURI WAR—1891

The history of Manipur will never be completed without having a look to the tragic political imbroglio during that period of 1891. After Maharaja Surchandra Singh left Manipur, the British Government of India refused to recognize Kulachandra Singh as the king of Manipur without accepting some conditions proposed by the government. In fact the action of Mr. Grimwood, the Political Agent in Manipur during the turmoil period was severely criticized by the Government of India. The Government of India, after having long deliberations, informed the Chief Commissioner of Assam Mr. J.S. Quinton that Kulachandra Singh might be recognized as the Maharaja of Manipur if he accepted the following conditions:-

- (a) He should allow the Political Agent to keep 300 soldiers in the residency.
- (b) He should administer the country according to the advice of the Political Agent.
- (c) He should agree to the externment of Tikendrajit Singh from Manipur and help the British Government in this respect.

The Government of India also instructed Mr. Quinton, the Chief Commissioner of Assam to enquire into the circumstances under which Surchandra Singh was expelled from Manipur without any reason. The British authorities also informed him to take suitable action against those princes who were found guilty. By February 1891, there was great curiosity in Manipur. Kulachandra Singh was on the throne of Manipur though not recognized by the British Government. By end of February 1891, Mr. J.S. Quinton planned for a visit to Manipur. The purpose of the visit was kept as secret. Nothing was disclosed event to Mr. Grimwood. On Sunday, February 21, 1891, Mr. Grimwood received a telegram from the Chief Commissioner of Assam, the gist of which was as follows:-

"I propose to visit Manipur shortly. Have roads and rest houses put in order. Further directions and dates to follow."

On 7th March 1891, Mr. J.S. Quinton left Golaghat for Manipur along with 400 Gurkha soldiers under the command of Colonel Skene. After his arrival, Mr. Quinton instructed Mr. Grimwood, the Political Agent, to convene a 'Durbar' (Meeting) to be attended by all the princes of all the royal family of Manipur. It was fixed on 22nd March 1891. The plan of the Chief Commissioner of Assam was to arrest Bir Tikendrajit Singh, designated as Jubraj (the heir apparent), who was seriously blamed by Surchandra Singh for his ouster from the throne of Manipur. The British authority took him as the man behind all the trouble in Manipur. Tikendrajit Singh was born in 1859. He was about 5 feet eight inches in height, lighter skin, pleasing countenance and smile with lot of interest for Polo. He learnt to speak Bengali and Hindi fluently. The Durbar, which was called immediately on arrival of Mr. J.S. Quinton was postponed till 23 March, 1891. Mr. Quinton failed to arrest Bir Tikendrajit Singh by proxy method. He then decided to apply force to arrest Bir Tikendrajit Singh by storming the Kangla. The Royal Capital was besieged and the house of the Jubraj was searched thoroughly. But the Jubraj was not there.

The war did not come to a close after the British troops captured the house of the Jubraj. On the contrary it increased the tempo of the fight. At about 4.30 P.M. the British troops which occupied the Jubraj residence came back to the residency of the Political Agent to strengthen it. There was no way to inform the Government of India as all the telegraph lines were cut off. Mr. Grimwood decided to stop the war and accordingly the bugler gave the cease-fire call. The Manipuris at once stopped fighting at the instance of Bir Tikendrajit Singh. The British officers, under the leadership of Mr. J.S. Quinton came to the palace, led to the courtyard inside the Kangla Fort for a conference. Large number of people including soldiers were anxiously waiting outside to know the result of the conference. Discussions went on for half an hour, where Bir Tikendrajit Singh demanding the British officers to surrender all firearms of the British troops. While coming out from the inconclusive conference, the British officials were attacked by the crowd. The Britishers finally requested the Manipuri prince Angousana to accompany them up to the residency to avoid the menace of the angry crowd. Again, when they came out from the royal gate, Mr. Grimwood received a mortal blow. Lieutenant Simpson, who immediately attacked the murderer, was slashed across the head with a sharp dao. On hearing the commotion outside, Bir Tikendrajit Singh came out and personally took the remaining British officials inside the Durbar Hall for safety and protection from the furious and impatient crowd. The old minister, Thangal General was asked to punish the British officials. He was an obstinate old man nearing eighty than seventy, taller than the average Manipuri and marvelously active for his age. He was credited with more bloodshed than any man in the Kingdom. Bir Tikendrajit Singh discussed with the old Minister Thangal General regarding the mode of disposal of the British officials who were held up by the crowds. There were long arguments between the two about this matter. Bir Tikendrajit Singh who was ailing and tired after a whole day's fighting went to sleep in the control room. Thangal General took this opportunity. He gave the controversial order to hand over the British officials to the executioner. Accordingly, the British officials were chained and given to the executioner. Their heads were severed from their bodies and put into a ditch. The people who witnessed the same were much delighted finding everything went according to the long current prediction.

MRS. ST. CLAIR GRIMWOOD'S FLIGHT

The story of the Anglo-Manipuri War will not be completed without mentioning the historic marches of Mrs. St. Clair Grimwood, wife of Mr. Frank St. Clair Grimwood, who stayed for a period of three years in Manipur with her husband. She was a young charming, beautiful and intelligent lady. She had a good rapport with most of the princes in Manipuri during her time. She used to entertain most of the British officers whenever they visited Manipur.

On 24th May 1891 in the evening, Mrs. Grimwood became anxious when her husband along with the Chief Commissioner Mr. J.S. Quinton and other British officials did not turn up for a long time. She was inside the residency with Captain Boileau, Captain Butcher, Captain Wood with some Gorkha troops. At about 12 O'Clock at night on that day, it was announced from the palace that the British officials would not come back to the residency and suddenly the announcement was accompanied by the boom of the big guns. She knew from that time onward that it was not going to be peace. Everybody inside the residency thought that Mr. Quinton and his party have been arrested. All chances of defending the British residency and the Union Jack were gone. At 2 A.M. on 25th March, Mrs Grimwood along with Captain Boileau, Captain Butcher, Captain Wood and 200 Gorkha soldiers left the residency and proceeded towards Cachar along the Imphal Cachar Road, on foot. The Manipuri sepoys did not pursue their move. However, they plundered the residency when there was no response after the heavy firing. The residency was set on fire. Mrs. Grimwood and her party traveled day and night, crossed several Nallah and rivers, climbed various hillocks, covered a large jungle area. Her party decided to walk across the fields, make their way over the hills, hoping to strike Cachar road. During this period, Captain Cowley with 200 Gorkha sepoys was on his way from Cachar to Imphal. They commenced their journey some days before the outbreak of War and were supposed to arrive at Leimatak Hill (6700 feet above MSL) on 25th March. Hoping to meet the party, Mrs. Grimwood's party walked non-stop. The two parties met on 26th March at the Leimatol Hill (Leimatak Hill) area about 30 miles from Imphal. Her party then proceeded towards Cachar and by 31st March crossed the Jiri River and entered into Cachar, the British territory. She stayed at Cachar for about one week without knowing the terrible fortune of those British officials who went to the palace of Manipur on 24 Mar 1891 and lost their lives. However, the news of the death of those British officials including her husband Frank St. Clair Grimwood was broken within no time. After staying for some time at Cachar, Mrs. Grimwood arrived in England in Jun 1891. She was given a warm and tremendous welcome by the people of England. Immediately she was honoured with the medal of Red Cross by the British Government.

BRITISH OFFENSIVE

When the situation in Manipur became clear to everybody, the British officials decided to launch a full scale offensive against the ruler of Manipur. Three columns were formed and advanced into the state from three approaches—Kohima, Silchar and Tammu (Burma). Nearly 8,000 soldiers were employed in this operation. General Collet of the British Army was given the overall command of the operation. The column from Kohima was led by him. He began his advance on 20th April 1891 accompanied by Mr. Mekeb, the newly appointed Political Agent of Manipur.

On 27th March 1891 in the morning, 35 men of 43 Gorkha Light-Infantry, who escaped from Langthabal Fort reached Tammu and reported about the disaster to the small garrison there. Lieutenant Grant (later on Major) advanced from Tammu to Imphal with 50 personnels of 12 Madras Infantry and 30 Jawans of the 42 Gorkha-Light Infantry. He met steep resistance at Thobal (Thoubal), 14 miles from Imphal. The troops of the Maharaja of Manipur were dressed mostly in white jackets with white turbans and dhotis, armed with tower muskets, Enfield and Snider Rifles and 200 of them in red Jackets, white turbans, armed with Martinis, a Rifle that could shoot over twice as far as snider. A detachment of 43 Gorkha Light-Infantry, who broke out from Langthabal garrison under Jamadar Birbal Thapa, joined Lieutenant Grant at Thoubal. Lieutenant Grant could not break through the Manipuri defences at Thoubal. He withdrew and waited for the arrival of the Burmese column. At Pallel, he was attacked by nearly 400 Manipuri soldiers. In the meantime, the Burmese column arrived from Burma and linked up with Lieutenant Grant's forces. The only opposition to the advance by the Burma column was at Pallel, where a band of 300 Manipuris led by Paona Brajabashi had encamped in a small tactical location at Khongjom. Paona Brajabashi and his followers fought a heroic defensive battle and dedicated their lives. General Collet before he entered Manipur informed the Regent Kulachandra Singh that if he submitted without further resistance he would be tried and his life might be spared, otherwise he would surely be executed. General Collet's forces entered Manipur without meeting any resistance from the Manipuri's forces. They found the place empty and the whole area presented a deserted appearance. On 27 April 1891, the Union Jack was hoisted over the Capital of Manipur. The Cachar column also converged to the Capital, after facing steep resistances at Bishenpur. Before the fall of the Capital, the Regent Kulachandra Singh, Tikendrajit Singh, Thangal and most of the prominent leaders went underground. The British official announced prices for the arrest of those key personnels (Kulachandra Singh: Rs. 5,000; Tikendrajit Singh: Rs. 5,000; Thangal General: Rs. 2,000; Subedar Niranjan Singh: Rs. 1,000). The dead body of Mr. J.S. Quinton, Mr Grimwood and others were recovered from the graves of the British Residency. Several days had elapsed since the arrival of the British forces in the Capital, yet the Manipuris showed no sign of returning to their houses. Accordingly, General Collet declared that no harm would be done to anybody who returned to their home voluntarily excepting those who had directly participated in the murder of British Officers, plundered and burned the British Residency and desecration of the British graves. On receiving such assurance most of them returned to their homes. After seven days, by another declaration they were asked to surrender their arms. In the meantime, Thangal General was arrested. Regent Kulachandra Singh, who was hiding at Chassad village was arrested with the information given by his followers. Bir Tikendrajit Singh, who was ill and hiding at the house of a Manipuri Magistrate Balram Singh was arrested. After Tikendra Singh's arrest, the British Government of India set up a special court to try those persons responsible for waging war against the British Crown. Charges were brought against Tikendrajit Singh, Thangal General, Regent Kulachandra Singh and Prince Angou Sana. Tikendrajit Singh for his defence prayed to the court to allow him to bring a qualified lawyer from Cachar. The court refused to give such permission and advice him to appoint anyone in Manipur suitable to perform the task of defence counsel. However, one Bengali, Janaki Nath Basak, who happened to be a businessman by profession, who had a little knowledge of English and Manipuri with no background and knowledge of criminal law was appointed as the defence counsel after two days the prosecution had started. The court found Kulachandra Singh, Tikendrajit

Singh, Prince Angou Sana and Thangal General guilty on various charges such as waging war against the Queen Empress of India, murdering European Officers, abetment of murder etc. Tikendrajit Singh, Thangal General and others were convicted and sentenced to death under the British Indian Penal Code while Kulachandra, Angou Sana and others were convicted and sentenced to transportation for life. The order was announced to the people of Manipur on the 13 August 1891. Gallows were erected on the Polo Ground at Imphal for execution of the hanging order on that day. In the Raja's period, a criminal sentenced to death was occasionally deprived if a sufficient number of women appeared to intercede for him, and hoping that possible the old might still prevail, the women had assembled in their thousands. As far as the eye could see, the place as white with women. Tikendrajit Singh and the old Thangal General closely guarded by the police and military were brought out of the prison. As the drop fell, the Senapati, Bir Tikendrajit Singh and the Thangal General were launched into eternity and a deep grown went up from the assembled throng. Kulachandra Singh, Prince Angou Sana and others were taken out of Manipur and lodged in Tezpur Central Jail in Calcutta and finally transported for life to Andaman and Nicobar Island.

The Anglo-Manipuri War of 1891, particularly the execution of Chief Commissioner of Assam Mr. J.S. Quinton and other British officers and subsequent events of the trial and hanging of Bir Tikendrajit and others still evoked an emotional sentiment among the peoples in Manipur. The British officials were tried too hastily and executed just after the cease-fire, which occurred at about 7 P.M on 24th March 1891. Justice hurried, justice buried, leading to violation of the principles of natural justice. Another political and emotional incident was the hanging of Bir Tikendrajit Singh and others and confiscation of the state of Manipur by the British Government. The charges brought against Bir Tikendrajit Singh and other lacked merits from the angles of principles of law of justice. The Government of Manipur under Regent Kuachandra Singh had not declared war against the queen Empress of India. Abetment to the murder of the British officials was not thoroughly investigated and proved legally beyond doubt. It was opined that the special court set up by the British Government of India had no jurisdiction to try Bir Tikendrajit Singh and others on the said charges without giving ample opportunity for doing so. Despite the above facts and legal implications, Tikendrajit Singh, Thangal General and others were tried under the British law, convicted and sentenced to death.

MANIPUR – A PRINCELY STATE (1891-1947)

After the Anglo-Manipuri War of 1891, the administration of Manipur was completely taken over by the British Government under the Governor-General of British India, as a 'Subordinate Native State'. On 18th September 1891, HM Durand, Secretary of the Government of India notified in the Gazette of India No. 1861-4, "that the Governor General in Council had selected Churachand, son of Choubiyaima a great grandson of Rajah Nara Singh of Manipur, to be the Rajah of Manipur. The kingship was given to a six year old boy—His Highness Sir Churachand Singh (KCSI, CBE) who was a relative of Maharaja Nara Singh. As he was minor, the British Political Agent arranged for his education outside the state. He studied for a few years at Mayo College, Ajmere. Maharaja Churachand came back to Manipur in 1901 and ruled the state with active support and advice of the Political Agent of British Government. However, his rule was subjected to the advice of 'Durbar' (Council of members) headed by the Political Agent, for all practical purposes. The British Political

Agent was better known as the 'President of the Durbar' and in fact he was the de-facto ruler. No significant incidence occurred during the Maharaja's time, till World War-I broke out.

MANIPUR MERGED TO INDIAN UNION


The Maharaja of Manipur, Bodhachandra Singh, son of Sir Churachand Singh ruled Manipur with the help of interim council from 1947 to 1949. By the end of 1948, Manipur introduced a constitutional Monarchy with a Legislative Assembly of 53 members including 18 representatives from the hills. During this period, Sardar Patel, Home Minister of India started contacting the various princely states for a final solution of princely states of India. In the initial stage, the idea of acceding these states to the Union Government only for defence, foreign policy/affairs and communication were on the agenda. But it contradicted the promises and slogans made by the Congress before Independence. Patel told the princely states to join the Indian Union *in toto*, thereby leaving no room for criticism and doubt on the democratic setup. It was agreed that some of the privileges of those kings/rulers would be kept in tact and they would be entitled for Privy Purses. For small states, the quantum of Privy Purse worked out at approximately one-tenth of the revenue of that particular state, and for bigger states like Jaipur, Jodhpur, it came to one-eighth of the revenue. Serious problem came up in princely state like Hyderabad where the Nizam of Hyderabad refused to give in easily till military forces applied for integration. The hard hand of Sardar Patel came to the princely states of North East India in the late stage of 1949. In September 1949, the Maharaja of Manipur was called at Shillong for a meeting with Sardar Patel and other officials. The Maharaja was told about the merger of his state with India considering the political wind prevailing in India. A draft 'Merger Agreement' copy was shown to him. He was told to sign the Merger Agreement. The Maharaja wanted to discuss the matter with his officials and ministers in the legislative council. Sardar Patel did not agree to the suggestion of the Maharaja and later on he explained to the Maharaja, the unnecessary complications which could occur due to his refusal. On 21st September 1949 the Maharaja of Manipur signed the Merger Agreement with the Governor of Assam, acting on behalf of the Government of India, thus ending the rule of monarchy in Manipur. Immediately, hardly within a month, on 15 October 1949, a Chief Commissioner was posted to Manipur for the administration of the state. The Council of Ministers and State Assembly were dissolved. On 26 January 1950, India became a republic. With the enforcement of the Constitution of India, Manipur was placed as a Part 'C' State.

Indian Parliament passed Union Territory Act, 1956 which gave a better opportunity than the Part 'C' state (Law) Act 1950. By this, Manipur became a Union Territory, authorized Territorial Council of 30 elected and 2 nominated members. The Chief Commissioner governed the state on behalf of the Union of India. The Territorial Council had a limited financial and legislative power. To satisfy the intense feeling of the people of Manipur, the Territorial Council was replaced by a Legislative Assembly of 30 elected and 3 nominated members, under the Union Territories Act of 1963. This enables Indian Parliament to create, (a) A body, whether elected or partly nominated and partly elected, to function as a legislature for the Union Territories, (b). A council of Minister, or both with such constitution, power and functions in case as may be specified in the law. Provisions were made for reservation of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. But all bills passed by legislature were subjected to reservation by the administrator i.e. the Chief Commissioner for the assent by the President of India. The Act empowered the administrator to recommend demands of

any grant, which he deemed, fit to do so. The legislative competence of the Territorial Assembly also extended to union list and concurrent list of the sixth schedule of the Constitution of India. The Union Government created separate contingency and consolidated fund and the administrator was given 'special responsibility' in respect of border defence. Any difference in the functioning between the legislative assembly and the administrator would be refer to the President of India. The President could suspend the Council of Ministers, on the advice of the administrator, thereby putting the Legislative Assembly and a shaky foundation in the affairs and functioning of the union territory. There was large scope for the Central Government intervention. The people in the state were not satisfied with the Territorial Council Act, 1963 and the demand for a statehood was launched. Considering the sentiment of the people, Manipur was granted statehood in 1972. The inauguration of statehood was presided over by Smt. Indira Ghandhi, the Prime Minister of India and Shri B.K. Nehru was sworn in as the Governor of Manipur on 21 January 1972.



Bir Tikendrajit Singh



Residence of British Political Agent (1880s), Manipur.



Bir Tikendrajit Singh

Senapati (Commander-in-Chief) Kingdom of Manipur. (under arrest)

- Born in : 1859
- Complexion : Dark lighter skin
- Height : 5 feet 8 inches.
- Charges : Waging war against the Queen Empress of India, murdering European officers and abetment of murders.
- Punishment : Sentenced to death under British Indian Penal Code.
- Hanged on : 13th August, 1891.
- Analysis :
 - Justice hurried.
 - Justice buried.
 - Violation of principles of natural justice.




Anglo Manipur War 1891


Bir Tikendrajit Singh, the man loved by the people of Manipur was laid to eternal abode by the power of a British kangaroo court within 2 days (11-12 August, 1891).



Bridge on Manipur River(1880s)



The Kangla:1880s. The citadel of Manipur
The view of the Royal Capital of Manipur (The Kangla) from the south. The structure (citadel) was destroyed during the Anglo-Manipuri war of 1891. Later on, the area was occupied by the British troops, then in 1930's by the Assam Rifles (Paramilitary forces) till 2004.



The Irang river on National Highway 53 (NH 53), Manipur
During early 1850's, a suspension bridge made of cane connected Imphal and Silchar for movement of British troops and personnel. During dry season, the lower river-bed was used for movement. In 2005 the modern bridge was destroyed by NSCN-IM.




The Kangla:1880s (Manipur)

In early 19th century, power flows from the Kangla-sah (two identical animals seen above) of Manipur in the state. Important public ceremonies and festivals used to be held in front of Kangla.



Women Power in Manipur, 1880's

Though unorganised, lacked legal stikes and full of adhocism, women power in Manipur is unimaginable. They were the vanguard for all socio-cultural revolution in Manipur. They are playing a crucial role in conflict situation in Manipur.



Suspension Bridge on Leimatak River (1880s), Manipur.

3

GENESIS OF MANIPUR INSURGENCY

*"Insurgency is the pursuit of the polity of a party inside
a country by every means."*

—Clausewitz

History showed that, insurgency, an intriguing blend of old and new warfare, enjoyed more frequent use during the last three decades than at any other time. Insurgency has been defined in various ways, meaning and context by many writers. Defining the meaning, is itself a controversial and mind-numbing endeavour. Disagreement and confusion will always be apparent during discussion where the terms guerilla, partisan, Insurgent, patriot, Martyrs, Terrorist and Mercenary are used. In the opinion of some scholars Guerilla, partisan and insurgent are inter-related and interchangeable. However, a common agreement among the analysts is that insurgency is not a recent phenomenon but an old system of warfare.

INSURGENCY

David Galula, the French military writer described insurgency as 'A protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objective, leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order'. It is a difficult and complex phenomena to understand insurgency completely as it involved various political, sociological, psychological, economic and military factors and a number of complex interactions among the participants. In 1970-71, in USA, a research team worked on a project of insurgency and described the same as "Efforts to obtain political goals by an organized and primarily indigenous group (or groups) using protracted, irregular warfare and allied political technique (Andrew. M. Scott, *Insurgency*, 1971). The definition excluded sudden coups, short-lived outbreaks of violence, invasion by other foreign forces. But, it will be seen that there is enough room for considerable variation in the elements that comprised the definition. No line can be drawn for determining when a conflict is protracted or not. There is a common belief that insurgency warfare is a civil war. But it is not so. A civil war may suddenly erupt and splits a country into various factions, resembling an international war. On the other hand, insurgency movement, is considered as an armed uprising, the fundamental concept being the use of native resources to overthrow the

legitimate government of a country. In short, it is an irregular warfare waged by the depressed and deprived people in a country against the existing government. It has got not only the military meaning and activity but also the political one.

REVOLUTION

Any attempt to take the power of a government by force or illegal methods may be generally termed as Revolutionary War. A revolutionary war is primarily an internal conflict though external elements and assistances may be involved. It may also contain the element of a plot, a clandestine action of underground group or organization to throw out the existing government and top leaders of the country. A revolutionary is a person who is involved in bringing and causing a great changes, sometimes accompanied by violent means. Other elements who are closely related to revolutionary war are Martyr, patriot, Nationalist etc. A Martyr can be defined as a 'person who is put to death or caused to suffer for his religious beliefs or for the sake of a great cause or principle'. A Patriot in the best form can be defined as a 'person who loves and is ready to defend his country'. Revolutionary, martyr, patriot, nationalist etc. are always interchangeable and inter-related. However, one man's revolutionary is another man's terrorist.

GUERRILLA

"Guerilla" is a Spanish word which means "Little war". In ancient time, the Spanish used to fight in small groups in an unorthodox pattern amongst themselves. Thus, a generic word known as 'Guerilla war' came up. 'Guerilla warfare is a type of warfare characterized by irregular forces fighting small-scale, limited actions, generally in conjunction with a larger politico-military strategy, against orthodox military forces. Guerillas are usually nondescript in dress, unconventional in weapons and equipment, lack formal supply lines and employ highly unorthodox tactics. In addition to extremely mobile, aggressive operations, their tactics embrace all aspects of psychological warfare, including the use of sabotage and terrorism (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1968). A study of different historical periods in the world shows that, whenever insurgency movement arises, there would be violence. The mode of violence adopted is by way of Guerilla warfare.

In 360 BC, one of the known Guerilla war was fought in China by Emperor Huang against his enemy Tsi-Yao, who created problem in his empire. But Tsi-Yao was too clever and too powerful and could not be defeated by conventional military method. Huang started organizing an entirely different force, an irregular force with unorthodox organization, strategy, tactics and pattern. They were trained not in a conventional pattern and methods but in a different mode of warfare known as Guerilla war. Emperor Huang finally defeated Tsi-Yao. In the sixth century B.C. the Chinese tactician and military historian Sun-Tzu analysed and applied the concept and theory of Guerilla warfare in many battles. He analysed perceptively and in depth the theory of war and wrote the oldest military treatise in the world known as "*The Art of War*". His writing of the book brought him to the notice of Emperor Ho Lu, the ruler of Wu empire, in middle eastern China (located to the west of present city of Shanghai, with present city Wuchang as its capital). Finally Sun-Tzu was made General in the Army of Ho Lu forces. At later stages, Guerilla tactics propounded by Sun-Tzu was effectively used by the Roman forces against Hannibal and vice versa. At one stage, Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum and it appeared that Fabius had trapped

him by irregular tactics. When night came in, Hannibal fastened faggots to the horns of some 2,000 oxen, set them on fire and drove the terrified animals towards the mountain passes held by the Roman Army. The Romans were so terrified that they withdrew from the mountain passes and Hannibal's Army crossed safely through the mountain defile.

REVOLUTIONARY AND GUERILLA MOVEMENT

In 1882, Napoleon Bonaparte's Army had a difficult time while invading and fighting on the soil of Russia. After crossing the Neimen river, he had to fight a different type of forces known as the Russian partisan Movement group, who organized themselves as Guerilla band, harassed and dislocated his Army. In early 1894, in China, one peasant leader, Dr Sun Yat Sen, fought the Chinese Government by means of peasant revolution which led to the formation of the China Revival Society. In 1911, it changed its name to Kuo-Min-Tang which means the 'People's National Party', and became the focal point for Chinese revolution. They fought the old Chinese Dowager with a new concept of warfare known as Revolutionary war. In 1912, Revolutionary movement in China, under Dr Sun Yat Sen brought down the Manchu dynasty. Another chapter which showed the brilliant action of revolutionary warfare was that of Colonel T.E. Lawrence, popularly known as the Lawrence of Arabia. The revolt of 1916-18 was a classic example of successful guerilla warfare in the history of Arab world, leading to the independence of Arab land from the Turkish Army.

In early 1920, a young Chinese lad, named Mao-Tse-Tung came into the limelight in the history of revolutionary and insurgent warfare. In 1930-40 the peasant population in China suffered due to the autocratic rule of Chiang-Kai-Sek, the Commander-in-Chief and President of China. Mao organized an untiring and loyal followers and persuaded the Chinese peasants to defeat the corrupt and inept regime of Chiang-Kai-Sek. Mao's guerilla band, popularly known as the Red Army, a name probably copied from the organization created by Lenin and Trosky during the Bolshevik Revolution in 1918-19, won the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. It was Mao-Tse-Tung who said that 'Power flows from the barrel of a gun', which was applied widely during revolutionary movement in communist China, many Third World countries, underdeveloped African and Latin American Nations. Later on, Mao's theory of revolution was studied and applied by many insurgent, revolutionary, Guerilla and partisan movement groups in South East Asia, Burma, Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam and North East India.

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

In Asia, insurgency and guerilla movements sprang up in a wide scale in 1940's. During World War II, the Allied forces used guerilla warfare against the Japanese Imperial forces in Far East Asia which included Burma, Philippines, Malaya, Indo-China and Indonesia. The Chindits, a military specialized forces which was organized and trained in Central India, by the British Army, was used as a guerilla force against the rear areas of the Japanese Army in South East Asia. In 1945-46, Dr. Ho Chin Minh took control of Indo-China, after Emperor Bao Dai left the country as a result of the defeat of the Japanese Army. The French Army, who colonized Indo-China could not agree to the demand of Dr. Ho Chin Minh, who formed a guerilla Army known as the Viet-cong, an armed group of the Viet-Minh party. With assistances from communist China, the Viet-cong guerillas, under the leadership of willy guerilla leader, General Von Nguhen Giap defeated the French Army in the

battle of Dien Bien phu. This led to the division of the country into two parts at 17th parallel. In 1948-49, there was an uprising by the Malaysian insurgents as a result of political and ethnic disagreement between the Malayas who earn their living mostly by cultivation and the indigenous Chinese who had better economic conditions. It took almost 10 years to bring down the Malaysian insurgency movement. Philippines another multi-ethnic country, dominated by the Christian Philippino, had a chequered history and faced insurgency, guerilla and militancy movement due to political, ethnic and religious discords. In 1968, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed by the Philippino Muslims (the Moros) in the southern part of Mindanao Island and the Sulu archipelago, demanding a separate Islamic state in Philippines. In 1984, another faction known as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) came up into the scene with active assistance and moral support from the Abu Sayyaaf Group (ASG) and other West Asian Muslim countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. By 2003, the Moros Independent movement has cost more than 1.5 lakh lives in Philippines.

Tibet

On 10th March 1959, Tibet, a tiny region of Asia, the land of the Tibetan Lamas, revolted against the suppression of the ethnic Tibetans by the Chinese communist Government. The Chinese established a military Government in Tibet (Tibet Military Region) violating Peking's (Beijing) pledge that it would allow the Tibetan peoples the right of exercising National regional sovereignty (Major-General D.K. Palit, 1984). The Khampa tribe, short-statured, sturdy, hilly people started an uprising from Chamdo to the entire Indo-Tibetan border. The revolution was crushed by a strong Chinese troops of 1,00,000 in strength. The 14th Dalai Lama, who was hardly 24 years, the spiritual head of the Tibetan people, left Lhasa and fled to India. To avoid Chinese persecution, he was escorted by 'horseman' Gyakpon Keldam and 20 hardcore Tibetan revolutionaries. After a treacherous journey, mostly carried out at night, to avoid the pursuing Chinese troops and intelligence personnels, the Dalai Lama's party reached Tawang Monastery (India). Within one month, they were followed by a stream of Tibetan refugees, which included Yanten Gyatso and Chanzo Ngawang Tempa La. In spite of threat and intimidation from Mao-Tse-Tung and Chou En Lai, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, gave the most hospitable and befitting humanitarian assistances to those scare-crow Tibetan refugees by allowing them to settle down in India, particularly in McLeodganj (Uttar Pradesh). Later on India paid a heavy price in 1962. The western countries with their swan song dumped the Tibetan issue into the dust-bin of UNO. The Dalai Lama fought a lonely political battle for Tibetan Autonomy, deserted by the younger Tibetans, who are bereaved of strong and dynamic political leaders and revolutionaries. Gradually, in a phased manner, the Beijing Government allowed the ethnic Hans Chinese to make a demographic invasion of Tibet for slow disappearances of the ethnic Tibetan group. By 1990's, the concept of revolution of the '1959 Generation' was tapered down to mere political formality as the young Tibetans were mowed down by the weight of the Communist Red flag and batons.

Burma (Barma or Myanmar or Doh-Myanma Asiatyone), a neighbouring country of India, with an area of 678,034 square kilometers and population of 46,524,948 (1997) with more than 100 indigenous languages and large number of ethnic groups lies on the western edge of Indo-China

peninsula. In ancient time, it was known as the gateway to South East Asia. In the 11th century, due to its proximity to India, Burma became the first area (Country) in South East Asia to embrace Buddhism. The Burmans, the Mons, the Shan, the Kachin, the Karen etc. played an important role in the history of Burma. In January 1866, it became a province of British India, a bitter blow to the Burmese pride. In 1936, student leaders like U-Nu (later on Prime Minister of Burma) and Aung San (Father of Dow Aung San Suu Kyi and later on General of the Army) joined the 'Thakin Movement'. It was formed in 1930 by the radical students in Rangoon University who resented their British professors. During World War II, Aung San and the Thakin Movement formed a coalition of all parties known as the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) and negotiated with Britain for transfer of power to Burma. However, in July, 1947, Aung San and most of his cabinet members were assassinated and the Governor of Burma Major-General (Retd) Sir Hubert Rance, asked U Nu to form a new cabinet. On 04 January, 1948, Burma became a Union of Burma, sovereign independent country. In 1958-60, Burma faced serious politico-ethnic turmoil. In 1960, U Nu for the second time became the Prime Minister of Burma. However, in March 1962, General Ne Win, a member of old Thakin group, led a coup d'etat, suspended the constitution of Burma and ruled the country with a military council and supported one party system known as the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). That brought a spate of insurgency movements by the ethnic groups like the Kachin Independent Army (KIA); the Shan State Army (SSA); the Arakanese Revolutionary Army (ARA); the Chin National Army (CNA); the National United Party of Arakan (NUPA) against the Rangoon Military Junta. The insurgency and separatist movement in the Sagaing division, Chin Hills and the Arakan region of Burma seriously affected the politico-strategic environment of the eastern fuselage of India and Bangladesh. Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland were directly affected by the insurgency and separatist movement, drug trafficking, narco-terrorism from the Golden Triangle, and the political brinkmanship between the Burmese Military Government and pro-Democracy movement group led by Dow Aung San Suu Kyi.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh, with a total land area of 147,570 square kilometers and population of 125,340,261 (1997) was borned as a republic on 16 December 1971. It has got long international border with India (4031 km). 98% of the population are ethnic Bengali Muslims. Bangladesh enacted its own constitution on 16 December, 1972. From 1974-75, the country faced serious politico-religious upheaval and extremism, leading to the assassination of the Father of Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The successive Bangladesh Governments (including Military regime) came under the influence of Pakistan and its powerful Intelligence organizations, the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). In 1980's, presidents Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh and Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan were actively involved in the insurgency upheaval in the North Eastern region of India. The Jammat-e-Islami of Bangladesh became the mouthpiece of anti-Hindu religious 'Jehad' and they were used as religious baton by Zia-ur-Rehman, Begum Khalida Zia and many Muslim fundamentalist and extremist groups against India. A large number of ISI agents, module, mole, nodal centers were established in various parts of North East India primarily through Bangladesh immigrants, refugees and foreign agencies. In turn, insurgent outfits from North East India were welcome on the Bangladesh soil, and rewarded handsomely.

NORTH-EAST INDIA

Since a long decade, insurgency and guerilla movements were in existence in the North Eastern region of India. Manipur and Tripura flourished as independent Kingdoms. Assam has got a long history of its own. At later stages, the district of Naga Hills, a part of Assam was named as Nagaland; the old Lushai Hills district as Mizoram; the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) as Arunachal Pradesh (the land of the rising sun); the Khasi and Jaintia Hills as Meghalaya. A cursory look showed that there is an asymmetry in ethnic life-style, customs, traditions, cultures and habit of the entire areas starting from the Tibeto-Bhutan region right up to Indo-Burma border. During the British rule in India, they identified a large number of minorities and tribal groups in the region and classified the areas as "Excluded Areas", so that the natives could manage their own affairs. The Assamese, the Garos (the Garrows), the Angamis, the Kukis, the Khasis, the Lushais, the Aos, the Semas, the Mizos etc. fought the British Expeditionary forces by different tactics including insurgency and guerilla warfare. By 1940's, many ethnic minorities came up with the concept of independent and sovereignty.

Nagaland

During the British rule in India, Naga Hills (Now Nagaland) was specified as 'Excluded Area'. The Naga tribe, a pan Mongoloid or Tibeto Mongloid group, used to 'exist' independently in small groups like mini Greek's city state; had their own leader; spoke their own dialects, incommunicado to each others, with repeated internal fights and clashes among themselves. Upto early 1870, the British authority did not have a proper system of administration of Naga Hill district. However, during World War I, the Nagas contacted the outside world through the British war effort outside India. By early 1921, Christianity started creeping into the Naga society. During World War II, the Nagas worked for the British forces against the Japanese Army. In 1929, some educated Nagas established the Naga Club an organization consisting of local government officials and village headmen. After World War II political awareness among the Naga tribes saw a sudden changes. In 1946, members of the Naga Club and the Naga Hill District Tribal Council established the Naga National Council (NNC). In June 1946, the NNC submitted a memorandum to the British Cabinet Mission in India projecting their demands that all the Naga tribes in Tuensang, Naga Hill and other unadministered areas be treated as one entity and be included in an autonomous Assam in a free India with local autonomy and due safeguards for the interest of the Nagas (Major-General DK Palit, New Delhi, 1984). Sir Akbar Hydari, the then Governor of Assam, formulated a compromise plan with member of the NNC, by signing a 9-point Agreement in June 1947. In March 1951, Mr A.Z. Phizo, the legendary Naga insurgent leader, an Angami Naga by birth, gathered more fanatical elements of the NNC and boycotted the District council election. In 1952, the Nagas boycotted the first General Election of India. Within a few years, Naga Hills, a district of Assam was in turmoil due to insurgency movement. On 1st December, 1963, Nagaland was granted statehood and became the 16th State of India. On 11 November 1975, an accord known as the Shillong Accord was signed between the Government of India and the insurgent to bring peace and harmony in Nagaland. However it failed. In July 1997, the Government of India and the NSCN (IM) signed a ceasefire agreement and peace-talk continued to solve the Naga imbroglio.

Mizoram

The Mizos are Tibeto-Burman group of the Tibeto-Chinese race. During the first century AD, it was believed that the Mizos inhabited the entire Kansu province of North West China and even part of Tibet. From 7th to 9th century, they mostly concentrated in the Kabaw valley area and river Tiau. During 14th century, the powerful Shan rulers of Burma spread their power and influence towards Kabaw valley and in turn the Mizos left the area and took shelter in the Chin Hill areas. They settled down in a very difficult condition in Chin Hill, Lushai Hill, valley and Hill areas of Manipur. By 17th century AD, they came to know the existence of a better terrainic area after crossing the Tiau River to the west of Burma. They proceeded to that place which was known as Mizoram. In the 18th century AD, the chiefs of various groups of Mizo started fighting for power and dominations. The Lushai Hill and the Chin Hills areas turned into a place where the British authority failed to control and subdue the wild tribal people. The British authority sent several military expeditions to Chin-Lushai Hill areas. In due course of time, the Sailo chiefs became friendly to the British authority. On 3 July, 1890, the North Lushai Hills district with headquarters at Aizawl was formed and 1 April, 1981, the South Lushai Hills district was constituted with headquarters at Lungleh. On 27 January, 1898, the Government of India accepted the proposal of the Chief Commissioner of Assam for amalgamation of the North Lushai Hills district with the South Lushai Hill district under one single administrator under the administration of Assam. On 1 April, 1898, a separate Lushai Hills district with headquarters at Aizawl was constituted. By 1935, the Lushai Hills areas was made part of the 'Excluded Areas', under the British Government of India Act 1935 and local chiefs were permitted to retain power, though no political activity was permitted. On 9 April, 1946, educated Mizos established a political organization known as the Mizo Union. On 5 July 1947, a group of Mizos from Burma and Mizoram formed another organization at Aizawl known as the United Mizo Freedom organization for making Mizoram, a part of India. In April 1954, Lushai Hills district was christened as Mizo district by an Act of Parliament of India.

The Mizos believed that 'Mautam' (Famine) occurred with a cyclic period of 50 years with the flowering of young bamboo plants. The flowering brought an increase in the population of rats who ate the young bamboo plants, and finally invaded the paddy fields, destroying the crops. It occurred in 1910-11 before the outbreak of World War I. In 1959, the Mizo elders reported about the likely Mautam. But the Assam State Government and the bureaucrats in Shillong took it very lightly and the Mizos faced serious disaster. It was during that period that a young and flamboyant Mizo named Mr. Laldenga formed an organization known as the Mizo National Front (MNF). In early 1960's, the MNF insurgent outfit became one of the most powerful insurgent groups in the North Eastern region of India. On 28 February 1966, they announced the independence of Mizoram. The Government of India launched Military operation and brought down the Mizo insurgents under control. On 21 January 1972, Mizoram was granted the status of Union Territory. On 30 June, 1986, a peace accord was signed between the Government of India and the MNF and came to a close in the state.

Tripura

The history of Tripura is full of heroic performances by its Maharaja and kings who spread their influences and power to neighbouring countries and states. In olden days, the state used to be inhabited

by the Tripuris, an Indo-Mongoloid or Indo-Burman group, with rich cultural heritages, customs and traditions. When India got independence 1947, Tripura was merged with the Union of India. However, during the partition of India and Pakistan, a large number of Bengali and Muslim refugees from East Pakistan (Bangladesh) poured into the state and registered themselves as permanent settlers. On 1 May, 1958, the official registration was stopped but the refugee influxes continued. By early 1960, it came to the horrors of the indigenous Tripuris that the Bengali and Muslim refugees had surpassed them in population figure, showing an increase of 135% from 1951 to 1961. Agartala, the capital of the state became an exclusive posh area for the Bengali settlers and the Tripuris were ejected towards the rural areas. The Tripuris were reduced to minority in their own state by political default.

On 10-11 June, 1967, an organization known as the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS) was formed to fight the rights and privileges of the indigenous tribal people of Tripura. Another organization known as the Sengkrak (a clenched fist) in Kok-Borok dialect was formed in North Tripura, in Kailashar district, adjoining Mizoram. In 1970, a large number of refugees poured into the state from East Pakistan during Bangladesh Liberation War. That completely destroyed the ethnic mosaic in the state and the question of refugees remained as the most burning issue of Tripura. On 21 December, 1978, the frustrated youths of the TUJS and others formed an insurgent organization known as the Tribal National volunteers (TNV). On 12 December, 1980, another organization known as the All Tripura People's Liberation Organisation (ATPLO) was formed. In May 1990, an insurgent organization, All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF) was formed with active support and backing from the Communist Party of India (Marxists), targeting the Congress (I) and the TUJS cadres. In 1991, the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) came into the scene. The socio-ethnic conflicts in Tripura, particularly between the indigenous tribal Tripuri and the Bengali speaking majority population continued incessantly. The various ethnic and the sub-ethnic insurgent groups involved in the conflicts and clashes in the State.

Assam

Assam has got a long history of its own. The Indian epic, the *Mahabharata*, mentioned the king of ancient Pragiyotisha or Western Assam who joined the battle of Kurukshetra on the side of Duryodhana surrounded by his army of Kiratas and Chinas. The *Ahom Buranji* (The chronicle of Assam) mentioned various events of the kingdom of Assam during the time of its rulers. Many scholars described the ancient inhabitants of the region as Indo-Mongoloid, pan-Mongoloid, proto-Mongoloid and Tibeto-Mongoloid. During the Mughal period in India, the famous silk route used to pass through Assam for business between south east Asia and the central Asia. In the 12th and 13th centuries, the Shan king of Burma repeatedly invaded Assam, Manipur, Tripura and Chittagong areas. In 1792, the influences of British India Government touched the region. On 24 February, 1826, by virtue of the Treaty of Yandabo, Assam was annexed by the British India Government. In 1947, Assam which includes the present states of Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh became a state of India. Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh were carved out of Assam and formed separate state. Then came the refugee influxes in Assam from Bangladesh. The Assamese saw the writing on the wall and an upheaval came up in the Brahmaputra valley to throw out the refugee Bengali settlers from Bangladesh. That led to the birth of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) as

one of the most powerful insurgent groups in the North-eastern region of India. At later stages, the Bodo insurgent outfits, the Dimasa insurgent groups, and Muslim fundamentalist groups posed serious threat to the politico-ethnic equation in the State.

MANIPUR

*Manipur Sana Leimayol
Chingna Koina Pansaba
Haona Koyna Panngakpa*

(My Manipur, Prime of the mainland of God; how bulwarked thou art by the ranges of thine hills all around. And sentinel led by the children of Nature on their round).

A close study of the history of Manipur shows that it was replete with plots, royal intrigues, ethnic and community uprisings, revolutions and insurgency movements. In olden days, the supremacy of the Maharaja (King) of Manipur was challenged from time to time by internal and external agencies. The unbreakable Manipuri Naga relations were seen at its best during the time of Maharaja Garib Niwaz (Jai Singh). However, many of the communities, from time to time, were not happy with the monarchy in the kingdom. The uprising in 1784 by the Tangkhul tribe in Ukhrul was one of such manifestations. In the present day context, the uprising may not be fitted to classify as Insurgency or revolution, but certainly could be counted as a serious 'village uprising' during that period. During the period of 'Seven Years Devastation (1812-1818)', there were many incidents of palace intrigues, internal disagreement and plots but not insurgency movement in the real military term and meaning.

In 1820-1823, Maharaja Gambir Singh of Manipur, who was in exile in Cachar kingdom, raised a native force known as the 'Manipur Levy', conspired and usurped a part of Cachar Kingdom. The military strategy and tactics used were local partisan movement, intrigues and to some extent insurgency movement. In 1851 Maharaja Chandrakirti Singh and relatives of Maharaja Nara Singh tried to remove King Devendra Singh from the throne of Manipur. Again, the military means and methods used to dislodge the king consisted of propaganda, Insurgency movement, guerilla warfare, political pressure to British authorities etc. During World War I, some hill tribes from Manipur refused to obey the British authorities when they tried to recruit local people for war services in Europe. When the British authorities put military pressure, they resisted the same in the form of guerilla war, mercenary tactics, insurgency warfare and ethnic resistance tactics.

In 1947, when India attained Independence, Manipur State Constitutional Act, 1947, was in force and legally Manipur became an Independent state from 14 August 1947, under the said Act. "Whereas it is expedient to enact a law for the governance of the Manipur state, His Highness, the Maharaja of Manipur state is pleased to enact as follows: Title : This Act shall be called the Manipur State Constitution Act 1947". Thus, the whole concept of Independence and sovereignty came up into the mind of the Manipuris, particularly the younger generation, when they were neglected by the mainstream of India.

From 1947 to 1951, there were some signs of revolutionary movement, launched particularly by the cadres of Communist Party of Manipur under the leadership of a firebrand, young communist leader, Jananeta Hijam Irabot Singh. He was the brain behind the building up of two politico-

revolutionary organizations in the state, known as the Manipur Praja Sangha and the Manipur Krishak Sabha. He used both the organizations as a trident for a revolutionary movement in Manipur and adjoining areas. In 1948, both the organizations were banned by the Maharaja of Manipur as unlawful organizations. As a consequent, Sri Irabot Singh went underground. On 29 October, 1948, the cadres of the communist party of Manipur decided to take up arms against the princely state government of Manipur and as such formed an underground Armed Resistance group, known as the Red Guard Council. They maintained close contact with three communist parties of Burma i.e. The Communist Party of Burma (Thakin Than Tu), The Burma Communist Party (Thakin Son) and the People's Comrade Party (Bidu-A-Bo) which were quite active during that period. The revolutionary and resistance movement led by Irabot Singh spread throughout Manipur and adjoining areas of Silchar (Assam) and Sylhet (Bangladesh). However, the movement could not achieve its desired aim and objective due to the geo-political changes in the region after World War II. The untimely death of Comrade Jananeta Irabot Singh on 16 September 1951 at Tangbo Village near the bank of Ningthee (Chindwin) river retarded the first known revolutionary movement in Manipur.

TREMORS IN HILLS

During 1952-56 period, politically, socially and culturally, Manipur was in a stable condition and environment. However, Naga Hills (now Nagaland), a district of Assam, became a hot boiling spot for young democratic Government of India. On 30 March 1953, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru visited Kohima and then Manipur. He addressed the Naga citizen at Kohima ground.

"Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the darling of India's crowds, was effectively boycotted by the Nagas, as the entire audience excepting a few government servants left the place of meeting where Nehru was addressing and he was left to address a few dozens of government servants and their family members, most of whom were not Nagas but plain people. The reason behind the boycott was the refusal of the Nagas demand to read out a statement of the public meeting for the acceptance of 9-point programme and conceding their right to secede after 10 years." (B.N. Mullick, 1972).

By 1954, Naga Hills became a turbulent spot due to armed violence, murder, arson, looting, kidnappings by the underground Naga insurgents led by the legendary Naga leader Mr AZ Phizo, an Angami Naga. On 29 January 1956, Naga Hills was declared a disturbed area and Armed forces were inducted into the area. On 22 March of the same year, the Naga National Council (NNC) declared the formation of a clandestine Naga insurgent organization known as the Federal Government of Nagas (FGN). The moderate Nagas who did not subscribed to the hardline views of the NNC formed another political organization known the Naga People's Convention (NPC). In April, 1958, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Regulation 1958 (No 2 of 1958) was promulgated by the President of India under the power of Article 240 of the Constitution of India. The Act was extended to Kohima and Mokokchung districts of the Naga Hills-Tuengsang Area (NHTA). In December 1963, Naga Hills, a district of Assam, a neighbouring area of Manipur was declared as the 16th state of India.

The Naga underground movement in Nagaland had a serious collateral effects to the valley and hill areas in Manipur. Some of the tribal inhabitants of the state particularly the Tangkhul Naga youth from Ukhrul, Mao, and Maram areas joined the underground Naga insurgent outfit in Nagaland. Parts of the hill areas of Manipur were affected in socio-economic field as a by-product of the Naga

insurgency movement. Educated Manipuris were in transitional state of upheaval. The Manipuris demanded that Manipur should be upgraded to the status of a state of the Union of India from Union Territory status. If Nagaland could be formed as a state out of a district of Assam, then what was stopping in upgrading Manipur from a Union Territory to a full-fledged state of India? The Manipuris were up in arms. Due to sheer frustration and lack of faith in the political directions of the Government of India policy, gradually most of the inhabitants of the valley area were drawn into the politics of communist doctrine of revolution, insurgency movement, and guerilla warfare. Finally, they laid the keel for sovereignty, and Independence of Manipur.

MIZO INFLUXES

The Mizo uprising in 1964, in the tiny, serene, picturesque and virgin Mizo district in Assam hit the headlines of the national newspapers in India, but not of course of the world. Mr Laldenga, the legendary Mizo insurgent leader, who transformed the Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) into the Mizo National Front (MNF), demanded for an independent sovereign state of Mizoram. On the night of 28 February, 1966, the MNF declared 'Independence of Mizoram', with simultaneous attacks against security posts, Government offices, sub-treasury office, Banks, communication centers, important government buildings etc. Aizwal and Lungleh, two important towns were almost overrun by the MNF cadres and law and order were completely broken down. The Armed forces, carried out 'operation Jericho' against the Mizo insurgents, strafing the town by the Indian Air Forces fighter planes and open-up the Silchar-Aizwal-Lungleh road blocked by the Mizo insurgents. Lungleh town was relieved on 13 March, 1966, 13 days after it was captured by the MNF insurgents. Mizoram, a district of Assam, was declared a disturbed area under the power of the Disturbed Area Act, applied the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 and the security was handed over to the Armed Forces. Mr Laldenga fled to East Pakistan along with his lieutenants, established the MNF headquarters at Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and carried out insurgency movement for another 20 years or so. In the meantime, the security forces (SF) carried out 'operation accomplishment', an Army strategy for grouping of villages to deny food, clothing, extortion, recruitment, social contacts, information, shelter etc. to the MNF cadres. Under the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous Districts) Act, 1953 and the Defence of India Rules, the grouping of villages were carried out along the Silchar-Kolasip-Aizwal-Serchip-Lungleh axis and other important areas astride the roads.

Churachandpur, the southern district of Manipur were inhabited by the Kukis, Mizos, Vaiphei, Simpte, Ralte, Paite etc. When the security forces launched military operation against the Mizo insurgents in Mizoram, they faced a harsh social life and started migration towards Imphal, Churachandpur, Silchar and even to Burma, to avoid harassments, arrests, captures, intimidation and killings. Gradually, Imphal, Churachandpur, Chandel, and areas along the Mizoram-Burma international border became the transit camp, hiding place, rest and recoup areas, base area and temporary headquarters of the MNF cadres. A large numbers of Mizos migrated to Manipur in steady stream, as jhooming (terrace cultivation) were restricted and limited. If allowed, the same was carried out under the watchful eye of the security forces. Socially, economically and culturally the Mizos suffered heavily. Thus, per force, they crossed over to Manipur through Manipur-Mizoram border and settled down in various areas of the state, particularly at Churachandpur district.

The Mizo influx had its politico-social effects to Manipur in the long run. The law and order problem became serious, leading to the induction of large number of Armed forces, para-military and police personnel into the southern region of Manipur. It also brought a steady demographic change among the sub-tribes, communities, and sub-communities existing in the areas.

BENCHMARK OF MANIPUR INSURGENCY MOVEMENT

In July-August 1959, when insurgency movement flared up in North East India, some Manipuri youths who are disillusioned, disheartened and disenchanted with the political attitude of the Government of India were attracted towards the concept of revolution, independence and insurgency movement. They formed a clandestine insurgency outfit known as the Meitei State Committee (MSC). The revolutionary group was established in a messy manner, more on the emotional and ethnic line rather than with a popular aim and objective, good cause, strong leadership, public support and goodwill etc. which were prerequisite ingredients for a successful and viable guerilla and insurgency movement. The MSC remained stalled for quite sometimes not able to take off from the ground like the Naga insurgents.

In 1964, a group of Manipuri youths, particularly from the valley areas, formed another insurgency organization known as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), which at a later stage became one of the most powerful insurgent organizations in the North Eastern region of India. During that periods the youths of the Meitei State Committee revived the Red Army, an armed resistance group based on communist doctrine of revolution. Some of the insurgents maintained a close relations with the Naga and the Tripura insurgents and opened up its relations with East Pakistani (now Bangladesh) authorities in Sylhet and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). In the political front, the Manipur Territorial Council, established under the Union Territory Act, led by Sri Mairembam Koireng Singh, could not do much to control the twin political problems which consisted of the Manipuri and the Naga Insurgency movement. In fact 1964-65 became the benchmark for the evolution of the Manipur insurgency movement in the North Eastern region of India.

PAN-MONGOLOID MOVEMENT

From mid 1965 onward, the question of poor economic standard, lack of communication problem, demographic changes, New Delhi's political concept of 'Excluded Area', bureaucratic and administrators attitude of 'too far, too uncivilized and too dangerous' syndrome came into the mind of young and educated Manipuris. They realized that Manipur, inhabited by the peace-loving, shy, and docile Manipuris had been out of the screen of New Delhi. Politicians, student organisations, youth wings, local clubs etc. came out on the streets and demanded statehood for Manipur. On the other side of the fence, Naga insurgents from Nagaland were criss-crossing the international borders with Burma, China, Nepal and East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Ethnic socio-political discontentment had cropped up in Assam, Tripura and NEFA (North East Frontier Agency). A number of ethnic insurgent organizations were on the card to be christened as insurgent outfits in the entire region.

In 1969, an insurgent organization known as the Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM) was born in the state, with high aim and objective. They established an underground element with auxiliary components to start a revolutionary movement for independence and sovereignty of Manipur.

The RGM outfit could not organize proper and viable Armed element to support the underground core group and challenge the Armed forces of the state and the Central government. A small group of the outfit then proceeded to East Pakistan (Bangladesh), contacted the ISI authorities and other insurgent outfits from the region, chalked out a programme to go to China for training and assistances. The Indian Intelligence Agencies followed the movement of all insurgent groups from North East India who traveled to China, East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Burma and Nepal. The action and reactions of the Indian Intelligence Agencies were seriously hampered due to strong hostile policy of the People's Republic of China and Pakistan against India. During 1964-71 period, China and Pakistan strongly encouraged and supported all insurgent groups from North East India in terms of political, materials and morale, including special radio broadcasts aimed against India.

During the turmoil period of 1970's, a youth organization known as the Pan-Manipur Youth League (PANMYL), which was christened as early as 1964, came up as the torch-bearer and mouthpiece for the young generation of Manipur including adjoining Manipuris inhabited areas in Assam, Tripura, Nagaland and Sylhet (East Pakistan). The organization became a focal point for educated Manipuri youths. They started publication of Magazines and pamphlets, which were considered provocative, Anti-National; 'subversive' and 'Anti-Government' as per assessments by Intelligence Agencies from New Delhi. The Pan-Manipur Youth League raised its head with credible aim, objective, and a good cause for the Manipuri youths not only in Manipur but also in South East Asian region. However, they had weak and poor organizational infrastructure and weak financial support. Indian Intelligence Agencies and the state authorities considered the organization as 'Anti-establishment' rather than a platform for youth movement. The movement was pinned down by the sheer weight of the Security Forces (SF) and the State Government. A number of educated youth leaders, popularly known as 'Lamyamba' (The Pathfinders) were questioned, detained and arrested by the state security forces to curtail the Manipuri Nationalism built up by the organization.

Linguistic and Cultural Nationalism

In 1960-70, a movement against the Vaishnavite Hindu cult and culture, followed by 75% of the population of the state, particularly in the valley area came up in full swing. The socio-lingua-cultural movement was led by a group of Manipuris who wanted to identify themselves as the Meitei (Meetei), an earlier name for the Manipuris before they embraced Hinduism. The old religion followed by the Manipuri in the state was known as 'Sanamahi'. Within a short time the Sanamahi-cult spread out quickly and a socio-religious conflict between Hinduism and the Sanamahi followers were seen all over the state. The Manipuri Meitei (Meetei) wanted to built up a religio-cultural upheaval for all the Manipuris inhabiting in South East Asia. The intellectual brinkmanship and conflict scenario between the old (Sanamahi religion) and the new (Hinduism) religious concept brought a remarkable imbroglio in the religio-cultural environment not only in Manipur but also in the entire Manipuris inhabited areas in the region. The same was followed by the controversy of the Manipuri language scripts, which used the Bengali alphabets. The Manipuri had their own scripts known as the Meitei Mayek but the same was not used for a long time. They felt that the Bengali scripts had put a road block in building up Manipuri Nationalism, on the same analogy like the kok-borok language in Tripura. There was a lot of emotional upheaval, hue and cry, rather than a holistic action plan to

improve and propagate the old Manipuri script (Meitei Mayek) to the general masses in the region. The upheaval for the revival of the religio-cultural movement and the concept of having their own scripts brought a mixed feeling to the formation of Manipuri Nationalism.

STATEHOOD

In 1969-70, the insurgency movement in the North eastern region of India, particularly in Manipur, Nagaland and Mizoram came down to a manageable level when the Indian Armed forces, backed up by the para-military forces, launched counter-insurgency operations (CI Ops) in a concerted, gradual, deliberate and effective manner. In 1970, the state government of Manipur announced a general amnesty for all those armed insurgents who surrendered voluntarily to the government of Manipur. However, the political situation went from bad to worse due to strikes, bandhs, mass demonstrations, closing of education institutions, destruction of government properties etc. by the political parties, politicians, student organizations, social organizations, local clubs for demand of statehood. The Manipuri populace strongly condemned New Delhi and retorted that the Union Territory (UT) status conferred to the old princely state is tantamount to political neglect and a step motherly treatment to the inhabitants of the state. Nagaland, which was a district of Assam was conferred the status of a full-fledged state of the Union of India as early as 1963. The act of New Delhi setting aside the demand of the Manipuris and giving political advantage to Nagaland was seen by the Manipuris as an Anti-Manipuri political agenda to satisfy the Naga insurgent groups. The Manipuri populace particularly the younger generation swayed by the general feeling that the Government of India would listen to the language of gun culture and not to the democratic, justified and rightful demand of the people of the state. During 1971, Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi was totally involved with daily intelligence reports from East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and likely Indo-Pak war cloud on the horizon. New Delhi knew that a large number of insurgent outfits were camping along the Indo-East Pakistan border, which would marginally affected if not in a big way, to the impending military operation in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Manipur was promised due share after the Bangladesh Liberation War. The entire Manipuri populace contributed handsomely to the war effort of New Delhi even accepting a small percentage of Bangladeshi refugees on its soil. Consequently, on 21 January, 1972 Manipur was conferred the status of a state within the Union of India, with a theme of 'better late than never'. The liberation of Bangladesh gave a sudden shock wave to a number of insurgent groups from North East India.

The Naga, the Mizo and the Manipuri insurgent outfits lost momentarily their bearing, safe sanctuaries, base camps, hideouts, and training areas along the Indo-Bangladesh international border, particularly in the CHT areas. The Manipuri insurgents who used Sylhet (East Pakistan) as one of the most important base, inhabited by the Manipuri and the Bengali, suddenly became dysfunctional in Manipur insurgency map. The State Government of Manipur, led by Chief Minister, Mohammad Alimuddin announced General Amnesty to all those insurgents who surrendered voluntarily and advised them to have a peaceful and constructive life by joining the mainstream society. The State Government also took action to transfer a number of Manipuri insurgents who were arrested and lodged in the Tripura Jail. Finally, they were released under the provisions of the General Amnesty. On release, some were given warm reception by their fellow members, some absorbed in Government job, some given lucrative contracts and assignments, a few joined politics and some were left in wilderness.

One young man who was left in the cold storage by the state Government officials was Nameirakpan Bisheshwar Singh, who later became the chairman of the People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA).

The continuing political event of 1972-73 carried an important bearing on the Manipur insurgency movement. The General Amnesty offered by the state government had a great impact and the United Left party state Government led by Mohammad Alimuddin, of the Manipur People's Party (MPP), maintained some respite. However, control of the law and order in Hill areas were almost taken over by the Indian Army as the civil administration and the Manipur police became redundant due to the Naga insurgent movement. On 16 August, 1973, in Nagaland, 1500 Naga insurgents surrendered to the Government of India, at Zunheboto, where the Chief Minister of Nagaland, Mr Hokishe Sema (Congress-I Government) played an important political role. That gave some breathing space to the state government of Manipur.

A close study of the Manipur insurgency movement show that there were enough and concrete evidence of the involvement of countries like China, Burma, Bangladesh and Pakistan in the insurgency turmoil in the Northeastern region of India. The Chinese government offered active support and assistance to all insurgents from North East India and advised them to form a common platform. A number of external agencies wanted to check-mate India's positive economic and political swing by creating adverse political, social, ethnic and communal violence in the region.

Manipur never had a stable state government since early 1950. President's rule under article 356 of the Constitution of India was imposed repeatedly in the chequered political history of the state. Many young Manipuris came out into the open and struggled for a distinct identity of the Manipuri society. In July, 1974, a young energetic politician Mr Yangmaso Shaiza, a Tangkhul Naga from Ukhrul district of Manipur, became the Chief Minister, under the flag of United Democratic Front (UDF) of Manipur. In December, 1974, he was replaced by Mr RK Dorendra Singh, an articulate, energetic and a young firebrand socialist in his early life, who formed a Congress-led government and ruled the state till 13 May 1977.

HOPE AND DESPAIR

Shillong Accord 1975

On 25 June 1975, Mrs Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, declared National Emergency in response to the political turmoil in India and the call for 'total revolution' made by Sri Jaya Prakash Narayan, the great Indian parliamentarian and Sarvodaya leader. The national political scene had an adverse effect to the regional political environment in the North eastern region of India including Manipur. On 11 November 1975, an accord known as the Shillong Accord was signed between the Government of India (represented by Sri B.K. Nehru, Governor of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland) and the underground Naga insurgent leaders. A number of Naga politicians and social workers from the Hill areas of Manipur were involved in signing the Shillong Accord though the same was Nagaland-centric. The Shillong Accord brought out a virtual division of the Naga insurgents into two groups and led to the formation of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). However, those moderate Nagas from Manipur extended their full support to the Accord. In Manipur, the political atmosphere was seriously polluted by those Naga insurgents who refused to accept the Shillong

Accord. They intimidated those moderate Nagas who signed the Accord for dire consequences. It was during that time that the Manipuri insurgents came closer to the NSCN.

Manipur, Mizoram and MNF

The Manipur imbroglio was also connected by the umbilical cord of homogeneous socio-cultural relations between the Manipuris and the Mizos. Manipur was a mini-India inhabited by a large number of ethnic groups and sub ethnic communities, caste and creed. During 1975-76 period, Mr Laldenga, the great Mizo pathfinder, who dream of an independent Mizo State (sovereignty) and his hardcore groups were scattered physically and psychologically by the sheer weight of the Indian security forces; strategic plan of village grouping; lure of town and city life; distance mirages of sovereignty; democratic political vibration and upheaval in Mizoram. In 1974, as a last parting shot, the MNF ambushed the Lieutenant Governor of Mizoram on Silchar-Aizwal Highway. In 1975, they gunned down the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Mizoram Police and his two aides inside the Police Headquarters in Aizwal. In the same year, a large number of the Mizo National Army (MNA) cadres surrendered to the Government in batches. The third batch surrendered their arms and weapons at Imphal (Manipur). On 01 July 1976, the MNF signed a Peace Accord and agreed to end insurgency movement in Mizoram and surrounding areas. The Government of India read that insurgency had come to an end in Mizoram. But it was not so.

It was during that period that the MNA cadres supplied arms and ammunition to the Manipur insurgents who were waiting to come up as a strong viable insurgent group. South Manipur was seriously affected by the Mizo insurgency movement. A large number of Mizos poured into the state particularly to Churachandpur district due to the Chin-Lushai-Mizo upheaval along the Indo-Burma international border.

The Turning Point

In early 1970's the Manipuri society was in a state of turmoil due to socio-cultural conflict and confusion, accord and discord of Manipuri scripts (Meitei Mayek), the issue of Kangleipak demand for inclusion of Manipuri language in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India, ousted the 'Mayang' campaign, restoration of Sana Leibak Manipur (Golden Land of Manipur) etc. The psychological yearning of the young generation gradually transformed towards the formation of Manipuri nationalism.

In May, 1977, the RK Dorendra Singh led Congress-I state government came crashing down due to the formation of Janata Dal Government in New Delhi. On 29 July, 1977, Mr Yangmaso Shaiza who was ousted in previous occasion by Dorendra Singh formed a United Democratic Front (UDF) Government and became the Chief Minister. It was on 09 October 1977, that a group of Manipuri Meitei youths announced the formation of People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) under the leadership of RK Tulachandra Singh, a firebrand revolutionary. On 26 September, 1978, Mr N Bisheshwar Singh, who was left in wilderness during 1970's General Amnesty and totally forgotten, neglected and sidelined by the central and the State Intelligence Agencies, announced the formation of another insurgent outfit known as the People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA). The Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) which was in dormant state exploded suddenly. The UNLF tried to consolidate its cutting power under Mr RK Meghen Singh (alias RK Sanayaima). All available

space in the valley area of Manipur was plastered with slogans like 'Free Manipur', 'Awake Manipur', 'Kick out the colonial Indian Army' etc. which formed attractive psychological propaganda warfare, and good catalyst for the formation of a Manipuri Nationalism.

The insurgent outfits in Manipur, Nagaland and Mizoram, irrespective of their differences in aim and objective, political approaches, ethnic and sub-ethnic aspiration, tried to maintain a close working relations among themselves. The valley-based insurgent groups of Manipur used to wage insurgency movement in tandem with the Naga and the Mizo insurgents. It was quite amusing, that in spite of having different ethnic aim and objective, the Manipuris, the Naga and the Mizo insurgent outfits managed an unholy alliances for such a long period in the history of insurgency movement in the North Eastern region of India. Some of the reasons as to why the honeymoon succeeded were:

- (a) The concept of Independence and sovereignty formed the primary aim and objective, leaving aside other important ingredients.
- (b) The combined hatred and anathema by all insurgent outfits from the region, of anything 'Indian' and 'Look like Indian' became the catalyst for a bond of friendship, mutual respect, mutual assistances and collective approaches.
- (b) The insurgent outfits believed in the dictum 'your enemy is my enemy'.
- (d) In a myopic manner, they feel shy to discuss the important territorial issue (Greater Manipur, Greater Nagaland and Greater Mizoram).
- (e) They waited for 'Golden opportunity' to hit each other 'below the belt'.

The Manipur insurgent outfits were completely blind to the demands of the Naga and the Mizo insurgent outfits. The formation of Greater Manipur would affect neighbouring state/states; so as Greater Nagaland or Greater Mizoram. On 30 June 1986, when Laldenga signed the Mizoram Peace Accord and Article 371G of the Constitution of India was amended, it heralded the end of marriage of convenience between the Manipuris and the Mizo insurgents. On the other hand, the nexus between the Manipuri and the Naga insurgents continued on the theme, 'Manipuris and the Nagas are the same brothers, with the same Mongoloid features. We are going on the same road for liberation of our motherland from the yoke of Indian Imperialism; so on and so forth'. In 1988, when the NSCN divided into two groups-the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN (K), the Manipuri insurgents faced the biggest and hardest trauma of deciding between the deep-sea and the Devil. Unwittingly, for a few years, the valley-based Manipuri insurgents tried to ride both the boat : (NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K) which they failed miserably in due course of time.

Politico-Insurgency War-Game

In 1980, the politico-social environment in Manipur became very murky and muddy. The Governor of Manipur, General (Retd) KV Krishna Rao, who had a long innings in the North Eastern region of India during his Army service, had serious reservation about the political approaches adopted by the Manipur politicians to curb insurgency movement and anti-national activities in the state. In September, 1980, Manipur was declared a disturbed area and the Armed forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Power (Amendment) Act, 1972, an Act which amended the Armed Forces (Special Powers)

Act, 1958, came into force. The Armed forces under the overall supervision of 8 Mountain Division, based at Jakhama, between Nagaland and Manipur, along NH-39, with a large number of para-military forces launched massive counter-insurgency operations (CI Ops) in Manipur and Nagaland, under Major General VK Nayar (later on Lieutenant General and after retirement, Governor of Manipur). The Governor submitted a report to New Delhi on the deteriorating political situation, law and order problem, and perennial corruption in the state. As a consequence, Chief Minister RK Dorendra Singh was removed from the seat of power and Mr Rishang Keishing, a young energetic and willy Tangkhul Naga from Ukhrul District, Manipur was installed as the Chief Minister of Manipur. The politico-ethnic division between the valley inhabitants and the Hill people was deepened gradually. The Rishang government pulled up their socks, cracked down on the valley-based insurgent outfits and declared them as unlawful bodies. However, the bigger fish, the NSCN was going on full-throttle in the hill areas of Manipur. Rishang Keishing was blamed for abetting the NSCN, and playing Naga card from the gallery with full support from the Central Government.

In 1987, the NSCN insurgent outfit, before its bifurcation into the NSCN(IM) and the NSCN (K), launched its last grand attack against the security forces in Manipur. On 11 July, 1987, they surrounded the company post (Wing Headquarters) of 21 Assam Rifles at Oinam village, 120 kms to the north of Imphal, and 45 kms from Lairou Ching (Jawalamukhi) in Senapati district of Manipur, in the morning hours. The post was attacked by 200 well-armed NSCN cadres, killing a number of Jawans (soldiers), looted the entire arms, ammunitions and communication equipments and then tried to exfiltrate towards Burma border via Ukhrul district of Manipur. By noon on the same day, communication with the post was lost. Helicopter which tried to hover around the post were fired upon. Immediately the security forces launched counter-insurgency operation, under the command and control of Major General Prem Kukreti, Inspector-General of Assam Rifles, North (IGAR North). The code-named of the operation was christened as 'Operation Blue Bird'.

The aim and objective of 'Operation Blue Bird' was to block the route of exfiltration of those NSCN insurgent, capture, kill and recover all arms, ammunitions and communication equipments looted by them. They carried out the operation blocking all likely escape routes and tracks, searching the inhospitable jungle and dense wooded areas, crossing small rivulets and streams, accompanied by the heavy rains. A large number of suspects were arrested, interrogated and detained. The military operation was seriously hampered due to heavy monsoon rain during July-August. The security forces were able to capture and killed some NSCN cadres, recovered almost the looted arms, ammunitions and communication equipments. Some civilians lost their lives and sustained injuries due to cross-fire between the security forces and NSCN cadres. They were blamed by the Manipuri, the Naga, Naga NGOs and villagers in and around Oinam village for excesses committed by them during the operation. They claimed that a large number of women and children were raped, houses were burnt down, many villagers were tortured, villagers used as guides during the search operation were shot dead at later stages, state police forces were debarred from entering the area of operation, curfew was imposed as a smoke screen to hide the skeleton etc. The operation attracted serious public anger and attention at the national level as some of the charges found to be true.

SUB-ETHNIC INSURGENCY MOVEMENT

In early 1990's the insurgency movement in Manipur transformed itself into a politico-ethnic insurgency environment by the blessings of the nexus between the political parties, politicians and the ethnic insurgent outfits. The ethnic Kuki tribe who inhabited mainly in Churachandpur, Chandel, Tamenglong, Senapati and part of Ukhrul were concerned with the ethnic strategies and approaches adopted by the Naga politicians in Manipur, particularly the Tangkhul Naga group. In 1988, the Kuki National Army (KNA), an ethnic Kuki insurgent group, was formed as an armed wing of the Kuki National Front. Gradually, the Kuki raised the issue of Kuki nationalism, on the same theme as Naga nationalism. New Delhi saw the complicated politico-ethnic situation of Manipur and wanted to install someone as the Chief Minister, who was acceptable to all. Sri RK Jaichandra Singh, Member of Parliament from Manipur, who was Minister of State (MoS) for Chemical and Fertilizer, Government of India, was pulled out and installed as the consensus Chief Minister of Manipur to avoid the factional fight particularly between RK Dorendra Singh loyalists and the Rishang Keishing's supporters. It was during this period that the Kuki ethnic issue came up in a long stride. Naga-Kuki ethnic clashes erupted, endangering thousands of human lives and properties. The Naga insurgent outfit, particularly the NSCN(IM) sided with the Naga inhabitants and the Naga politicians. The Kuki insurgent outfits, particularly the KNA closed ranks with the Kuki political parties, Kuki politicians and with the common Kuki inhabitants. The Muslim insurgent outfits contacted Muslim fundamentalist organizations in Assam and Bangladesh. In April 1992, in the melee, the MPP led state government of RK Ranbir Singh was pulled down.

On 4 April 1992 RK Dorendra Singh was installed again as Chief Minister and Rishang Keishing became the Deputy Chief Minister of the state. The Naga politicians, particularly the Tangkhul Naga blamed the RK Dorendra's Ministry for supporting the Kuki ethnic issue: Sadar Hill imbroglio and demand of Kuki homeland. On the other hand, the Kuki political parties warned the state Government and the NSCN(IM) for political brinkmanship, politico-ethnic conflict and crisis, ethnic aspiration, enforced demographic changes and ethnic cleansing. In a surprise environment, the Manipuri Meitei became the biggest sufferers and the best loser. They did not read the writing on the wall: Manipur state is going to break up due to ethnic crisis and clashes.

In 1994, Governor of Manipur, Lieutenant General (Retd) VK Nayar, informed the central Government (Report to the President of India) about the complex politico-social scenario, facts and figures, probable course of action for the politico-insurgent solution in the state. The complexities included:

- (a) The Naga politicians in Manipur, including the Deputy Chief Minister Mr Rishang Keishing, abetted the Naga insurgent outfits, particularly the NSCN(IM).
- (b) The political aspiration of the Manipuri Naga was dichotomy: on the one hand, they support 'Greater Nagaland' concept which included areas of Manipur and on the other they claim to support the territorial integrity of Manipur.
- (c) The Manipuri Meitei politicians, including the Chief Minister, RK Dorendra Singh, and others were suspected to assist the valley-based Manipuri Meitei insurgent outfits.

- (d) The Kuki political parties and politicians, including C. Doungel (Finance Minister, Government of Manipur), were suspected of maintaining a close nexus with the Kuki insurgent movement.

Considering the ongoing talk between the Government of India and the NSCN (IM), the Central government felt that to install a Manipuri Naga Chief Minister in Manipur would be a correct political option and decision. On 13 December, 1994, as a balancing act, PV Narasimha Rao, Prime Minister of India, installed Mr Rishang Keishing as the Chief Minister of the state and dumped the majority Manipuri Meitei legislators' claim. The central government considered the Naga insurgency problem and its solution more important than the politico-ethnic issue of the Manipuris and the Manipuri Nationalism. However, the Governor of Manipur, had a divergent political opinion after seeing the ground situation inside the state, the active rivalries among the sub-ethnic insurgent outfits, involvement of Naga, Kuki, Manipuri Meiteis politicians, internal frictions among the Manipuri Meiteis politicians, dichotomic *ad hoc* approaches to Manipuri imbroglio *vis-à-vis* Naga imbroglio etc. National political interest and supremacy of New Delhi prevailed upon the interest of Manipur state. In the ding-dong political battle, Lieutenant General VK Nayar (Retd) resigned to avoid political and constitutional crisis and controversies. The central government made a political error by accepting an abstract political conclusion that the Naga peace process, as a political compulsion and necessities, occupied a higher place at the national level than the volcanic imbroglio in Manipur and the North East India and the same could be sacrifice at the National political alter of India.

Insurgents Flexed Political Muscles (1994-95)

During 1993-94 period, the Manipuri Naga politicians had a fear psychosis of the Naga insurgent outfits and as such accepted their command and wishes for political equations and gains. On 31 December, 1994, the NSCN (IM) issued a warning (directive?) to all the Manipuri Naga Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA's) to resign from their elected post or face the consequences. The reason: the State Government of Manipur allegedly helped the Kuki in the Naga-Kuki ethnic clashes. The Manipuri Naga MLA succumbed to the warning, congregated at Dimapur (Nagaland) and created a political crisis in Manipur state. New Delhi saw the political writing on the wall and proclaimed President's Rule in Manipur, under article 356 of the Constitution of India. In February, 1995, election was held and Congress-I tried to form the state government. Perennial scene of Manipur political drama reenacted: whether to select a Manipuri Meitei or a Manipuri Naga Politician as the Chief Minister. The Central government as a policy of 26 political safety, wanted any Manipuri Naga politician to occupy the chair of the Chief Minister of Manipur, so that the Naga insurgency problem could be solved even at the cost of manipulatable Manipur's problem, particularly that of the Manipuri Meiteis. Thus, Rishang Keishing, the old fox of Manipur politics, was again installed as the Chief Minister of Manipur. Naga politicians won a grand politico-ethnic battle by means of the dangerous coercive weapon: the politico-ethnic-insurgency movement via the NSCN (IM). The Manipuri Meitei politicians looked crestfallen when they saw the end-result of the dirty politics in the state.

COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (CI OPS)

In 1995, the hill areas of Manipur were completely under the control of the various Naga, Kuki and Manipuri Meitei insurgent outfits. Civil administration was broken down and law and order were deteriorated day by day. The valley areas were completely under the control of the valley-based

insurgent outfits. In August 1995, para-military and police force, under the supervision, command and control of 57 Mtn Division (based at Leikakhong, 18 km from Imphal) launched a counter-insurgency operation, codenamed 'Operation Sunny Vale'. The aim and objective of the operation was to check thwart, destroy, and annihilate extremist outfits operating in the state particularly in the valley area. On 4 August, 1995, detailed plans of the operation were discussed by the General Officer Commanding of 57 Mountain Division, Major General NS Gill with the Director General of Police (DGP) Manipur, Inspector-General of Central Reserve Police (IG, CRPF); Deputy-Inspector General of Assam Rifles, 9 Sector and many other officials of the Intelligence Agencies. The state Government of Manipur and Nagaland and the Chief Minister of Manipur (Mr Rishang Keising) were informed. On 05 August, the next day, operation Sunny Vale was launched in Manipur.

Namtiram Rampage

On 07 August, 1995, in Tamenglong district, suspected Naga insurgents ambushed a convoy of 21 Rauputana Rifles, killing one soldier and injuries to some. The incident occurred at Namtiram, (Tousem sub-division), 170 Kms to the North-West of Imphal. In retaliation, the army personnel carried out a virtual siege of the villages of Namtiram, Azuram, Saramba, Thiulon and Jout Pabram. During the counter-insurgency operation, it was reported that the Army committed excesses in the form of rape, molestation torture and killing of innocent people. More than 52 persons including women and children suffered serious injuries attracting political attention at the national level. The Chief of the Army Staff, General Shankar Roy Choudhury (later on Member of Parliament) air dashed to Manipur and other states in the region. An Army spokesman in New Delhi said that the matter (the Namtiram incident) was being investigated and if any personnel were involved in a war-like conduct, strict action would be taken against them (*The Telegraph*, 20 September, 1995). The General Officer-Commanding, Eastern Command, Lieutenant General RN Batra, admitted that some excesses had been committed by the Army personnel. "Here is a prima facie case for an act of indiscipline by troops. I am not satisfied with what happened and the guilty will be punished", General Batra said.

During operation 'Sunny Vale' (05 August to 13 September 1995), the security forces arrested, killed and captured a number of insurgents operating in Manipur, particularly in the valley area. A number of arms, ammunitions and communication equipment were also captured.

Civil-Military Mistrust

In September 1995, during the budget session of Manipur Assembly, the conduct of Military operation 'Sunny Vale' was discussed. During the question hour in the State Assembly, the Chief Minister replied that he was not informed about the military operation. However, the opposition leader, Mr RK Ranbir Singh, of the Manipur People's Party (MPP) expressed strong concern about a statement made by the General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command, Lieutenant General RN Batra, in Calcutta, that, Mr Rishang Keishing, Chief Minister of Manipur was lying about the military operation (Sunny Vale) to the people. The General said that the Chief Minister had been apprised of the operation, by the General Officer Commanding, 3 Corps (Lieutenant General SS Grewal), based at Rangapahar, near Dimapur (*The Telegraph*, 10 September 1995, Calcutta). The opposition leader said that the General should be called to the house to find out the fact of the statement and if found

incorrect, initiate a privilege motion against him for attacking the head of the State. The politico-military mistrust and mudslinging erupted when the Chief Minister made the statement that he was not aware of any military operation known as Sunny Vale. Operation Sunny Vale highlighted the extreme importance of civil-military cooperation and trust during counter-insurgency operation.

DANGEROUS HYDRAS

On 25 July, 1997, a ceasefire Agreement between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM was signed for a period of three months with effect 1st August 2007, 'to bring about a lasting political solution to the long drawn out Indo-Naga issue'. The political analysts in Manipur and North Eastern region of India, showed that one of the clear political objective and parameter while signing the ceasefire agreement with the Naga insurgent outfit, the NSCN (IM), was that the sovereignty and integrity of India were non-negotiable at all cost. The agenda of the Government of India was kept a secret. However, the broad parameters of the negotiation were based on:-

- (a) The demand of the Naga insurgent outfit for 'Sovereignty' and 'cessation' from India were ruled out.
- (b) The NSCN (IM) would sever all ties and nexus with other insurgent outfits in the region.
- (c) Political, socio-economic, developmental demand concerning Nagaland would be discussed and settled politically.
- (d) Negotiations and peace-talk with other insurgent outfits to be followed.
- (e) Peace-talk and peace process to be followed by other politico-military actions (surrender of arms, depositions of arms, strategy for settlement of surrendered insurgents).
- (f) Political action for transformation and reformation of insurgent outfits into political organization (like Mizo National Front in Mizoram) to be followed and encouraged.

In 1997-99 when the Politico-military activities were in full swing in Nagaland, the insurgency environment in Manipur was quite different. The security forces and Indian Intelligence Agencies identified more than 22 major and minor insurgent organizations operating inside the state, forming a total strength of 15,000-16,000 or so with sophisticated weapons, ammunitions and communication equipments. The state government, under the Chief Minister, Wahengbam Nipamacha Singh (Manipur State Congress Party), who refused to dance to the tune of the central government's Naga centric policy and strategy had his back on the wall. A number of insurgent outfits raised their heads and there was a sudden spurt in insurgency related incidents which caught the state administration and the security forces off-guard. Insurgent organisations operating on the soil of Manipur included the Manipuri Meitei, Naga, Kuki and the Islamic insurgent outfits.

MANIPURI MEITEI INSURGENT OUTFITS

- People's Liberation Army (PLA).
- United National Liberation Front (UNLF).
- People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK).

- Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP).
- Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL).
- Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF).
- Manipur People's Army (MPA)

NAGA INSURGENT OUTFITS

- The National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Isak-Muivah group (NSCN-IM).
- The National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang group (NSCN-K).

KUKI INSURGENT OUTFITS

- The Kuki National Front (KNF):
 - Military Council Group:
 - ☐ T. Samuel Group.
 - ☐ President Group.
 - ☐ Zougam Group.
- The Kuki National Army (KNA).
- The Kuki National Organization (KNO).
- The Kuki Security Forces (KSF).
- The Chin-Kuki Revolutionary Front (CKRF).
- Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA).
- The United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF).
- The Kuki Liberation Army (KLA).

ZOMI INSURGENT OUTFITS

- The Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA).
- The Zomi Revolutionary Volunteers (ZRV).
- The Zomi Re-Unification Organisation (ZRO).

HMAR PEOPLE'S CONVENTION (HPC)

MUSLIM INSURGENT OUTFITS

- People's United Liberation Front (PULF).
- North East Muslim Liberation Army (NEMLA).
- North East Minority Front (NEMF).
- United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA).
- Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS).

In early 1999, a large number of personnel of the Indian Army were withdrawn from Manipur and the North Eastern region of India for military operation in Western and Northern sectors of India, during Kargil operation. In Manipur and the North Eastern region of India, insurgent outfits took the advantages of the absence of the Army and stepped up insurgency movement. During January to December 1999, a number of casualties occurred to troops of the Assam Rifles (AR); the CRPF; the Rashtriya Rifles (RR); Manipur Rifles (MR); Indian Reserve Battalion (IRB); due to ambushes, bomb blasts, IED explosion (Indegenous Explosive Devices) and attacks carried out in crowded places by the insurgents. The indiscriminate firing by the security forces as a counter-measure resulted in heavy casualties to innocent civilians and provoked a strong reaction from the general public. On 13 February, 1999, the UNLF ambushed a medical team of the Rashtriya Rifles near Thinku village in Churachandpur district and killed nine Army personnel including one captain (a Medical Officer). On 24 March, valley-based insurgent outfit killed five personnel of Mizoram Armed Police (MAP) and injured two civilians on the Manipur-Mizoram border. Assam Rifles personnel were attacked near Manipur University, Canchipur (11 July, 1999), Bishenpur (22 July 1999), Sangakpham (28 July 1999); Toupokpi in Bishenpur district (03 August 1999); Ukhongsang village in Thoubal district (12 August 1999).

The Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) became the main target of the insurgent attack after the withdrawal of 57 Mountain Division from Manipur. On 21 July 1999, armed insurgent outfits attacked a convoy of 81 Battalion, CRPF at Churachandpur, south-west of Imphal. On 11 August, 1999, the personnel of the para-military forces on security duty at All India Radio (AIR) complex at Imphal city resorted to panic firing after one of their colleagues was killed accidentally in a grenade explosion during cleaning of arms and ammunition. The same scene re-ran on 13 August of the same year, at Irilbung check post, 7 Kms to the east of Imphal. On 05 October, 1999, the biggest faux-pas occurred, during the Tonsen Lamkhai ambush in Thoubal district, south-east of Imphal, were seven personnel of the CRPF including one Deputy Commandant lost their lives, due to ambush by the UNLF. After the ambush, the CRPF personnel went berserk, lined up innocent civilians in the general areas and 'suspected' people were allegedly gun down in cold blood. The All Manipur Student Union (AMSU) alleged that those innocent people were shot dead by the CRPF jawans after 45 minutes of the ambush. Manipur Chief Minister, W. Nipamacha Singh, had to order a magisterial inquiry into the incident. The Director-General of CRPF, Mr M N Sabherwal airdashed to Imphal to take the stock of the situation. It was believed that the para-military forces committed excesses due to panic syndrome and lack of command and control.

HOLI TRUCE

On 26 February, 2001, Indian Armed Forces announced that it would suspend military operation against all insurgent outfits operating in Manipur for 15 days in view of the Holi festival, known as 'Yaushang'. General-Officer-Commanding (GOC) of 57 Mountain Division, Major General Iqbal Singh made a statement in a News conference at the Kangla Fort (Manipur Fort) in Imphal, that the Army and the Assam Rifles would not conduct Counter Insurgency Operations for 15 days (1-15 March, 2001). However, he cautioned that if the insurgents attacked the troops during the period, the latter would not hesitate to retaliate.

Immediately, on 27 February, 2001, Chief Minister of Manipur, Mr Radhabinod Koijam, announced a unilateral ceasefire for one month till 30 March, 2001. During a press conference, he reiterated that the duration of the truce would be extended if his government received a positive response from the insurgents. "The unilateral ceasefire is an opportunity for the rebels to come for talks. We hope they will response positively to our gesture", he said. "The rebels cannot indulge in killings, abductions, and extortions. They are also barred from moving about with arms or wearing battle fatigue", he said. The Union Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, who visited Manipur in February, 2001, stated that the Central Government in New Delhi agreed with the views of Chief Minister of Manipur. However, in May, 2001, the three-month old Samata Party led State Government of Radhabinod Koijam was toppled by the BJP Legislatures, led by RK Dorendra Singh, the pointman of valley politics. The reason was the refusal of the Chief Minister to toe the political line of the Central government's policy *vis-a-vis* Naga ceasefire extension to the constitutional territory of Manipur.

POLITICAL BOMBLAST

In May-June, 2001, there was a political rumour that the Central Government interlocutor in the Naga peace talk Mr K Padmanabhaiah would convey to the NSCN (IM) leaders Mr Isak Chisi Swu and Mr Th Muivah the Government of India's willingness to extend the Naga ceasefire in Nagaland to other Naga inhabited areas in Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. On 13 June, 2001, a meeting was held between Mr K Padmanabhaiah and the NSCN (IM) representatives, who mutually agreed that "the ceasefire Agreement is between the Government of India and the NSCN as two entities without territorial limit". Within 72 hours there was a political explosion from the general public in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur to the word 'without territorial limit'.

The people of Manipur reacted so strongly that by 18 June 2001, the Manipur state administration, and Legislative Assembly, which was under suspended animation came to a standstill. On 27 June, six social organizations the AMUCO, AMSU, AMKIL, IPSA, NIPCO and UPF made a public declaration terming the Naga ceasefire extension to Manipur state as a first step towards disintegration of territorial integrity of Manipur. To protect the interest of the people of Manipur, a social organization known as the United Committee of Manipur (UCM) was formed by the above mentioned six organizations together with a large numbers of social and cultural organizations of other communities. The Kuki community, politicians, and student's union intensified their agitation against the reported extension of Nagaland ceasefire into Manipur's territory. The Manipuri Muslims also joined the agitations. However, on 28 June 2001, the Naga People's Convention (NPC), Senapati District in Manipur and the United Naga Council (UNC) in Senapati, expressed deep appreciation of the Government of India and the NSCN (IM) and rejoiced the reported news. 18 Manipuri youth lost their life on the 18 June 2001 people's uprising.

It was reported that some Manipur insurgent outfits took part in the June uprising, in covert fashions. The organizers of the agitations appealed to the insurgents not to be involved themselves in the uprising as it would give a wrong direction, impression and colour to the democratic movement by the people of the state. On 27 June, 2001 Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee, announces that the word 'without territorial limit' would be deleted and *status quo ante* would be maintained immediately. The Prime Minister kept his word. The serious contentious issue "Without territorial limit" was deleted and immediately Manipur state was placed under president's rule.

TIGHTEN THE NOOSE

On 11 September 2001, members of the Islamic Jihadi group, the Al Qaeda, led by the Muslim fundamentalist leader Osama bin Laden, a great disciple of Dr Aiman Al Zawahiri, the head of the banned Islamic Jihad in Egypt and Shaikh Omar Abdel Rehman, the blind Egyptian preacher lodged in a US Jail for the World Trade Center bombing and a leader of banned El Gamaa Islamiyya (in Egypt), attacked New York and Washington simultaneously. The whole world was shocked and appalled by the terrorist attack. India advocated strongly that terrorism was a crime against humanity. "Terrorism is a regression into medieval malevolence. It was an experience that India has had travelled these gloomy and dark bylanes and roads of terrorism. It was not enough to address the issue of terrorism episodically, or just talk about the symptoms; we have to go to the root and address the system that promotes as symptoms" (Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 12 September 2001).

In October 2001, an ordinance known as the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance Act, (POTA) 2001, was promulgated by the President of India, Sri KR Narayanan, 'an ordinance to make provisions for the prevention of, and for dealing with, terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith'. The Union Home Secretary, Mr Kamal Pande, said that unlike the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) which lapsed in 1995, the ordinance contained built-in-safeguard to make it more humane for the innocent. After the 11 September 2001 attack in the United States, India strongly felt the necessity to undertake an urgent special measure to curb terrorist menaces with deterrent punishments. The new ordinance branded Deendar Anjuman, Students Islamic

Movement of India (SIMI), most of Kashmiri and North East India militant outfits and Liberatin Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as terrorist organizations. The insurgent and militant outfits of North East India which were branded as terrorist organizations included 7 organizations from Manipur, 2 from Tripura and one from Assam. Not a single organizations from Nagaland, Meghalaya, Arunachal

NORTH EAST INDIA

Insurgent Outfit branded
as terrorist organisations under
POTA, 2002 and the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Amendment Act, 2004

- | | | |
|----|---|-----|
| 1. | Arunachal Pradesh | Nil |
| 2. | Nagaland | Nil |
| 3. | Mizoram | Nil |
| 4. | Meghalaya | Nil |
| 5. | Assam: | |
| | • United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) | |
| | • National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) | |
| 6. | Tripura: | |
| | • All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF) | |
| | • National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) | |
| 7. | Manipur: | |
| | • People's Liberation Army (PLA) | |
| | • United Nation Liberation Front (UNLF) | |
| | • People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) | |
| | • Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) | |
| | • Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) | |
| | • Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF) | |

Pradesh and Mizoram were branded as Terrorist organization.

However, political and defence analysts did not subscribed to the foresight and hindsight of New Delhi and its Intelligence Agencies of targeting selectively a few insurgent groups from Assam, Manipur and Tripura for branding as Terrorist organisations under the POTA Act, 2001, leaving behind a large number of others unaffected. The only logical conclusion read by the people in the region was the political necessity of New Delhi. The political act of commission and omission of the Central Government were construed by the people of Manipur as an act of naked division of ethnic and other minority communities in the region by means of dirty politics. However, the sound of dissention and desperation were negated by the Prime Minister of India during his tour in North East India. In April 2002, during his address at the inauguration of the Rail-Road Bogibeel bridge at Dibrugarh, Assam, Sri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India said, "Terrorism is an international challenge and what is happening here is also Terrorism which has no place in a civilized world. Leave the wrong road and take the path of peace".

SAJIK TAMPAK – 'LIBERATED ZONE'

During 1999-2004 period, the valley-based Manipur Insurgent outfits which included the UNLF, the PLA, the PREPAK and the KCP concentrated their activities at Chakpikarong, a small town in Chandel district, Manipur, 120 km to the south of Imphal. Sajik Tampak, a beautiful place, close to Chakpikarong, along Chakpi river, situated in the undulating hilly terrain, inhabited by mixed hill tribes, were totally neglected by the security forces for almost 20-25 years. Gradually, it became the tactical Headquarters of the UNLF and the PLA and a combined training area for the valley based insurgent groups. The Manipuri Meitei insurgents

NORTH EAST INDIA

Insurgent organizations not branded as terrorist organisations under POTA, 2002 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2004

Nagaland

- National Socialist Council of Nagaland Issac-Muivah group (NSCN-IM).
- National Socialist Council of Nagaland Khaplang group (NSCN-K).
- Federal Government of Nagaland (FGM).
- Naga National Council (NNC).

Meghalaya

- A'chick National Volunteer Council (ANVC).
- Hynniewtrup National Liberation Council (HNLC).


Manipur-Assam

- All Kukis Insurgent outfits.

Assam

- Dima Halam Daoga (DHD).
- Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF).
- Muslim Insurgent outfits.

Sajik Tampak Operation
(South Manipur)
April 2004



built up their rapport with the civilians populations, looking after the welfare of the villagers; buildings roads and tracts; construction of village water storage tanks; supply of Medicine; provision of rice and other daily essential items. The civil officials and the personnel of the state police forces became dysfunctional. The insurgents clandestinely used to call many civil officials, contractors, bureaucrats, tainted officials of various departments of the State Government and the Central Government for 'official discussions', 'explanations' and 'award of punishments'. Tax collected on monthly and annual basis normally handed over to the insurgent outfits at Sajik Tampak by low-level government officials and the civil populace through various means and channels. By 2002-03, Sajik Tampak was declared a 'Liberated Zone' by the Manipuri Meitei insurgents outfits.

By end of 2003, the Central Intelligence Agencies were surprised to the gradual built up of Insurgent-public nexus in Sajik Tampak leading to the existence of the 'dual administration' in the general area. The Armed forces swung into military response. By April, 2004, a Brigade strength troops of the Indian Army (44 Mountain Brigade), a crack Brigade, was rushed to Chandel district, established its Brigade Headquarters at Chakpikarong under Brigadier GS Malhi (Armoured Corps). The media reported that the Armed forces used helicopter gunships and Artillery guns in their operation against the insurgents. They also reported displacement of hundred of villagers during April 2004. However, on 9 May 2004, the Armed forces claimed that they used 'minimum force' and not Artillery or Helicopter gunships against the insurgents in their counter-insurgency operations in the general area. Finally, they flushed out the insurgents from the area and Sajik Tampak became a 'Liberated Zone' for the security forces.

ISI WIND TOUCHES MANIPUR

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan, an Intelligence Agency transformed itself into a premium institution of Pakistan political structure with vast political and military power. Today, it can make or break any Pakistani Government in no time. In 1947-48, Major General WJ Cawthoril, CB, CIE, CBE, an Australian-born British Officer who opted for Pakistan Army during partition formulated and developed the blue-print for the establishment, structure and functioning of an Intelligence Agency known as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. The ISI played a vital role during the Indo-Pak War of 1965, 1967 and 1971. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan used to depend heavily on the ISI in Pakistan's politics. In 1970, General Yahya Khan used the military Intelligence Agency to divide the various political parties and politicians and influence the Pakistani elections in 1970. During the Afghanistan crisis (1980-1988), the ISI maintained a close working relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of USA. The ISI trained a large number of Afghan Majaheed groups for large scale overt operations spreading its tentacle in

MANIPUR IMBROGLIO:

ISI ACTIVITIES IN NORTH EAST INDIA: CUT, BLEED AND SEVERED:- 'ALLAH-HO-AKBAR'

Primary Targets	Secondary Target
➤ Assam.	➤ Meghalaya.
➤ Manipur.	➤ Sikkim.
➤ Tripura.	➤ Arunachal Pradesh
➤ Nagaland.	
➤ North Bengal	

various directions. By 1990, Western media considered the ISI as one of the most effective Intelligence services in South Asia and the third world. By 2000 AD, the ISI expanded its aim and objectives and started covert actions in many parts of Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and India including the North Eastern region of India.

The ISI wanted to sever the North Eastern region of India from the mainland India through the Siliguri corridor. The primary and secondary focii were the Muslim dominated areas of the region. In the Muslim dominated areas, the ISI die-hard Pakistani agents functioned in many disguises. They used to recruit local Muslim youth to maintain and coordinate the activities of sleeping module in the Muslim inhabited areas. All the funding was canalized in a systematic manner. Muslim fundamentalist insurgent outfits, the ULFA of Assam, and the NSCN (IM) were the main groups which received a substantial assistance in the form of arms, ammunition, finance and political patronages. The political strategy of the ISI in the region were:

- (a) Assist and encourage all insurgent and militant outfits, to bleed India with the concept of sovereignty, Independence and ethnic nationalism.
- (b) Funding of NGOs, social organizations, educational institutions which are anti-Government of India.
- (c) Assist in establishment of new Madrassas and extend financial assistances for Islamic teachings.
- (d) Maintain links with the CIA and other foreign Intelligence Agencies operating in South East Asia, including North East India.
- (e) Penetrate police forces, para-military and Armed Forces of India.
- (f) Maintain a close link with politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, drug-baron, black marketeers, etc.

By late 1990's the ISI was able to achieve some of their objective in many parts of the North East India including Manipur. It was strongly believed that ISI agents were involved in the 1993 Manipuri Meitei and Manipuri Meitei Pangal flare up in Thoubal, Imphal and Jiribam areas. In April, 2003, speaking at a public rally at Dibrugarh, 450 Kms to the North East of Guwahati, Sri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India said "Our neighbours are trying their best to see that India's democracy breaking down and the country disintegrates but we shall not allow their dreams to turn into a reality".

MANIPUR INSURGENCY
Agreement for Suspension of Operation
Between the Security Forces and the Kuki
Insurgent Outfits
August, 2005

1. Kuki National Front (Samual) : KNF (Samuel)
2. Kuki National Front (Zougam) : KNF (Zougam)
3. Kuki National Front : KNF (MC)
(Military Council)
4. Kuki National Front (President): KNF (P)
5. Kuki National Army : KNA
6. Kuki Liberation Army : KLA
7. Kuki Revolutionary Army : KRA
8. Zomi Revolutionary Army : ZRA
9. Hmar People's Convention : HPC (D)
(Democratic)
10. United Kuki Liberation Front : UKLF

KUKI INSURGENTS INTO CEASEFIRE NET

In 2004-2005, the Kuki insurgents, the Kuki political parties and the Kuki politicians faced serious politico-ethnic problem from two fronts: the NSCN (IM) and the security forces of India. The NSCN-IM who slipped in their peace-talk with New Delhi tried to corner and force the Kuki ethnic groups to follow the Naga political agenda and joined Naga politics. The NSCN-IM cadres, with their green card of Naga ceasefire threatened the Kukis in all fronts. From another front, security forces put military pressure to the Kukis and the Zomi insurgents to enter into a ceasefire agreement with New Delhi like the NSCN-IM and other insurgent groups. The Government of India, with great secrecy, contacted the Kuki political leaders and leaders of Kuki insurgent outfits through its Intelligence Agencies. Hectic parleys continued between the Kukis and the officials of the Government of India which included officials of Intelligence Bureau (IB); Ministry of Home; and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DGMI). The State Government of Manipur and the officials of the state police force were not informed for reasons known to New Delhi. In August 2005, an agreement was signed between the security forces and 8 Kuki Insurgent outfits, which later on joined by two more insurgent groups. The agreement known as suspension of operation, gave a chance to many Kuki insurgents to come out in the open but retained their arms and ammunitions like the cadres of the NSCN-IM. The state police force who was not a party to the agreement continued their counter-insurgency operation against them. That brought a hell of a confusion among the security forces, para-military, the Central and state police forces. Finally, Home Ministry, Government of India informed Manipur state that an agreement known as suspension of operation and hostility was signed between the security forces and 8 Kuki insurgent outfits in Manipur and the state government should join the same for a tripartite ceasefire agreement. In 2007, high level official of Intelligence Bureau (IB), rushed to Imphal, briefed the Chief Minister, Chief Secretary, Director General of Police (DGP), Manipur and others, to implement the suspension of operation against the Kuki insurgents. However, New Delhi kept one important politico-military agenda, concerning the Manipuri Meitei insurgents, close to its chest, which baffled the state law and order Agencies. New Delhi and the security forces believed that they could corner, trap and annihilate the stubborn Manipuri Meitei insurgents along the Indo-Burma (Indo-Manipur) International borders with assistance from the Burmese military officials, Kuki and Zomi insurgent groups and the Naga insurgents who disliked the Manipuri insurgents, for simple ethnic reasons.

HMAR UNDER CROSSFIRE: 'OPERATION DRAGNET'

In early 2000 period, the Manipur insurgent outfit, the UNLF, almost controlled South Manipur, which included Chandel, Churachandpur and part of Tamenglong district. After the Sajik Tampak Operation by the counter-insurgency forces in the Chandel district of Manipur, a large number of the UNLF cadres shifted their operational infrastructures towards Churachandpur and Tamenglong districts. They built up their strong influences of insurgency movement in general areas Thanlon, Parbung, Henglep, Singhat, and Churadhandpur town areas, where the Hmar tribal groups inhabited. Due to ethnic crisis, the Hmar tribal inhabitants were more close and loyal to the Hmar Peoples Convention (Democratic), in short, HPC(D), a sub-ethnic Hmar insurgent group, operating in Manipur, South Assam and Burma. HPC(D) maintained a close relations with the NSCN (IM), who wanted

to bring the Hmar tribal sub-ethnic group under the banner of Naga ethnic group. The Hmar inhabitants used to pay 'taxes', shelters, foods and other assistances to the Hmar insurgents but not to the cadres of the UNLF. That brought a tension between the Hmar inhabitants and the UNLF cadres. The UNLF also warned the Hmar inhabitants not to give any assistance which directly and indirectly affected the insurgency movement of the valley-based insurgent group. By January 2006, clashes between UNLF and HPC(D) reported in general areas Thanlon, Tipaimukh, Parbung, Henglep and isolated places along the Indo-Burma international border. By second week of January 2006, some of the Hmar inhabitants fled towards Mizoram to avoid the crossfire between the UNLF and HPC(D). 57 Mountain

**Manipur Insurgency(2006-2007)
Hmar Tribe under crossfire**

1. **July-December, 2005.**
 - **Tension broke between HPC (D) and UNLF.**
2. 01-10 January 2006.
 - UNLF and HPC (D) cadres clashed in Tipaimukh, Parbung and Thanlon.
3. 15-17 January, 2006.
 - UNLF cadres warned Hmar tribe for abetting HPC (D) cadres.
 - Fratricidal clashes between UNLF and HPC (D) cadres.
4. 17-20 January, 2006.
 - Hmar tribe fled towards Manipur-Mizoram border.
5. 20-22 January, 2006.
 - 57 Mountain Division launched 'Operation Dragnet'.
 - Claimed flushout success.


Division, the cracked counter-insurgency division of the Indian Army, who looked after the general area, planned to launch counter-insurgency operation to flush out those cadres of the UNLF from the area. By third week of January, 2007, an Army Operation, code-named 'Operation Dragnet' was launched, under the supervision of Major-General G.G. Dwivedi, General Officer Commanding, 57 Mountain Division, located at Leimakhong, 22 kilometers to the North of Imphal. It was widely reported that the Military Operation was actively supported by the cadres of HPC (D) and important Hmar villagers with full fledged media war against the UNLF which included harassment, torture, molestation and rape. 'Insurgents molested and raped Hmar women and girls', claimed the Hmar inhabitants in South Manipur. They also claimed that the UNLF cadres used Hmar villagers as 'human shields' to stop attacks by the cadres of HPC(D). In Mizoram, Mr. C. Zoramthanga, the Chief Minister of the state instructed state officials to set up a relief camp for the Hmar and Paite refugees at Sakawrdai, the Headquarter of Sinlung Hills Development Council close to Churachandpur district of Manipur. However, the UNLF claimed that they had not raped or molested any women or girl during its chashes with the HPC (D) cadres or the Army. Media and Defence analysts closely analysed, read the situation and came to the conclusion that the insurgent outfit was a concrete disciplined group which avoided anti-people act of commission and omission. There was no doubt that the Hmar people's stand-off suffered UNLF in its image projection as a disciplined insurgent group. By 23rd January, 2007 the Army claimed that they had completed the sanitization of the 250 kilometres long Churachandpur-Tipaimukh stretch of the National Highway 150 and the Army would be deployed in the interiors of Churachandpur which included Thanlon, Tipaimukh, Parbung, Henglep etc. On

7 February, 2007, Lieutenant-General Z.U. Shah, General Officer Commanding of 3 Corps, Indian Army stated in a press conference in Imphal that insurgents (UNLF) had been flushed out from 6 Districts of Manipur by launching various military operations. On the other hand, the Manipur People's Army (MPA), the Armed wing of the UNLF, claimed that they lost 4 of their cadres during the military operation by the 'Indian occupational forces' (IOF), though the security forces claimed much more dead/killed.

After 'Operation Dragnet', the sub-ethnic hatred, mistrust, political division between the Hmar and the Manipuri Meitei increased manifolds. Hmar political leaders, with reported assistances from Military Intelligence agencies exploited, the UNLF-HPC (D) impasse for political progression; used Hmar women and children to denounce the UNLF; exploited the available media coverages; and created a political sub-ethnic imbroglio in South Manipur. After the operation, the state Government of Manipur, reestablished civil administrative infrastructures in Thanlon, Parbung, Gothai, Tipaimukh and other areas.

SOMTAL OPERATION : THE LAST BASTION

In 2007, Indian Intelligence Agencies came to know the concentration of the UNLF cadres in general area Somtal, in Chandel district of South Manipur along the Indo-Burma International border. All the villager in the tribal belt of Somtal enclave and surrounding areas belongs to the Kuki community and were Christians by religion. In November 2007, Indian Counter-Insurgents troops under the aegis of the Inspector-General of Assam Rifles, South (IGAR-S) and 57 Mountain Division launched a military operation against the cadres of UNLF, to flush them out from general area Somtal, situated close to the Indo-Burma International border. After pushed back by the security forces from Tamenglong, Churachandpur and Chandel districts, during and after 2004, Manipur insurgents, particularly the UNLF continued to offer resistances in Khengjoi, old Somtal, New Somtal and Molcham areas on the southern tip of Manipur bordering Burma. The area was dominated by the UNLF, during and after the Kargil operations, when Indian troops were pulled out from North East India for the western and the Northern sectors of India.



The Great Clashes


Throughout the globe, Indigenous Explosive Devices (IED) were used by many insurgents, militants and terrorists since early 1950's. From early 1980's, it was gradually used by insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir and in the North Eastern region of India. In July-October 2007, it was reported that the UNLF laid more than 200 IED along the routes and tracks normally used by the security forces

in general area Somtal. Some of them were laid on the ground, particularly sides of the roads and tracts used by foot patrols and some others were tied on the trees. In November 2007, units of the Assam Rifles and the Army defused more than 30 IEDs which could cause serious damages to troops and the villagers. The IED is normally exploded when trampled by unknown person or it can be exploded by remote control appliances. It is a weapon of nuisance warfare. It can be made by assembling a few explosive devices available in the local areas.

By the first week of November, 2007, the security forces started the counter-insurgency operation against the Manipur Insurgents (UNLF, PLA, KYKL) under a code-name 'Operation Somtal' under 26 Sector, Assam Rifles (equivalent to an Army Brigade) and other troops which included para commando. The operation was conducted under the overall supervision of Major-General BK Chengapa, Inspector-General of Assam Rifles (South), who was based at Mantripukhri, 8 kilometer from Imphal. The security forces in the initial stages, did not know the correct picture of the general layout of the area on ground except study carried out on the map. Somtal enclave was a hilly terrain with few roads and tracks. The area included Khengjoi, Molcham, Old Somtal, New Somtal, Dingpi, Laijang, etc. inhabited by mixed groups of Kukis. There were dense jungle areas, where it gave excellent advantages to the insurgents but a dead-trap to the advancing security forces. The area was dominated by high mountain tops, gorges, deep Nallahs, rivulets and enchanting water springs. There were some flat paddy-fields but majority of the inhabitants carried out Jhum cultivation for their livelihood. There was no sign of the existence of state administrative infrastructures in the general area. The civil and the state police personnel used to function from Thoubal or Pallel which were 70 to 80 km from Somtal. Thus the UNLF completely controlled the general area in the form of dual administration with the full blessing of the civil populace who got no alternative for their survival. By first week of December 2007, the security forces claimed that they had flushed out the UNLF cadres from Khengjoi and old Somtal areas except some area of New Somtal which were still influenced and dominated by them. Thus by January 2008, the security forces continued counter-insurgency operation in New Somtal area under the code-name 'Operation Somtal-2', to clear the 'last bastion' of the UNLF. The security forces reached New Somtal on 7 January and Molcham village on 9 January 2008. They destroyed the Headquarters, A company of 293 Battalion of MPA (Manipur Peoples Army), at Laijang and Molcham, which was 15-20 minutes drive from the metalled road to Kalembo in Burma (Myanmar). MPA (Manipur Peoples Army), the armed wing of the UNLF, suffered heavily, though they claimed that they had shifted the Battalion Headquarters of their 293 Battalion to a safer and more elevated position. UNLF cadres used to cross the international border towards Burma whenever the Indian security forces launched operation against them. New Delhi's request to the Burmese military Junta to launch military operation against the cadres of the UNLF or allowed the Indian troops to chase them inside the Burmese soil did not materialized due to political complexities. The Burmese Army were more concerned with the NSCN(K) and the ULFA cadres who had got militant camps in Shlewebo area and Hukwang valley which gave tremendous political headache to Burmese military government. However, Operation Somtal severely damaged the military capabilities of the UNLF and exposed their weaknesses and limitations to the general public. The security forces called the operation as the 'Last bastion' of the UNLF. On the other hand, the UNLF stated that 'the whole length and breadth of Manipur is a battle field and will launch attack on security forces at any time, anywhere according to convenience.' (*The Shanghai Express*, Imphal, 13 January, 2007).

OPERATION CANNON

During January-March 2008, South Manipur remained in a volatile environment due to increased insurgency movement by the UNLF, PLA and the KYKL cadres. One of the Kuki insurgent group, the UKLF controlled 50% of the space (area) of Chandel district, and maintained a close link with the security forces, collected 'taxes' freely and tried to dominate Chandel district before signing the suspension of Operation (SOO). That became the bone of contention and the clash of ethnic insurgent interest with the Manipuri Meitei insurgent outfits. On 15 March, 2008, 293 Battalion of the MPA (Manipur's Peoples Army), launched an operation code-named 'Operation Cannon' against the security forces, attacked the security post of 24 Assam Rifles, located at T. Minou (Thangbung Minou), 10 kilometres to the south of Moreh town, astride the Indo-Burma International border. The insurgents used rocket launchers; 60mm mortars; M-79 Lethod guns and approximately fired 4000 rounds of ammunition of all sorts. After the attack, they rolled down the mountain slopes towards the Tamu-Falam Highway of Kabaw Valley (Burma). Helicopters were used extensively by the counter-insurgency forces to evacuate casualties and routine administrative action after the attack. The Chairman of the UNLF, Mr. R.K. Sanayaima Singh, hailed the special fighting group of the 293 Battalion for successfully launching an attack against the security forces. The security forces lost one person (Rifleman WM Mohamad Hadish) due to bullet and burnt injuries and suffered casualties to four persons.



SUSPENSION OF OPERATION (SOO)


On 22 August, 2008, an agreement known as Suspension of Operation (SOO) was signed between the Government of India and the state government of Manipur on one side and the UPF (United Peoples Front) and the KNO (Kuki National Organisation), who represented various Kuki insurgent outfits on the other at Ashoka Hotel, New Delhi. Shri Nabin Sharma, Joint Secretary (Home), Government of India and Sri DS Punia, Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur signed on behalf of the Government of India and the state government of Manipur respectively. The agreement was for a period of one year from the date of signing. The agreement was a modified version signed between the security forces and 10 Kuki insurgent outfits in August, 2005, but not vetted by the state Government of Manipur. The UPF banner consisted of the KNF-P; ZRO; HPC-D; UKLF; KRA; KLA; KNA; KNF-Samuel; and KNF-P. The KNO banner formed by the KNA; USRA (United Socialist Revolutionary Army); UKRA; KNF-MC; KNF-Zougam; HNA (Hmar National Army); KRA-U; ZDV (Zou Defence Volunteers) and the ZRF (Zou Revolutionary Front). In January 2009, the Manipur

Government decided to set up five designated camps (out of the 10 proposed) at Vangai range and Nathajang in Churachandpur district, Chelap in Chandel district, and Shamushang and Sejang in Senapati district respectively. Each camp will accommodate 500 cadres, with a court for keeping weapons under lock and key. The dialogue process will start once the cadres are housed inside the camps.

‘OPERATION, SUMMER STORM’

During late 2008, the security forces in Manipur came to know the frequent movement and concentration of the valley-based Insurgent outfits in and around the famous Loktak lake, the inhabitat of the famous animal:- the Sangai. New Delhi announced the holding of 15th Lok Sabha election during April 2009, including the State of Manipur. The various ethnic insurgent groups in North East India planned to put their weight on the election. New Delhi directed the security forces and the Manipur police to take special security measures to maintain strict law and order during the election. The entire available Intelligence Agencies which consisted of the Intelligence wing of Manipur police, Defence Intelligence units, Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), and the Border Security forces were put on maximum alert, particularly along the porous Indo-Burma International border. By January-February 2009, the security forces in complete secrecy observed, analysed, scrutinised and followed minutely the movement of the Insurgents, particularly in and around the Loktak lake with human Intelligence, signal Intelligence and regular feed-backs by means of UAV (Unarmed Aerial Vehile). The PREPAK insurgents liberally used the Loktak lake, which included the famous Keibul Lamjao National park as hideouts and transit camp for their insurgency movement.


On the night of 11-12 April, 2009, ‘Operation Summer Storm’, a counter-insurgency operation, consisting of troops of 57 Mountain Division (Major-General Shakti Gurung, General Officer Commanding) and Manipur police (Y Joykumar Singh, IPS, Director General of police) was launched in Loktak lake, with the slithering of troops of para-command from helicopter, giving a shock therapy to the unsuspected PREPAK elements. The entire lake area was cordoned-off to block escape of those trapped insurgents. Search operation continued. Within a period of 10 days, the PREPAK lost 12 (10!) of its cadres in a high profile counter-insurgency



operation launched by the security forces and the Manipur police. For the first time, the security forces and the Manipur police worked and operated as a close-knit team which was an essential ingredient for successful counter-insurgency operation. However, villagers, who sustained their livelihood on fishing, collecting vegetables and other aquatic greens, suffered due to the conflict between the security forces and the Insurgents. The operation was called-off after 10 days. 'Operation Summer Storm' bled the already shagging morale of the PREPAK, both politically and militarily.

PART II
INSURGENT ORGANISATIONS

MANIPUR IMBROGLIO Main insurgent organisations in the North Eastern region of India



INSURGENT ORGANISATIONS

(MANIPUR, NORTH-EAST INDIA AND ADJOINING AREAS)

Insurgency and militancy movement in Manipur are closely related to the environment existing in the North Eastern region of India; Indo-Burma International border; Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal. From politico-military, demographic and geographical angle, insurgent groups operating in Manipur can be broadly classified as under:

- (a) Valley-based organisations.
- (b) Hill-based organisations.
- (c) Valley and Hill-based organisations.

2. The insurgent outfits operating in Manipur are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Manipur (Manipur Insurgent Organisations)

Valley-based	Hill-based
◆ People's Liberation Army (PLA)	◆ National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah group (NSCN-IM)
◆ United National Liberation Front (UNLF)	◆ National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang group (NSCN-K)
◆ People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)	◆ Kuki Insurgent Outfits
◆ Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)	◆ Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA)
◆ Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)	◆ Hmar People's Convention (HPC)
◆ Revolutionary People's Front (RPF)	
◆ Manipur People's Army (MPA)	
◆ Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF)	
◆ People's United Liberation Front (PULF)	
◆ Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF)	
◆ North East Muslim Liberation Front (NEMLF)	

**Both Hill and Valley-based*

There are large numbers of Insurgent outfits which belongs to other states in the region but carry a direct/indirect bearing to the imbroglio in Manipur. Most of the problems raised by them are inter-related:- sovereignty, self-determination and independence, which are some common core issue normally raised by those groups. The ideology, doctrine and principle of many of those organisations carries a direct bearing to Manipur imbroglio.

ASSAM

Insurgent organisations of Assam, which affect Manipur imbroglio and the insurgency movement in North-east India are given below (Table 2).

Table 2: Assam Insurgent Outfits

Name	Aim and Objective	Christalisation	Remarks
♦ United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)	Sovereign State of Assam	1975	
♦ National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)	Sovereign State of the Bodos (Boros)	1986	Ceasefire with New Delhi (October, 2004)
♦ Bodo Liberation Tiger (BLT)	Independent state of Bodoland	1980	
♦ Dima Halam Daoga (DHD)	Sovereign State of the Dimasas (Dhimaraji)	1990	Ceasefire with New Delhi
♦ Dima Halam Daoga (DHD) (Jewel Garlossa)	Sovereign State of the Dimasas (Dhimaraji)	1990	Ceasefire with New Delhi
♦ Karbi Longri NC Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF)	Sovereign State of Dimasas	2002	
♦ Bodo National Liberation Front (BNLF)	Sovereign Bodoland	1990	
♦ Bodo Security Forces (BOSF)	Independent Bodoland.	198	
♦ Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA)	Independent Islamic State in North East India	1990	
♦ United Liberation Front of Bodoland (ULFB)	Independent Bodoland	2007	
♦ Adivasi Cobra Military of Assam (ACMA)	Independent state of Adivasi in Assam	2006	
♦ Adivasi Viper Militant Force (AVMF) of Assam	Independent state of Adivasi in Assam	2006	
♦ Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA)	Independent Islamic state in Assam.	1990	
♦ Muslim Liberation Tiger of Assam (MLTA)	Independent Islamic state in Assam.	1991	{Many Islamic militant groups came up in Assam after the Babri Masjid demolition in Ayodhya (India)}

Name	Aim and Objective	Christalisation	Remarks
♦ Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA)	Independent Islamic state in Assam.	1995	
♦ Muslim Liberation Front (MLF)	Independent Islamic state in Assam.	1995	
♦ Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA)	Independent Islamic state in Assam.	1998	
♦ Muslim Liberation Army	Independent Islamic state in Assam.	1997	
♦ United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA)	Independent Islamic state in Assam.	1998	

NAGALAND

Insurgent organisations of Nagaland, which affect Manipur imbroglio and the insurgency movement in North-east India are given below (Table 3).

Table 3: Nagaland Insurgent Outfits

Name	Aim and Objective	Christalisation	Remarks
♦ National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Isak Muivah group:	Sovereign state of Nagaland NSCN-IM	1988	Ceasefire with New Delhi
♦ National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang group:	Sovereign state of Nagaland NSCN-K	1988	Ceasefire with New Delhi
♦ Naga National Council (NNC)	Sovereign state of Nagaland	1950	
♦ Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN)	Sovereign state of Nagaland	1956	
♦ National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Unification: (NSCN-U)	Sovereign state of Nagaland	2007	Actively involved for for unification of all Naga insurgent groups

MEGHALAYA

Insurgent organisations of Meghalaya, which affects Manipur imbroglio and the insurgency movement in North East India is given below (Table 4).

Table 4: Meghalaya Insurgent Outfits

Name	Aim and Objective	Christalisation	Remarks
❖ A'chik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)	Independent State of the Garos	1995	Tripartite ceasefire agreement in July 2004 with Union and the State Government
❖ Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (HNLC)	Independent State of the Garos	1991	
❖ Atong Liberation Army (ALA)			Shadow outfit of NSCN-IM operating in South Garo Hills
❖ Pnar Liberation Army (PLA)			
❖ People's Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLFM)		2003	
❖ United Achik National Front (UANF)		2007	Breakaway group of PLFM. Active in Dalu, Gasuapara, Purakhasia, Kherapara areas of Garo Hills bordering Bangladesh

TRIPURA

Insurgent organisations of Tripura, which affect Manipur imbroglio and the insurgency movement in North-east India are given below (Table 5).

TABLE 5: TRIPURA INSURGENT OUTFITS

Name	Aim & Objective	Christalisation	Remarks
♦ Tripura National Volunteers (TNV)	Independent State of Tripura	1975	Peace agreement with New Delhi
♦ National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	Independent State of Tripura	1990	
♦ All Tripura Tiger Forces (ATTF)	Independent State of Tripura	1990	
♦ All Tripura People's Liberation Organisation (ATPLO)	Independent State of Tripura	1980	

Name	Aim & Objective	Christalisation	Remarks
♦ Chakma National Liberation Front (CNLF)	Independent State of Tripura	1990	
♦ Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF)	Independent State of Bruland	1997	Peace accord with Mizoram (26 April 2005)

ARUNACHAL PRADESH

Insurgent organisations of Arunachal Pradesh, which affect Manipur imbroglio and the insurgency movement in North-east India are given below (Table 6).

Table 6: Arunachal Insurgent Outfits

Name	Aim & Objective	Christalisation	Remarks
♦ East-India Liberation Front (Formerly, Arunachal Dragon Force-ADF)	To recreate the pre-British era 'Teola Country' of the Tai-Khamtis	1996	Area Sadiya Lohit and Dibang

MIZORAM

Insurgent organisations of Mizoram, which affect Manipur imbroglio and the insurgency movement in North-east India are given below (Table 7).

Table 7: Mizoram Insurgent Outfits

Name	Aim & Objective	Christalisation	Remarks
♦ Mizo National Army (MNA)	Independent State of Mizoram	1960	Signed Mizo Peace Accord (Now defunct)
♦ Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram (BLFM)	Independent State of Bru (Bruland)	2004	Active
♦ Hmar People's Convention (HPC-D)	Independent State of Hmar in Mizoram, Manipur and Assam		

BURMA INSURGENT OUTFITS

The insurgency and ethnic upheaval in the North Eastern region of India, particularly in Manipur, Nagaland and Mizoram were affected by the ethnic political turmoil in Burma (Myanmar). Since 1950s, Burma was wrecked by the Burmese Communist Party (BCP); the Kachin Independent

Organisation (KIO); the Chin National Organisation (CNO); the Shan revolutionary groups; the Arakanese Independent movement; the Karen Liberation movement; Independent movement by the Wa ethnic groups and many other minority groups. They directly and indirectly affected the ethnic upheaval in the North Eastern region of India. Some of them had entered into Peace Agreement with the Burmese Military Junta and some still demanding their ethnic rights and liberties. Some important ethnic Burmese insurgent groups which carry lot of weight in the imbroglio of North-east India are given in Table 8.

Table 8: Ethnic Burmese Insurgent Outfits (which affected North-east India)

Name	Aim & Objective	Christalisation	Remarks
♦ Burmese Communist Party (BCP)	Independent Communist regime in Burma.	1950	
♦ Kachin Independent Army	Formation of Kachinland	1950	Assistances from China. Close contacts with insurgents from NE India.
♦ The Shan State Army (SSA)	Independent Shan State	1960	Assistances from China. Close contacts with insurgents from NE India.
♦ Arakanese Revolutionary Army (ARA)	Independent State of Arakan (Rakhaingpyi)	1950	[Maintain contacts with insurgents from NE India.]
♦ Arakan Communist Party (ACP)	Independent State of the Rakhine (Rakhaingpyi)	1950	Assistances from China
♦ Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP)	Independent State of Arakan (Rakhaingpyi)	1970	Suspected assistances from China.
♦ National United Party of Arakan (NUPA)	Independent State of Arakan	1980	[Suspected assistances from India. Stop by 1999-2000 AD.]
♦ Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO)	Independent Islamic State in Arakan	1980	[Assistant from Bangladesh. Base facility at Cox Bazar, Comilla and Sylhet]
♦ Chin National Vanguard Party (CNVP)	Independent Chin State	1958	Almost defunct.
♦ Chin National Liberation Party (CNLP)	Independent Chin State	1960	Not very active.

Name	Aim & Objective	Christalisation	Remarks
◆ Chin Independent Army (CIA)	Independent Chin State	1960	[Came to an end when Bo Phil Maung, the leader, was killed.]
◆ Zomi National Front (ZNF)	Independent State of Chin-Lushai	1964	[Not very active after Mizoram became a State in India.]
◆ Zomi Liberation Front (ZLF)	Independent State of Chin-Lushai	1987	[Prefer to copy status of Mizoram (India) in Burma.]
◆ Chin National Army (CNA)	Independent Chin State	1990	[Close contacts with insurgents from North East India. Armed wing of Chin National Front (CNF)]

4

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY OF MANIPUR (PLA)

- | | | | |
|----|-------------------------------|-----|---|
| 1. | Official Name | : | People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA) |
| 2. | Origin | : | Manipur |
| 3. | Year of formation | : | 25 September 1978 |
| 4. | Ethnicity | : | Manipuris (Manipuri Meiteis) Meitei Pangal, Nagas |
| 5. | Aim, Objective and Ideology : | (a) | Formation/Establishment of an independent sovereign state of Kangleipak (Greater Manipur) |
| | | (b) | Believed in communist doctrine of revolution and mass people's uprising. |
| 6. | Armed strength | : | 1800-2000 (2004-2005 AD) (Excluding civilian) |
| 7. | Area of operation | : | Manipur, Burma, Bangladesh, Assam, Tripura |
| 8. | Financial assessment | : | Rs. 50-55 crores (1999-2000 AD). |

On 25 September, 1978, an insurgent organization known as the People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA) was christallised in Manipur, under the leadership of Nameirakpam Bisheshwar Singh, a hard-core China-trained Manipuri insurgent leader. Within a short span, PLA put Manipur under insurgency flame with demand for sovereignty and independent of the state of Manipur.

AIM

To form an independent sovereign state of Manipur through armed struggle with communist doctrine of revolution.

OBJECTIVE

Believed and propagated the establishment of a pan-Mongoloid independent state in the North eastern region of India by throwing out the colonial rule of 'Imperialist India'.

IDEOLOGY

The PLA strongly reiterated, emphasized and propagated that Manipur was historically an independent princely state before it was forcibly merged with the Indian union in 1949. In its long history, it never formed a part and parcel of the Indian mainstream. The Manipuri Nationalism has got a long history of its own. The people of Manipur do not want to remain under the 'Colonial yoke of Indian imperialism' and have got complete and absolute right for self-determination as indigenous peoples.

They also believed in mass peoples uprising which formed an important ingredient in the communist doctrine of revolution. They feel that there is a need for a National Liberation movement in the North eastern region of India.

BRIEF HISTORY

During 1970-71, insurgency movement in the North eastern region of India showed an upwards swing including in the state of Manipur. That was the period when Pakistan Government was trying to suppress and crush the Bangladesh revolution movement led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, founder leader of the Awami League and father of Bangladesh. During that period, a number of insurgent outfits from the North eastern region of India obtained materials, morale, and political support from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) which included base facilities, hideouts, training areas, guerilla base, financial assistances, arms and ammunitions. Pakistan, through its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate provided all assistances to the Naga, Mizo, Manipuri, Tripura and Assamese insurgents and guerillas who raised the banner of secessionist movement. When war broke out in East Pakistan (Bangladesh), a number of insurgents which belonged to the Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM) and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) were arrested along the Indo-Bangladesh border while trying to exfiltrate from Bangladesh. In 1972, the state Government of Manipur declared a General Amnesty to all insurgents and misguided youths who surrendered voluntarily and joined the mainstream of public life. Some of them listened to the call of General Amnesty and surrendered to the state Government to lead a peaceful and purposeful life. The Government of Manipur, led by Chief Minister, Mohammad Alimuddin (MPP led United Left Front Government) literally proclaimed that insurgency movement in Manipur has come to an end. But it was not so.

Track to China

In 1973-74, some of the hardcore Manipuri insurgents who could not reconcile to the changed political environment brought by the General Amnesty refused to divorce from insurgency movement and remained committed to their demand of a sovereign independent state of Manipur. They were led by a short statured and stocky person, named Nameirakpam Bisheshwar Singh, born at Khongman, Imphal East, Manipur. On 14 June, 1975, a group of 20 Manipuri youths, under the leadership of N Bisheshwar Singh tried to cross the international border between India and Tibet (China) for training

in insurgency and Guerilla warfare from communist China. They followed the same routes and tracks used by the Nagas and the Mizo insurgents. Bisheshwar Singh divided his party into two groups. The first group landed at Kathmandu. But the second group led by him could not marry-up with the first group. Accordingly, the first group crossed Nepal-China international border and landed to an unknown Chinese military camp. The Chinese military officials who were not fluent in English and Hindi could not interact with the Manipuri insurgents who could not speak English fluently or had any knowledge of Chinese language. At later stage, some Chinese officials who could speak English were managed and the great language confusion came to an end. They were told by the Chinese military officials to come along with their leader Mr. N. Bisheshwar Singh, so that they could verify the correctness of the Manipuri insurgent group. Later on, they came back merry up with Bisheshwar Singh party in Manipur. The combined team then proceeded to Tibet, followed the same route followed by the first group, with a 'rousing reception' from the Chinese Communist officials. They were given full military training in guerilla warfare, imparted communist theory of revolution, doctinated with doctrine of mass people's uprising, and Mao's theory of communist movement in South East Asia. 75%-80% of the training schedules consisted of political lessons, programmes and policies of communists movement in South East Asia and 20%-25% to military training by the officials of the People's Liberation Army of China. After the training, the Manipuri insurgents came back to Manipur, through Tibet-Kathmandu-Guwahati (Assam)-Imphal with large quantities of arms, ammunitions, cash and training materials to organize a strong and viable Manipuri insurgent group.

The Poirei

After exfiltration from China, N. Bisheshwar Singh, and the hardcore China-trained insurgents tried to form a strong Manipur insurgent outfit by mobilizing and recruiting youths of the state. Bisheshwar Singh and his followers had a difficult time, in the initial stage, to decide a name suitable and which could be accepted by the general public. Finally, they called it as 'Poirei'. It is believed that 'Poirei' is the ancient name of Manipur, mentioned in Puya, the ancient chronicle of Manipur. Poirei could not take off as a viable insurgent outfit. One of the reason was the inability of the outfit to spell out a clear aim and objective which could be acceptable to the general public. Secondly, the name failed to arouse the sentiments of the people. Thirdly, there was a lack of vision. Bisheshwar Singh and his hard-core group failed to take of from the ground.

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA)

On 29 June 1977, the United Democratic Front (UDF), led by Chief Minister Mr. Yangmaso Shaiza, a Tangkhul Naga leader, came to power in Manipur. He was actively involved in the signing of Shillong Accord of 1975. Manipur had a political turmoil as a backlash of National political changes at the National level in New Delhi. In the neighbouring state of Nagaland, the Naga Federal Government (NFG), the insurgent outfit, led by the legendary Naga leader Mr. A.Z. Phizo, faced its own internal problem after the Shillong Accord. The accord and discord among the Naga insurgent outfits directly affected the politico-insurgency environment in Manipur. That was the time, Mr Bisheshwar and his close allies, who were in wilderness, pondered on the drawbacks of the 'Poirei' outfit; formulated new aim and objective, mobilized manpower from the urban and rural areas and

floated a new insurgent outfit. On 26 September, 1978, they announced the birth of the People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA) with a solid assistance from the People's Republic of China. In fact, PLA came up into the scene of Manipur Insurgency movement like a hurricane wind. New Delhi failed to read the changing politico-insurgency environment in Manipur when they were focusing their political attention to Naga and Mizo insurgency movement. N. Bisheshwar Singh, the Chairman of PLA, who baptized with the communist doctrine of revolution, became one of the most powerful insurgent leaders not only in Manipur but also in the North eastern region of India.

Insurgency Movement

By 1980, the Manipuri Insurgency movement came up in full swing. PLA published its own 'Red Book', which contained a heavy doses of writing of Mao-Tse-Tung thought on communist doctrine of revolution, communism and guerilla warfare. In Burma, they forged a close link with the Kachin Independent Army (KIA), the Arakanese Revolutionary Army (ARA), The Shan State Army (SSA), the Chin National Army (CNA) and old volunteers of Burma Communist Party (BCP). They also maintained working relations with the Naga, the Mizo and the Tripura insurgent groups. The KIA provided them with arms and ammunitions and assisted them in their journey to China through Kachin State (Kachin Land). In Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) of Bangladesh, they established their training camps and hideouts and concentrated in Sylhet city where a number of Manipuri populace were in existence. The external assistances provided by the Bangladesh and the Burmese Intelligence Agencies; the assistances from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the political assistances from the People's Republic of China played a vital role in the growth of PLA as a formidable insurgent outfit of North East India. Mr N. Bisheshwar Singh completely dominated the organization with an iron hand and he became a household name in Manipur just like Phizo in Naga insurgency movement.


End of Bisheshwar Period

When insurgency movement flared up in Manipur and Nagaland, 8th Mountain Division, a cracked counter-insurgency force of India, based at Jakhama (Nagaland) between Kohima (Nagaland) and Mao (Manipur), astride National Highway Number 39, swung into counter-insurgency operation against the Nagas and the Manipuri insurgents. In 1982, in one of the military operation in South Manipur, a number of PLA cadres were cordoned off at a place called Tekcham, approximately 35 kilometer to the south of Imphal. In the fierce gun battle and exchange of fire a number of PLA cadres were killed and the remainders were captured. To the great surprise of the security forces, among the captive, Mr. N. Bisheshwar Singh, the golden goose, happened to be the prized catch. That brought a serious jolt to the insurgency movement in Manipur and the PLA, momentarily became a rudderless ship. There was a vacuum in the top hierarchy of the organization with the question : After Bisheshwar Singh-who? The security forces, under Major-General VK Nayar (later on Lieutenant-General and then Governor of Manipur) tried to convince Mr. N. Bisheshwar Singh and the Manipuri insurgents the futility of the demand of sovereignty and Independence by means of Armed Insurgency movement. While he was under the custody of the Armed forces, Mr. Bisheshwar Singh was advised to fight the cause of Manipur by political means from political platform. While in Imphal Central Jail, he fought State Assembly election in January 1985 and got elected from Thongju Assembly Constituency of Imphal Valley. Consequent on his election as MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly) of Manipur

State Assembly, he was released from Imphal Central Jail and plunged into Manipur politics. However, his old colleagues and other PLA cadres started questioning the rationale behind his joining Manipur politics, leaving the flag of sovereignty and Independence of Manipur, propounded by him and followed by many young Manipuris.

PLA Resurgence

After the exit of N Bisheshwar Singh, the PLA tried to consolidate, regrouped, recouped and occupy the central spot of insurgency movement in Manipur by reorganizing its top echelon and revamping its organizational structure, men and materials. To plug the absence of political platform to handle political agenda and goal, they formed a political wing known as the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF) which also would coordinate the functioning of the Armed wing and the political wing. During 1988-1990, they took up public friendly issues:



30th Raising Day (26 February 2009) of the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF)

'Sovereignty, Independence, self-determination, and freedom movement.'

No alcohol; No drugs; No rape and assault; No corruptions etc. By 1990, they copied and followed the communists Vietcong style, during the Vietnamese Liberation War, of calling the general public to inform them for any wrongdoing by the Government, Government servants, individuals and Institutions, so that necessary punishments could be meted out. In the same year, Mr. Irengbam Bhorot Singh alias Chaorren was elected as the president of the outfit and severed all links with former chief N. Bisheshwar Singh. The RPF approached the Burmese Military Intelligence officials for assistance and hideouts on the Indo-Burma international border. The Burmese Military Government-the SLORC (State Law and Restoration Council) was unhappy with New Delhi's role of sympathizing and supporting the exiled Burmese nationals which belonged to the pro-democracy movement, led by Daw Aung San Swu Kyi (National League for Democracy) and various Kuki, Chin and Zomi Liberation movement groups operating against the interest of the Burmese Government. Thus, PLA had a free movement on the Indo-Burma international border to the great discomfiture of the Indian security forces.

By 1991-1993, the PLA trained its armed cadres at Kachin State (Burma) under the KIA. The KIA training camps included cadres from the ULFA, the Kuki insurgents and other Burmese insurgents. The basic training included the art of fighting in the frontline, minefield training, Grenade throwing, Bomb making, Rifles firing, office management and organizational administration. Once the basic training was over, the insurgents were introduced in a practical class of facing active encounter with the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw).

In 1992, PLA formed a combined revolutionary frontal organization known as the Revolutionary Joint Committed (RJC) with the PREPAK and the KCP. In 1997, when the NSCN-IM signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government of India, PLA distanced itself from the Naga insurgent outfit.

ORGANISATION

In the initial, PLA was organized as a compact insurgent group without having any clear demarcation between the political wing and the Military wing. Later on, RPF was formed as a political wing and the PLA retained the form of an Armed wing. The organisations of the RPF and the PLA are given in Table 4.1 and 4.2.

STRENGTH

- | | | | |
|-----|---------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| (a) | Total manpower | (i) 3000-3200 | (1980-1981) |
| | (Both civil and the | (ii) 2300-2500 | (1999-2000) |
| | Armed Wing) | (iii) 3000-3500 | |

(b) Classifications

- | | | | |
|-------|----------------------|---|-----|
| (i) | Uneducated Cadres | : | 35% |
| | (Upto Class VIII) | | |
| (ii) | Semi-educated cadres | : | 50% |
| | (VIII to XII) | | |
| (iii) | Educated cadres | : | 15% |
| | (Above XII Classes) | | |

**Manipur Insurgency.
Age Profile of PLA**

15-25 years	: 35%
25-35 years	: 35%
35-50 years	: 25%
Above 50 years	: 5%

- | | | | |
|-----|------------------|-------|--|
| (c) | Weapons | (i) | Rifles 303, AK-47, AK-56, M-16, 7.62 mm SLR. |
| | | (ii) | Sten Machine Carbine. |
| | | (iii) | Light Machine Gun/Universal Machine Gun. |
| | | (iv) | Mortars, Rocket Launchers. |
| | | (v) | Mines, booby traps, IEDs. |
| | | (vi) | Communication equipments. |
| (d) | Medical | (i) | Local doctors. |
| | | (ii) | Government Dispensary/ Hospitals. |
| | | (iii) | Private Nursing Homes. |
| | | (iv) | Private Pharmacies. |
| (e) | Transport | (i) | Two-Wheelers. |
| | | (ii) | Four Wheelers. |
| | | (iii) | Boats (Lake/River areas). |

FINANCES

No insurgent/militant organization can survive without having a sound and smooth financial resources from various angle. PLA, as an armed insurgency outfit, managed its finances from various sources.

Sources

- (a) Central Government departments, State Government departments Government Institutes, Private Sectors,
- (b) Businessmen, Contractors, Private companies, Transport agencies.
- (c) Government employees.
- (d) General public.
- (e) Foreign assistance.

MANIPUR INSURGENCY

PLA HOW THEY EARNED ONE RUPEE

◆ Extortion	: 70-75%
◆ Looting	: 5-6%
◆ External Assistance	: 4-5%
◆ Income generated : 8-10% actions plans	
◆ Donations	: 5-6%

Income Assessment

(a) 1985-1986	: 25-30 crores.
(b) 1990-1991	: 30-35 crores.
(c) 1995-1996	: 45-50 crores.
(d) 2000-2001	: 55-60 crores.
(e) 2005-2006	: 70-80 crores.
(f) 2010-2011 (projected)	: 95-100 crores.

SOURCES OF ASSISTANCES/ARMS/AMMUNITIONS

The PLA as a powerful insurgent organisation obtained arms, ammunitions and other assistances from different sources in South East Asian region which were full of clandestine arms dealers, gun racketeers and smugglers. Sources of assistances, arms and weaponry are as under:-

- (a) **China**
 - * Political and moral support.
 - * Training facilities.
- (b) **Bangladesh**
 - * Political and moral support.
 - * Safe sanctuaries, hideouts, training camps.
- (c) **Pakistan**
 - * Assistance of arms & ammunition through ISI (Bangladesh Desk)
- (d) **Burma**
 - * Safe sanctuaries, hideouts, training camps
 - * Political and moral support.

Breakdown of Sources : How PLA obtained their weaponry

★ Clandestine sources	: 50%
★ Friendly Insurgent groups	: 40%
★ Snatching, Looting and Ambushing	: 8%
Others	: 2%

OVERALL ASSESSMENT (2007-2008)

Strong Points

- (a) Advocated for politico-social issues of Manipur.
- (b) Generally, not involved in minor ethnic and sub-ethnic issues.
- (c) Considered as a disciplined insurgent organization from military angle.

Weak Points

- (a) Lack of charismatic leaders/Torch bearers.
- (b) Prolonged hibernation period after the exit and demise of Late N. Bishshwar Singh.
- (c) Survival depends on political pull by Bangladesh and Burma.
- (d) Major foreign assistance are minimal.
- (e) Inability to form a common platform in Manipur insurgency movement.
- (f) Fed-up syndrome of general public in Manipur insurgency movement.
- (g) Political and ethnic imbroglio with Naga insurgents.

Table 4.1: REVOLUTIONARTY PEOPLE'S FRONT (RPF)





Table 4.2: PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY (PLA)

(BRIEF SKETCH)



5

UNITED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (UNLF)

1. Official Name : United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
2. Origin : Manipur
3. Years of formation : 24th November, 1964
4. Ethnicity : Manipuri Meiteis, Khongjai, Meetei Pangal, Kabuis, Nagas
5. Aim, Objective and Ideology :
 - (a) Formation/establishment of an independent sovereign state of Kangleipak (Greater Manipur).
 - (b) Believed in mass people's uprising through armed revolution
6. Armed Strength : 2100-2300 (2000-2001 AD)
(Excluding civilian)
7. Area of operation : Manipur, Tripura, Assam, Bangladesh, Burma
8. Financial Assessment : Rs 80.00 Crores (1999-2000 AD)

On 24 November, 1964, an insurgent organization known as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), was raised in Manipur by some Manipuri youths, when the Naga and the Mizo insurgents put the Northeastern region of India under fire. Later on, the composition of the outfits was augmented by some sub-tribes and communities of the state. Within a short time, UNLF became one of the most powerful insurgent outfits in Manipur.

AIM

To form an independent sovereign state of Manipur in the Indo-Burma region through armed struggle against the 'Colonial rule of India'.

OBJECTIVES

They consists of the following:

- (a) Campaign for a National People's Democratic revolution in the Indo-Burma region.
- (b) Liberation of Manipur from India's colonial grip.
- (c) Committed to intimate development of a genuine democratic form of Government, free from the non-progressive and the repressive character of the colonial past.
- (d) Committed to a truly prosperous future of the people in the region. ,

IDEOLOGY

The UNLF strongly believed in the mass people's uprising through armed revolution. They believed that from historical perspective, the Indo-Burma region always had a unifying distinctive common character. To achieve the political and military objectives, there is a need to transform the National liberation struggle into a broad based united front for a National liberation movement. They believed that the people of Manipur had to consolidate unity by raising the level of political consciousness and awareness among its populace. The outfit strongly propagated the concept of Manipuri Nationalism and its age-old cultural heritage.

The UNLF strongly defended, as faith accompli, that Manipur was a princely independent state before it was forcibly merged with the Union of India in 1949. The state has got its own distinct social life, traditions, cultural heritages, social characters and customs, which were quite different from the mainstream of India. The people of the state have got full right and liberty for self-determination as indigenous people under the charter of the United Nations Organisation.

BRIEF HISTORY

In early July, 1959, some young Manipuris, due to frustration, anger and disillusionment with the socio-economic backwardness and ailment of social life, formed an insurgent outfit known as the Meitei State Committee (MSC) in the fertile valley area of Manipur. In 1963, Nagaland was carved out from Assam as the 16th state of the Union of India. The Manipuri, particularly the ethnic majority Manipuri Meiteis (Meiteis) were completely disillusioned, disheartened and a sense of alienation, mistrust, lack of faith and anger against the Central Government's policy cropped up in the minds of Manipuri youths. If Nagaland could be formed by means of insurgency movement, why could not Manipur attained Independent and Sovereignty by the same means. The 1964-65 became the bench mark for the evolution and revolution of Manipur Insurgency movement.

It was during this period that some Manipuri youths from the valley area formed an insurgent organization known as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) in Manipur. It was christened in Imphal valley under Sri. Arambam Somorendra Singh, a young, energetic and flamboyant person from greater Imphal area. In 1968-69, it was splitted into two groups due to conflicts for leaderships and ideological differences. One group formed an organization known as the Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM) under the leadership of Sri Oinam Sudhir Singh, who held from Yaiskul, Imphal. The UNLF preferred to have a strong working relations with the powerful Naga and the Mizo insurgent

groups. Shortly, they followed the Naga insurgents' tracks and established insurgent base, training camps, hideouts in Chittagong Hills Tracts (CHT) in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). During and after the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, the UNLF cadres suffered heavily in men and materials due to the sudden geo-political changes in the region. In 1972, the Chief Minister of Manipur, Mohammad Alimuddin, the first Muslim Chief Minister of Manipur, declared a General Amnesty to all insurgents, who surrendered voluntarily and unconditionally. A number of UNLF and the RGM cadres surrendered voluntarily. Some were rehabilitated, some were settled down, some were absorbed in the State Government's services and some were left high and dry. With a sagging morale, lack of charismatic leaders, depleted men and materials, organizational drawbacks, sub-ethnic tensions and conflicts, lack of financial resources, pressure from the security forces, the UNLF was completely pinned down on the ground but not written off. In the meantime Mr. Oinam Sudhir Singh, the ex-RGM supreme was exterminated on ideological ground and the RGM came to a natural dead.

Resurgence

The period of 1975-1980 show the emergence of a number of insurgent outfits in Manipur and the Northeastern region of India. The UNLF consolidated its position with active recruitment drive, organizational revamping, streamlining financial resources, systematic supply of arms and ammunitions sorting out leadership problem, and maintaining close ties and cooperation with the Naga insurgents. They maintained close working relations with the NSCN. They secured training camps inside Burma which included Somra Tract area, Hukawng Valley, Homalin, Shwelebo, Maunkan, Tamu Kelemyo where one of the NSCN leader Mr. S.S. Khaplang, a Burmese born Hemi Naga had complete sway and authority. During this time, a flamboyant Manipuri youth, Rajkumar Meghan Singh (alias Sanayaima Singh), borned at Yaiskul, Imphal and a post graduate degree-holder of Jadavpur University, Calcutta, occupied the leadership chair. In 1980, Manipur was declared a disturbed area and the Armed Forces (Special Power) Act, 1958, was imposed on the state. Correspondingly, the UNLF was banned in the state as an unlawful organization. In 1988, the outfit played an important role in mediation between the NSCN(IM) and NSCN (K) not to bifurcate. In 1989-90, there was an internal crisis and one senior leader Mr. Namoijam Oken Singh, a resident of Soibam Leikai, Imphal broke away with few peoples and announced the formation of UNLF, Oken Faction (UNLF-O). At later stages, UNLF(O) transformed itself into the Kangleipak Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL). In 1990-95, UNLF maintained a strong posture insurgency movement in the North Eastern region of India. On 22 May 1990, they joined hands with the NSCK (K) and the ULFA of Assam and formed a united insurgent front known as the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF), demanding an independent sovereign state in the Indo-Burma Region. They politically and ideologically targeted the NSCN(IM) led by Mr. Isam Chishi Swu (Nagaland) and Mr. Th. Muivah (Manipur). In 1992, the UNLF formed its Armed wing and christened it as the Manipur People's Army (MPA). In 2003, it formed an umbrella armed group known as the Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF) with the PLA and the PREPAK. In January 2005, the UNLF launched a politico-insurgency war by raising the plesbicite for Manipur for a lasting solution of the Indo-Manipur conflicts under the supervision of the UNO.

ARMED CONFLICTS

Though raised in 1964, the UNLF could not play any important role in the insurgency movement in Manipur and surrounding areas till 1980's. During 1980-85, they adopted the principle of political

warfare, relegating the armed conflict with the security forces in the second place. They focused their activities more on the political objectives and strategies rather than resorting to an all out armed uprising and struggle against New Delhi. They concentrated their energy on publicity, propaganda, public relations, psychological warfare and Media war game. Before resorting to armed struggle, they wanted to lay down a solid foundation for armed revolutionary movement by developing a clear agenda, strategies and public consciousness of the question of self-determination, finally leading to the birth of an independent sovereign state of Manipur in the Indo-Burma region.

Upto 1990's, the UNLF avoided any major direct armed conflicts with the security forces of India. They maintained their influence of insurgency movement between the Chindwin river (Burma) and Manipur. They joined small-scale operations under the banner of IBRF. They did not believe Mr. Th. Muivah, the supremo of the NSCN-IM, a Tangkhul Naga from Manipur, who championed for a Naga cause. In 1992, when the Naga-Kuki ethnic clashes broke out, the UNLF appealed to both the Naga and the Kukis insurgents to maintain peace and harmony so that the National Liberation struggle could continue without any deviation from its ultimate aim. In April 1995, when the Indian security forces launched 'Operation

Golden- Bird', with the aim of capturing and neutralizing the Manipuri insurgents, the cadres of the UNLF avoided a direct armed conflict and managed good escapes from the Indo-Burma international border towards Burma. However, UNLF cadres targeted their operation against the central paramilitary forces and the Manipur Rifles (MR). On 31 August 1995, in a daring mid-night operation, the MPA cadres overpowered the Manipur Rifles (MR) personnel on a guard duty at the Telecommunication Department's Repeater centre on the Kangchup Hill, west of Imphal, astride NH-53 and looted all arms and ammunitions without facing a single shot from the personnel on guard duty. In November 1996, the UNLF refused to accept the unconditional peace-talk offered by Mr. HD Deve Gowada, the Prime Minister of India. In July 1997, when the NSCN-IM signed a cease-fire agreement with New Delhi, UNLF show the political game plan and gear-up its cadres for direct armed conflicts with the security forces.

By 1999-2000 AD, they converted Sajik Tampak as the main tactical Headquarters and training location for Manipuri insurgents. Churachandpur, Chandel and part of Tamenglong districts came under their influences and grips. From 2001-2002, they had a series of armed conflicts with the 'Indian occupational forces' (Indian security forces) at Sajik Tampak, Thangjing Hills, Ziribam, Kabaw Valley,



**R.K. Meghen Singh @ Sanayaima
Chairman, UNLF**

Thanlon, Parbung, Henglep, Singhat, Churachandpur, Karang Island, and the Somtal enclave'. By 2005-07, the UNLF suffered a psychological defeat due to the incessant military operations launched by the Security forces; the inter-factional clashes and killing amongst the Manipuri insurgents; the political thaws between the Manipuri Meiteis, the Naga and the Kukis; and India's political pressure to Burma to check-mate the insurgent outfit on their soil.

ORGANISATION

The UNLF has got its political as well as the Armed wings. They are given in Table 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.

Strength

- | | | | |
|-----|---|-----------------|---|
| (a) | Total manpower | (i) 1000-2000 | (1980-1981 AD) |
| | (Both civil and the | (ii) 3500-4000 | (1999-2000 AD) |
| | Armed Wing) | (iii) 3500-4000 | (2004-2005 AD) |
| (b) | Classification | | |
| | (i) Uneducated Cadres (Up to Class VIII) | : | 30% |
| | (ii) Semi-educated cadres (VIII to XII) | : | 55% |
| | (iii) Educated cadres (Above XII Classes) | : | 15% |
| (c) | Weapons | (i) | Rifles 303, AK-47, AK-56, M-16, 7.62 mm SLR. |
| | | (ii) | Sten Machine Carbine (SMC) |
| | | (iii) | Light Machine Gun/Universal Machine Gun, AGL (Automatic Grenade Launcher) |
| | | (iv) | Mortars, Rocket Launchers. |
| | | (v) | Mines, booby traps, IEDs. |
| | | (vi) | Communication equipments. |
| (d) | Medical | (i) | Local doctors. |
| | | (ii) | Government Dispensary/Hospitals. |
| | | (iii) | Private Nursing Homes. |
| | | (iv) | Private Pharmacies. |
| (e) | Transport | (i) | Two-Wheelers. |
| | | (ii) | Four Wheelers. |
| | | (iii) | Boats (Lake/River areas). |

Manipur Insurgency. Age profile of UNLF

15-25 years	: 40%
25-35 years	: 35%
35-50 years	: 20%
Above 50 years	: 5%

Finances

No insurgent/militant organization can survive without having sound and smooth financial resources from various angles. UNLF, as an armed insurgent outfit, managed its finances from various sources.

Sources

- (a) Central Government departments, State Government departments, Government Institutes, Private Sector.
- (b) Businessmen, Contractors, Private companies, Transport agencies.
- (c) Government employees.
- (d) General public.
- (e) Foreign Assistance.

Income Assessment

- (a) 1975-1976 : 3-4crores.
- (b) 1980-1981 : 8-10 crores.
- (c) 1985-1986 : 13-15 crores.
- (d) 1990-1991 : 35-40 crores.
- (e) 1995- 1996 : 55-60 crores.
- (f) 2000-2001 : 80-85 crores.
- (g) 2005-2006 : 95-100 crores
- (h) 2010-2011 : 120-140 crores
(projected)

MANIPUR INSURGENCY**UNLF
HOW THEY EARNED
ONE RUPEE**

- ◆ Extortion : 65-70%
- ◆ Looting : 4-5%
- ◆ External : 5-7%
- Assistances
- ◆ Income generated : 15-17%
actions plans
- ◆ Donations : 4-5%

Sources of Assistance/Arms/Ammunitions

The UNLF as a powerful insurgent organisation obtained arms, ammunitions and other assistances from different sources in South East Asian region which was full of clandestine arms dealers, gun racketeers and smugglers. Sources of assistances, arms and weaponry are as under"

- (a) **China** * Political and moral support.
- (b) **Bangladesh** * Political and moral support.
* Safe sanctuaries, hideouts, training camps.
- (c) **Pakistan** * Assistance of arms & ammunition
- (d) **Burma** * Safe sanctuaries, hideouts, training camps
* Political and moral support.
- (e) **Friendly** * Arms, ammunitions, hideouts, training camps, sanctuaries.
insurgent outfits
(NSCN (K),
ULFA, KIA, ARA

OVERALL ASSESSMENT (2007-2008)

Strong Points

- (a) Championed for politico-social issues of Manipur.
- (b) Generally not involved in minor ethnic and sub-ethnic issues.
- (c) Considered as a disciplined insurgent organization from military angle.
- (d) Not involved in political and ethnic assassinations/killings of politicians.

Weak Points

- (a) Likely vacuum of charismatic leaders/Torch bearer after Mr. R.K. Meghen Singh faded out from the scene.
- (b) Survival depends on Burma's politico-military honeymoon with India.
- (c) No identifiable major foreign Assistances.
- (d) Fed-up syndrome of general public in Manipur insurgency movement.
- (e) Inability to form a common platform for Manipur insurgent outfits.
- (f) Political and ethnic imbroglio with Naga insurgents.

Breakdown of Sources: How UNLF obtained their weaponry

★ Clandestine sources	: 60%
★ Friendly Insurgent groups	: 30%
★ Snatching, Looting and Ambushing	: 7%
Others	: 3%

Table 5.1: UNITED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (UNLF)

BRIEF SKETCH OF ORGANISATION

Chairman : Mr. R.K. Meghen Singh
(Alias Sanayaima Singh)

General Secretary : N. Thabal Singh
General Headquarters: Indo-Burma
International Border

- ☛ Home Secretary
- ☛ Finance Secretary
- ☛ Publicity, Propaganda and Education Secretary

Political Wing

- Central Committee
- ☛ Home Affairs
- ☛ Defence Affairs
- ☛ Finance Affairs
- ☛ Foreign Affairs
- ☛ Political Affairs
- ☛ Law and Justice
- ☛ Publicity and Information

Armed Wing

- Manipur Peoples Army (MPA)
- ☛ Commander-in-Chief
- ☛ Deputy Commander-in-Chief
- ☛ Adjutant
- ☛ Quarter Master General
- ☛ Medical Officer
- ☛ Camp Commandant





Table 5.2: MANIPUR PEOPLE'S ARMY (MPA)



6

KANGLEIPAK COMMUNIST PARTY (KCP)

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| 1. Official Name | : | Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) |
| 2. Origin | : | Manipur |
| 3. Years of formation | : | 1954-55 |
| 4. Ethnicity | : | Manipuris |
| 5. Aim, Objective and Ideology | : | (a) Formation/establishment of an independent sovereign state of Kangleipak (Greater Manipur).
(b) Believed in communist doctrine of revolution and armed struggle. |
| 6. Armed Strength
(Excluding civilian) | : | 350-400 (2004-2005 AD) |
| 7. Area of operation | : | Manipur, Burma, Assam. |
| 8. Financial Assessment | : | Rs. 13-14 Crores (1999-2000 AD) |

The Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) is an insurgent organization formed by some communist-oriented Manipuri youths in the valley area of Manipur. It is an old organization, seeded in the Imphal valley as early as 1954.

AIM

The aim of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) is to establish a sovereign independent state of Kangleipak (Greater Manipur).

OBJECTIVE

The KCP demanded that a sovereign state of Kangleipak (Greater Manipur) should be formed by the people in the region by throwing out the 'colonial rule of Imperialist India'. They propagated that the working class, the rural poor and the peasantry in Manipur should struggle for a revolutionary movement for a solution for an independent state of Kangleipak.

IDEOLOGY

The KCP believed in communist doctrine of revolution and mass people's uprising. They believed in the concept of Armed Revolution which formed the fulcrum of peasant's revolution against imperialism. They strongly denounced the Government of India and the Security Forces and reiterated that Manipur was annexed forcibly by India in 1949. They propagated that the people in the region should overthrow the capitalist Indian Government by means of National Liberation movement formed by the working class, peasants, rural poor etc. A struggle of the working class and revolutionaries against the exploiting classes, capitalism and the 'colonial concept of Indian Imperialism' will have an effect on other sections of the society and bring victory to the people in the region.

BRIEF HISTORY

In early 1930's, like democracy, communist political movement, considered as an old institution, spread out in the North Eastern region of India and Manipur state in a visible form. In Manipur, though political discontentment were seen, there was no serious sign of insurgency and extremist movement. During 1948-51, there were some signs of revolutionary movement launched by the Communist Party of Manipur, under the leadership of Jananeta comrade Hjam Irabot Singh, a charismatic, firebrand communist leader, who hailed from Imphal (Manipur). In 1950-51, people in Manipur came to know the existence of the Armed Resistance group of the Communist Party of Manipur, when they killed some police personnel and looted its armoury at Mayang Imphal, approximately 35 km to the south of Imphal, the capital of Manipur. They also made contacts with the three communists parties of Burma—i.e. the Communist Party of Burma (Thakin Than Tu); the Burma Communist Party (Thakin Son) and the People's Comrade Party (Bidu-A-Bo). Due to political and social changes, the revolutionary movement in Manipur, started by the Communist Party, could not achieve its desired aim and objective due to the untimely demise of comrade Irabot Singh on 16 September 1951 at Tangbo village near the bank of Ningthee river. In 1954-55, as a continuation of the communist revolutionary movement, the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) was raised in Imphal valley area as an armed revolutionary group.

Though raised after the demise of Jananeta comrade Hjam Irabot Singh, the KCP did not come out into the open as an insurgent organization till early 1970's. During 1954-1970, the movement of the organization was on a very low level politico-insurgency movement. During 1970-80, they showed their presence in the valley areas of Manipur along with other insurgent outfits. They established their stronghold in Imphal East, Imphal West and part of Thoubal District. They followed other valley-based insurgent outfits and made foothold in Burma and Bangladesh for base and training camps. They also managed hideouts, based camps and training areas in Assam,



Comrade (Late) Y. Ibohanbi Singh, aka Paji Ibohanbi Singh, Chairman KCP (Ibohanbi group)

Born in Pungdongbam, Sawombung, Imphal East Manipur (India). Took part in communist revolutionary movement in Manipur, North East India and Indo-Burma region in early 1960's. Founder member of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) along with comrade (Late) Ibopishak Singh (aka Paji Ibopishak) in early 1980's. Played an important role in the insurgency movement in North East India. Killed by Indian Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in Imphal East on 01 July, 1995.

Tripura and Meghalaya. They normally carried out heavy extortion from civilian, civil government employees, Government's Departments, Businessmen etc. They were against the 'Mayang' (outsiders) who illegally entered Manipur, who carried out business in Manipur and tried to control the economic movement of the state. At one stage the 'Mayang' issue (Foreigner's issue) formed an important agenda of the insurgency movement of the KCP.

In early 1980's there was an open internal conflict and differences of opinion on the aim and objective of the organization. Some of the top leaders wanted to maintain a close link with the Communist Party of Manipur and continued their movement in the form of politico-insurgency movement. However, some other leaders did not

subscribe to the changed policy and wanted to maintain its own identity, distancing itself from the politicians and political parties. That brought a vertical split of the organization. One group was led by Sri Comrade Y. Ibohanbi Singh and was known as the KCP (Ibohanbi Group) and the other led by Comrade M. Ibopishak Singh and known as the KCP (Ibopishak). The KCP maintained a stronghold in Sawombung, Lamalai, Yaingangpokpi, Yairipok, Kakching, Imphal West and some parts of Bishenpur Districts.

Manipur Imbroglia

Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)

Factional groups by 2005-2006 AD

- * KCP (Ibopishak) group
- * KCP (Ibohanbi) group
- * KCP (Lamphel Luwangcha) group
- * KCP (Noyon) group
- * KCP (Ak Shyamsunder aka Kokkai) group
- * KCP (City Meitei) group.
- * KCP (MC) group.
- * KCP (Nganba) group
- * KCP (GS) group
- * KCP (Sengoi) group

Comrade Ibohanbi Singh, before the split, served as the commander-in-chief of the undivided KCP organisation under comrade M. Ibopishak Singh, who was the Chairman of the outfit. The emergence of two factions of the outfit rang the downsliding communist insurgency movement in Manipur and the surrounding areas. On 01 July, 1995, comrade Y. Ibohanbi Singh was killed by the security forces (Central Reserve Police Force) in Imphal East, Manipur. KCP (Ibohanbi) group was in complete desarray. To the great advantages of the Indian security forces, the Manipuri Meitei Insurgent groups (UNLF, PLA, PREPAK, KYKL, KCP etc.) started factional wars and clashes among themselves. In September, 2003, UNLF invited both the factions of the KCP at Sajik Tampak (South Manipur) to resolve their factional clashes. However, it did not achieve the desired result. By 2004-2005 AD, security forces and Intelligence Agencies operating in Manipur and Manipur and North East India identified large number of factional groups of the outfit. On 14 April, 2008, KCP celebrated their 28th raising day. President, Ksh. Sengoi sent out the messages that factionalism and factional clashes would never achieve revolutionary aim and efforts of the Manipur insurgent outfits.

By 2007-2008, Intelligence Agencies contacted some groups and tried to convince them for ceasefire as armed insurgency movement would not be able to solve Manipur Imbroglia. On 17 January, 2009, during 'Operation Grand Slam' (Manipur Police; Delhi police; and Intelligence officials, 57 Mountain Division, Indian Army), most of the top leaders of KCP (Mangang); KCP (Lamphel Luwangcha) and KCP (City Meitei) who were trying to form a united group, were arrested from

New Delhi. In February, 2009, during 'Operation Grand Slam II' (Manipur Police; Mizoram Police; Intelligence officials, 57 Mountain Division), top ranking functionary of the KCP (MC) group, Mr KC Lanheiba Meitei (code name) was arrested from Aizawl (Mizoram). By 2009 AD standard, political and defence analyst felt that, KCP, one of the oldest insurgent group (Revolutionary group) in South East Asia, with high doctrine of mass people uprising, presented itself as an old leaking country boat ready to sink in Manipur, Irrawaddy or Chindwin river, when the rainy season come.

ORGANISATION

The KCP can be described as a valley-based Manipur insurgent outfit which dominated insurgency movement in Manipur from early 1950's till late 1990's. The organization of the outfit is given at Table 8.1.

Strength

(a) Total manpower (Both civil and the Armed Wing)	(i)	900-1000	(1975-1976 AD)
	(ii)	1000-1300	(1980-1981 AD)
	(iii)	1300-1500	(1985-1986 AD)
	(iv)	1000-1100	(1990-1991 AD)
	(v)	900-1000	(1995-1996 AD)
	(vi)	800-900	(2000-2001 AD)
	(vii)	700-800	(2005-2006 AD)

(b) Classification

- (i) Uneducated Cadres (Upto Class VIII) : 35%
- (ii) Semi-educated cadres (VIII to XII) : 50%
- (iii) Educated cadres (Above XII Class) : 15%

(c) Weapons

- (i) Rifles 303; AK-47; AK-56; M-16; 7.62 mm SLR.
- (ii) Sten Machine Carbine.
- (iii) Light Machine Gun.
- (v) Mines/Booby traps/IED.
- (vi) Communication equipments.



End of Road: End of Revolution!!

Naorem Amumacha Singh (Age 56) residence of Khongman Bashikhong, Imphal East, Manipur a hard-core KCP insurgent, was arrested from New Delhi on 17 January 2007 by a combined team of Delhi Police, Manipur Police and Intelligence officials of 57 Mountain Division of the Indian Army. He was elected as the President of a United KCP group formed by the KCP (Mangang), KCP (City Meitei) and KCP (Lamphel) factions. Indian Intelligence Agencies gained optimum advantage from the factional fights among the various factions, and groups of the insurgents.

- (d) **Medical**
- (i) Local doctors.
 - (ii) Government Dispensary/Hospitals.
 - (iii) Private Nursing Homes.
 - (vi) Private Pharmacies
- (e) **Transports**
- (i) Two-Wheelers.
 - (ii) Four Wheelers.
 - (iii) Boats (Lake/River areas).

**Manipur Insurgency.
Age profiles of KCP**

15-25 years	: 30%
25-35 years	: 40%
35-50 years	: 25%
Above 50 years	: 5%

Finances

No insurgent/militant organization can survive without having sound and smooth financial resources from various angles. KCP, as an armed insurgency outfit, managed its finances from various sources.

Sources

- (a) Central Government departments, State Government departments, Government Institutes, Private Sectors.
- (b) Businessmen, Contractors, Private companies, Transport agencies.
- (c) Government employees.
- (d) General public.
- (e) Foreign Assistances.

Income Assessment

- (a) 1980-1981 : 2-3 crores.
- (b) 1985-1986 : 9-10 crores.
- (c) 1990-1991 : 15-16 crores.
- (d) 1995-1996 : 18-20 crores.
- (e) 2000-2001 : 15-16 crores.
- (f) 2005-2006 (Both factions) : 10-11 crores.
- (g) 2010-2011 (projected) : 10-11 crores.

MANIPUR INSURGENCY

KCP HOW THEY EARNED ONE RUPEE

■ Extortion	: 80-85%
■ Looting	: 10-12%
■ External Assistances	: Negligible
■ Income generated by actions plans	: 10-12%
■ Donations	: 2-3%

Sources of Assistances/Arms/Ammunitions

Sources of assistances, arms and weaponry are as under:

- (a) **Burma**
 - * Safe sanctuaries, hideouts and training camps.
 - * Political and moral support.
- (b) **Bangladesh**
 - * Political and moral support.
 - * Training camps, safe sanctuaries, hideouts.

- (c) **Friendly Insurgent Outfits** : Arms and Ammunitions
Mutual Assistancess
(UNLF, KYKL,
Kuki Insurgents)

OVERALL ASSESSMENT (2007-2008)

Strong Points

A strong influence in the political movement of communism in Manipur and adjacent areas.

Weak Points


- Bankrupt in leaders/Torch bearers after 1990's.
- Inability to form or merged with other insurgent outfits.
- Minimal military significance from counter-insurgency warfare angle.
- Limited area of operation/maneuverability.
- Negligible external assistances.
- Silent public wrath, anger and fed-up syndrome.
- Too many factions: End-game for natural dead?

Breakdown of Sources: How KCP obtained their weaponry

- ★ Clandestine sources : 25%
- ★ Friendly Insurgent groups : 60%
- ★ Snatching, Looting and Ambushing Others : 10%
- : 5%

Table 6.1: KANGLEIPAK COMMUNIST PARTY (KCP)

(BRIEF SKETCH)



PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF KANGLEIPAK (PREPAK)

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Official Name | : | People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) |
| 2. Origin | : | Manipur |
| 3. Years of formation | : | 09 October 1977 |
| 4. Ethnicity | : | Manipuris |
| 5. Aim, Objective and Ideology | : | (a) Formation/establishment of an independent sovereign state of Kangleipak (Greater Manipur).
(b) Believed in mass peoples uprising and communist doctrine of revolution. |
| 6. Armed Strength
(Excluding civilian) | : | 600-650 (2004-2005 AD) |
| 7. Area of operation | : | Manipur, Assam, Meghalaya |
| 8. Financial Assessment | : | Rs. 20 Crores (1999-2000 AD). |

The People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) is an insurgent organization formed by some valley-based Manipuri youths in the urban area of Imphal valley in early 1970's. The organization was raised on 9 October, 1977 on the sacred hill-top of Koubru Hill, 36 Kiliometre to the north of Imphal, astride National Highway Number 39 (NH-39), Senapati district of Manipur. The organization was crystallised under the leadership of one young, charismatic and flamboyant Manipuri youth, Mr. Raj Kumar Tulachandra Singh and his buddy and comrade Mr. Maipak Sharma.

AIM

To form a sovereign, independent state of Kangleipak (Greater Manipur) in the Indo-Burma region.

OBJECTIVE

PREPAK believed that the people of Manipur should re-establish the Kangleipak state (Land of Manipur) which was in existence in the olden days by means of revolutionary movement. They also believed that the people in the region have got absolute right for self-determination and complete sovereignty by throwing out the 'colonial yoke of Indian imperialism'

IDEOLOGY

The PREPAK strongly believed in the communist doctrine of revolution and mass people's uprising. They propagated, emphasized and reiterated that Manipur had its own distinctive character as an independent princely state known as Kangleipak. In olden days, Kangleipak country (Greater Manipur) included all ethnic groups in the region: the Manipuri Meiteis, the Nagas, the Kukis, and a number of smaller communities. They advocated that there was a need to start revolutionary movement for the re-establishment of Kangleipak state by uniting all communities, and ethnic groups.

BRIEF HISTORY

From 1972 till 1979, Manipur faced serious political upheaval and turmoil in its political history. Within a span of 7 years, the Chief Minister of the state were changed four times. In 1977, the wind of the National political changes and environment in New Delhi also affected the state political environment. The Naga and the Mizo insurgency movements seriously affected the political, socio-economic, cultural and the social life of the people of Manipur. The same was compounded more by the insurgency movement of the valley-based Manipur insurgent organisations which included the UNLF and the low key communist-oriented cadres of the KCP. In 1974, the United Democratic Front (UDF) State Government led by Chief Minister Mr. Yangmaso Shaiza, a Tangkhul Naga from Ukhrul District of Manipur, a charismatic and upright person, ruled the state for almost 5 months (10-5-1974 to - 05-12-1974). But, he was dislodged by the Congress-led coalition party under Sri RK Dorendra Singh, a political heavy weight, seasoned politician, and charismatic figure who started his political career as a firebrand socialist youth leader. The Congress-I coalition government ruled the state for almost 2½ years (06-12-1974 to 13-05-1977). However, in the national scene, the congress-I lost power in New Delhi, replaced by the Janata Dal and the wind of political changes swept most of the Indian states. The Congress-I coalition state government in Manipur led by Sri RK Dorendra Singh was brought down and the UDF formed state government again under Mr Yangmaso Shaiza as Chief Minister and ruled the state for almost 2½ years (1977-1979).

The political turmoil in Manipur, compounded by the Naga and Mizo insurgency movement, seriously affected many ethnic groups and sub-groups in the state and surrounding areas. Some of the Manipuri youths were against the policy of the state and the central government of appeasing and concentrating all efforts to the Naga insurgency problem totally neglecting the socio-economic, cultural and social upliftment of the Manipuris who followed the path of democratic movement. Some of them due to frustration, anger and disillusionment with the social and political environment, decided to form a Manipuri Insurgent group to challenge the Central government on the same politico-insurgency principle adopted by the Nagas, the Mizos and other ethnic insurgent groups in the region. Accordingly, in October, 1977, they selected the thick Jungle covered high Hill-top of Koubru Hill which was

considered as one of the most important sacred place in the state, as the location to solemnized the birth of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK). Most of the Manipuris believed that any decisions or promises solemnized on the top of the Koubru Hill always led to positive blessings. Those young Manipuris, along with few girls climbed the hill, established well organized camps, erected banners and fastens, and announced the launching of a Manipur insurgent organization on 09 October 1977 on the top of the Hill.

INSURGENCY MOVEMENT

In 1977, when the PREPAK came into the scene of Manipur as an insurgent organization, there was hardly any Manipur-based insurgent organization, except the UNLF who could call the shot. Within 2-3 years, the organization contacted the Naga and the Mizo insurgents for assistances like arms, ammunition, training facilities, base facilities etc. They recruited a number of young boys and few girls particularly from the valley area of Manipur for armed insurgency and guerilla movement. A few cadres under the leadership of RK Tulachandra Singh and Maipak Sharma exfiltrated from Manipur, entered Bangladesh, contacted other North East India's insurgent groups, established based camps and training areas in the Sylhet Division and the Chittagon Hill Tract (CHT) areas of Bangladesh along the Indo-Bangladesh border. They purchased a few arms and ammunition from friendly insurgent organisations, international black marketeers, gun-runners, and Narco-traffickers. After getting necessary training, they infiltrated into Manipur and carried out vigorous urban guerilla movement particularly in the Imphal valley areas. They carried out heavy extortion from civilian, Government employees, Government Departments, businessmen etc. They came down very heavily against the 'Mayangs' (Foreigners' – People from outside Manipur) who carried out business in the state. RK Tulachandra Singh became a house-hold name and completely controlled the outfit with an iron hand.

However, by early 1980's, the organization faced a serious leadership crisis due to differences in opinion between the two top leaders RK Tulachandra and his junior partner Maipak Sharma. The internal feud came into the open and charges and counter charges went on daily in the local newspaper. The insurgent outfit was on the brink of dissection. Maipak Sharma and his faction was suspected of having a tacit relations with some politicians in the valley areas of Manipur. Within a short time Maipak Sharma was exterminated and the organization continued under the leadership of RK Tulachandra Singh. On 19 February 1980, RK Tulachandra Singh was arrested. During 1980-88, the insurgent outfit was seriously caught in the ethnic politics of the Nagas and the Manipuri (Meities) when Mr. Rishang Keishing ruled the state as Chief Minister for 8 years. The Meitei, Meitei Pangal (Manipuri Muslims) and some Kuki politicians blamed the Chief Minister (Rishang Keishing) for supporting and helping the Naga insurgents operating in Manipur and Nagaland, though the same was refuted by him (Rishing Keishing). On the other hand, the Chief Minister blamed the Manipuri (Meitei) politicians for helping and assisting the Manipuris insurgents. Some of the politicians were even blamed for their involvement in the formation of the PREPAK. The ding-dong political battles for supremacy brought a serious rift between the valley-based insurgent outfits and the Hill-based Naga insurgent outfits.

From the very beginning, the PREPAK strongly reiterated that the issue of Kangleipak (Greater Manipur) was in trouble as the 'Foreigners' had already taken roots inside Manipur. They strongly

objected to the domination and control of the state economy by the people from outside the state with no genuine interest in socio-economic development except siphoning of the natural wealth of the state. From 1991-92, they started movement against those outsiders and illegal immigrants, who entered the state illegally, exploited the socio-economic fabric of the region and slowly taken roots inside the state. Within a short time, all the outsiders were coined as "Mayang" which mainly included large number of uneducated labours from Bihar, UP and Bangladesh; businessmen and traders from Rajasthan, Punjab, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal; big businessmen, Narco-traffickers, black marketeers and gun-runners from South India. The outfit took up the issue of Mayang (Foreigner) very seriously. However, they failed to neutralise and destroy the economic hold of the 'Mayang' (outsiders) as the same was deep-rooted and too strong. All the political parties and politicians used to depend on the 'money power' of those 'Mayang businessmen' to win election. In fact, the economy of the state of Manipur was totally controlled by three elements: Mayang businessmen; National Highways Number 39 and 53, and the insurgent groups.

In 1993, the organization faced another crisis. The internal conflicts of the PREPAK erupted again. The faction led by late Maipak Sharma was very much against the top leaders of the organization. In March 1993, RK Tulachandra Singh, who was under threat internally, was shot dead by its own cadres and the PREPAK as an insurgent went into the doldrums. In 1994-95, they tried to retrieve their old glory with new recruitment drive, heavy extortion from general public and forming alliances with other valley-based insurgent groups. On 9 October, 1995, during XIXth Foundation Day celebration, the PREPAK reminded the general public and reiterated that freedom of the people and its land, both in Hills and the plains had already faded away since the merger of Manipur into the Indian 'Imperialist Government', forcibly on 15 October 1949. They also reminded the people that no one should forget that issue. They propagated that the foreigners (Mayangs) had taken over large areas of land and formed save enclaves at Ziribam, Moreh, Saparmeina, Kalapahar, Kanglatongbi, Koirengei, Mantripukhri, Pukhao, Thangal Bazar, Serou, Saiton etc. Those foreigners, instead of establishing industries and carried out socio-economic upliftment, had turned those places into market places of Narco-trafficking, drug manaces, gun-running, illegal business in precious gem and stones, illegal settlement etc. Such actions which were against the socio-economic, cultural, traditional and ethnic aspirations of the people of Manipur would seriously damaged the future generation of Manipur and the people in the Indo-Burma region. In October-November 2004, again inter-factional crisis erupted in PREPAK. One

PREPAK celebrates 19th Foundation Day

Operation Sunny Vale glaring example of colonialism: PREPAK

Imphal: Oct. 7 "The most greedy attitude of expansion of colonial regime in the south east Asia has already kicked our Kangleipak into a real Neo-colonial state today. Under such policy programme of the Indian Government in Manipur, the foreigners have already taken its root at several places such as Jiribam, Moreh, Saparmeina, Kalapahar, Kanglatombi, Koirengei, Mantripukhri, Pukhao, Thangal Bazar, Serou, Salton etc. Instead of establishing industries the place has turned into a market place for Indian goods only. The teaching of Indian history has replaced the past Kangleipak. Indians are replacing the people of Kangleipak." ...

—19th Foundation Day of
PREPAK; 07 October, 1995;
Imphal, Manipur.

group was led by Nongdrenkhomba, the Vice-Chairman and the other by the General Secretary. The UNLF and the General Secretary of the PREPAK proposed that both the insurgent outfits should unite and formed a single platform. However, the Vice-Chairman expressed his desire to consult the Red Army of the PREPAK through a convention before disbanding the organization (PREPAK). That brought a factional crisis and clashes from November 2004 onwards (Kumbi Haotak incident: 17 November 2004; Khordak Ichil incident: 09/10 January 2005).

ORGANISATION

The PREPAK can be described as a valley-based Insurgent Organisation of Manipur. Its Military Wing (Armed Wing) is known as the Red Army. The organization of PREPAK is given in Table 7.1:

Strength

(a) Total manpower (Both civil and the Armed Wing):

- (i) 1000-1200 (1980-1981 AD)
- (ii) 1500-2000 (1990-1991 AD)
- (iii) 1200-1500 (2000-2006 AD)
- (iv) 800-1000 (2005-2006 AD)

(b) Classification

- (i) Uneducated Cadres (Upto Class VIII) : 45%
- (ii) Semi-educated cadres (VIII to XII) : 40%
- (iii) Educated cadres (Above XII Class) : 15%

(c) Weapons (i) Rifles 303, AK-47, AK-56, M-16, 7.62 mm SLR.

(ii) Sten Machine Carbine.

(iii) Light Machine Gun/Universal Machine Gun.

(iv) Mortars, Rocket Launchers.

(v) Mines, booby traps, IEDs.

(vi) Communication equipments.

(d) Medical

(i) Local doctors.

(ii) Government Dispensary/Hospitals.

(iii) Private Nursing Homes.

(iv) Private Pharmacies.

(e) Transport

(i) Two-Wheelers.

(ii) Four Wheelers.

(iii) Boats (Lake/River areas).

Manipur Insurgency. Age profiles of PREPAK

15-25 years	: 35%
25-35 years	: 40%
35-50 years	: 20%
Above 50 years	: 5%

Finances

No insurgent/militant organization can survive without having a sound and smooth financial resources from various angles. PLA, as an armed insurgency outfit, managed its finances from various sources.

Sources

- (a) Central Government departments, State Government departments, Government Institutes, Private sectors,
- (b) Businessmen, Contractors, Private companies, Transport agencies.
- (c) Government employees.
- (d) General public.
- (e) Foreign assistance.

Income Assessment

- (a) 1980-1981 : 1.5-2.00 crores.
- (b) 1985-1986 : 07-10 crores.
- (c) 1990-1991 : 18-20 crores.
- (d) 1995-1996 : 23-25 crores.
- (e) 2000-2001 : 20-21 crores.
- (f) 2005-2006 : 20-21 crores.
- (g) 2010-2011 : 25-30 crores.
(projected)

MANIPUR INSURGENCY**PREPAK
HOW THEY EARNED
ONE RUPEE**

- Extortion : 80-85%
- Looting : 10-12%
- External : Negligible
Assistances
- Income generated : 8-10%
actions plans
- Donations : Negligible

Sources of Assistance/Arms/Ammunitions

The PREPAK a valley-based insurgent outfit of Manipur obtained arms, ammunition and other assistances from different sources in North East India. Sources of assistances, arms and weaponry are as under:

- (a) **Burma** : * Safe sanctuaries, hideouts and training areas.
- (b) **Bangladesh** : * Political and moral support.
* Training camps, hideouts and safe sanctuaries.
- (c) **Friendly Insurgent Outfits** : Arms and Ammunitions
(ARA, KIA Kuki Insurgents)

OVERALL ASSESSMENT (2007-2008)**Strong Points**

- (a) Still continuing for the politico-social cause of Manipur.
- (b) Carry some political wave in valley areas.

Weak Points

- (a) Bankrupt in leaders/torch bearers after the demise of RK Tulachandra Singh and Sri Maipak Sharma.
- (b) Inability to merge with other insurgent outfits.
- (c) Fed-up syndrome, silent public wrath and anger.
- (c) Low military significance from counter-insurgency warfare angle.
- (d) Limited areas of operation/maneuverability.
- (e) Negligible external assistance.

Breakdown of Sources: How KCP obtained their weaponry

- Clandestine sources : 60%
- Friendly Insurgent groups : 40%
- Snatching, Looting and Ambushing : 8%
- Others : 2%

Table 7.1: PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF KANGLEIPAK (PREPAK)

BRIEF SKETCH

◆ Chairman: A Ngangba Meitei

◆ General Secretary:
Mr. Subhash aka Biren Singh
Singh Alias Paliba
◆ Vice Chairman: Nabachandra
Singh Alias Nongdren Khomba

Political Wing

- ◆ Home Secretary: Ratan Singh
aka B. Ibomcha
- ◆ Finance Secretary : Sarat Singh
aka Miraba
- ◆ Deputy Finance Secretary
- ◆ Publicity, Information and Media

Armed Wing

Commander-in-Chief :
Ningthoujam Chinkhei aka Shanti
Deputy Commander-in-Chief
Adjutant General
Quarter-Master General

1st Battalion
(Myanmar)

2nd Battalion
(Bishenpur)

3rd Battalion
(Thoubal)

© Manipur Imbroglia
Lt-Col. T. Hemo Singh

KANGLEIPAK YAWOL KANNA LUP (KYKL)

1. Official Name : Kangleipak Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)
2. Origin : Manipur
3. Years of formation : 1994
4. Ethnicity : Manipuris
5. Aim, Objective and Ideology : (a) Formation/establishment of an independent sovereign state of Kangleipak (Greater Manipur).
(b) Believed in armed revolution, insurgency movement and armed struggle.
6. Armed Strength (Excluding civilian) : 650-700 (2004-2005 AD)
7. Area of operation : Manipur, Assam, Burma, Meghalaya
8. Financial Assessment : Rs. 30 Crores (1999-2000 AD).

The Kangleipak Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) is a valley-based insurgent organization of Manipur formed by some break-away insurgents from the UNLF, KCP and PREPAK. In early 1989, a faction led by Mr. Namoijam Oken Singh, a resident of Soibam Leikai, Imphal East, Manipur and Mr. Toijamba Singh, a resident of Thoubal District, Manipur, broke-away from the UNLF and formed the United National Liberation Front, Oken faction, UNLF(O) which later on christened as the Kangleipak Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL).

AIM

To establish a sovereign independent state of Kangleipak (Greater Manipur) in the Indo-Burma region.

OBJECTIVE

KYKL believed that an independent state for the people of Manipur should be formed by waging a revolutionary war against the colonial rule of India.

Kangleipak Yawol Kanna Lup believed in social awakening of the people and mass people's uprising against the Democratic Government of India. They feel that the young generation of Manipur has been drifted towards the wrong direction and the same should be saved by social awakening from complete ruin and elimination.

BRIEF HISTORY

In 1988-89, when Mr. Namoijam Oken Singh and Mr. Toijamba Singh, formed a new organization by breaking away from the UNLF, they were bogged down for an acceptable name for the new organization. However, in military parlance, particularly in the Northeastern region of India, it was generally known as the UNLF(O), to distinguish it from the original organization—the UNLF, led by Mr. R.K. Meghen Singh. Mr. R.K. Meghen Singh believed that a close relations with the NSCN (K), led by Mr. S.S. Khaplang would achieve tremendous advantages and politico-strategic benefits to the Manipuri insurgency movement, considering the ethnic political perceptions, aim and objectives and the geo-political environment along the Indo-Burma region. However, the break-away group had a different perception and wanted to have a close tie with the NSCM-IM. Finally UNLF (O) failed to take off and the general public refused to accept them as an insurgent outfit.

After cooling their heels, the UNLF(O) tried to stand on their feet as an outfit. On 25 April, 1994, they announced the formation of an organization known as the Kangleipak Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) with assistances from the NSCN(IM). In 1995, an organization known as the Self Defence United Front of the South East Himalayan Region was formed by the NSCN-IM and the KYKL became a member of the same. In May, 1995, KYKL was divided into two factions, one group led by Sri Oken Singh known as KYKL(O) and the other led by Sri Achou Toijamba Singh known as the KYKL(T). In 1997, Mr. Oken Singh was arrested and later on released on bail. While on bail, he flew out into the wind, rejoin his outfit, never to return to face charges legally framed against him by the Government of Manipur. In 1999, both the factions, KYKL(O) and KYKL(T) tried to regroup and flexed its muscle in the Imphal Valley.

By 2000-2001, to build up its images and for short-term political gains, they struck the educational sector of Manipur including the kidnapping of the Director of Education, Government of Manipur. They announced capital punishment for his involvement in corruptions, mismanagement and nepotism. However, due to public pressure, Educational Staff, Educational Institutions, strikes, upsurge in protests etc. he was awarded 'lesser punishment'—shot on the thigh and left at a prominent place in Imphal East. There was a public outcry against the act of commission and omission of the outfit.

SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL

In spite of their best effort to show an excellent social images, the KYKL was always suspected by the Manipuri society for their cosy honeymoon with the NSCN (IM). The valley populace could not accept the rationale of the outfit maintaining a close and working relations with the Naga outfit when both of them had divergent political aim and objectives, and critical issue of state integrity. The social disapproval of the outfit reached its climax on 18 June, 2001—the great June uprising. The Naga insurgent groups were demanding 'Greater Nagaland', which included large chunks of 'Kangleipak State' (Greater Manipur), the dreamland of the KYKL. Politically, ethnically and

ideologically, there was no meeting point or converging vortex between the two insurgent organisations except fooling around the general public and intelligentsia of Manipur and adjacent areas. By January, 2002, both the factions (KYKL-O and KYKL-T) realized the gravity of the social indignation against the outfit, held several meetings to reunite, formed a single insurgent groups keeping in view the public anger and the sentiment of the Manipuri society. In February 2002, both the groups united. A military commission, having all military powers was formed under Namoijam Oken Singh. Another Adhoc Executive Committee, headed by Mr Achou Toijamba Singh as General Secretary was also formed. They distanced themselves from the NSCN-IM and its satellite Kuki insurgent outfit: the United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF). The result: in February 2003, its cadres suffered serious setbacks and casualties in Chandel district, the stronghold of the UKLF, due to counter-insurgency operation carried out by the Assam Rifles. In December, 2002, the outfit imposed a 'dead penalty' on Mohammad Maniruddin Sheikh, Minister of state for education (School) for corruption, concerning the appointment of Block research coordinators for the Centrally sponsored Sharva Shiksha Abhiyan Scheme (SSAS) in Manipur. Five hostages kidnapped by them were released due to public pressure and appeal. In 2004, they kidnapped the Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar of Manipur University and shot them on their knees: a punishment popularly known as 'Capping', widely used by the IRA in Britain. The outfit claimed that it was a part of their social action known as 'Operation New Kangleipak' (ONK) which aimed for cleansing of corruption and nepotism in Manipur.

RESURGENCE

By 2005-06, KYKL concentrated its insurgency movement in Greater Imphal, Churachandpur, Bishenpur and Moreh areas. They improved the manpower strength by constant recruitment drive with monetary benefits to young insurgents. By 2007, they were able to muster a total strength of 950-1000 persons including the overground workers (OGW). However, they had some setbacks when the Kuki insurgent groups signed a memorandum with the Army for cessation of hostility and firing (suspension of operations) in Manipur, particularly in Hill areas.

By 2007, KYKL, suffered politically and militarily when the Indian security forces, particularly 57 Mountain Division and the Assam Rifles under the command of the Inspector General of Assam Rifles (South), IGAR (South), carried out a series of counter-insurgency operation in Manipur, particularly along the Indo-Burma International border (Churachandpur, Chandel, Ukhrul etc.). The relentless military operation against the outfit by the security forces in the hill areas with helping hand from the Kuki and the Naga insurgent outfits seriously damaged the military capability and the punching power of the KYKL cadres. Finally most of its top leaders fled to Burma (Myanmar), imbedded in area of Falam, Tamu, Minya, Shwelebo, Maungkan and Homalin astride the Indo-Burma International border. They maintained close relations with the UNLF, PLA, KIA and the ULFA cadres. To augment a sound financial position, some financial sectors, which included Government's contract job, construction of roads and drains; supply and devlivery, transport business; recruitment and selection and other non-visible social action. 'Tax' collection from Greater Imphal area continued in full swing, 3-5% of the salary of the Government employees were collected in real earnest and 8-10% deductions from the profits of the Government's contractors continued without any inhibitions. The proscribed organisation required sufficient and healthy fund to purchase arms, ammunitions, accessoreis from

the clandestine gun-runners and other insurgent outfits which included the KIA, SSA and the ARA in Burma and Islamic insurgent group in Bangladesh and friendly insurgent groups in north-east India. By 2008 A.D., the general public in Manipur became very irritating, anguished and angry with the outfit for their senseless killing of innocent people (killing of migrants, 17-18 March, 2008). The intra-factional clashes and killings among the various Valley-based insurgent outfits also affected the morale, capability, and acceptability of the outfit in the Manipur insurgency movement.

ORGANISATION

The organisation of KYKL is given in Table 8.1.

Strength

(a) Total manpower (Both civil and the Armed Wing)

- (i) 250-300 (1995-1996 AD)
- (ii) 400-450 (2000-2001 AD)
- (iii) 950-1000 (2005-2006 AD)

(b) Classification

- (i) Uneducated Cadres (Upto Class VIII) : 35%
- (ii) Semi-educated cadres (VIII to XII) : 50%
- (iii) Educated cadres (Above XII Classes) : 15%

(c) Weapons: (i) Rifles 7.62 SLR, AK-47, AK-56, M-16.

(ii) Sten Machine Carbine.

(iii) Light Machine Gun.

(v) Grenade/Explosives/IED

(vi) Communication equipments.

(d) Transport (i) Two Wheelers.

(ii) Four Wheelers.

(iii) Boats (Lake/River areas).

Manipur Insurgency. Age profiles of KYKL

15-25 years	: 40%
25-35 years	: 40%
35-50 years	: 15%
Above 50 years	: 5%

FINANCES

Sources

- (a) Central Government departments, State Government departments, Government Institutes, Private Sectors.
- (b) Businessmen, Contractors, Private companies, Transport agencies.
- (c) Government employees.

- (d) General public.
- (e) Foreign Assistances.

Income Assessment

- (a) 1995-1996 : 3-4 crores.
- (b) 2000-2001 : 25-30 crores.
- (c) 2005-2006 : 30-35 crores.
- (d) 2010-2011 : 40-50 crores (projected).

Sources of Assistance/Arms/Ammunitions

Sources of assistance, arms and weaponry are as under:

- (a) **Bangladesh**
 - * Political and moral support.
 - * Training camps, hideouts.
- (b) **Burma**
 - * Safe sanctuaries, hideouts and training camps.
 - * Political and moral support.
- (c) **Friendly Insurgent Groups** : Mutual Assistance.
(PLA, UNLF, UKLF, ANVC)

OVERALL ASSESSMENT (2007-2008)

Strong Points

Advocated for public friendly socio-economic issues of Manipur.

Weak Points

- (a) Lack of charismatic and recognizable leaders to hold the flag.
- (b) Aim and objectives does not commensurate with their activities.
- (c) Involved in more fear psychosis to the general public rather than soft approach.
- (d) Public anger, wrath and fed up syndrome.
- (e) Low military significance from counter-insurgency warfare angle.


MANIPUR INSURGENCY KYKL HOW THEY EARNED ONE RUPEE

- Extortion : 75%
- Looting : 10%
- External Assistances : Negligible
- Income generated : 15%
actions plans
- Donations : Negligible

Breakdown of Sources: How KYKL obtained their weaponry

- Clandestine sources: 75%
- Friendly Insurgent : 15%
groups
- Snatching, Looting : 5%
and Ambushing
- Others : 5%

Table 8.1: KANGLEIPAK YAWOL KANNA LOOP
(KYKL)



NATIONAL SOCIALIST COUNCIL OF NAGALAND ISAK-MUIVAH GROUP (NSCN-IM)

- | | | |
|---|-----|--|
| 1. Official Name | : | National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Isak-Muivah group
NSCN (IM) |
| 2. Origin | : | Nagaland |
| 3. Years of formation | : | 1988 |
| 4. Ethnicity | : | Main sub-groups:
Sema, Pochuri, Ao, Sangtam, Rengma, Lotha, Zeiliang,
Angami, Tangkhul |
| 5. Aim, Objective and Ideology : | (a) | Formation/establishment of an independent sovereign
state of Nagaland. |
| | (b) | Believed in insurgency movement and mass people's
uprising. |
| 6. Armed Strength
(Excluding civilian) | : | 2400-2500 (2004-2005 AD) |
| 7. Area of operation | : | Nagaland, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Western Burma |
| 8. Financial Assessment | : | Rs 190.00 crores (1999-2000 AD). |

In early 1990's, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Isak-Muivah group, in short form, the NSCN (IM), was considered as one of the most dreaded and powerful insurgent groups in the North Eastern region of India. It was formed in 1988 due to the bifurcation of the erstwhile Naga insurgent organization, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, the NSCN. Mr. Isak Chishi Swu, a Sema Naga from Nagaland became the chairman and Mr. Thuigaleng Muivah, a Tangkhul Naga from Manipur state, the general secretary of the insurgent group. Over a period of time, the NSCN (IM)

pioneered the Naga insurgency movement and took the leading role in the campaign for a 'Naga cause'. Finally in August 1997, they clinched a cease-fire agreement in Nagaland with the Government of India, followed by peace talk for solving the vexed Naga insurgency problem.

AIM

The aim of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Isak-Muivah group, the NSCN(IM) is to establish an independent sovereign state of Nagaland through armed insurgency movement and mass people's uprising.

OBJECTIVE

They believed that the Nagas has got their own distinct ethnic character, tradition, cultures, customs and social life which were quite different from the Indian way of life. The Nagas have the full right for self-determination as an indigenous group by establishing a sovereign state of Nagaland, by means of armed insurgency movement.


IDEOLOGY

The NSCN (IM) strongly emphasized and propagated that the 'Nagas are not Indian and will never form a part of India'. They attained independence on 14 August 1947, one day earlier than India, when the British rule in India came to an end. The Indian, by virtue of its power are occupying 'Nagas Land' through the medium of its armed forces. The act of commission and omission of the 'Indian Colonial Armed Forces' have completely destroyed the Naga Nationalism and the Naga way of life. There is a strong need to unite all the Nagas, inhabiting the North-Eastern region of India under one single unit. To achieve Naga sovereignty, there is a need to adopt the concept of armed revolution and armed insurgency movement against the Government of India and particularly against the Security Forces (SF). The Nagas have got the historical right to remain as an independent state.

BRIEF HISTORY

The insurgency movement in Nagaland had travelled a long way in its chequered history in the North-Eastern region of India. Mr. A.Z. Phizo, the father of the Naga insurgency movement, coined the concept of a sovereign independent state of Nagaland as early as 1950's. On 14 August, 1947, Phizo and his fellow Naga followers declared independence of Nagaland. On 16 May, 1951, a 'plebiscite' was conducted on the question of whether the Nagas wanted an independent state or remain within the Union of India. A few thousand persons were marshaled from urban areas of Naga Hills, particularly from Kohima, Zunheboto, Tuensang, Phek etc. and a 99% vote in favour of Naga independence was declared. On 22 March 1956, the Naga underground group declared the formation of the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) at Phen Sinyu village in Kohima district. On 01 December 1957, the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area (NHTA) was created as an autonomous district directly under the Governor of Assam, acting on behalf of the President of India. On 01 December 1963, Nagaland was constituted as the sixteenth state of the Union of India. During that period, A.Z. Phizo left India and took shelter in London, carried out the Naga insurgency movement with no end. In December 1963, Nagaland went into the poll for its first Assembly which consist of 60 Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA). The Naga National Organisation (NNO) won the election and formed a state government.

In 1964, a peace-mission was formed with a peace centre at Chedema near Kohima in the hope of bringing a cease-fire and finally peace in Nagaland. In August 1964, with hope and strong determination, an agreement designed to bring about a cease-fire throughout Nagaland for the purpose of enabling to bring peace was signed between the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) and the peace mission, on behalf of the Government of India. On 14 August 1964, the Governor of Assam and Nagaland, Sri Vishnu Sahay issued the order for the suspension of operations agreement. From 1964 till 1969, a number of peace-talks were held



Celebration of 20th Raising Day of NSCN at Chomi Village, (India)

between the Government of India and the Naga insurgent group. In November 1975, an accord, known as the Shillong Accord was signed between the Naga underground group and the Government of India. However, a large section of the insurgents refused to accept the Accord and denounced those people who signed the Accord as 'Anti-Naga', 'Anti-National', Betrayer of the Naga people etc. In 1979, those insurgents who did not recognize the Shillong Accord, formed another Naga insurgent group known as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). In the organizational set-up, Isak Chishi Swu became the Chairman, Mr Thuingaleng Muivah, the General Secretary and Mr SS Khaplang the Vice-Chairman respectively. From 1980 to 1986, the Government of India took many political actions to control the insurgency movement in the North-Eastern region of India. Bilateral relations with the neighbouring countries: China, Bangladesh, Nepal and Burma were improved. The Government of India sent many feelers and proposals to the NSCN leaders to come to the negotiating table and solve the vexed Naga problem.

It was during that period that accord and discord among the ethnic Naga groups which formed the NSCN came up in the open. The powerful ethnic Sema Naga, the Angami Naga, the Ao Naga from Nagaland and the Tangkhul Naga from Ukhrul district of Manipur dominated the activities of the NSCN and relegated other Naga tribes like the powerful Koyak, the Chakesang, the Pochuri, the Khemungren, the Lotha, the Rengma etc. into the second rung. Smaller ethnic Naga group and sub-groups from Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh almost turned into non-entity. In 1987, there was serious difference of opinion and ethnic suspicion between the groups led by Mr Isak Chishi Swu and Mr Th. Muivah on the one hand and SS Khaplang on the other. Isak Chishi Swu and Th Muivah were supported by the Sema Naga, the Angami Naga, the Rengma, the Lotha and particularly by the Tangkhul Naga. On the other hand, SS Khaplang was supported by ethnic Naga groups, the Konyak, the Chakesang, the Pochuri, the Khemungren, the Sangtam etc. from Nagaland and the Hemi Naga, the Pangni Naga and other tribes from western Burma. Mr Khaplang's group blamed the Isak

Chishi Swu and his companion Th Muivah. By 1988, the NSCN was divided into two groups: the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Isak-Muivah group, known as the NSCN(IM) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang group, known as the NSCN(K) led another faction.

INSURGENCY MOVEMENT

In early 1990's, the tactical concept of the NSCN(IM) was to wage insurgency warfare against the Government of India, apply internal and external pressure by politico-insurgency means, internationalised the Naga issue and finally demand a sovereign Naga country. In 1990-91, the outfit carried out large scale recruitment among the Naga youths under the banner: 'Nagaland for Christ'. A number of bloody ambushes were carried out against the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Border Security Force (BSF), the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), the Assam Rifles and the Army with serious casualties and loss of life. The NSCN-IM was able to internationalise the Naga issue and opened a number of offices in South-East Asia: Bangkok, Singapore, Bangladesh, Europe and North America. They managed to get admission to the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) which was an NGO based in Hague and was very popular with ethnic insurgent organisations all over the world. In fact, the UNPO had nothing to do much with the various official activities of the United Nations. In 1993 the NSCN(IM) also used the easily available international stick of Human Rights and approached the UN Human Rights Commission session in Geneva for redressal of grievances. In 1993-94, the ISI established well-organised intelligence module in many parts of Assam, Nagaland, Tripura, Manipur, West Bengal, Bangladesh and Burma. Mr. Th. Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu frequently used the ISI conduits for political, moral and material supports. They strongly alleged that the Chief Minister of Nagaland SC Jamir, on Ao Naga, was helping the NSCN(K), a charge refused by the Chief Minister. NSCN(IM) also attempted to kill SC Jamir on many occasions. The first attempt was made in 1987, in Forest Colony, Kohima where his wife was seriously injured. In 1992, a second attempt was made at Nagaland House, New Delhi where Jamir was hit on the chest by a bullet, but survived. The inter-factional clashes and fight between the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN(K) brought dirty upheavals in Nagaland politics. In 1994, the Governor of Manipur, Lt-Gen (Retd) V.K. Nayar in a report to the President of India, recommending President's rule in Manipur, linked the names of Mr. Rishang Keishing a Tangkhul Naga who occupied the Chief Ministership of Manipur and other Naga politicians to the NSCN(IM) and Mr. SC Jamir to the NSCN(K) respectively. The Security Forces in Nagaland protested strongly against the manner of release of Mr Khuya Hurie, the self-styled Finance Secretary of the NSCN(IM) by the state government of Nagaland on flimsy ground. The NSCN(IM) sent a number of its cadres as students in schools and colleges in Meghalaya (Shillong), Manipur (Imphal, Senapati) and Assam. Many top leaders of the outfit acquired properties in Dimapur, Kohima, Shillong, Agartala, Silchar, Guwahati, Imphal, Senapati, Chandel etc. to give cover for their insurgency movement.

CEASEFIRE: JULY 1997

In 1996-97, the momentum for a peace-talk to solve the vexed Naga problem show some light. A number of top-level functionaries of the outfit were arrested in Nagaland and surrounding areas by the Security Forces. On 15 July 1997, a cease-fire agreement was signed between the Government of India and the NSCN (IM) to be effective from 01 August of the same year, covering a period

of three months. Peace-talk were held between the representatives of both the parties at regular intervals at Dimapur, the commercial city of Nagaland. A cease-fire monitoring group, an apex body to see the implementation of the agreement, was established at Dimapur (Diphupar). The cadres of the NSCN (IM) were allowed to concentrated and established camps at designated places in Nagaland, within the rules, regulations and frameworks agreed upon as per Cease-Fire Ground Rules (CFGR). During that period, the NSCN(IM) never stopped their act of insurgency. In 1997, they planted explosive devices at the farmhouse, at Chumukedima (Dimapur) which belonged to Chief Minister Mr. SC Jamir and tried to assassinate him by exploding the same. Third time, SC Jamir survived.

The NSCN (IM) strongly believed in the concept of ethnic cleansing and carried out the same against the Kukis in Manipur. Large number of Kukis were dislocated from one place to another. Finally, the NSCN (IM) was able to concentrated all the Nagas in Senapati, Tamenglong and Ukhrul District of Manipur by means of ethnic cleansing and claim a Naga inhabited areas. During the lull-period of Cease-fire, they extorted huge amount of money, recruited young Naga boys (between 14-16 years) and girls (between 13-16 years). By April 1999, many NSCN (IM) leaders, who were in foreign countries and foreign bases, started tickling down in Nagaland. Isak Chishi Swu and Mr Th Muivah came to Nagaland, discussed the Nagaland insurgency problem with various sections of the general public, church leaders and the Naga Ho Ho. The Central Government interlocutor for peace-talk in Nagaland, Mr Swaraj Kaushal, clearly sent the messages that sovereignty might be inalienable for Isak Chishi Swu and Mr Th Muivah but not for the central Government of India.

A number of insurgency movements related incidents occurred during the period of repeated cease-fire extensions from 1999 till 2007. The



Unauthorised NSCN-IM camp, Siroy village, Ukhrul district Manipur, 2009

Fragile and limbotic politico-military strategy of India in Manipur.

The National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Isak-Muivah group (NSCN-IM) entered into a cease-fire agreement with the Government of India on 01 August, 1997 covering the whole state of Nagaland. Later on, in 2001 AD, addition of additional words like 'Without territorial limit' created politico-ethnic havoc in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The NSCN-IM clandestinely established 'designated camp' in Siroy village, Ukhrul district, Manipur, on the plea that the agreement was 'without territorial limit; Manipur Government objected that the agreement was applicable to Nagaland state. Troops of the Assam Rifles removed those NSCN-IM cadres from Siroy hill-top on 02 February, at 9:30 a.m. but with loud politico-ethnic noises from NSCN-IM; overground Nagas and sympathisers of Naga insurgency movement. They were allowed to move to one of the 'politically disputed camps' (3 camps) in Manipur.

NSCN(IM) was heavily involved in Naga-Manipuri ethnic flare up in July 2001, particularly in Senapati District of Manipur. The United Naga Council (UNC), a politico-social Naga organization in Senapati District (Manipur) was totally controlled, financed and eclipsed by the NSCN(IM) cadres. They were used as a political weapon by the Naga insurgent organization, under Mr VS Atem (a former 'Chief-of-Staff' of the 'Naga Army' to achieve the final aim and objective of the formation of 'Southern Nagaland'. The organization involved politically and physically in the Manipur Assembly election of February 2002. They were responsible for the defeat of the oldest surviving Naga political figure in Manipur, Mr Rishang Keishing. The NSCN(IM) had a series of perennial clashes and conflicts with its arch rival—the NSCN(K), particularly in Dimapur for easy money. 25%-30% of the extortion money in Nagaland by the NSCN(IM) accounted from Dimapur town only. Interfactional clashes between the NSCN(IM) and the NSCN(K) became a regular routine incident in Dimapur and the surrounding areas.

ORGANISATION

The NSCN-IM is a powerful insurgent outfit, which carried out insurgency movement in Nagaland and adjacent areas. Its political wing and the Armed Wing are given in Table 9.1 and 9.2 respectively:-

Strength

(a) **Total manpower** (Both civil and the Armed Wing),

(i) 2000-2100 (1990-1991 AD)

(ii) 3500-4000 (2000-2001 AD)

(iii) 4500-5000 (2005-2006 AD)

(b) **Classification**

(i) Uneducated Cadres (Upto Class VIII) : 40%

(ii) Semi-educated cadres (VIII to XII) : 50%

(iii) Educated cadres (Above XII Classes) : 10%

(c) **Weapons**

(i) Rifles .303, AK-47, AK-56, M-16, 7.62 SLR.

(ii) Sten Machine Carbine.

(ii) Light Machine gun/Universal Machine gun.

(iii) Mortars, Rocket Launchers.

(v) Mines, Booby traps, IEDs.

(vi) Communication equipments.

(d) **Medical**

(i) Local doctors.

(ii) Government Dispensary, Hospitals.

(iii) Private Nursing Home.

(iv) Private Pharmacies.

**Manipur Insurgency.
Age Profile of NSCN-IM**

15-25 years : 25-35%

25-35 years : 30-35%

35-50 years : 30-35%

Above 50 years : 3%

- (e) **Transport** (i) Two wheelers.
(ii) Four wheelers (Light and heavy vehicles)

FINANCES

Sources

The NSCN-IM has got multiple sources of income. They are as under:

- (a) Government Departments and Institutions.
- (b) Businessmen, Contractors, Private Companies, Transport Agencies.
- (c) Government Employees.
- (d) Foreign Assistance.

Income Assessment

- (a) 1989-1990 : 40-45 crores.
- (b) 1995-1996 : 120-130 crores.
- (c) 2000-2001 : 190-200 crores.
- (d) 2005-2006 : 280-300 crores.
- (e) 2010-2011 : 350-400 crores (projected).

Sources of Assistance/Arms/Ammunition

Sources of assistance, arms and weaponry are as under:-

- (a) **China** * Political and moral support.
- (b) **Bangladesh** * Political and moral support.
* Arms and weaponry.
* Safe sanctuaries.
- (c) **Burma** * Arms and weaponry.
* Safe sanctuaries.
- (d) **Pakistan** * Political and moral support.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT (2007-2008)

Strong Points

- (a) Advocate for Naga cause.
- (b) Considered as a powerful insurgent group in North East India.
- (c) Strong support from some political parties and politicians in Nagaland (entered into ceasefire agreement with Government of India).

MANIPUR INSURGENCY	
NSCN-IM	
HOW THEY EARNED	
ONE RUPEE	
☐ Extortion	: 60%
☐ Looting	: 3-5%
☐ External Assistance	: 15%
☐ Income generated : 20% actions plans	
☐ Donations	: 5%

- (d) Feable moral support from few western countries via religion.

Weak Points

- (a) Lack of charismatic leaders/torch bearers after Mr Isac Chishi Swu and Mr. Th. Muivah faded out from the scene.
- (b) Survival depends on its success for ceasefire with the Government of India.
- (c) Factional clashes with the NSCN(K), NNO and the FGN.
- (d) Stand off with the Naga Ho Ho and the Church leaders.
- (e) Involved heavily in the factional politics of Nagaland and Manipur.
- (f) Likely to be transformed into a political organization within a short time.

Breakdown of Sources: How NSCN-IM obtained their weaponry

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| ☐ Clandestine sources | : 80% |
| ☐ Friendly Insurgent groups | : 15% |
| ☐ Snatching, Looting and Ambushing | : 3-5% |
| ☐ Others | : Negligible |

**NATIONAL SOCIALIST COUNCIL OF NAGALAND : ISAK-MUIVAH GROUP (NSCN-IM):
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF NAGALAND (GRPN)**

BRIEF SKETCH





TABLE 9.2: ORGANISATION OF NSCN (IM) (2000 AD)
(MILITARY WING)

© Manipur Imbroglia
Lt-Col T Hemo Singh

NATIONAL SOCIALIST COUNCIL OF NAGALAND KHAPLANG GROUP (NSCN-K)

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| 1. Official Name | : | National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang group NSCN(K) |
| 2. Origin | : | Nagaland |
| 3. Years of formation | : | 1988 |
| 4. Ethnicity | : | Main sub-groups:
Konyak, Chakesang, Burmese Nagas, Ao, Khemungan, Sema, Phom, Lotha, Chang, Angami, Yimchunger |
| 5. Aim, Objective and Ideology | : | (a) Formation/establishment of an independent sovereign state of Nagaland in the Indo-Burma region.
(b) Believed in armed insurgency movement and communist doctrine of revolution. |
| 6. Armed Strength
(Excluding civilian) | : | 2200-2500 (2004-2005 AD) |
| 7. Area of operation | : | Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Western Burma |
| 8. Financial Assessment | : | Rs 120.00 crores (1999-2000 AD). |

The National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang group, in short, the NSCN(K), is a powerful Naga insurgent organization operating in the Indo-Burma region. It was formed in 1988 under the leadership of Mr. Shangwang Shangyung Khaplang, a Burmese Hemi Naga and Mr. Kholi Konyak,

a powerful Naga insurgent leader of the Konyak Naga tribe of Nagaland. Over a period of time, the NSCN(K) with public support and assistance from the powerful Konyak, the Ao, the Burmese, the Angami, the Chakesang and other smaller ethnic tribal groups continued the insurgency movement for a final solution of the vexed Naga problem.

AIM

The aim of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang group, the NSCN(K), was to form an independent sovereign socialist state of Nagaland in the Indo-Burma region.

OBJECTIVE

The NSCN(K) strongly believed that the Nagas in the Indo-Burma region had got their own distinct character, culture, tradition, customs and their own way of life. The Nagas should unite and formed an independent country in the Indo-Burma region by throwing out the 'Colonial Indian Army' through armed revolution and armed insurgency movement.

IDEOLOGY

The NSCN(K) strongly believed the Nagas could decide their future by themselves and not by the Indians. They reiterated that the Nagas never formed a part of India and would never be the same in the future. The people in the Indo-Burma region belong to the Indo-Mongloid group which were quite different from the Aryan Indian stocks and the Indian way of life. The Nagas in the region had got full right to carry out armed insurgency movement to establish an independent state of Nagaland by throwing out the Indian Armed Forces from the region. They reiterated that the Security Forces of India were occupying land which belonged to the Naga people. The Nagas has got the birthright to remain as an independent state.

The NSCN(K) also believe that all the insurgent groups in the Indo-Burma region should form a common revolutionary front to achieve their common aim and objective.

BRIEF HISTORY

Since a long time, the Nagas which inhabited the North-Eastern region of India along the Indo-Burma International border had close ethnic affinity with the Naga tribe on the Burmese (Myanmar) soil. They used to carry out local trades and business, maintained matrimonial relationships and migrated from one place to another with least disregard to the existence of the International border. The Indo-Burma International border carried no meaning to the Naga tribal inhabitants along the region. When Mr. A.Z. Phizo, the father of the Naga insurgency movement, gave a clarion call for sovereign state of Nagaland, most of the illiterate Nagas along the Indo-Burma region had no knowledge and ideas of 'Sovereignty' and 'Independence'. The wild Naga tribe on the Burmese side, particularly in the far-flung inaccessible jungle areas, with full menaces of mosquitoes and malaria and never traveled in a vehicle in their life-time, considered the call for 'Sovereignty' as nuts and non-entity as compare to their fights against the onslaught of wild elephants and wild boars to their agricultural field and isolated villages. However, in early 1960's some of the semi-literate Nagas from the Burmese side who had closed affinity with the Konyak, the Ao and the Chakesang Nagas along the Indo-Burma International border, attracted towards the insurgency movement spearheaded by Mr. A.Z. Phizo.

A number of Pangmi Naga and the Hemi Naga from the Burma side joined the Naga insurgency movement in the hope and aspiration that the dream of a 'Sovereign independent Nagaland' in the Indo-Burma region might turn into reality. That was the time, when Mr. S.S. Khaplang, a mercurial Hemi Naga, a charismatic leader by all means, born in a small village on the North-Western part of Burma joined the bandwagon of A.Z. Phizo.

In early 1960's the Naga insurgent outfit, the FGN, under the leadership of Phizo, contacted the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) for logistic, materials and other assistances. In early 1970's the government of the People's Republic of China extended material, moral and political support to the Naga insurgency movement. In November 1975, the Government of India, under the leadership of Sri. L.P. Singh, Governor of Assam and Nagaland, and a selected group of bureaucrats, clinched an agreement with the Naga insurgents (the NNC) known as the Shillong Accord. However, in 1979, these insurgents who refused to accept the Shillong Accord formed another Naga insurgent group known as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). Isak Chishi Swu became the chairman, Mr. Thuingaleng Muivah, the General Secretary and Mr. S.S. Khaplang, the vice-chairman respectively. The outfit was dominated by the main Naga ethnic groups, the Sema, the Ao, the Angami and the Tangkhuls. The main powerful tribe, the Konyak (Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh); the Chakesang (Nagaland and Burma); the Pangmi and the Hemi Naga (Burma); the Pochuri, the Khemungren, the Lotha etc. which inhabited along the Indo-Burma International border were relegated to the second rung. That created a silent discords, anguish, unhappiness and disillusionment among the various ethnic Naga tribes and sub-tribes. In early 1987-88 the tribal ethnic groups led by Mr. S.S. Khaplang and Mr. Kholi Konyak suspected the political move of the Mr. Isak Chishi Swu and Mr. Th. Muivah vis-a-vis the peace process under taken by the Government of India. In 1988, serious factional clashes and inter-ethnic rivalries occurred and the NSCN was virtually divided into two factions—one led by Mr. S.S. Khaplang, known as the NSCN-K (the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang group) and the other led by Mr. Isak Chishi Swu and Mr. Th. Muivah, known as the NSCN -IM (the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Isak-Muivah group).



**Shangwang Shangyung Khaplang,
Chairman, NSCN(K), 1998.**

Born in Western Burma (Sagaing division); a Hemi Naga; date of birth not recorded; joined Naga Insurgent movement in early 1960's led by (Late) A.Z. Phizo. Hold Vice-Chairman post of NSCN till 1988. Formed NSCN(K) in 1988 and became its Chairman. Entered into cease-fire agreement with New Delhi in 2001. Archrival of NSCN(IM). Carryweight for peace in Nagaland (India).

INSURGENCY MOVEMENT

After the division of the NSCN in 1988, the NSCN(K) started insurgency movement under the leadership of Mr. S.S. Khaplang, Kholi Konyak and Daily Mungro in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Western Burma. By 1990, Mr. Khaplang forged a strong alliance with the powerful Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the armed wing of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), which was established in 1961 to fight for an independent Kachinland. Mr. Khaplang also established working

relations with the Shan State Army (SSA), formed in 1964 as the main politically-oriented rebel group among the Shans of Burma. On 22 May 1990, the NSCN(K), the UNLF of Manipur and the ULFA of Assam announced the formation of a joint insurgent group known as the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF). They tried to challenge the NSCN (IM) in every field and corners. They established their Headquarters (HQ) on the western region of Hukawng Valley of Burma close to the Indo-Burma international border. From 1990-95, they carried out concerted insurgency movement in Nagaland, recruiting large numbers of young Naga boys and girls and trained them for insurgency and guerilla movement.

In 1992-93, the Naga-Kuki ethnic clashes erupted in Manipur, Nagaland and Assam. The ethnic Naga group was led by the Tangkhul Naga from Ukhrul district of Manipur, supported by the Mao, the Maram and the Zeliangrong. On the other hands, the Kukis wanted other sub-tribes like the Thadou, the Zou, the Paite, the Simte etc. to form part or group of the Kuki clan and identified themselves as the Kukis. The NSCN(K) warned the various factions and appealed for communal harmony. They strongly warned the NSCN (IM) for creating a communal flare-up in the region and trying to divide between the Nagas and other communities. In 1994-95, Mr. Rajesh Pilot, Union Minister of State of India, made a secret visit to various important areas in the North Eastern region of India to find out a probable and acceptable solution to the Naga problem. He called upon the NSCN(K), the NSCN (IM), the ULFA, the UNLF, the PLA etc. to come to the negotiating table for peace and tranquility in the region. But the insurgents refused.

On 25 July 1997, the Government of India and the NSCN (IM) clinched a Cease-Fire agreement, to be followed by peace-talk. The NSCN(K) refused to accept the NSCN (IM) as the sole representative for the Naga people for concluding an agreement with the Government of India. Within a short time, fratricidal clashes and killings between the two groups started in an unprecedented manner. The NSCN (IM) wanted to neutralised the NSCN(K) and the FGN in Nagaland; the UNLF, the PLA and the KNA in Manipur and keep a distance from the ULFA in Assam. To show a politico-insurgency supremacy, the NSCN (IM) killed Mr. Pavizo (Self-styled General of the NSCN-K), a powerful, popular and tall Chakesang Naga (Phek District). On 18 August 1999, they shot dead Mr. Dally Mungro, 55 years old Naga, the General Secretary of the NSCN(K), in broad daylight at Jotsama village, 8 kilometers from Kohima, the capital of Nagaland. The FGN also reacted very strongly against the killing of 'General' Pavizo. They declared that the NSCN (IM) which was dominated by the Tangkhul Nagas had openly demanded a Union Territory out of Manipur state within the Union of India and rehabilitation packages for their comrade in Nagaland state (Z. Chizho, publicity and information officer, Chakesang region, FGN : 15 November 1999, Kohima). By 2000 AD, the ethnic-based fratricidal killings between the NSCN(K) and the NSCN (IM) became a dangerous trend for the Naga society. On regular intervals, clashes and killings occurred in Kiphire, Mon, Tizit, Zuhenboto, Wokha, Dimapur etc. On 07 April 2000, the NSCK (K) and the NSCN (IM) had a firefight at Jotsoma village near Kohima and weapons like 2" Mortars were used against each other. There were casualties on both sides. Shortly, ethnic insurgent clashes flared-up again at Mon district (Konyak Naga region) where more than 300 NSCN(K) cadres tried to drive out about 50 NSCN (IM) cadres from the Tiru Hill areas. In September of the same year, both the factions had serious clashes in Tirap and Changlang area of Arunachal Pradesh. Nagaland Chief Minister, Mr. S.C. Jamir repeatedly appealed to Indian

Government to have a cease-fire with the NSCN(K) to bring a meaningful solution to the Naga problem.

In 2001, Union Home Minister Sri. L.K. Advani said that the centre was considering the S.C. Jamir Government's appeal to extend the cease-fire (the Naga cease-fire in Nagaland of 25 July 1997) to other Naga underground groups. On 27 April 2001, the NSCN(K) declared that they would work out a cease-fire agreement with the centre after conducting a "Public Referendum" and formulate terms and conditions of political talks with the Union Government of India for a permanent settlement of the vexed Naga problem. On 28 April 2001, the Government of India declared a cease-fire with the NSCN(K) which came into effect in Nagaland, for a period of one year. In a statement, Mr. L.K. Advani said that because of persistent demands from the people in Nagaland, NGOs, church leaders and the state government, the centre took the plunge in formally declaring the ceasefire with the group. A ceasefire Supervisory Board (SFSB) comprising five representatives from the Central Government, the Nagaland Government and another five from the NSCN(K) respectively set up to monitor the situation. The Central Government appointed Lt-Gen (Retd) Kulkarni as the Chairman of the Board. The Indian Security Forces (SF) on its part would not attack the NSCN(K) cadres who would remain confined to designated camps though they (SF) would reserve the right to retaliate.

In November, 2001, Mr. N. Kitovi Zhimomi, the General Secretary of the NSCN(K) warned the Government of India that "Eastern Nagaland" (the western part of Burma inhabited by Naga people), would be a greater threat to the country than Pakistan if the centre ignored chairman of the NSCN(K) Mr. S.S. Khaplang at the ongoing peace process in Nagaland. In an oblique reference to the leaders of the NSCN (IM) he said "Exiled leaders cannot represent the true sentiment of the Naga people and their Nation" (the *Telegraph*, 02 November 2001).

ORGANISATION

The NSCN-K is a powerful insurgent outfit, which carried out insurgency movement in Nagaland and adjacent areas. Its political wing and the Armed wing are given in Table 10.1 and 10.2 respectively.

Strength

(a) Total manpower (Both Civil and the Armed Wing)

- (i) 1200-1300 (1990-1991 AD)
- (ii) 2500-3000 (2000-2001 AD)
- (iii) 3500-3800 (2005-2006 AD)

(b) Classification

- (i) Uneducated Cadres (Upto Class VIII) : 50%
- (ii) Semi-educated cadres (VIII to XII) : 45%
- (iii) Educated cadres (Above XII Classes) : 5%

(c) Weapons (i) Rifles .303, AK-47, AK-56, M-16, 7.62 SLR.

- (ii) Sten Machine Carbine.
- (ii) Light Machine gun/Universal Machine gun.
- (iii) Mortars, Rocket Launchers.
- (v) Mines, Booby traps, IEDs.
- (vi) Communication equipments.
- (d) **Medical**
 - (i) Local doctors.
 - (ii) Government Dispensary, Hospitals.
 - (iii) Private Nursing Home.
 - (iv) Private Pharmacies.
- (e) **Transport**
 - (i) Two wheelers.
 - (ii) Four wheelers (light and heavy vehicles)

**Manipur Insurgency.
Age Profile of NSCN-K**

15-25 years	: 25%
25-35 years	: 35%
35-50 years	: 35%
Above 50 years	: 5%

Finances

NSCN-K has got multiple sources of finance. They are as under:

- (a) Central Government Departments, State Government departments, Government Institutions, Private sector.
- (b) Businessmen, contractors, private companies, transport agencies.
- (c) Government employees.
- (d) Foreign assistance.

Income Assessment

- (a) 1989-1990 : 15-20 crores.
- (b) 1995-1996 : 50-60 crores.
- (c) 2000-2001 : 120-130 crores.
- (d) 2005-2006 : 160-180 crores.
- (e) 2010-2011 : 200-210 crores.

Sources of Assistance/Arms/Ammunition

Sources of assistance, arms and weaponry are as under:

- (a) **China** * Political and moral support.
- (b) **Bangladesh** * Political and moral support.
- * Arms and weaponry.

MANIPUR INSURGENCY

**NSCN-K
HOW THEY EARNED
ONE RUPEE**

- ☐ Extortion : 65%
- ☐ Looting : 5%
- ☐ External : 10%
assistance
- ☐ Income generated : 15%
actions plans
- ☐ Donations : 5%

- * Safe sanctuaries.
- (c) **Burma**
 - * Arms and weaponry.
 - * Safe sanctuaries.
- (d) **Pakistan**
 - * Political and moral support.
- (e) **Friendly Insurgents Groups** : Arms and weaponry (KIA, SSA, ARA, BCP)

**Breakdown of Sources :
How NSCN-K obtained
their weaponry**

☐ Clandestine Sources	: 80%
☐ Friendly Insurgent groups	: 15%
☐ Snatching, Looting and Ambushing	: 3-5%
Others	: Negligible


OVERALL ASSESSMENT (2007-2008)

Strong Points


- (a) Advocate for Naga cause.
- (b) Considered as a powerful insurgent group in North East India.
- (c) Strong support from some political parties and politicians in Nagaland.

Weak Points

- (a) Lack of charismatic leaders/torch bearers after Mr S.S. Khaplang faded out from the scene.
- (b) Survival depends on its success for ceasefire with the Government of India; Nagaland politics; and support from the Church leaders in Nagaland.
- (c) Inability to form a common platform with other Naga insurgent outfits.
- (d) Stand-off with the Burmese Military Junta (SLORC).
- (e) Hot and cold blow with New Delhi.

TABLE 10.1: NATIONAL SOCIALIST COUNCIL OF NAGALAND : KHAPLANG GROUP (NSCN-K):
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF NAGALAND (GRPN)(BRIEF SKETCH)

© Manipur Imbroglia
Lt.-Col. T. Hemo Singh

TABLE 19.2: ORGANISATION OF NSCN (IK) (2000 AD)
(MILITARY WING)

KUKI INSURGENT OUTFITS

1. Official Name	:	Kuki Insurgent Outfits
2. Origin	:	Manipur-Burma border
3. Years of formation	:	1988-1999 (Various groups)
4. Ethnicity	:	Kuki tribal groups
5. Aim and Objective	:	Formation of Kukiland
6. Armed Strength (Excluding civilian)	:	400-500
7. Area of operation	:	* Manipur, * Indo-Burma International border
8. Financial Assessment	:	Rs. 20-25 crores (2004-05 AD).

The Kuki insurgency movement in Manipur and adjacent areas started in early 1980's. In 1987-88, Mr. Nehlun Kipgen, a charismatic and flamboyant Kuki leader, announced the formation of an ethnic Kuki organization known as the Kuki National Front (KNF), demanding a separate Kuki Homeland in the Indo-Burma region. Shortly, in February 1990, another politico-ethnic organization, known as the Kuki National Organisation (KNO), was formed under the leadership of Mr. Sohlun and he became the president of the organization. At later stages, the KNF was divided into many factions. New Kuki insurgent outfits, based on sub-tribe and group 'nationalism', came up on the map of North East India. By 2004-05, more than 10 satellite Kuki insurgent outfits roamed around on the soil of Manipur and surrounding areas, with almost similar aim, objective and ideology.

AIM

Demand for an independent Kuki Homeland in the Indo-Burma region.

OBJECTIVE

The Kuki insurgents believed that the Kuki ethnic groups inhabiting in Manipur, Nagaland, Assam and the Indo-Burma region have got a distinct character and could form an ethnic mosaic group of

their own. They also believed that they should achieve their aim by means of armed insurgency movement and mass people's uprising.

IDEOLOGY

The Kuki insurgents strongly believed that they should protect the political, ethnic, cultural and traditional interest of the Kukis at all times. They believed that they have got the right to form a separate Kuki Homeland (Kukiland).

BRIEF HISTORY

The historical account of the Kuki tribal group showed that they had a long history in the North Eastern region of India, Burma and Bangladesh. Kuki belongs to the Indo-Mongoloid group. In the 19th century, they settled down in the Indo-Burma region under a generic name of Kuki-Chin group. Sir James Johnstone, the then Political Agent of Manipur wrote that "the Kukis are the wandering race consisting of several tribes who have long been working up from the south. They were first heard in Manipur, between 1830 and 1840; though tribes of the same race had long been subject to the Rajah of Manipur. The new immigrants began to cause anxiety about the year 1845, and soon poured into the hill tracts of Manipur in such numbers, as to drive away many of the older inhabitants. Mr. McCulloch, then Political Agent of Manipur, as they arrived, settled them down, allotting to them lands in different places according to their numbers and where their presence would be useful on exposed frontiers". In 1917, during the 'Kuki Rebellion', the distinct Kuki tribal nationalism was seen, when they challenged the plan of the British Authority to raise a Kuki Labour Force for war services in France and Mesopotamia during World War I. After India got independence in 1947, the Kukis were found concentrated in Manipur, Assam, Naga Hills (Nagaland), Lushai Hills area (Mizoram), Tripura and Western Burma.

In early 1960's the Naga and the Mizo insurgency movement spread out in Nagaland and Mizoram respectively without having much collateral effects to other ethnic and minority inhabitants. However, by 1970's, the Naga insurgents raised the issues of Naga areas, affecting the ethnic identity, village boundaries, village areas, and settled areas of the Kuki inhabitants. By early 1980's, the Kukis found themselves left behind, politically and ethnically, as compared to the progress made by other tribal groups. It was during that time, in 1987, that Mr. Nehlun Kipgen formed the Kuki National Front (KNF), demanding a separate Kuki Homeland (Kukiland). At the same times, some Kuki politicians, social workers, and social activists formed a political organization known as the Kuki National Organisation (KNO), with the aim and objective of establishing a Kuki Homeland within the Union of India. The Kuki Homeland demand clashed with the concept of 'Southern Nagaland', and later on 'Greater Nagaland', orchestrated by the NSCN-IM and the Naga NGOs, which included large Kuki inhabited areas. On the political front, the Kuki demanded the formation of Sadar Hills District as a separate revenue district in Manipur bifurcating Senapati district. To offset the Kuki's political move, the NSCN-IM, then launched the ethnic cleansing operation, forcing and driving out large number of Kukis from Naga majority areas and villages. A number of young Naga politicians and social workers joined the bandwagon of the NSCN-IM ethnic cleansing operation which benefited them handsomely in their ethnic political career.

It was during that uncertain period that on 22 February 1990, some of the hard-core Kukis formed an insurgent organization known as the Kuki National Army (KNA), in Churachandpur district, South Manipur, in a deliberate and desperate manner. A few Kuki ex-servicemen from the Indian Army, joined the outfit to express for the ethnic Kukis solidarity; negation of the savage treatment meted out by the cadres of the NSCN-IM against the Kukis; the imbalance politico-social approach of New Delhi to the Kuki problem vis-a-vis the Naga problem and finally the Kuki Nationalism. Gradually, a series of ethnic Kuki insurgent outfits came up in Manipur and surrounding areas. By 2004-2005 AD, the following Kuki insurgent outfits joined the insurgency movement in Manipur:

- | | |
|--|----------------|
| (a) Kuki National Front (President) | : KNF (P) |
| (b) Kuki National Front (Military Council) | : KNF (MC) |
| (c) Kuki National Front (Zougam) | : KNF (Zougam) |
| (d) Kuki National Front (T Samuel) | : KNF (Samuel) |
| (e) Kuki National Army | : KNA |
| (f) Kuki Liberation Army | : KLA |
| (g) Kuki Revolutionary Army | : KRA |
| (h) United Kuki Liberation Front | : UKLF |
| (j) Zomi Revolutionary Army | : ZRA |
| (k) Hmar Peoples's Convention | : HPC |

INSURGENCY MOVEMENT

The Kuki insurgency movement in Manipur can be classified as a politico-ethnic outburst by the Kukis due to anger, frustration and social indignation against the policy of New Delhi. In 1996-97, the KNF splitted into two groups. : KNF(P) led by Mr. Tongboi Seikhotingthang with 150 armed cadres and the KNF (MC), led by Mr. Thangboi Kipgen and Mr. Seikam Kipgen with 180-200 cadres. On 10 April 2000, Mr Seikam Kipgen was apprehended and released on bail on medical ground. Gradually, two more factions known as KNF (Zougam) and KNF (Samuel), were formed as a result of internal conflicts. Two more groups, known as the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) and the Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) came into the scene. One group, known as the United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) was formed with assistances from the NSCN-IM, operating mainly in Chandel district of Manipur. However, the inter-factional clashes (IFC) amongst the Kukis insurgents completely destroyed the aim and objective of the Kuki insurgency movement. At later stages, they tried to control some important areas like Moreh, Churachandpur, Chandel, Kangpokpi, Saikul and others so that the politico-social upheaval could remain afloat.

During 2002-03 AD, New Delhi, through its Intelligence Agencies, contacted the Kuki insurgent leaders, convinced them to come to the negotiating table and renounce violence by having a ceasefire agreement. The Kukis analysed some of the advantages achieved by the NSCN (IM) cadres after entering into a ceasefire agreement with New Delhi. Firstly, the NSCN-IM cadres were shielded from

attack or arrest by the security forces. Secondly, they hold back their arms and weaponry in their custody. Thirdly, peace talk continued in a manner which suited them. The Kuki insurgents wanted to copy the NSCN-IM strategy and at the same time continued their political movement with arms. In August, 2005, the insurgent outfits entered into an agreement with the security forces for suspension of hostility and firing in Manipur and surrounding areas. In 2001 during 'Operation Dragnet', the Kuki insurgents team-up with the security forces against the UNLF who dominated south Manipur for a long time. In January 2007-2008, KNA cadres supported the security forces in the 'Somtal Operation' in Chandel district of Manipur against the valley-based insurgent outfits, the UNLF and the PLA.

THE TURF WAR

By 2008 A.D., the Kuki insurgent movement turned into a turf war among the various Kuki insurgent factions. They started clashes and killing within the Kuki tirbal group based on their loyalty and interest on the politics of clan, rather than the bigger tribe concept. Smaller clans, ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 persons which included the Hanshings, Chongloi, Kipgen, Haokip, Misao, Khongjai (Khongsai) and others involved in the dirty clan war for blood revenge based on the customary archaic rule of tribal warfare—Blood for blood. The KRA, KLA, KNA, KRA (U), UKLF etc. fought each other in Saikul, Senapati, Kangpokpi, None, Churachandpur and Chandel. The clan war even extended to insurgent faction, KLA/KLO which was vertically divided into two factions - the KLA (Timothy Kuki) group and the KLA (Malsom) group clashed each others like two Red Indian wild tribes of the olden days, with wild and dangerous grimaces; long spears, beautiful headgears with feathers, guns and hatchets; spitting and shouting each others in a two hours western movie. On the same analogue, KRA was divided and the new faction KRA (U) was actively involved in the inter-factional war in Manipur. KRA claimed that KRA(U) was formed by those 'defector and traitor Kukis', who left the organisation for their personal gains and teamed up with Manipuri Meitei insurgents in the ratios of 10% (Kuki) and 90% (Manipuri Meiteis). The KRA (U) strongly refuted the charges. In Manipur insurgency movement, the Manipuri Meitei insurgents were not happy with the Kuki insurgents for their act of entering into a 'cease-fire agreement'

Kuki factions launch Media War

Bit Irom

Imphal, November 6 : The Kuki National Army (KNA), an underground outfit based in Myanmar, and United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) mainly operating in the India's North Eastern states, especially in the Kuki inhabited areas of Manipur, have launched a media war against assisting the Indian security forces in counter-insurgency operations along the porous Indo-Myanmar border. The KNA alleged that the UKLF has been formed by the NSCN(IM) to spoil the clean image of Kuki revolutionary organisations. . . . James Bond Kuki, the leader of the UKLF in a statement alleged that the BSF personnel escorted the KNA Army Chief Khaimang Haokip when he visited Sugnu and Moreh in the southern part of the state recently. . . .

A prominent political leader had sought financial help from the centre (New Delhi) for funding the KNA with plea that the organisation was established to abolish the NSCN. The centre had accordingly given Rs. 3 crores to the KNA, the statement charged. . . .

—Nagaland Post, 07 November, 2001.

with New Delhi and some Kuki Insurgent outfits making a bed-fellow with the NSCN (IM), thereby degenerating the insurgency movement in the state into a doldrums. There was no doubt to the central and the state intelligence Agencies that KRA(U) consisted of a number of youths from the Kuki and the Manipuri Meitei groups. KRA(U) which was anti to the Naga insurgent required assistances from the Manipuri Meitei insurgent outfits to remain as a credible Kuki insurgent outfit. The UKLF outfit imbedded themselves in Chandel district of Manipur under the protective umbrella of the 'Suspension of Operation and Hostility' and alledged assistances from the Indian security agencies. They became the flag-bearer of the 'Kurmi region' of the NSCN-IM and an anti-dot to the valley-based Manipuri Meitei insurgent groups. New Delhi and the Indian Security Agencies accepted the clandestine activities of the Kuki insurgent outfits so long their acts helped in countering the activities of the Manipuri Meiteis insurgents along the Indo-Burma International border. However, the bottom-line was that they should not cross the red-line (limit) where New Delhi could be seen as the culprit of inter-ethnic clashes and killings in the region. From India's security point of view, by end of 2007, the Kuki insurgency movement in Manipur was marginalised militarily, put into the gennies bottle, sealed temporarily (permanently??) with a tag of 'not to be open'. The concept of Kuki's 'tribe Nationalism' was put into the dustbin by the various Kuki insurgent outfits, transformed themselves and adopted the flag of clan political supremacy. That brought the dead-end of Kuki insurgency movement in Manipur and surrounding areas leaving only the political baton to be handled by political means.

ORGANISATION

Manpower/Finances (2005-06 AD)

Nomenclature	Armed	Finances	Area of Operation
(a) KNF(P)	80-100	Rs. 1.00	Kangpokpi
(b) KNF(MC)	60-70	Rs. 1.00	Kangpokpi
(c) KNF(Zougam)	80-100	Rs. 1.00	Chandel
(d) KNF(Samuel)	90-100	Rs. 1.00	Chandel, Kangpokpi
(e) KLA	70-80	Rs. 1.00	Imphal East
(f) KRA	120-130	Rs. 2.00	Kangpokpi
(g) KNA	250-300	Rs. 4.00	Chandel, Ukhrul
(h) ZRA	120-130	Rs. 3.00	Churachandpur
(j) HPC	180-200	Rs. 5.00	Churachandpur

[Source: *Data collected at random from general public, Kuki sympathisers, surrendered Kuki insurgents and State Government officials.]

Weaponry

- (a) Pistol, revolver.
- (b) Sten Machine Carbine (SMC).

- (c) Light Machine Gun.
- (d) Grenades.
- (e) Booby traps.
- (f) Communication equipments.

Transports : Two wheelers and Four wheelers

Medical : Local Doctor • Government dispensary/Hospitals • Private Nursing Homes • Private pharmacies.

Financial Sources

Financial resources of the Kuki Insurgent Outfits are:

- (a) Central Government Departments/Institutions.
- (b) State Government Departments/Institutions.
- (c) General public.
- (d) Contract works of Government.
- (e) Taxes on Drugs and Narcotics businessmen.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT (2007-08 AD)

Strong points

- (a) Advocate for Kuki cause.
- (b) Entered into Suspension Of Operation (SOO) with the Government of India & Manipur State.
- (c) Support from Kuki political parties, politicians and general public.
- (d) Maintained strong politico-social equilibrium with the majority Manipuri (Meitei) community.

Weak points

- (a) Lack of charismatic leaders.
- (b) Difficulty of identification of areas for the formation of a Kuki Homeland (Kukiland).
- (c) Naga-Kuki ethnic equation and imbroglio.
- (d) Kuki-Zomi ethnic equation and imbroglio.
- (e) Lack of 'Kuki Nationalism'.
- (f) Considered as defunct from military angle after the agreement of cessation of hostility with the security forces.

MANIPUR INSURGENCY

KUKI INSURGENT OUTFITS HOW THEY EARNED ONE RUPEE

☐ Extortion	: 60%
☐ Looting	: 15%
☐ Drug business	: 10%
☐ External Assistance	: 3%
☐ Donations	: 5%
☐ Others	: 5%

MANIPUR INSURGENCY

Sources of Arms and Ammunition Kuki Insurgents Outfit

▲ Clandestine sources	: 75%
▲ Friendly Insurgent groups	: 15%
▲ Looting	: 5%
▲ Foreign Assistance	: Nil
▲ Others	: 5%

12

PEOPLE'S UNITED LIBERATION FRONT (PULF)

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| 1. Official Name | : | People's United Liberation Front (PULF) |
| 2. Origin | : | Manipur-Assam |
| 3. Years of formation | : | 11th April, 1992 |
| 4. Ethnicity | : | • Meitei Pangal • Bengali refugees from Bangladesh |
| 5. Aim, Objective and Ideology | : | Formation of an Islamic State in North East India. |
| 6. Armed Strength
(Excluding civilian) | : | 80-100 |
| 7. Area of operation | : | Manipur, Nagaland, Assam |
| 8. Financial strength | : | Rs 4-5 crores (2004-2005 AD). |

Since a long decades, Manipur was inhabited by a small section of Meitei Pangal (Manipur Muslims), who almost absorbed in the socio-economic and political field in the state. In 1990's, Manipur was in a turmoil environment due to the Naga-Kuki ethnic imbroglio followed by the Manipuri Meitei and Meitei Pangal flare-up. It was during that period that some fanatic Muslims from Imphal, Ziribam and Silchar formed an 'Islamic' insurgent organization known as the People's United Liberation Front (PULF).

AIM

To establish an Independent Islamic state in the North Eastern region of India.

OBJECTIVE

They believed in having a distinct identity of the Muslim inhabitants of the North Eastern region of India by observing the Islamic tenets under the Holy Koran. They strongly believed that they should

join the pan-Islamic forces operating in India, particularly in the North Eastern region of India, for 'Islamisation' of Muslim. For such act, they believed in the formation of underground Tanzeems to spread the message of Jihad in and around Manipur. For they should obtain assistances from the Wahhabi organizations in Bangladesh Islamic Jihad groups operating in Assam, South India and Jammu and Kashmir.

IDEOLOGY

They draw their ideological principle from the Holy *Q'uran (Koran)*. They believed in the growth of armed Insurgency movement (Jihad) under cover of religious tanzeems and infiltration of Madrassas. They want to unite Muslim inhabitants in the region under the banner of Islamic movement by funding religious institutions, schools and *madrassas*, which will produce Muslim fundamentalists in the near future.

BRIEF HISTORY

In early 1980's, North East India was affected by the Islamic militancy movement in Jammu and Kashmir, Central India and South India. A number of Islamic militant organisations like the Muslim Liberation Front (MLF); Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA); Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA); Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA); Muslim Liberation Army (MLA); United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA); Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MLTA) and a number of minor outfits in Bengal-Bangladesh border spread out their militancy movement in a quick speed to cover the entire North East India. Other Jihadi groups from mainland India, which included the Harkat-ul Mujahideen, Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hujbul-Mujaheedeen (HM), Jamait-ul Mujabideen etc. also appeared on the soil of North East India. Hozai, Hailakandi, Naogong, Barpeta and Silchar became as prominent as Srinagar and Jammu. Gradually, the Islamic Militancy movement spread out from Assam to other parts of Manipur, Nagaland and Meghalaya. In 1990-91, some Meitei Pangal contacted Islamic insurgent groups in Assam (Guwahati and Silchar) and raised a new outfit known as the People's United Liberation Front (PULF) in Manipur. After the Manipuri Meitei-Pangal flare up in 1993-94, some Meitei Pangal contacted Islamic insurgent outfits in Assam, South India and Uttar Pradesh. On 21 April 1995, they formed another outfit known as the Islamic National Army (INA). However, due to lack of organizational expertise, charismatic leader, lack of credible aim and objective, INA failed to take off as a credible insurgent/militant organization. In 2006, they tried to raise their head in Manipur insurgency but failed. They could not subdue or neutralised the influences of the PULF among the Muslim population in Manipur and Silchar (Assam). The cadres of PULF were trained by the NSCN-IM and a few arms and ammunitions were given on cash payment. A number of PULF cadres concentrated at Dimapur, Ziribam and Lilong (Thoubal District of Manipur). However, in 2004-05, the organization suffered factional crisis and clashes.

INSURGENCY MOVEMENT

The Islamic insurgent outfit, the PULF, was formed in Manipur, more on the basis of Islamophobia spreading on the Indian soil from Central Asian Arab countries, rather than the socio-economic and political disadvantages prevailing on the state soil. They were assisted by the NSCN-IM during their organizational stage. The NSCN-IM was interested in raising and assisting any insurgent and militant

outfit in Manipur which could act as anti to the Manipuri Meitei insurgency movement. PULF operated in Dimapur, Imphal East, Thoubal and Jiribam districts in tandem with the NSCN-IM. The outfit faced a serious problem when the NSCN-IM entered into a ceasefire agreement in July 1997, with the Government of India. After that they operated in Manipur, particularly in Imphal East, Imphal West, Thoubal and Jiribam areas independently. They sought assistance from the ISI through various channels. By 1998-99, security agencies, came to know that the proscribed outfit had spread its influences in Barpeta, Nagaon, Lakhimpur and Silchar in Assam. A state committee headed by one Abdul Aziz and three district committees for Nagaon, Barpeta and Lakhimpur were formed. Gradually, they were involved in several cases of kidnapping for ransom, extortion from businessmen and recruitment of boys from the Madrasas. In July 1999, General Officer Commanding, 21 Mountain Division, Major General BK Bopana, who was based near Rangia (Assam) stated that some Madrasas (Islamic religious institutions) in Assam were helping the growth of separatist forces with active help from the ISI, "There are numerous such schools in lower Assam's Nalbari and Barpeta districts as well as in southern Assam's Barak valley. The Army has taken serious note of it in view of the large-scale Bangladeshi infiltration into the North East. The possibility of many militants taking shelter in these schools cannot be ruled out", the General said (*The Deccan Herald*, 08 August, 1999).

HYDRA SYNDROME

By 2000-2001 AD, PULF's cadres contacted the activists of the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), through the medium of existing Madrasas, Madrasa teachers and the Islamic religious scholars in and outside Manipur. The terror syllabus of the SIMI, which included the call for the formation of an Islamic state free from the western cultural influences and the Hinduism, spread out in Manipur and the surrounding areas. The proscribed outfit encouraged and dictated young Muslim girls to change from the Manipuri cultures and social traditions and adopt the Islamic Burkha culture by wearing hijab liberally. New Madrasas were constructed; old one were renovated; Muslim youths were encouraged to go to Masjid regularly, learned koranic (Q'uranic) tenets and teaching. A number of Madrasas were established in Imphal East, Imphal West, Thoubal, Jiribam and other places. PULF were on the process of establishing and organising women's combat and preaching wing, the 'Shaheen Force', a SIMI's plan to recruit women as *Jehadis* to intensify its Islamic terrorism in India and South East Asia.

By 2006-2007, PULF's connection with other trans-national insurgent and terrorist outfits came into the limelight of the Intelligence agencies and the security forces. They contacted cadres of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) in Jammu and Kashmir and tried to obtain assistance, training, financial supports, arms and ammunitions. Mohammad Sadeeq, son of Mahammad Amuddin, a resident of Thoubal district, Manipur was enrolled in the LeT, sent to Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) in Bangladesh via Silchar. After training, he alongwith other cadres were shifted to Karachi by sea-route, moved to Muzaffarabad (Pakistan), crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and infiltrated into Doda and Kupwara district of Jammu and Kashmir. In Doda, he operated under a codename as Abu Waqar till he was arrested by the Indian security agencies. In 2006, three Muslim youths from Manipur suspected to be cadres of LeT were arrested by Delhi police. The ISI wanted that Islamic insurgent outfit like the PULF should act as the satellite module of those national Islamic terrorist groups operating in South East Asian region.

The insurgency movement of the PULF was, however seriously dented not by the counter-insurgency operations launched by the security forces but due to its inter-factional conflicts and killings. The conflicts basically concerned for the control of funds collected inside and outside the state and the huge amount received from other Islamic religious foundations. To remove the Islamic tag, PULF tried to attract uneducated Manipur Meitei youths into their fold. By 2008 AD, the insurgency movement of the PULF was seriously marginalised due to its internal conflict, particularly among the group led by Mohammad Farooq known as PULF (Farooq); PULF (Azad); PULF (Umar) etc. On 07 March, 2009



PULF leaders Kazi Umar and RK Nandarani arriving at Imphal after their arrest from Mumbai

End of Road: End of Revolution but beginning of terrorism and fundamentalism??

Mohammad Tabe aka Kazi Umar aka Umar Bin Usman (age 42), son of Yusuf Ali of Kwakta Khunou arrested from Navi Mumbai on 05 March, 2009, with his wife R.K. Nandarani Devi (age 34)

four leaders of the PULF (Azad) group were killed during a pre-dawn encounter with a combined security forces (Manipur Police Commandos and personnel of 28 Assam Rifles) at Irilbung in Imphal East district. That included Chairman, Mohammad Azad aka Abdul Kalam Azad (37). On 05 March, 2009, Mohammad Tabe aka Umar Kazi aka Umardin Usman (42), Chairman of the PULF (Umar) faction was arrested from Navi Mumbai by a combined security forces (Manipur Police, Mumbai Police and personnels of 12 Maratha Light Infantry posted in Manipur).

ORGANISATION

It maintained both civil and military armed wings.

Armed Strength : 80-100 (2004-05 AD)

Sources of Finances

- (a) Government Institutions/Departments.
- (b) Government Employees, Contractors and businessmen.
- (c) NGOs.
- (d) Civilians.

Financial Strength : Rs. 4-5 crores (2004-05 Index)

Sources of Arms and Weaponry : * NSCN (IM)

* Islamic Insurgent outfits.

* Clandestine sources.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT (2007-08)

Strong Point

They can sway Muslim populace in Manipur and surrounding areas in the name of Islam. Foreign and Indian Muslim Insurgent and terrorist outfits can use the organisation as a vanguard for Islamic revolution in South East Asia.

Weak Points

- (a) Survival depends on assistances from other Islamic Insurgent groups, ISI and Islamic countries.
- (b) Fed up syndrome of general public in Manipur insurgency movement.
- (c) Lack of charismatic leaders.
- (d) Minimal military significance from counter-insurgency warfare angle.

UNITED KOMREM REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (UKRA)

1. Official Name : United Komrem Revolutionary Army (UKRA)
2. Origin : South Manipur.
3. Years of formation : 23 October, 2004
4. Ethnicity : Aimol, Chiru, Kom, Koireng, Kharam, Purul etc.
5. Aim and objective : To protect the interest of the Komrem community
6. Armed Strength : 40-50
(Excluding civilian)
7. Area of operation : South Manipur.
8. Financial Assessment : Rs. 2-3 crores (2004-05 AD).

In Manipur's Insurgency Kaleidoscope, a number of smaller ethnic sub-groups and communities sandwiched between the Manipur Meitei, the Naga and the Kuki insurgent outfits and suffered in political and socio-economic movement. They included small tribal groups of the Aimol (Aimole), Chiru, Kom, Koireng, Kharam, Purul and many others. They are spread out both the hills and the plain areas of Manipur. During the Naga-Kuki ethnic crisis and clashes (1991-1998) in Manipur and surrounding areas, those smaller sub-tribes were subjected to inhuman treatment from both the Naga and the Kuki insurgent outfits. The Naga forced them to identify themselves with the Naga group and the Kuki with the Kuki group. That was the period where the Komrem Union came up and played a decisive role for the interest of Komrem community. By 2000-2001 AD, they could not stand the politico-insurgency pressure of the Naga, the Kuki, the Zomi and other bigger ethnic group in Manipur, particularly in South Manipur. Educated Koireng, Aimol, Chiru, Kom Purul, and Kharam people discussed the socio-economic devastation of their sub-tribes and community due to the conflict situation prevailing in Manipur. On 23 October, 2004, they formed an organization known as the United Komrem Revolutionary Army (UKRA) in South Manipur.

AIM

To protect the interest of Komrem community.

OBJECTIVE

They believed in the promotion of unity among people belonging to the Komrem community and maintain cordial relations with other communities.

IDEOLOGY

Protect Komrem community's interest by means of armed revolution.

INSURGENCY MOVEMENT

UKRA felt that in the face of mounting pressure from people from both the hills and the valley, the tribal community had to protect themselves from the onslaught of other insurgent outfits. The outfit normally concentrated in general area Chandel, Churachandpur and Thoubal districts. By 2005-06, the Intelligence Agencies in Manipur came to know the existence of the organization, when they recruited a few boys from each community to form the armed insurgent group. They collected 'taxes', purchased a few arms and ammunition from other insurgent groups, which included the NSCN-IM and the Zomi Revolutionary groups; and appealed to major insurgent outfits not to harass the Komrem community. They warned other armed groups that anyone demanding money from the Komrem community would be 'treated as an enemy' (Stephen Bibard, Senior Information and Publicity Secretary, UKRA; 26 October 2006).

During the Bunge Chiru firing incident on 16 November 2004, where one Mr. L.D. Rentuiwan was killed by 28th Assam Rifles and shot his wife Mrs. Thangmmuchin during counter-insurgency operation at Bunge Chiru, Bishnupur district, 75 km to the south of Imphal, the newly floated insurgent group, the UKRA, played an important role in withdrawing a probe panel set up by the state government of Manipur. The 28th Assam Rifles tendered an apology to the unintentional killing and the First Information Report (FIR) lodged with the Bishnupur Police Station was withdrawn by the family under the supervision of Komrem Union, Bunge Chiru chief and of course, the UKRA. Accordingly, the Bunge Chiru Firing Inquiry Commission headed by retired Judge C. Upendra Singh was closed. UKRA as an armed insurgent outfit carry little significance in Manipur insurgency movement.

ORGANISATION

The Komrem Union, for political and socio-economic reason act as the political wing and the United Komrem Revolutionary Army (UKRA) as the armed wing.

Armed strength : 40-50

Sources of Finances

- (a) Government institutions/departments.
- (b) Government employees, contractors and businessmen.
- (c) NGOs.
- (d) Civilians.


Financial strength : rs. 2-3 crores (2004-05 index).

ASSESSMENT (2007-08)

It is a localised ethnic armed group operating in south Manipur. It carry no military significance from counter-insurgency military point of view.

NOTES

1. *'The story of shepoumaramth'*; Publicity Department, NSCN-IM Nagaland; 1995.
2. *"A Brief Account of demanding sovereignty of Manipur"*; RPF (Revolutionary People's Front) 1995.
3. *"Nagalim – 50 Years of Resistance" (souvenir)*; Ministry of Information and Publicity. Government of the People's Republic of Nagalim (MIP, GPRN).
4. *The Constitution of the Fedral Government of Nagaland* (The Yehzabo of Nagaland), 1968:
"136. Protestant Christianity and Naga Religion are reconised Religions in Nagaland ...
138. The Naga National Council shall be the only reconised political institution in Nagaland."



PLA Insurgents of Manipur (Somewhere along the Indo-Burma International Border, 2002)

Founded by (Late) N. Bisheshwor Singh with assistances from China, Pakistan and Burma. Demand sovereignty of Manipur. Rated as one of the most powerful insurgent groups in North East India and the Indo-Burma region during 1985-1995. Armed mainly with Ak-47 rifles, Light Machine Guns, M16 Rifles, Lethod guns, Sten Machine carbines, Grenade Launchers, 2 inches Mortars, Grenades and Chinese

made communication sets.

On 21 October 2008, PLA changed the conflict dynamics in Manipur and North East India by having a three points agreement with the left wing Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist), who terrorised more than 230 districts and 22 states in India. The organisation is not yet ready for peace talk with the Government of India.



UNLF Insurgents, Manipur (Somewhere along the Indo-Burma International Border, 2002)

Founded in 1964. Closely operated with the Naga insurgents till 1988-90. Rated as one of the most powerful insurgent groups in North East India and the Indo-Burma region. Demand sovereignty of Manipur. Armed mainly with Ak-47 rifles, Light Machine Guns, M16 Rifles, Lethod guns, sten machine carbines, grenade launchers, 2 inches mortars, automatic grenade launchers, grenades, Chinese-made communication sets. Not yet ready for cease-fire and peace talk.



Manipuri insurgent

RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade), Lethod Gun, Mortars etc. can be obtained from black market, gun-runner and friendly insurgent groups in South East Asia.



Manipuri insurgent

To obtain ammunitions for the correct bore is the main problem for many insurgent outfits in North East India. They normally build up their stockpile through various channels.



Training, Manipuri Insurgents, 2002 (Along the Indo-Burma International Border)

Problems: Menpowers (volunteers), dedicated and secured training areas, shortages of arms and ammunition, motivation and dedication.



Self-help programmes to sustained revolutionary movement (somewhere along the Indo-Burma International border). Such programmes were adopted by the vietcong guerillas, KIA, SSA, KNU, LTTE and Maoist Communist cadres of Nepal



Self-help programmes to sustained revolutionary movement (somewhere along the Indo-Burma International border).



Training Session: Manipuri Insurgents

Why and how these young boys joined Insurgency movement in the region?

Anger, frustration, poor socio-economic conditions, violent social environment, anti-establishment hate-virus, momentary charm for jungle life (Robinhood).



Motivation is the driving force for survival of insurgents. Motivation depends upon the existing politico-social environments, poor socio-economic development and societal conflicts. It has to be commensurate with the degree of suffering of the masses. The more the people suffer the easier to motivate them (Mao-Tse Tung, Ho-Chi Minh, Ernesto Che Guevera, General Giap etc.)



Female Manipuri Insurgents

All insurgent groups have female cadres. Generally used in non-combat purposes like medic, public relations, couriers, extortions, administrative duties and informers. Both male and female cadres should serve for a minimum period before permitted to marry.



Female Manipuri Insurgent

Why she joined Manipur insurgency movement. She was not born as an insurgent. Who are responsible for turning this young innocent girl to an insurgent? of course, The government, the society, intelligentsia, insurgent outfits and finally the God.



A group of Manipuri Insurgent Outfit. (Somewhere along Indo-Burma International Border)

Moral and material supports from neighbouring countries keep their movement alive in South East Asia.



Anup Chetia, General Secretary of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)



A group of Manipuri Insurgent Outfit
(Somewhere along Indo-Burma International Border).
Terrainic condition give them advantages over the security forces.



A Group of Manipuri Insurgent Outfit along the Indo-Burma International Border.

Peoples support give them advantages in their movement.

Manipur Insurgents can survive so long they are getting people's support in general area, Manipur, North East India, Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal and Bhutan. In future, India's bilateral relations with Burma and Bangladesh will play an important role in Manipur Insurgency movement.



Paresh Barua, leader of ULFA (at large) (United Liberation Front of Assam)

Paresh Barua, Commander-in-Chief of the United Liberation Front of Assam (is at large).

Anup Chetia, the General Secretary of the outfit (arrested on Bangladesh soil and lodged in Dacca Jail), and Arabinda Rajkhowa, the Chairman of the outfit (is at large) formed the trimvurate of ULFA. He is Master of almost nine to twelve languages and dialects.

PART III

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION OF MANIPUR IN THE CONTEXT OF NORTH EAST INDIA

The dynamics of problem of the North Eastern region of India is really mind boggling, frightening, awesome and full of desparations. Some of the problems includes historical debris and ashes; man-made socio-political issues; lack of socio-economic development; instinct for natural progression of human society. Since early 1950's, the region has been plagued by Insurgency movement; ethnic crisis and clashes; Changes in demographic contours; religious aspirations; yearning for ethno-cultural supremacy and external influences. The general area has been identified as a breeding pond of ethnic insurgent outfits which requires pathological analysis. Why so?

NORTH EAST INDIA



Sketch Map
(Not to scale)

NORTHEAST INDIA - A PARADOX

GENERAL

The term 'North East India' (Northeastern region of India) is a common reference used to denote initially the seven states in the region: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura, popularly known as Seven Sisters. Later on, from political and socio-economic angle, Sikkim was added, forming it a 'consortium' of 8 states. The region has got a unique place not only in India but also in South East Asian context, in terms of geographical location, terrain; social and racial characters, ethnic identity and religious upheavals etc. The demographic contours present the existences of people of martial character, with very high ethnic aspirations and 'Nationalism', which led to ethnic crisis, clashes and killings for ethnic supremacy.

The Northeastern region of India, formed a part of the tropical rain forest, stretches from the foothills of the Himalayas to the region of Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, the fertile plain of the Mekong River. In early 1940's, to most of the people particularly of western countries, South East Asia covered the general areas from Burma to Vietnam in east-west direction. The region was bestowed with lots of primary and secondary jungles; rivers of different size and lengths; insects; malaria; dusty roads; bamboo houses; large number of ethnic groups sometimes identified as unsophisticated, underdeveloped, uncultured and uncivilized people. A closer scrutiny show that North-East India formed a part of Southeast Asia and identified itself as the eastern fuselage of India. It formed a gateway to India to demographic invasion from the Irrawaddy valley; the Salween basin; the Chindwin river belt; the Yangtze basin; the Mekong Delta; primarily passing through the valley of Manipur, the hilly terrain of Mizoram and Nagaland, and the high mountain passes of Arunachal Pradesh. In early 1950's, the region came up in world's insurgency map with militancy and ethnic revolutionary movement in Nagaland and Manipur, closely-followed by Mizoram, Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh. In 1970's the region's imbroglio turned into a complex politico-strategic phenomena due to the involvement of foreign countries like China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and probably few western countries who played the politico-socio-religio card to check-mated India in international fora. Myanmar (Burma) insurgent groups like the Chin National Army (CNA); the National United Party of Arakan (NUPA); the Arakanese Revolutionary Army (ARA); the Eastern

Naga Regional Council (ENRC); the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the Kachin Independent Army (KIA), the Shan State Army (SSA) etc. had direct bearing on the ongoing insurgency upheaval in the Northeastern region of India. The activities of the ISI of Pakistan which maintained close links with the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also had a direct influence to a large number of Muslim population in the region, particularly those 3 crores Bangladesh refugees which formed large mobile population. Bangladesh, for political brinkmanship, socio-religious identity and fear psychosis of having big brother India as neighbour, is playing the North East India card in regional and bilateral politics. Bhutan has been put on the dock by the presence of many insurgent outfits from this region on its soil. The crackdown by the RBA (Royal Bhutan Army) with assistance from the Indian Army in mid 2004 has not yet solved Bhutan's problem completely.

Today, all the states in the Northeastern region of India is facing a complex, variable and multiple problems in terms of social, cultural, development, economic, ethnic identity, psychological, political, religion, human rights, territorial conflicts, demographic and cultural invasion, drug menaces and external influences. The region is divided bitterly on ethnic, sub-ethnic, community and religious lines and presented an image of war-torn area, likely to form mini Greek states for self-destruction in the long run. The politico-religio-social upheaval in the region may become one of the main factors for the balkanisation of India in the near future. In all the states, corruption is rampant, perennial and cheap. State government machineries particularly those of law and order are dysfunctional; sense of socio-economic development are negligible, urgency in industrialization is missing; poor, rudimentary monetary system and banking services are clearly seen. Political parties, political system and politicians changed their colour, integrity, loyalty and dress overnight to suite their myopic ethnic and personal gains. There are strong nexus between political parties, politicians, anti-social elements, drug warlords, black marketeer, militants and insurgent outfits.

In terms of economy, the region is backward and socio-economically underdeveloped. Communication and transport system are inadequate and in some cases are archaic in modern parlance. State capitals are not linked by railway network except Assam; travel by air is of awful nightmare; inland water transport system has not been fully exploited. Religion played a vital role in societal structures and upheavals, transforming old religious system into new one. Within a period of 60 years, since India's independent, one eighth of the total population of the region has been converted into Christianity, discarding old religious system that considered unwittingly as Animism. There are active politico-religious movements for the revival of Hinduism and Islam and a feeble attempt by insurgents and militants to exploit the religious system thereby making negative impact to the various ethnic groups and sub-groups, presenting a long-termed dangerous trends for the region as a whole. An appraisal of historical records of India shows that India was very complacent about the region and adopted the archaic British policy of *"leave the people to manage their own affairs"*, which would not pay good dividend in the long run. There are many hard facts of the region, which require sound, and humane understanding, analysis and assessment.

HARD FACTS: NORTH EAST INDIA

"What ails North East India", inhabited by wonderful, simple and honest people, considered as a lovely and beautiful place in South East Asia. The people in the region are facing perennial problems, which are classified as political, socio-cultural, constitutional, economic and ethno-cultural in character and behaviour. All the states in the region has got asymmetric problem. Manipur is not an exception.

FACTS-SHEETS

HARD FACTS: NORTH-EAST INDIA

❖ Existence of Political Imbroglio	❖ Socio-economic Backwardness
❖ Vital Strategic Platform of India	❖ Yearning to join the Oriental Club
❖ Easy external influences	❖ Prolong negligence by mainland India.
❖ Emergence of Crisis of confidence.	❖ Mutual mistrust and lack of unity.

POLITICAL

- North Easterners, including the insurgents, have genuine grievances against mainland India.
- There is a lack of clear understanding of the distinctive nature of the people and the region by the mainstream of Indian society.
- Existence of political bankruptcy and aberration for a solution of the region's imbroglio.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC

- Protracted neglect by New Delhi.
- Socio-economic imbalance of the region vis-a-vis mainstream of India.
- Lack of communication and transport in perennial form and texture.

- (d) Region identified as landlocked and hilly area.
- (e) No pragmatic agenda and approaches for industrialization.

STRATEGIC SECURITY PARADIGM

- (a) A stable North-East India is the prerequisite for India's dream of Asian superpower.
- (b) Manipur is one of the soft spot of India in South-East Asian context, including the 'Look East Policy'.
- (c) Manipur is the springboard of India's venture to Eastward direction.
- (d) In world strategic politics, China, Burma and Bangladesh will play the North-East India Card.
- (e) Pakistan and Bangladesh favours to sever North-East India from mainland India.
- (f) United States of America and some western countries has got their politico-strategic interest in the region.

ETHNIC IMBROGLIO

- (a) The region is prone to ethnic influences.
- (b) The ethnic and sub-ethnic interest and aspiration overshadows the national interest of India.
- (c) Religion and religious conflicts play a major role in the region's politico-ethnic equation.

EXTERNAL

- (a) The region is prone to external influences.
- (b) Comfortable exploitation by external elements due to its peculiar geo-political location.

SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL.

- (a) North-east India: a land too far for mainland India.
- (b) Barrier between 'we, the Indian' and those 'the North-Easterners' exists.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DOLDRUM

ECONOMIC DEADLOCK

Upto early 20th century, Economics, deals particularly with the management of the income and expenditure of the people or a country as a whole of what they produce and what we consume, and their relation with each other and other countries and people (*Glimpse of World History*; 544). With the advancement in science and technology, economy has been described as the 'management of concerns and resources of a community and understanding better the nature of the world'. However, in the Northeastern region of India, people have got least regards to the meaning, context and importance of economy in the socio-economic development of the region. Economy of any state, region or country is related to the National aspirations of the people; political stress and strains; geopolitical environment; natural resources; geographical location; communication and transport etc.

Sixty one years after Independence of India, Manipur is fighting for a single railway line to connect its capital Imphal with the rest of India. In the present day context of advancement in science and technology, the fast speed in computers and computerizations; concept of globalization and industrialization; the IT (Information Technology) concept; fast speed in biotechnology etc. Manipur and other areas in the region have been left far behind in the race. The economic health of Manipur (2002-2003) is

"It is a sad commentary on the then bureaucrats of the state, that it was not possible to spend as much as Rs 5,20,000 out of Rs 15,500,000 from the First Five Year Plan allocation, when Manipur was directly governed by the Central Government. During the next Three Five Year Plans, out of a total of Rs 32 crores, Rs 4 crores was surrendered."

(VIK Sarin, *India's North East in Flames*)

100-150 years behind Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh; 180-200 years behind Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Kuwait; 350-400 years behind, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, 500-600 years behind Sweden, France, Italy; and many centuries behind United Kingdom, United States of America, Germany and Hong Kong.

The socio-economic movement in Manipur is so slow that it was just like a cow walking on the snow playfield. It is sheer criminal act that agriculture and allied services, the mainstay of economy

of Manipur remained stand-still for the last 40-45 years. The watershed management programmes, Management of wasteland, scientific method of livestock farming; poultry; piggery, cattle's and fish farming etc. which could bring tremendous economic vibration and benefits has remained stagnated for a long period. Since early 1960's, the economy of the state has been strangled socially, politically and ethnically in a phase manner. The entire ethnic population in North-East-India has been shattered by politico-ethnic economic conflicts. Conflicts and collision among more than 100-110 ethnic and sub-ethnic segments has seriously blocked the economic development of the region. Manipur is not an exception.

Some of the neglected socio-economic fields/areas in Manipur are:

- (a) World famous Manipuri Handloom and Handicrafts industry.
- (a) Food processing and fruit processing industries.
- (b) Bamboo industry.
- (c) Agriculture and allied sector.
- (d) Huge reservoir of human resource development and Information Technology (IT).
- (e) Tourism industry.
- (f) Oil and Natural gases along the Indo-Myanmar International border, close to the Chindwin River belt.
- (g) Communication and transport sector.
- (h) Hydropower resources.

Manipur has no means to support itself economically. It depends to New Delhi for its fiscal support. But whatever it received from the Central Government, a large chunk of it ploughed back to mainland India from where it gets its essential supplies. The rest goes to different directions: corruption; pilferages; educational institutions outside Manipur; Bank account in foreign countries; insurgent outfits; political bags etc. Hundreds of educated unemployed youths have got two options-go outside the state to find a job and livelihood or remain in the state to indulge in insurgency, Militancy, organized crime, senseless agitations and anti-social activities. Such environment has indebted the Manipuri society from socio-economic angle. Today the entire populace is lamenting and crying under their own folly.

POWER CRISIS

The Northeastern region of India has got a large hydropower potential, which has not tapped for the last 50 year and so. The total assessed power potential of the region including Sikkim and North Bengal touched the magic figure of 67,000 MW (NECCC-1, 1994). As per survey conducted by the Northeastern Council (NEC), the seven sisters in the region have a power potential of 31.857 MW (NEC, 2001). Hydropower, which was introduced by the British authorities to manage to augmented their business interest in tea, oil exploration and railway, still remained untapped.

In 1930, the first hydropower in Manipur was installed at Leimakhong, 21 kms to the north of Imphal city. 150-160 KW powers generated were used for electrification of Imphal town; British

residency (later Raj Bhawan); palace complex, Kangla fort (old 4th Assam Rifles location) and important government offices. Within a short time, another Diesel power plant was constructed at Keisampat, Imphal to supplement electric supply in case of breakdown of Leimakhong power supply. In 1960's, most of the districts particularly in the hill areas did not have the advantages to get electric supply. In 1983, the Loktak hydro-electric project was commissioned, under the management of North East Electric Supply Corporation (NEESC) to produce power 105 MW. By 1985-86, people in the state dreamed of excess power supply and end of the era of Hurricane lamps, candle and patromaxes. To construct the Loktak Hydroelectric project, people in the state had sacrificed more than 55,000 hectare of prime cultivable land. Hundred of peoples were dislocated from their original inhabitants and beautiful pristine areas were sacrificed. But still the state is facing the biggest power crisis for the millennium for domestic and industrial uses. The daily power requirements of Manipur were 100 MW (1998-1999) 110 MW (1999-2000 AD); 120-125 MW (2000-2001 AD) and will be 200-250 by 210-2011 AD.

In mid 1980's, various actions were taken to launch new power projects to plug the serious gaps of demand and supply of power. Thoubal Dam project; Ithai Barrage; Loktak down stream project; heavily fuel power projects etc. were launched with high aim and objectives. All the projects were delayed inordinately due to lack of political will power, absence of bureaucratic interest and vision; financial mismanagement; heavy doses of corruption and lack of social awareness. Thoubal Dam project suffered heavily due to the interference and extortion by the Naga insurgent outfits. The impasse of the construction of Tipaimukh Dam in the Barak catchments areas at the trijunction of Manipur, Mizoram and Assam, which was estimated to produce 1500 MW at an estimated cost of Rs 3500-4000 crores (1999-2000 AD index), has not yet fully resolved. The impasse of the construction the Dam involved many political, social, economic and ethnic issues where New Delhi is not ready to listen and solve amicably in public interest.

TIPAIMUKH DAM IMPASSE

The main issues involve in the construction of the Tipamukh Dam in the southern hilly region of Manipur are:

- Ethnic, sub-ethnic and regional political interests.
- The issue of socio-economic benefit to Manipur state.

POWER SUPPLY OF MANIPUR

The 16th Electric Power Survey of India had assessed the requirement of 208 MW of Peak Load power and 857 MU of Energy for the state for the year 2004-05.

The power supply of Manipur depends entirely on the share of power allocated from Central Sector power plants like Loktak Hydro project, Kopili HE project, Khangdong HE project, Assam Gas based power project, Katnalguri Agartala Gas Turbine power project at Ramchandranagar, Ranganadi HE project and Doyang HE project. The State's own generation is negligibly small. Out of 646.807 MU available from the Central Sector/State Sector generations and energy purchased, 571.264 MU of energy was purchased. Free energy available from Loktak HE project and energy generated by the State were 74.110 MU and 1.433 MU respectively.

—Administrative Report, 2004-2005,
Government of Manipur.

- In principle, River Barak flows and belongs to Manipur, whereas the benefit of the Dam proposed to be share with Mizoram and Assam for free power.
- Socio-Economic and political benefits to Manipur will be pea-nut.
- More than 275.50 square kilometers of Manipur's landscape will be submerged.
- Likely changes in habitat, environmental scenario, forest areas and pristine surroundings.
- The feasibility of making smaller Dam along the course of Barak river not discussed in public interest.
- The feasibility of handing over of Tipaimukh Hydro power project from the Central Government Control to the State Government of Manipur after a period of 25-30 years.

The people of Manipur are not convinced that the Tipaimukh Hydro Power project, once, completed would bring new life style and fresh smile to the inhabitants of the state. They vividly remembered that when the British oil firm, the British Petroleum (BP), set out to build its \$3.5 billion natural gas plant in Tangguh gasfield, west Papua, Indonesia, to extract 14 trillion cubic metres of gas, the rosy smile of the Papuan inhabitants vanished quickly when the project came into stream and started productions. Suddenly, thousands of migrants rushed in to work in the project, and the Papuans, the original inhabitants were ejected in a slow and deliberate process from the area. The British company, who owned the oilfield, worth more than \$100 billion and aimed to supply gas to China, USA, Mexico and some other countries, literally blocked the fishing activities of the local peoples in the Exclusive Zones established by the company; reduced job quota of the Papuan natives from 6000 to 50 or so; invited other ethnic Indonesian workers into the region (BP's plant) with the help of Manila; and the local Papuans were refused to be full-time staff members of the BP. "We predicted that BP and Indonesia would not care about the very survival of the Papuans on their land and their nation. We expect that BP and Indonesia would continuously destroy our forests and our trees and pollute the rivers and seas", said Pauan leaders (*Guardian Newspaper Limited*, 2008). The British Company strongly denied that they were causing environmental damages; loses to pristine Papuan rainforests; creating conflicts between the local inhabitants and the migrants; increased level of pollution; helping Manila against their fight for the Papuan Independent movement. However, the local leaders voiced their anger, frustration and fear against the Indonesian Government who used the British Oil company for ethnic cleansing agenda against the illiterate, unskilled and the undeveloped Papuan inhabitants.

The fear psychosis, political uneasiness, lack of political trust of New Delhi, the sound bite of the Narmada copycats; the question of end-use benefits to the people of Manipur etc. derailed the timely construction of the Tipaimukh Dam. The feeling of uneasiness and mistrust of New Delhi by the Manipuris were real. Such situations used to exist in Latin America, African continent, China, South East Asia with a trail in pollution, Human Right abuses, devastation to eco-system, distressed inhabitants with no share in the wealth extracted/produce from their soil. The Manipuris used to claim that they were not totally against the construction of the Dam. However, they objected that New Delhi should not put the socio-economic life of the people of Manipur into the political dustbin in the name of development. The people of the state should have the maximum end-use benefit once the Dam got commissioned. Accordingly, many social worker, NGOs and economists suggested that the Dam should be constructed but the management and the ownership should be handed over to Manipur State after a period of 25-30 years, so that the socio-economic life of the people could be improved at par with the rest of India.

COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORT

GENERAL

In 1962, India suffered a humiliating defeat due to the Chinese invasion on India's Northern and Northeastern border. During that period the communication network of the Northeastern region of India were of primitive in nature and pathetic in overall conditions. The entire region was connected with mainland India by a small strip of land in Siliguri corridor (West Bengal), popularly known as India's 'Chicken neck'. After crossing the corridor, one find that the mighty Brahmaputra river divided the entire region into two segment: areas to the south of Brahmaputra which included the states of Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram Tripura, Nagaland and part of Assam; areas to the north which included Arunachal Pradesh and part of Assam. Steamers, small ferries and countryboats were used for transportation between the southern and northern bank of the river, thereby creating a major communication and transportation bottleneck after Siliguri corridor.

NORTH EAST INDIA : GENERAL SCENARIO

In early 1933, during the British rule in India and for their interest in economic exploitation in tea and oil exploration sector in the Northeastern region of India, a plan was conceived to construct a bridge over river Brahmaputra at Saraighat (Pandu), Assam. The plan was shelved when the British government was heavily involved in World War II. In early 1950's, the Assam government raised the pathetic communication problem existing in the region and construction of the Brahmaputra bridge started, to link up the northern and southern regions of Assam. In 1963, the road-cum-rail strategic bridge, 1.43 km in length, was open to regular traffic. However, development of railway lines and the national highways in the region were extremely slow and tardy. A single old Metre Gauge (MG) railway line connected the entire Northeastern region with the mainland India, disrupted frequently by floods and rain. Travel by train from Siliguri corridor towards Guwahati (Gauhati), Dimapur, and Dibrugarh used to be a nightmare. After 1963, the Broad Gauge (BG) railway line was extended upto New Bongaigaon, keeping in view the establishment of a petro-chemical complex in the area. After 1965-66, the construction of Broad Gauge (BG) line from New Bongaigaon to Guwahati and then to Luming (375 km) was carried out. However, the extensively used Metre Gauge (MG) railway

line running east west alignment had limited capacity and largely catered for transportation of foodgrains, raw materials, agricultural inputs, crude oil, coal and heavy military movement.

After the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, the Government of India assessed and analysed the strategic importance of Northeast India *vis-à-vis* China, Burma and Bangladesh. Important National highways of the region were given some priority from socioeconomic and strategic angle. Guwahati is connected to Meghalaya by NH-40 (100 km) and NH-51 (Guwahati-Tura); to Nagaland by NH-36 (Guwahati-Nagaon-Dimapur) and NH-37 (Dibrugarh-Sibsagar-Jorhat-Tezpur-Guwahati-Goalpara). Manipur is connected to Bramaputra valley by NH-39 (Imphal-Kohima-Guwahati) and to the Barak valley by NH-53 (Imphal-Silchar). Tripura is connected to Assam by NH-44 (Agartala-Silchar-Jowai-Shillong-Guwahati; 380 km). NH-52 connected Dibrugarh, North Lakhimpur, Tezpur and Guwahati; NH-52A, a short distance highway connects Itanagar, capital of Arunachal Pradesh with Assam through NH-52. The total road lengths of Nationals Highways in the region comes to approximately 18,561 km (1982-83 index) as compared to the total road surfaced lengths of 6,28,402 km of India, which formed 2.08% only.

In 1987, a bridge, 3.01 km in length, known as Kalia Bhomara, over Brahmaputra River was constructed and open to traffic. The construction of a third rail-cum-road bridge (2.31 km), the Narayan Setu was delayed due to political, financial, insurgency, militancy, and centre-state relations. The Government of India planned to construct another road-cum-rail bridge (4.7 km) at a place called Bogibil, 17 km downstream of Dibrugarh over Brahmaputra River. However, no major works at the national level has been executed for the remaining states in the region, projecting an imbalance in the execution of socio-economic development works in the area.

Sl. No.	Type of Road	Surfaced Kms	Non surfaced Kms	Total
1.	National Highway (NH)	957	-	957
2.	State Highway (SH)	683	-	683
3.	Major District Roads (MDR)	945	75	1020
4.	Other District Roads (ODR)	1190	718	1908
5.	Inter-Village Roads (IVR)	870	3208	4078
Total		4645	4001	8646

MANIPUR (CASE STUDY)

Manipur has got a total surfaces road of 4645 km (1998-99 index), as compared to 18,565 km (1983-84 index) of the Northeastern region of India and 6,28,402 km (1983-84) of India. For the state, the average length of surfaced road per square km was 6.92% (1984-85 index) as compared to the national average of 18.96%. As on 1983-84, the percentages of the surfaced road length to the total road length remain at 21.00% (18.08% for Northeastern region) as compared to the national average of 38.86%. Manipur is a landlocked state and road transportation is the only viable mode

available for common people. The road networks are still inadequate for socio-economic development. There are three National Highways: NH-39, NH-53 and NH 150, classified as all weather roads. The third National Highway, NH-150 has not yet fully come up.

NATIONAL HIGHWAY-39 (NH-39)

It is one of the most important highways of Manipur, connecting the state with the outside world. It link up Guwahati-Kohima-Imphal and Moreh. During the British period, it was known and recorded on all official documents as DMC road (Dimapur-Manipur Cart Road), with a total road length of 235 km, passing through Kohima, Mao, Tadubi, Maram, Lairou-Ching, Karong, Senapati, Kangpokpi, Sekmai and then to Imphal. From Imphal the road traversed to Lilong, Thoubal, Pallel, Tengnoupal and end up at Moreh, with a total road length of 104 Kms, on the Indo-Burma border. In 1944-47, during World War II period, the road became synonym with the Allied and the Axis forces (the imperial Japanese forces) during their military campaigns in Burma and South Asian region. It was extensively used for movement of troops, war materials, advances and withdrawal of forces at various phases of military operations. The road is blacktop over the whole of its length. During rainy season, the highway faced landslides at many places and blocked traffic for a considerable long period.

NH-39 is the main route for exit and entry to Manipur from the northern side and a link road to the Indian railway system at Dimapur. The density of traffic is 500-600 vehicles of all types per day, which includes buses, trucks, cars, vehicles of the Army, para-military and police forces. The road has been damaged at various places due to lack of maintenance, seepages at various places and landslides during rainy season. Some portions of the road is maintained by the BRTF (Border Road Task Force) and some by the state PWD (Public Works Department). Ethnic groups of people inhabited both sides of the road. From Imphal to Kangpokpi, the Manipuri Meitei and the Kuki tribals inhabited all along the road. From Senapati town to Mao Gate (border between Manipur and Nagaland), Mao and Maram Naga tribe settled on both sides of the road. The highway has been exploited by many ethnic tribal groups, ethnic communities, student organisations, for political supremacy. In fact the highway has been coined as the 'Political Highway-39' (NH-39).

MANIPUR		
Important Bridges along NH-39		
1.	Maram Bridge	RCC Type; 104 m
2.	Senapati	RCC Type; 48 m
3.	Pheidinga Bridge	RCC Type; 44 m
4.	Lilong Bridge	RCC Type; 97 m
5.	Waithou Bridge	RCC Type; 42 m
6.	Thoubal Bridge	RCC Type; 69 m
7.	Palel Bridge	RCC Type; 59 m
8.	Lokchao Bridge	RCC Type; 44 m

MANIPUR		
Important Bridges along NH-39		
»	Tupeil Bridge	RCC type over Tupei River (131 feet).
»	Noney Bridge	RCC type over Irang River (282 feet).
»	Barak Bridge	Hamillon type over Barak River (340 feet)
»	Maku Bridge	A cable suspension bridge over Maku River (240 feet).
»	Jirighat Bridge	RCC bridge over Jiri River

NATIONAL HIGHWAY-53 (NH-53)

It is another important National Highway, a class 40, all weather, black top road which connects Silchar (Assam) with Imphal, covering a total road length of 269 km. From Silchar the road traversed towards Imphal crossing important points like Ziribam, Nungba, Khoushanou, Lower Lukhambi, Noney (None), Tera and then to Imphal, meeting NH-39 at Imphal. From Imphal to Noney, the road covers the valley section; Noney to Nungba the hill section and Nungba-Ziribam-Silchar, the plain section. During olden days, Imphal valley was connected with Silchar and Ziribam by a road known as Tongjei Marin, astride NH-53 towards south, which passed through Bishenpur (Bishnupur), Leimatak, Laimaton Ching (Laimaton Hill) Nungba, Ziribam and Silchar. With the opening of NH-53, the importance of Tongjei Marin has been lost.

The Manipuri Meitei and the Kukis inhabited both sides of the road from Imphal to Noney. The Noney-Nungba section is inhabited by the Jeliang, Rongmei, Kabuis etc. Down hills from Nungba to Ziribam is a mixed hill-plain section and inhabited by mixed Nagas groups, Kukis and the Manipuri Meiteis. From Ziribam to Silchar, it is a run on plain areas inhabited by the Manipuri Meiteis, Cacharis, a few Assamese Muslims, few Nagas and a large number of Bengali Muslim refugees from Bangladesh who formed the main mobile population. From political, socio-economic, and security angle, the highway has been neglected by New Delhi, giving freedom of operation to many insurgent outfits all along its stretches.

NATIONAL HIGHWAY-150 (NH-150)

Manipur has started construction of a third National Highway, NH-150 a class 40, all weather black top road, running north-south direction to facilitate communication and transportation network along the Indo-Burma international border. The aim and objective of NH-150 is to connect Manipur with Nagaland to the north and Mizoram to the south. The highway follows the old state highway from Jessami to Litan (Ukhrul District), Yaingangpokpi, Imphal, Bishenpur, Churachandpur, Thanlon, Parbung, Tipaimukh and finally link up with Aizawl. To the Northern sector, the road envisaged to link up with northeastern part of Nagaland through Phek, Kohima, Chizami, Meluri, Kokokchung. The total distance from Jessami to Tipaimukh will be 230 Kms.

The road section between Jessami and Litan is inhabited by the Tangkhul Naga tribe. Before the Naga-Kuki ethnic clashes, a large number of Kuki tribe used to settled down both sides of the road. The stretches from Litan to Imphal is mainly inhabited by the Manipuris Meiteis, a few Nagas and the Kukis. This section is plain valley area. The plain section between Imphal to Churachandpur, is inhabited mainly by the Manipuri Meiteis and the Kukis. The section between Churachandpur and Tipaimukh, classified as hill section, are mainly inhabited by the Kukis, the Zou, the Paites, Mizos and few Manipuri Meiteis.

STATE HIGHWAYS (SH)

The State Highways (SH), together with the National Highways constitute the main communication network of the state. Some of the highways are radial in its characteristics and some are orbital. The entire road length of the National Highways and important state highways has been reduced to the standard of District Highway in any state outside Northeastern region of India. NH-39, NH-53,

and NH-150 were exploited to the fullest extent by the Insurgent outfits with blockades, extortions, and intimidation. The rift between the Manipuri Meiteis in the valley, the Nagas and the Kukis in the hills has taken serious political implication with great impact to free flow of movement on the National Highways and the State Highways.

AIR LINK

The state capital Imphal is linked by air with Silchar, Guwahati, Kolkata and Delhi. Imphal is a strategic airport, which can handle military aircrafts including fighters and transport aircraft. There are two old airfields (Advance Landing Ground), one at Imphal and another at Palel used by the Allied forces during World War II. Due to the expansion of the capital city Imphal, the present Imphal airfield will become redundant and unsafe by 2020-25 AD. There is a need to identify and earmark an alternative airfield, probably, Kakching airfield, for future expansion and safe air traffic.

RAIL CONNECTIONS

For the last 61 years and so, Dimapur was considered as the nearest railhead for Manipur and Nagaland states. Till early 1960's, Dimapur railway station was known as Dimapur – Manipur Road station. When Nagaland got statehood in December 1963, the name of the railway station was changed to Dimapur, more on politico-ethnic compulsion rather than from any technical angle. In early 1990's, the railway line from Silchar (MG line) was extended upto Ziribam, the border town of Manipur, 42 km from Silchar. The ceremonial railhead, which benefited a small section of people in Ziribam areas particularly, the Assamese, the Bengali and the Bangladeshi refugees, which formed 70% of the total population in the sub-division, does not help substantially in the socio-economic development of the valley and the hill areas of the state. The execution of another railway line from Diphu (Assam) to Karong and

	Bridges
1	Northern Sect
	▶ Lamlong
	▶ Sawombun
	▶ Litan
2	Central S Churachand
	▶ Nambol
	▶ Ningtho bridge
	▶ Salbung Churach bridge
3	Central Churacha
	▶ Tuilaiph
	▶ Laijang

then to Imphal was scrapped in 2004. Ziribam-Toupul (Tupul) railway line was visualized and an amount of Rs. 350 crores was earmarked for the same. The absence of rail connection to Imphal, the capital city with the outside world has got serious effects in terms of communication, transportation and socio-economic development.

TRANSPORT NETWORK

As late as 1950's, the people in Manipur used to travel from Imphal to Dimapur via Kohima, a clear distance of 235 km by bullock carts, through DMC road, with a time-frame of 7 days. Few trucks of the Bengali and Assamese businessmen and vehicles of the Royal family of Manipur used to ply on the road between Imphal and Dimapur in odd occasion. In early 1960's, the Manipur State Transport (MST), a state-owned transport corporation was formed and became the only means of transportation in the state. In early 1970's, some private buses and trucks started regular services on Imphal-Dimapur road, and on adhoc basis touched Guwahati. By late 1980's, the MST was transformed into a public sector transport corporation/organization, known as the Manipur State Road Transport Corporation (MSRTC). In 1990's, a number of private transport companies/organizations came up in the state and started transportation business on NH-39 and NH-53. The emergence of private transport companies, completely eclipsed the functioning and monopoly of the MSRTC. By 1996-97 index, the corporation with hardly 68 buses and trucks with a total heavy administrative personnel strength of 510, became a burden to the public exchequer due to sheer lack of direction; lack of management ethic; pilferages; misuses of transports by politicians and bureaucrats etc.

ALIENATION OF NORTH EAST INDIA

In 1823, the British Government officials opened up its communication with Manipur, through Raja Gambhir Singh, one of the members of the Royal family of Manipur, who fled to Cachar when the Burmese (the king of Ava) invaded Manipur and devastated the kingdom. Raja Gambhir Singh, alongwith 500 Manipuris under his command were taken into the pay of the British Government. Later on, the strength was increased to 2000; placed under command of Captain Grant and named as Manipur Levy. They took part in the Anglo-Burmese War of 1825-26. After the termination of the war, the right for possession of the Kabaw Valley (Kubo Valley) was keenly disputed by the Burmese (the Burmans) and the Manipuris (Muneepoores); documents produced by either party were examined; detailed reports were submitted to the Government for final decision and order. On 16th March, 1833, the British Government announced that "the supreme government still adheres to the opinion that the Ningthee river (Numpurong to the Shans; Kyendwen to the Burmans; Ningthee to the Muneepoorees) formed the proper boundary between Ava (Kingdom of Ava) and Muneepoor (Kingdom of Manipur); but that in consideration for His Majesty's (King of Ava) feelings and wishes, and in the spirit of amity and goodwill subsisting between the two countries, the supreme government consents to the restoration of the Kubo (Kabaw Valley) to Ava, and to the establishment of the boundary line at the foot of Yoomadoungh hills". The Governor General of India, Lord William Bentinck, was disinterested in the political and military affairs of Manipur. On 25 March 1833, while discussing the administration and welfare of the people of Manipur, he wrote in a Minute Sheet:-

"Whether the policy of identifying our interests with those of this tiny state—separated from our territories by an extremely difficult tract of country, and from those of Ava by one of great comparative facility—has ever been made a question I have not learned; the advantages, however, to us of a connection with Manipur appear to me very problematical, and this is the consideration to which I would now pay more particular direct attention."

Historically, Manipur suffered tremendously, due to non-attention by the British government officials. On 7 February 1835, Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General of India, again emphasized that Manipur was an 'useless and inconvenient post' to defend with, in case of any war with the Burmese. The Britishers did not ventured into the region for a considerable long time, as their National interests

revolved around to trade and commerce; colonization; planting of Union Jack in Delhi, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta (Kolkata). Occasionally, they sent British Expeditionary Forces into the Malaria-prone Brahmaputra, Barak and Imphal Valley; wild tracts in Naga, Chin-Lushai and NEFA (North East Frontier Agency) areas. They subjugated the kingdom of Ava; wanted to destroy the Manchu dynasty in China and raise the British flag in Tibet. They knew the existence of the kingdoms of Manipur, Tripura and Assam and the various wild tribes in the hilly region. But their interest was not to improve the civilisational welfare angle of the people but to extract British National interest.

EXCLUDED AREAS : TRENDS SETTER FOR ALIENATION

After the Anglo-Manipuri war of 1891, the British authorities made several attempts to suppress, the Ahoms (Assamese), the Manipuris, the Tripuris, the Nagas, the Mizos, the Mishmis, the Daflas etc. North East India became a corridor between British India and Burma. The British officials did not want to disturb the wild tribes in the region. They formulated one of the finest political doctrine, known as **'Excluded Area': Leave the tribe as far as possible to manage their own affairs.** It was very cheap, cost effective, archaic in nature and rudimentary in character. The political doctrine of Excluded Area became the main reason for British officials to remain out of touch with the civil populace in the region, gradually alienating them from Mainland British India. The Britishers did not treat the people in the general area on par with other citizens in other parts of India and the world. There were genuine grievances of the people of the region against the Britishers and their policy.

During World War II, the British officials came close towards the people in North East-India not by design but by destiny of the British war efforts in South East Asia. For the British and the American, winning a war in Far East Asia depended heavily on the strategic North East India which acted as the stepping stone of British war efforts. But the Britishers could not shake-off their Excluded Area phobia. In 1947, India got Independence. The young democratic Government of India and its bureaucrats adopted and continued with the same political doctrine of the Britishers and failed to translate the essence of Independence into reality, at least for North East India. The people in the region could not be absorbed and amalgamated into the mainstream of Indian society due to political bankruptcy, lack of political will-power, myopic vision, narrow political concept, and lack of general awareness. In the 21st century, people in the region remained as Excluded Area as it was in the 19th century.

GEOGRAPHICAL CURSE

A glimpse of the map of North East India will show that it is connected with Mainland India by a small narrow strip at Siliguri corridor, India's Eastern Chicken neck. In early 1930's, the region was classified as inhospitable area, full with high mountain ranges, jungles of thick growth, turbulent rivers and tributaries. Rivers Brahmaputra and the Barak; the high and rugged mountains in Naga Hills, Mizoram and NEFA, formed the critical ingredients which desisted the government officials to venture deep inside the region. Upto 1930's, 85% of the general area were covered by primary and the secondary jungle with few roads and tracts. Imphal valley, popularly known as Manipur Valley was the only recognizable SP (Start Point) for travel to Kalewa, Mandalay, Rangoon, Chiang Mai,

Vientiane, Bangkok, Phom Penh etc. from North East India. During World War II, the region was identified as Malaria infested area where the British and the Japanese Armed Forces lost more manpower due to the disease rather than bullets. In 1947, the British Empire lowered its Union Jack from the soil of India; packed-up their bag and baggages and handed over the neglected and mountainous hilly region to the young government of India as a parting gift. History cursed the geo-political landscape of the region which was too far from Red Fort, the seat of political power of India.

POLITICAL ALIENATION

In early 1950's, due to political immaturity and the National security aberration, India remained complacent about the North eastern region of India. In March 1950, the Vice-President of the new People's Republic of China declared very boldly that one of the tasks of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China was to liberate Tibet and claimed the huge land masses comprising Sikkim and NEFA (North East Frontier Areas), now called Arunachal Pradesh. In October, 1950, the PLA troops marched into Tibet, removed the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetan people, from Potola, the seat of Tibetan power and annexed Tibet as part of China. India did not react, except protests in the world political platform. The small group of Khampa tribes of Tibet rose in 'revolt' but crushed by the communist Chinese troops, fled towards India and continued their struggle in the form of revolution on the Tibetan soil. China blamed India for their support to the Tibetan cause and particularly to the support given to the Khampas revolutionary movement and termed it as Anti-China policy. In 1962, encouraged by the Tibetan adventures (misadventures) the Chinese Armed forces invaded India, sacked the Indian National political psyche and almost cut-off North East India from Mainland India at Siliguri corridor. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India lamented for the tragedy faced by the people of the region.

There were loud cry from the North Easterners that mainland India had left the people of the region at their own destiny to be crushed by the mighty communist dragon and drowned into the Brahmaputra and the Barak rivers. Under pressure from the United States of America and Western democratic countries, the Chinese Army pull-out from the Indian soil. India's political complacency of the North eastern region of India and its ethnic groups of people inhabiting the region could not be condoned by the high-pitch rhetoric declaration from the Red Fort in New Delhi.

At later stages, India was involved in countering Insurgency movement, militancy, fundamentalism and fanaticism on its soil, which included, the Tamil problem in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka; Jammu and Kashmir and of course North-east India. India for political reasons,

Manipur Imbrolio Insurgency Movement in North East India: Politico-Military efforts by India			
Areas	Political effort	Military effort	National & International Media attention
» Jammu & Kashmir	20-22%	80-85%	45%
» Tamil Imbrolio	80-85%	15-20%	45%
» Maoist Communist Movement	35-40%	60-65%	5%
» North East India	8-10%	90-95%	5%

accorded more political priority to some region and less military applications. The Tamil imbroglio including insurgency movement on the Sri Lankan soil by LTTE (Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam) consumed 80-85% of the political and bureaucratic efforts of New Delhi as compared to 20-22% in Jammu and Kashmir; 35-40% of the Maoist Communist movement in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, UP and West Bengal; and 8-10% in the North Eastern region of India. India applied more military ingredients to solve the problem of North East India as compared to any areas/region on its soil, thereby alienating the people from the National political bandwagon of New Delhi. The National and the International Media do not consider the imbroglio in the region as an important media menu which could compare with politico-military imbroglio in Chechnya, Jerusalem, Mindanao Island, Belfast, NWFP (North West Frontier Province) in Pakistan, and Kurdish region. The North Easterners feel that New Delhi has other important preoccupations for mainland India rather than wasting their precious political time and energy to the various problems of North East. Let the Manipuri sort out their political problem with the Nagas to the extreme end; so as the Assamese Vs the Nagas; the Mizos Vs the Assamese; the Mizos Vs the Riang (Bru); the Tripuris Vs the Bengali refugees so on and so forth. There is no end to the roster of violence. India comfortably used military means to solve the political problem of the region with the advice and assistance of some retired bureaucrats, defence personnel and Junior Ministers of the Union Cabinet of India. In Manipur and Tripura, the political environment was unfortunate and lamentable. The entire political environment presented a kaleidoscope of Gaza strip of Israel, the North West Frontier province (NWFP) of Pakistan or the Chiang Mai region of Thailand.

POLITICAL SUBALTERN, NOT CAPTAIN

In 1947, when India got Independence, political parties and politicians of all colours, from North, South, West, Central, and East rushed towards New Delhi to share the fruit of India's Independence. India's National Tricolour fluttered proudly on the rampart of Red Fort, the seat of political power, renting the air with the historic voice of Pandit Jawarharlal Nehru, declaring that at the stroke of midnight (14 August, 1947), India would be an Independent country. Many states reaped the fruit of Independence, known and unknown politicians raised their heads, political alignments and realignments surged ahead, and a composite Indian political culture was formed. However, the people in North East India had very little influences and lever in the overall post-political movement in India. Till 1990's, politicians from North East India were considered as politically redundant and expendable commodity. Gradually, there were signs of political discomfort among the North Easterners of identifying themselves as the proud citizen of India. Because, India's political scene, movement and ethos were full of paradoxes. The ancient believe of that the small eyed Mongolians should not rule the wide eyed Dravidians existed in a modified and dignified archaic form in the Indian political horizon. There is a great political division between the mainland India and the North East India.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC ALIENATION

It is strongly believed that the basic philosophy of a strong society is that all the citizens enjoy equal right regardless of caste, creed, religion, race and gender. Since India's Independence, the people in the North Eastern region of India remained in a cobweb state from socio-economic angle. Basic necessities of life which includes health care, basic education, sufficient income for survival, and

freedom from hunger and thirst were not easily available. Roads and tracts were few, movements from one place to another were time consuming and transports were scanty. North and the South Assam was connected by a steamer service along the mighty Brahmaputra river till the strategic Brahmaputra Bridge was inaugurated in early 1960's. Upto 1980's, North Easterners used the old meter-gauge railway line laid by the British military engineers during World War II for movement of troops with mainland India. The Broad-gauge railway line from mainland India towards Assam and beyond was extended only when India needed systematic transportation of crude oil from Assam to other states in India.

CULTURAL BARRIERS

Religious belief, culture and traditions formed an important part for the social life of human beings. The people in the North Eastern region of India have got their own distinct culture, traditions and social beliefs. They believe in social liberalism. Men and women are treated on par on social and cultural fields. They believed in open society which is a taboo in the Gangetic alluvial land. They strongly denounced the imposition of other foreign cultures and traditions on their sacred soil. However, people from mainland India considered the fine culture, traditions and age-old religious rites practiced by the tribal peoples in the region as 'Animism' and castigated them as aboriginal in character and textures. They propagated that the people (North Easterners) should try to assimilate into the traditional cauldrons of the Aryan and the Dravidian culture. Somebody can change religion in 10 seconds. But it will take 1000 years or more to change the culture of a society, community, and ethnic groups. We cannot change culture by force. It has to be done voluntarily in a gradual manner with the expressed willingness of the ethnic group concerned.

NATIONAL PSYCHE

The first impression which comes into the mind of any outsiders before they step into the North East-India is that the region is a paradise of jungle inhabited by the naked people with primitive character and behaviour. Negative impressions are made before they touch on the sacred and magnificent soil of the region. Young children, students, and job seekers from the region who landed in New Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore and Madras are generally identified as alien people from the East who belongs to foreign cultures and tradition. From political angle, few politicians from the region, including the Member of Parliament (MP) and the Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), does not carry any weight on Indian political scene. Naturally, New Delhi considered them as extra baggages in National and International politics of India.

PAN-MONGOLOID: A PIPE DREAM

During the British rule in India, particularly in 19th century, the Himalayan Frontiers in the north and the Northeastern region of India remained insignificant when British policy was dominated by the Russo-phobia. Autonomous Tibet region gave an excellent buffer beyond the rampart of the British government and considered the general area extending right up to the northern region of Burma as the land, which belonged to a group of people, ethnologically not different from the Mongoloid tribe. Some scholars used to call them as Tibeto-Burman or Tibeto-Chinese race or in short, simply Mongoloid. Generally, Pan-Mongoloid can be classified as those people of Chinese, Tibetan and Burmese origin inhabiting the general areas of North of Himalayas, southern part of China, Northeastern region of India, Burma, Thailand etc. People in the region used to speak Tibeto-Chinese language, which consisted of the Tibeto-Burman, T'ai Chinese, the Karen, and the Mon etc. The Kukis-Chin language, the Naga-Kuki-Chin language, the Manipuri language, the Assamese language, the Garos and the Khasi language and thousand of dialects, spoken and used by many groups and sub-groups of people in the region belonged to the Tibeto-Burman groups. Dr GA Grierson and Sten Konow who had contributed a lot in the research of various languages in India, faced many problems while classifying Tibeto-Burman languages. They found that the same were split up into different forms of speech at very early stages and period and there were numerous crossings and inter-crossings.

As early as 1930's, the then British India government knew that there existed a theoretical general concept of the formation of a Pan-Mongoloid state in the Northeastern region of India. They feared that the emergence of a strong, centralized and United People's Republic of China would upset the balance of power between Great Britain, China and Tibet, which maintained a triangular contest for a long time. On 7 November, 1950 Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel, the Iron Man of India wrote to Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru:

"China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and northeast, we have on our side of the frontier, a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined states of the frontier and existence on our side of a populations with its affinities to Tibet or Chinese have all the elements of potential trouble between China and ourselves." (Kuldeep Nayar, *Between the Lines*, 1969)

GEOGRAPHICAL PRISM

When Mao-Tse-Tung came to power, he saw the vast region of Southeast Asia as a fertile area for expansion of communism and communist doctrine of revolution. The Northeast India and its neighbours—Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Bhutan, China and Tibet formed a homogenous Mongoloid mosaic with tremendous political and strategic importance in the Asian continent. The post-World War II period brought great upheavals and changes in the geo-political scenario in the region. When the Britishers finally left India in 1947, there was a political and military vacuum in the entire region and the Northerners were left in wilderness, confronted by a new and vast number of Aryan stocks from the Gangetic plains with different culture and religion. A new political equation came into the region. The Chinese Communist party under the leadership of Mao-Tse-Tung wanted to have a strong foothold generally in Northeast India, Burma, Tibet and the Mekong basin region and kept on floating its sphere of influences among the people who inhabited the less developed, unadministered and 'excluded areas' in the region. The best weapon available was the Pan-Mongoloid with blends of communism, communist's doctrine of revolution, insurgency movement, guerilla movement etc. At later stages, many ethnic groups, minority and tribal groups were attracted towards the Mongoloid concept and tried to distance themselves from the Aryan and the Dravidian stock of mainland India. They felt that people in Northeast India were more closer towards their ancestors in the 'Eastern direction', rather than those new faces in the western region which included, the Aryans and Dravidian, the Brahmin, the Rajputs etc. That brought a great awakening among the people in the region uniting and joining all activities of the Mongoloid groups. Physically, most of the North-easterners had Mongoloid characters and features, and asymmetric psychological behaviour.

LINGUISTIC ANGLE

Linguistically, the ethnic affinities in the region were rather clear and loud. People in the region used to speak the Tibeto-Burman, Sino-Tibetan and Siamese-Chinese. The T'ai language, which was spoken by the Ahom rulers in Assam before 600 years ago, belonged to the Siamese-Chinese family. Many languages of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland and Manipur were classified as Tibeto-Burman group, which got heavy colours of Mongoloid learning and character. The Khasis and the Jaintias spoke two closely related allied languages, which belonged to the Austro-Asiatic branch of Austic family of languages prevailed in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Laos and Nicobar Islands. The linguistic affinity of Mongoloid character had brought the Mongoloid concept of ethnic pluralism which is quite different from the rest of India.

In early 1970's, Manipur faced a social crisis between those people who called themselves as 'Manipuri' and those hardliner group identified as the 'Meitei' (Meitei). The Meitei group alleged that the 'so-called Manipuri' was a misnomer, coined by one wandering sannasi (sannyasi), Shantidas Goshai, for 'complete extermination of an Asiatic Mongoloid people historically and culturally called the Meitei, whose ancient jurisprudence-based democratic statecraft is 5000 years old' (The Holy book of cosmic evolution: *The Sakok Shallai Thiren* and the *Seven Moirang Kangleirons*). They pointed out that the language of the Independent kingdom of Meitei laibak (Manipur) was Meiteiron (Meiteilon): the language spoken by the Meitei (Meitei). The British parliament, during their rule in India recognized the language of the state as Meiteiron (*Imperial Gazetteer of India*, 1907; *Indian*

Empire, vol. I. p. 387). They mentioned the 'Meitei' in their census Book of India from 1891 to 1941. The Indic-origin word 'Manipuri' does not mean the Sino-Tibetan speech-family word Meiteiron (Meiteilon). In early 1930's, [Shri] Naoriya Phulo, a Meitei, started a socio-cultural movement for the Meitei, firstly in Cachar district of Assam, then gradually spreading towards Imphal valley, the largest Meitei inhabited area in South East Asia, by establishing an association known as Apokpa Marup (*Apokpa* = Meitei ancestor deity; *Marup* = Branch). In Manipur, the movement was widely known as 'Sanamahi' [Sanamahi is the name of a house-deity worshipped by every Meitei (Manipuri Meitei) even today]. The organization who established such a movement was collectively known as the Meitei phurup or Meitei Marup [*Phurup* = Group; *Marup* = Branch]. They become the most hawkist group for the preservation and propagation of the ancient Meitei language. When the Manipuri language was made the official language of the State of Manipur, the Apunba Meitei Kanba Kanglup (AMKK), a hardliner group, who believed in politico-cultural-linguistic survival of the State independently, strongly objected to the official Gazetted notification of Manipur Government, using the word 'Manipuri language'. "Manipuri language means Meiteilon [Meiteilon] written in Bangali script and spoken by majority of Manipur population" [Manipur Official Language Act, 1979; para 2(8)]. In 1992, Manipuri language was included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India by an Act of Amendment of India (Constitution of India Seventy-first Amendment Act, 1992). However, the hardliner group stressed that 'Why the Indian parliament has committed such an international crime of genocide by depriving this Asiatic Ethnic Mongoloid Meitei in the National Census Book of free India as well as by confirming the castrationising of us as "Caste Hindu-Manipuri". (Memorandum to His Excellency, the president of India by the AMKK; 9 January, 1993)'. They strongly expressed their views that the word 'Meiteiron' should replaced the word 'Manipuri language' in the said Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India. The Meitei Marup claimed that the Government of India and the State Government have not given enough encouragement to improve the old Asiatic-Mongoloid language.

PIPE DREAM

The theoretical concept of Pan-Mongoloid in the North Eastern region of India came up due to the existence of a large number of asymmetric ethnic groups, linguistic affinity, socio-economic problem, similar Mongoloid stocks etc. and non-integration and non-assimilation of the inhabitants of the region into the Aryan and Dravidian layers. China, Tibet, Nepal, Burma and Bhutan inhabited by the Mongoloid stocks had close affinity to the inhabitants in North Eastern region of India. Many insurgent outfits from the region floated the pipe dream of creating a Pan-Mongoloid state on the similar line like the Pan-Islamic state. They strongly propagated that Pan-Mongoloid independent state can be established in the region based on the following premises and ingredients:

- (a) The inhabitants in the region basically belong to Tibeto-Burman or Indo-Burman group.
- (b) Historically, culturally, demographically, religiously and traditionally, the Mongoloid stock has difference with the Aryan and the Dravidian stocks.
- (c) If the Indian sub-continent break-up, under political and ethnic pressure, the North Eastern region can stand on the Pan-Mongoloid foundation as a homogenous group.

- (d) Due to the ethnic diversity and its complex phenomenon, the inhabitants of the region will not be able to assimilate into the mainstream of India.

In early 1960's, in Manipur, a socio-politico-cultural concept known as the pan-Manipuri (pan-Manipur), lesser than the pan-Mongoloid theoretical concept, came up in the valley area of Imphal, Silchar, Hojai, Lanka, and Sylhet (Bangladesh) etc. Pan-Manipur aimed to bring all the Manipuris inhabiting at various places in North East India, Burma and Bangladesh under one single socio-cultural umbrella of the Manipuri. The social movement was quite active in early 1970's. At later stages, the movement became a victim to the insurgency movement by the Nagas, the Manipuri, the Mizos, and the Kukis and wind of Naganisation in Nagaland and the tacit political support extended by New Delhi.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MANIPUR: CRISIS IN CONFIDENCE

Manipur is in existence since 2500-3000 BC or so, though lacked substantial historical documents or proofs of the early period. So far the period of 600-300 BC is concerned, the Royal chronicle of Burma (*Maharaja Vamsa*) throws some light for the existence of the Kingdom of Manipur. The Chinese used the Silk Trade Route, which passed through upper Burma, western Burma, Manipur and Assam for their caravans to Afghanistan, where the Chinese silks were exchanged with the gold of western countries. The chronicle of Manipur (*Cheitharol Kumbaba*) mentioned that, in 33 AD, Nongda Lairen Pakhangba, the snake king God ruled the state for 120 years. *Cheitharol Kumbaba*, also supported by other allied documents mentioned a long list of kings who ruled the state till 1947. The ruler and its citizens maintained their own territorial boundary and general areas in tact.

The boundaries and the general areas of the princely state of Manipur used to change in shape and size during the course of its history. During 18th century, the territory of the state stretched upto the Doyang River (Dhansiri River) to the North, Chindwin River (Ningthee Turel) to the east and Cachar valley (Assam) to the west. The total areas covered were approximately 68,000 square kilometers (three times more than the present areas). During the period of 1826-1834, the king of Manipur, Maharaja Gambhir Singh tried to settle the ownership of the Kabaw Valley, an area of 1500 square miles (41,000 hectares), which existed between Manipur and Burma. Both Manipur and Burma claimed the ownership of the fertile, teak wooded valley area. In January 1834, however, the British political authorities gave the abstract right of Kabaw Valley to Burma to keep the British relations with the Burmese in tact. In 1947, India's independence brought a complex political environment and scenario, social changes, communal crisis and clashes; political accord and discord, loss of past glory of kingdom for all princely state in India including Manipur. On 15 October 1949, Manipur was merged with the Union of India, as per terms and conditions laid down in the Manipur Merger Agreement, signed between Sri Bodhchandra Singh, Maharaja of Manipur and Mr VP Menon, advisor to the government of India, Ministry of State, in attendance of Sri Prakasa, Governor of Assam. The present territorial boundary and general areas is the same as it was existed in 1949.

In 1953, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India and Mr U-Nu Prime Minister of Burma, visited Manipur. The thorny issue of Kabaw Valley was discussed. The valley, which was considered as disputed areas by the Manipuris, was gifted to Burma to maintain good neighbourly relations as well as good gesture. From 1955-60, the law and order in some hill areas of Manipur deteriorated due to the Naga insurgency movement in Naga Hills (Nagaland) and its collateral effect to the state. In 1967, Manipur was granted Union Territory status. In 1971, the Government of India passed the Northeastern Areas (Reorganization) Act 1971, and Manipur became the 20th state of the Union of India on 21 January 1972. Manipur maintained a clear-cut, undisputed and constitutionally agreed territorial boundary and land areas of its own which belonged to the Manipuris.

ANXIETY

In early 1960's, the Naga underground movement in Nagaland came into full swing. In spite of granting statehood on Nagaland on 1 December 1963, the Naga underground movement continued under the leadership Mr. AZ Phizo, an untiring, uncompromising Angami Naga, who laid down the keel of Naga insurgency movement in North eastern region of India. The movement automatically affected the neighbouring state of Manipur, particularly the hill areas when the banner of 'Sovereign state of Nagaland' raised. The concept of 'Greater Nagaland' was floated as a political ploy by the Naga insurgent outfit, to attract maximum public support. A map of 'Greater Nagaland' was published, consisting of large areas of Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, and Burma. The same was followed by another politico-insurgency concept known as 'Southern Nagaland', consisting of a large hill area of Manipur state to be merged with Nagaland state. The ethnic-insurgency strategy of the Naga insurgents was to get at least a bigger share of the cake from New Delhi, if not the whole cake. In the meantime, the Mizo National Front (MNF) raised the banner of 'Greater Mizoram', which claimed Mizo inhabited areas of Manipur particularly Churachandpur district.

POLITICO-ETHNIC DRUM-BEAT

Till early 1970's, the Manipuris did not take seriously the influences and the political tornados created by the Naga insurgency movement to the hill areas of Manipur. Gradually, many valley-based Manipuri insurgent outfits came up into the scene, demanding 'Sovereign state of Manipur'. The concept of Manipuri Nationalism was floated and the banners of Pan-Manipuri flag were raised by the younger generation of Manipur. They claimed that Manipur was in existence since time immemorial with unquestionable clear-cut boundary and areas of its own, inhabited by people known generally as Manipuris. Both the hills and the plain people used to co-exist as one homogeneous group with diverse culture, customs, traditions and age-old religion. They felt that the politico-insurgency demand for 'Greater Nagaland' would seriously damage the close affinity, cultural and traditional bonds, close matrimonial relations of the Manipuri society which included the Manipuri Meiteis, the Kukis, the Tangkhul Naga, the Meitei Pangal (Manipuri Muslims), the Kabui and many other smaller groups.

In early 1970's the Manipur Naga Integration Council (MNIC), an ethnic Naga body was founded, mostly by those Nagas from Manipur. The council was dominated mostly by the Tangkhul Naga from Ukhul district of Manipur, with supporters from Mao-Maram areas, Zeliangrong Nagas from Tamenglong district and a few from Chandel district of the state. During that period, a large section of Tangkhul Nagas had already joined the Naga insurgent outfits in Nagaland, which later on formed

the core group of the NSCN(IM). After Manipur was granted statehood in 1972, the Manipur Naga Integration Council (MNIC) merged with the All-India Congress (I).

POLITICAL GIMMICK

In early 1990's the law and order situation in Manipur became worsened day by day due to simmering ethnic mistrust and tensions between the Naga and the Kukis. In 1992-93, the Naga-Kuki ethnic clashes erupted in the state. Nagaland politics was almost over-shadowed and overtaken by the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN (K). The FGN and the NNC were almost sidelined. In quick steps, Naga political parties and politicians in Nagaland transformed themselves to a dysfunctional political syndrome. The NSCN (IM) strongly pressurized the Naga politicians in Nagaland to toe their line of 'Greater Nagaland' concept. In 1994, the Nagaland State Assembly passed a resolution, claiming the entire hill areas of Manipur, as part of a state known as 'Greater Nagaland'. The rationale behind passing of the resolution was discussed in national and regional newspapers and more so in Nagaland and Manipur by many intelligentsia in the open form. They felt that Nagaland state had transgressed into the Constitutional boundary of another state in Democratic India. When the democratic parliament and the Constitution of India standing like a rock, will it be constitutionally and legally maintainable if a State like Nagaland passed a resolution in its State Assembly that part of Manipur should be merge with Nagaland State to form 'Greater Nagaland'. In the present context and political environment, it will tantamount to incorrect political and social wisdom if Assam State Assembly passed a resolution to merged all Assamese interested areas of Nagaland, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Surma valley, Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and Western Burma to form Greater Assam (Asom Empire ?). On the same analogue, is it constitutionally and lawfully feasible for the state Assembly of Manipur to pass a resolution and enact an Act to merge Nagaland (Southern area or up to Doyang river); Assam (Southern areas); Mizoram (Northern areas); and the Kabaw valley (Burma) to recreate ancient independent state of 'Kangleipak' (Greater Manipur). The politico-ethnic extravanga does not end here but rather continued to included 'Greater Mizoram', 'Sovereign state of Bodoland', 'Dimaraj', 'Twipara' etc. National and the regional political analysts felt that such political adventures (misadventures) with tainted ethnic and sub-ethnic colour has created serious socio-political repercussions in North East India. In the near future, such action of state law-makers may tend towards political gimmick and novicity.

DEMOCRATIC WAR-CRY

On 1 August 1997, during the announcement of Naga ceasefire in Nagaland between the Government of India and the NSCN (IM), news were spread out about the possibility of the formation of 'Greater Nagaland'. Rumours were spread out that the Central Government at New Delhi was examining to solve the Naga insurgency problem at the cost of territorial integrity of Manipur. That brought instantaneously a large section of the Manipuris on the road: Political parties, Politicians, Student Unions, Meira Paibis (Women's Voluntary Organisation), Lawyers, Human rights groups, Naga and Kuki volunteer groups on the streets. On 4 August 1997, a massive rally was organized at Mapal Kangjeibung (Imphal Polo Ground), Manipur attended by approximately 5 lakh peoples, described as one the biggest rally ever seen in the region. They were about to be drawn into the nasty ethnic clashes but saved by a whisker due to good sense prevailed among the Manipuri populace.

FORCED OUTBURST

The Manipuris were again forced to outburst on 13 August 1997 by the publication of the full remarks of the NSCN (IM) leader, Mr Isak Chishi Swu, regarding formation of Greater Nagaland, which affected the territorial integrity of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. There were great tension in Manipur and the State Government convened a cabinet meeting. The Chief Minister, Mr Rishang Keishing, who once occupied the chairmanship of the Manipur Naga Integration Council and all his cabinet colleagues were in thick political soup. The All Manipur Student's Union (AMSU), a powerful student pressure group and the All Manipur United Club's Organisation (AMUCO) joined the public fray; set a dateline of 7 p.m. of 21 August 1997 for the Government of India to make a statement that the sanctity of the territorial integrity of Manipur would remain in tact. An all-party delegation from the state air-dashed to New Delhi, met Prime Minister of India, Inder Kumar Gujral and the Union Home Minister, Mr Inderjit Gupta and made it clear that the territorial integrity of Manipur should not be sacrificed to bring peace in Nagaland. Sensing the volatile political scenario in Manipur, the Union Home Minister made a categorical statement that there was no question of disturbing the territorial identity and integrity of Manipur. On 21 August 1997, a few hours before the dateline, Prime Minister of India announced that no area of the state of Manipur would be merged with Nagaland. Shri IK Gujral told the all party delegation from Manipur, led by the Chief Minister, Mr Rishang Keishing, that the Central Government had no proposal to merge Naga-dominated areas of Manipur with Nagaland. That brought the high tension, explosive politico-ethnic situation to the normal level but not to an end.

PM: No transfer of Manipur Areas Many join protest against NSCN demand

Imphal: Even as thousands of people, mostly women joined hunger strike and sit-in across Manipur on Thursday to press their demand for protection of the state's territorial integrity, Prime Minister IK Gujral asserted that no area of the state would be merged with Nagaland.

The hunger strike and sit-in [protests] were called by All Manipur Students' Union (AMSU) and All Manipur United Clubs' Organisation (AMUCO) to protest the demand of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), an insurgent group, to merge four districts of Manipur with Nagaland.

However, the Prime Minister told an all party delegation from Manipur, led by Chief Minister Rishang Keishing, in New Delhi that the centre (New Delhi) had no proposal to merge Naga dominated areas of Manipur with Nagaland.

—Press Trust of India, Imphal, 14 August, 1997

CHOPPING AXE

In December 1997, in Manipur, the Rishang Keishing government was toppled down on the very delicate issue of Naga ceasefire extension to Manipur vs. protection of territorial integrity of Manipur. In September, 2000, W. Nipamacha Singh (Ex-Speaker of Manipur State Assembly), Chief Minister of Manipur called an All-Party meeting to discuss the political rumours that New Delhi had committed to extend the Naga Ceasefire in Nagaland to Naga-inhabited areas in Manipur. W. Nipamacha Singh became the stumbling block in the secretive strategy of the Government of India drafted by its interlocutor K Padmanabhaiah and the NSCN-IM to extend the cease-fire in Nagaland to Manipur's territory without any public notice. The political reward was wonderful. He (W. Nipamacha Singh) was removed from the Chief Ministership of the state. Then came Koijam Radhabinod Singh (RB Singh), a Samta Party candidate, a lawyer by profession, as the Chief Minister of Manipur. In May

2001, the same scenario was rerun in the state for Mr. Radhabinod Koijam, who opposed the Central Government move to extend the Naga ceasefire into the territory of Manipur. On 24 May 2001, the legislators of the BJP pulled down the Samta Party led State Government of Mr. Radhabinod Koijam. Political stalemate cropped up in the most turbulent form. The leader of the BJP legislative assembly, Mr RK Dorendra Singh, a former Chief Minister of Manipur, who had changed party colours several times, claimed to form the government. The Samta Party, an ally of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government in New Delhi, blocked the same. Another faction led by the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly, Mr. Sapam Dhananjay Singh also claimed to form the Government and met Mr. Ved Marwah (former Delhi Police Commissioner, former Advisor to Governor of Jammu & Kashmir), Governor of Manipur. Mr. Ved Marwah informed Mr. Sapam Dhananjay Singh that he should resign first from the speakership and then put up his claim to form the government. He refused to do so and as such the Governor did not entertain his claim. On 02 August 2001, article 356 of the Constitution of India was brought into force and Manipur was placed under President's rule and the state assembly was placed under suspended animation.

The Central Government made a faux-pas that by sacrificing the interest of the Manipuri, when the state was in political vacuum, could solve the Naga problem. It was during that week (first week of June 2001 AD), that Mr. K. Padmanabhaiah, the Central Government interlocutor in the Naga Peace talk, was air-dashed to Bangkok and conveyed to the NSCN (IM) leaders that the Government of India might extend the ceasefire in Nagaland to other states like Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. On 13 June 2001, the NSCN (IM) leaders and Mr K. Padmanabhaiah held a meeting in Bangkok and agreed that the ceasefire was between the government of India and the NSCN (IM) *as two entities, without territorial limits*. It was one of the greatest political and legal errata in the history of North East India, committed by New Delhi, in the politico-ethnic imbroglio in the region.

GREAT JUNE UPRISING

The 13 June 2001 agreement between the NSCN (IM) and the government of India brought one of the biggest public uprising in the state of Manipur, simmering tensions in Assam and serious anxiety in Arunachal Pradesh. On 14 June 2001, Mr. George Fernandez, the Defence Minister of India visited Manipur and left Imphal, promising for the protection of territorial integrity of Manipur. Just after he left, the state Government came to a grinding halt due to wide public anger and opposition to the words *'without territorial limits'* in the Naga Truce extension. The torchbearers and the path finders included the All Manipur Students Union (AMSU); All Manipur United Clubs Organisation (AMUCO); the United People's Committee (UPC); International Peace and Social Affairs (IPSA); and many small social organizations of the Nagas and the Kukis. On

GREAT JUNE UPRISING MANIPUR		
1.	13 JUNE 2001.	» Government of India and the NSCN-IM agreement of 'Without Territorial Limits'.
2.	14 JUNE 2001.	» Defence Minister of India, Sri George Fernandez: We will protect the Territorial Integrity of Manipur. » Protests against the wording of the agreement broke out in Manipur.
3.	18 JUNE 2001. and afterwards	» 18 peoples lost their lives. » United Committee Manipur (UCM) formed.

18 June 2001, the protestors went to meet the Governor of Manipur but he refused. The protest march turned into a violent mob; ransacked and burnt down the Manipur Legislative Assembly, residential quarters of MLAs and many other complexes. Pitched battle was fought between the public and the security forces. Imphal valley looked like a war-ravaged battlefield of World War II, where only dogs and the security forces roamed around to enforce curfew. The public uprising produced a social organization (socio-political organization?) known as the United Committee, Manipur (UCM) with the joining of hands by the AMUCO, AMKIL, AMSU, IPSA, NIPCO and UPF, as the apex body to protect the territorial integrity of Manipur. The UCM made a public declaration terming the extension of Naga ceasefire in Nagaland to Manipur as a first step towards disintegration of territorial integrity of Manipur. 18 Manipuri youths lost their lives in the uprising.




Protest against the Extension of Naga Cease-fire in Manipur.

CRISIS IN CONFIDENCE

In spite of serious insurgency and militancy problems in the entire Northeastern region of India, Manipur maintained communal harmony for the last 60 years and so, except the Naga-Kuki ethnic clashes during 1992-1996. There is a need to analyse and understand the reasons for the spontaneous public outcry and political flare-up in the state *vis-à-vis* the attempt to extend the Naga ceasefire into Manipur. The seed of mistrust, distrust, concept of communalism, which affected the Manipuri Nationalism, were sown by the very dichotomic policy of the Government of India, National political parties and politicians, ethnic politicians; bureaucrats inter alias the attempt to extend the Naga ceasefire in Nagaland into Manipur, which might lead to the disintegration of the democratic state.

FEAR PSYCHOSIS

The Manipuri do not completely disowned the Constitution of India as did by some other ethnic groups and insurgent outfits. However, they had a



Peace Rally supporting the extension of Naga Cease-Fire in Manipur by Tribal ethnic groups

second thought to the very reliability of the Central Government promises, bureaucratic actions, and politicians in the state as well in the North East-India. There are many major political issues where the Manipuris considered as the negative ingredients for the territorial integrity of Manipur.

TRIAL AND ERROR POLICY

- (a) The Government of India does not have a political strategy and approaches to solve Manipuri's problem in particular and generally the imbroglio of the Northeastern region of India.
- (b) The Manipuris felt that there is no viable logic of drafting a ceasefire agreement between the Government of India and the NSCN (IM) by adding additional words like '*without territorial limits*' to the previous agreement of July 1997. The statement involved extra-territorial implications and dimensions of Manipur, with a hidden political agenda and future political game plans of the Naga insurgent outfit. New Delhi wanted to test the political water of Manipur.
- (c) The extension of the Naga ceasefire in Nagaland to Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur will not solve the 'Naga ethnic problem'. It will lead to the opening of more Pandora's Box.

BOUNDARY ISSUE

- (a) The territorial integrity and identity of Manipur will naturally be affected if the Naga ceasefire extended to Manipur. Constitutionally and legally, it is not tenable.
- (b) The extension will tantamount to the violation of the act of the first schedule of the Constitution of India as well as Article 263 of the said Constitution.

ETHNIC DIVISION

- (a) New Delhi's policy for protection of territorial integrity and identity of Manipur vis-a-vis Greater Nagaland will lead to vivisection of the Manipuris Meities (15 lakhs); Nagas (3.6 lakhs); the Kukis (3.4 lakhs); Manipuri Muslim (1.2 lakhs) and other smaller communities (0.4 lakhs).
- (b) There will be serious ethnic division and clashes between the Nagas and the Kukis, if the Kukis interest, identity and ethnic integrity are not protected. Kukis Nationalism cannot be sacrificed for Naga Nationalism.
- (c) The truce extension was welcomed by many Naga and Naga organizations including some ethnic Naga politicians in Manipur. That could be considered as the avoidable political step for ethnic division in the State.
- (d) The policy of the government of India of appeasing and solving the problem of one ethnic insurgent group, at the cost of integrity and identity of a democratic state like Manipur would not bring peace and harmony in the region.

POLITICAL EROTICA

The various actions of the Central Government of India, including the extension of Naga ceasefire into the constitutional territory of Manipur, and its subsequent rollback was taken very seriously by

the Manipuris. They felt that the democratic demands and approaches of many states and ethnic groups from the North Eastern region of India were identified as a political weakness, thereby encouraging them for armed insurgency movement. The Naga insurgent outfits with lots of publicity, media coverage, assistance, and financial help from foreign countries, NGOs, religious institutions pressed the panic buttons for Indian politicians and bureaucrats. So far Manipur is concerned the NSCN-IM supremo Mr. Th. Muivah, who is having parley with the government of India, carried a cash award of Rupees three lakhs on his head which was announced by the state Government of Manipur through an office order No. 1-4(6)/80-4(pt. 1) dated 04 April 1994. On 17 August, 2000, the NSCN (IM) warned the state cabinet of Nagaland, terming the state government as the 'so-called state government', 'unmanned and proxy cabinet', when the Deputy Commissioner, Judicial, Dimpaur (Nagaland) issued arrest warrant against the General Secretary Mr. Th. Muivah and the self styled Army Chief (Naga insurgent outfit), Mr. Hanshi Tangkhul. In August, 2000, the Chief Minister of Manipur, Sri W. Nipamacha Singh, lambasted the NSCN (IM) and its overground sympathizers with his remarks that 'the ceasefire is between the government of India and the NSCN (IM) which is in Nagaland. And Manipur is not Nagaland'. Immediately, the NSCN (IM) reacted and asked the Chief Minister to withdraw his statement. 'We warned you that if you do not withdraw the statement and support the peace process, you will live to regret your ugly designs and hidden agenda'. [Q Tuccu, Kilo Kilonser (Home Minister) NSCN-IM; 12 August 2000, Nagaland]. On 11 September, 2000, Mr. Padmanabhaiah, explicitly clarified that the ceasefire agreement was limited to Nagaland only. Democratic governance, maintenance of rule of law and respect to the tenets of Human Rights provisions were serverely marginalized by the Naga insurgents in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Aruanchal Pradesh in the name of cease-fire and peace talk under the political umbrella of New Delhi. The people of Manipur felt that the Government of India, due to their partisan politics and vested political interests created a thorny politico-ethnic crisis in Manipur *vis-a-vis* Nagaland. They felt that the strategy, policy and approaches of New Delhi and its representatives to the vexed problems in the Northeastern region of India were, more or less could be termed as Naga-centric. Most of the mind-set of National politicians, bureaucrats and even the security forces were Naga-oriented. On the other hand, the democratic, constitutional and peaceful approaches and demands of the Manipuris was considered as a weak point as compared to the gun-cultures strategy adopted by other ethnic groups. They termed it as anti-Manipuri policy and strategy.

Naga Hoho to continue Naga Integration Process

Reconciliation commission kept in abeyance

"The Reconciliation commission is to be kept in abeyance for the time being. . . .

The Naga National Reconciliation Commission, formed by the Naga Hoho comprising of seven members and headed by Niketu Iralu as Chairman and Charles Chase as Secretary, had been criticized and rejected by the NSCN (IM).

The apex tribal body also urged the Naga legislators from Manipur in particular and also others in Naga inhabited states, to pursue the bill with regard to Naga Integration issue in its Assembly." . . .

—*Nagaland Post*, Nagaland, 18 July 2003.

After July 1997, the 'Naga Sovereignty issue' degenerated and tapered down to Naga Unification, which consists of heavy ingredients of anti-Manipuri Meitei movement under the leadership of NSCN(IM). In Manipur, the attempt for extension of Naga ceasefire was rolled back under the explosive public pressure. However on ground, it was an open secret, that the security forces did not launched military operation against the NSCN (IM) cadres in Manipur. All counter-insurgency operations were directed against the valley-based Manipuri Meitei and the Kuki insurgent outfits. Though not reflected in black and white, the Naga ceasefire in Nagaland was extended tacitly to Manipur for political compulsion, military interest and strategy. The Manipuri does not believe the repeated sermons of New Delhi that Naga truce has not been extended to Manipur. Thus, India created a territorial Minefield in Manipur putting the state and the North East India in a **political limbo**.

ETHNIC IDENTITY CRISIS AND CONFLICTS (MANIPUR)

"These warriors do not see the faces of the mothers and the fathers they have killed. They do not see the blood and hear the screams and live with those memories for the rest of their lives. . . . But a price was paid, too, by the men who were responsible for killing them. For these men, this was not a clean war of smart bombs and surgical strikes. It was Sherman described it, bloody and cruel."

—Peter Mass, "Good Kills", *New York Times Magazine*, 20 April 2003

Since time immemorial, ethnic aspiration, which is a natural instinct of mankind in different form, colour and manifestation used to exist on the earth. Many ethnic, sub-ethnic communities were in fierce competitions for ethnic supremacy; expansion of tribes, sub-tribes and clans; subjugation; absorption instinct; ethnic cleansing; formation of ethnic political parties and bases; etc. With the emergence of Insurgency and Militancy, the chemistry of the ethnic equation has also gone a sudden sea-change. Till early 1960's, the entire population in Manipur was known as Manipuri; in Nagaland as Naga; in Assam as Assamese; in Bengal as Bengali etc. At later stages, most of the ethnic/sub-ethnic groups wanted to identify themselves by their tribe, sub-tribe and community's name. Gradually, insurgent and militant groups exploited the ethnic chemistry, mixed the same with insurgent flags and gun. Finally, ethnic politics became the mother of all ethnic crisis and conflicts in North Eastern region of India.

ETHNICITY

In olden days, the Greek used the concept of city-state for establishment of 'Republic' based on racial ground. Later on, terms like 'Race', 'People', 'Ethnic', 'Nation', etc. came up and widely used by general public. Subsequently, the word 'Ethnos', which can be interpreted to the nearest truth, as a group of people, came up in the political, socio-economic, developmental and spiritual field of the world. Ethnic group is a social group with a common cultural tradition which exists

within a larger society. Ethnicity is considered as a process having a common culture, traditions, customs, religion, language, character, habits and beliefs. Many people consider it as a set of attitude closely related to ancestral identification.

Though exists since ages, the word 'ethnic' was not included in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1933 Edition), the *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* (1969), *Random House Dictionary of the English Language* (1966). It was reflected by *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (1961) and supplement to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1972). By early 1960's other terminologies like Indigenous people, Indigenous Community, Self-Determination, Nation etc. came up in world political platform like the UNO, International Human Rights Organisation, and the International Labour Organisation. Finally the same was used by insurgent outfits, militant groups, revolutionaries, patriotic organisations and freedom fighters.

IDENTIFICATIONS

Ethnic movement, crisis and clashes is not the overnight manifestation of a group of aggrieved people or the sudden outburst by them. It is the end result of a dormant fear psychosis, desires, despair, desperate instinct, attitudes, acts of commission and omission. It starts in a phase manner, though there is no yardstick to identify each phases. Normally the phases consist of the formative period, Demographic identification, Ethnic Aspiration, Ethnic upheaval, Self-determination and Liberation movement.

Since early 1950's, North East India has seen ethnic crisis and clashes mixed up with insurgency movement; sound of independent and sovereignty; Self-determination etc. Ethnic identity imbroglio has completely crippled the socio-economic development of the region. Democratic political movement has been dented seriously and damaged at various stages. In Nagaland and Manipur, ethnic community and sub-community, political leaders and ethnic drum-beaters are making noisy political sounds of ethnic supremacy. Many ethnic groups in a gradual manner, identified themselves with various insurgent outfits for political and natural survival. Politicians and political parties in many states in the North eastern region of India used to win election by identifying themselves with powerful ethnic insurgent outfits. Non-identification normally leads to defeat and despair. Because the rule of law of the land are normally replaced by the rule of ethnic interest and further by the rule of gun and violence.

ROLE OF ETHNIC INSURGENT OUTFITS

The ethnic imbroglio in Manipur is closely related to politics, religion, socio-economics, insurgency and militancy. The dominant role is played by the ethnic insurgent outfits, though the string is pull by the political leaders. All NGOs; student organizations; local bodies and clubs; women's organizations; etc in Nagaland and Manipur can survive provided they do not cross swords with insurgent outfits. In Nagaland, the NSCN (IM), the FGN, the NNC and the NSCN (K) dictated the political terms for all tribal groups. In Manipur, Kuki insurgent outfits twist the political fortune of Kuki politicians and the NSCN-IM those of the Tangkhul, Mao, Maram, Zeliangrong and other smaller groups. In the valley, the Manipuri Meetei insurgent outfits normally try to control the political radar. However, it did not succeed, though dented at some areas. The most intoxicating political brand in Nagaland-Manipur region is ethnic politics mixed with insurgency movement and religion which gives the finest kick better than the Scott's whisky.

NAGA-KUKI ETHNIC CLASHES

Since early 1980's, the democratic political environment of Manipur was seriously hampered by crisis of ethnic equation and ethnic supremacy adopted by many ethnic groups/communities. In early 1990's, the Naga-Kuki ethnic crisis and clashes erupted in Manipur and the surrounding states. Insurgent outfits of both the tribes were involved in the mad clashes in an unprecedented manner. The main reasons for the same were as under:

"The man who strikes first admits his ideas have given out."

—A Chinese proverb.

- (a) Ethnic identity conflicts between the Nagas and the Kukis.
- (b) Political conflict between Greater Nagaland and the Kuki Homeland.
- (c) Non-acceptance of 'Naga Sovereignty' concept by the Kukis which includes Kuki inhabited areas.
- (d) Fear psychosis of the Nagas in 'Kuki Homeland' concept which will derail 'Greater Nagaland' concept.
- (e) Ethnic cleansing policy of the NSCN (IM) making the Kukis non-existent in Nagaland, part of Assam and Hill areas of Manipur.

CASUALTIES

- (a) Killed (Both Naga and Kuki) : 1500
- (b) Injured. : 7500
- (c) Number of houses burned down : 6000
- (d) Total number of Kukis displaced from their original settlement : 10500
- (e) Total number of Nagas displaced from their original settlement : 2500
- (f) Estimated costs of properties lost : Rs. 10-11 crores

Affected Areas of Naga-kuki Ethnic Clashes (1992-1997)

Nagaland

- ▶ Kohima, Dimapur, Phek Jalukie

Manipur

- ▶ Ukhrul, Senapati, Chandel, Tamenglong

Assam

- ▶ Karbi Anglong, Nc Hills, Silchar

MANIPURI MEITEI-MEITEI PANGAL FLARE-UP

In May 1993, the Naga-Kuki ethnic crisis was sandwiched by the Manipuri Meitei-Meitei Pangals (Manipuri Muslims) communal flare up in Manipur. The reasons for the same were:-

- (a) In 1992-93, some Muslim youths from Manipur established contacts with the NSCN (IM) and the ISI of Pakistan.
- (b) ISI wanted to smuggle sophisticated arms and ammunition to Manipur to open up sleeping module for pan-Islamic revolution in the general area.

- (c) Bangladeshi refugees were brought in, married with the local people and settled down in Imphal East, Imphal West, Lilong, Sora and Jiribam.
- (d) Islamic religious preachers entered Assam and Manipur with money bags. Young Manipuri Meitei Pangal were sent to Islamic religious institutions in Kerala, UP, Rajasthan and Bihar.
- (e) The trend of sudden influences of Bangladeshi refugees affected the Manipuri Meitei demographic contour particularly in the valley area.
- (f) Some Muslim politicians tried to exploit the political environment by igniting religious IED (Indigenous Explosive Devices).
- (g) A number of cadres of PULF insurgent outfits were kept at NSCN-IM Headquarters in Dimapur (Nagaland). This affected the Manipuri Meitei insurgency movement.

**Manipuri Meitei-meitei Pangal
Flare-up : May 2003
Affected Areas**

Manipur

1. Imphal East, Thoubal, Lilong, Sora, Jiribam

Assam

2. Minor Communal Flare Up in Part Of Silchar (South Assam)

Casualties

- (a) Killed : 80
- (b) Injured : 300-315
- (c) Houses burned down : 600-700
- (d) Properties losses : Rs. 7-8 lakh.

KUKI-ZOMI CLASHES

The Naga-Kuki ethnic imbroglio continued up to 1995-96 with simmering tension. The Naga considered the Kuki and the Manipuri Meitei as the only stumbling block for the formation of 'Southern Nagaland/Greater Nagaland'. They wanted to disintegrate the Kuki community so that they could be integrated with the ethnic Naga group. Zomi which inhabited mainly in Churachandpur district was brought under their influences and identified as the 'Naga'. The same was not accepted by the Kuki community. In 1997-98, the Kuki-Zomi clashes flared-up in Churachandpur district. The main reasons were as under:-

- (a) Demand for recognition of Zou (Zomi) as a separate tribe.
- (b) Demand for Zou-land (Zoland) which affected Kuki Homeland concept.
- (c) Zou close understanding with the NSCN (IM) which affected the Kuki polity in Manipur and adjacent areas.
- (d) Influences and migration of Kukis into Zou inhabited areas. Zou considered the same as a serious sub-ethnic invasion.
- (e) Refusal by Zomi to pay 'taxes' to Kuki insurgent outfits.
- (f) Formation of Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA).

The Kuki-Zomi clashes caused a series of casualties to both the communities. Kuki and Zomi insurgent outfits joined the mad clashes of their respective ethnic groups where the objective was only ethnic political supremacy. Later on, a faction of ZRA maintained close working relations with the Manipuri Meitei insurgent outfit.

KUKI-TAMIL SKIRMISHES

In 1960's, a large number of Tamil settlers and businessmen were drove out by the Burmese Military Junta under General Ne Win during the great Burmese revolution to socialist programme (Burmanisation). Most of them were settled down on both sides of the Indo-Burma international border with Moreh as the epicenter. By 1980's, they involved in clandestine business, drug smuggling, opium trade, Jem and gold trades, Narcotics and psychotropic substances. The Kuki insurgents and the NSCN (IM) wanted to dominate the business in and around the Indo-Burma international border. On 1 June, 1995, clashes erupted in Moreh and surrounding areas between the Kukis and the Tamil businessmen. The Tamil businessmen obtained the necessary support and the firearms from the NSCN (IM). In the ensuing clashes, both sides suffered losses. The tension was cool down due to peace efforts by the Manipuri Meitei, the Kuki and other business communities in Manipur.

SADAR HILLS: KUKI'S TIME-BOMB

Sadar Hills, situated to the north of Manipur at a distance of 60-65 kilometers from Imphal formed part of Senapati District of Manipur. It comprises the three Kuki dominated Saikul, Saitu and Kangpokpi constituencies with an Autonomous District council. It is considered as one of the most sensitive areas which both the Kuki and the Naga in Manipur are having a political turf war. Since early 1960's, the Kukis are demanding the formation of a separate Revenue district known as the Sadar Hill in Senapati District of Manipur. By 1990's, they intensified their demand. The Manipuri Nagas read the writing on the wall and strongly objected against the same saying that it was their 'ancestral land'. In 1996, Manipur Government formed two state cabinet sub-committees for the creation of two additional districts i.e. Imphal East District and the Sadar Hill District under the chairmanship of Sri Radhabinod Koijam (later on Chief Minister) and Dr L Chandramani Singh respectively. In 1997, Imphal East District was formed but the process of Sadar Hills District was stalled by the Manipuri Naga politicians under the influence of NSCN(IM).

The Kukis are now demanding the formation of the district with Kangpokpi as the epicenter. Due to political pull and pushes, the question of creation of a revenue district of Sadar Hills is in limbo. This has surcharged tension between the two ethnic groups. Today, the issue has been eclipsed

**Important Sub-Tribes and Communities
of Sadar Hills, Senapati District,
Manipur**

Sl. No.	Sub-Tribe/ Community	East (Saikul)	West Kangpokpi
1.	Kuki	15,758	13,573
2.	Tangkhu	5,901	91
3.	Kom	1,998	216
4.	Vaiphei	1,173	1,075
5.	Marring	1,401	-
6.	Kabui	440	1,743
7.	Thadou	648	7,896
8.	Koireng	468	7,896
9.	Chiru	368	1,746
10.	Thangbal	632	962
11.	Liangmei	-	3,083
12.	Rongmei	-	1,118
13.	Mao	-	1,682
Total		31,818	52,559

by Greater Nagaland demand. To off set the political swing in favour of the Naga, the Kuki insurgent outfits had entered into an agreement for cessation of hostility and firing with the Armed forces of India in 2005.

GREATER NAGALAND : ETHNIC POLITICS

One of the finest political baton produced by the Naga insurgents for their politico-insurgency war for self-determination is 'Greater Nagaland' involving other states like Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar (Burma). It is the brainchild of ethnic Naga politicians from Nagaland. The aim is to achieve their goal not only by means of politics but also by brute force. The politico-ethnic-Insurgency objective was to attain Greater Nagaland at all cost, if not 'Naga Sovereignty'.

To boost up Greater Nagaland concept, another politico-ethnic insurgency ploy, concerning only the state of Manipur and Nagaland was coined as 'Southern Nagaland'. It was the political theory and concept of Manipuri Naga politicians to merge the northern areas of Manipur with Nagaland. By 1990's as a political gimmick, 'Greater Nagaland' map, which was almost 8 times the size of present Nagaland state of India was published for public consumption.

NAGA UNDER ONE SINGLE ADMINISTRATIVE UMBRELLA

After Naga ceasefire of 1997, Nagaland Naga NGOs, some politicians, Church leaders and the NSCN (IM) raised the banner of "Naga under one single Administrative umbrella". It was raised when the Naga insurgents realized that 'Naga Sovereignty' has got very less takers. It is just nothing but 'Greater Nagaland', with more political sugar-coating. Nagaland Nagas (Ao, Sema, Angami, Lotha etc) has got their own ethnic political aspirations concerning their distinct culture, tradition, customs, dialects and sub-ethnic interest different from the Manipuri Nagas (Tangkhul, Mao, Maram, Zeliangrong etc). More important was the question of land. Public debate is going on that land cannot be divided and dissected to form the interest of one ethnic community and loss to others. The Manipuri Meitei group has not accepted and will not accept in the near future the division of Manipur State on ethnic line. That became one of the relying strong political points for the Manipuri politicians, general

Kukis Uphold Sadar Hill Issue, Manipur 8 February 2000

While the Kukis have been demanding upgradation of the Sadar Hills area, which has a separate Autonomous District Council, to a full-fledged revenue district, the Nagas have opposed the demand, calling the area their "ancestral land". The issue has led to the resignation of prominent Kuki leaders, Chungkhokai Dongel and Thangmilien Kipgen from the ruling Manipur State Congress party (MSCP) and as legislators..... "Creation of Sadar Hills district is essential for the Integrity of Manipur", said Dongel.

—*The Telegraph*, Kolkata, Sri Oinam Sunil Singh)

IM Doors Open to Neighbours

NSCN-IM Chairman Isak Chisi Swu and its General Secretary Th. Muivah today consulted Naga leaders and intellectuals on the ongoing Naga Peace talks at the 4th Naga Peoples' Consultative Meeting. Addressing the gathering, Muivah said, 'we welcome the Meitei brothers, Kuki brothers, Dimasa brothers, Hmar brothers, Karbi brothers, if they want to live together with us'.

—Hebron Camp, Dimapur, Nagaland;
20 January 2005;

4th Naga Consultative Meeting.

intelligentsia, NGOs and the Insurgents. They warned New Delhi that if the same is done by force, the political repercussions would be very costly. In 2002-2006, the sound of Naga unification became quite shrill when the Government of India and the Armed forces made it very clear to the Nagas that there was no place for 'Naga Sovereignty' in Indian political set-up. The Naga insurgent outfit, particularly the NSCN (IM) was completely neutralized on military front. Gradually, the Naga adopted the politically oriented concept of 'Naga under one single Administrative unit', embracing the views and opinions of all Naga NGOs, Church leaders, ethnic politicians and ethnic parties.

The United Committee Manipur (UCM) pointed out that the important political issue in question was that if tomorrow the Manipuris wanted to stay under one single Administrative umbrella, involving Manipur, Cachar Valley, Nawgong, Hailakandi, Hojai, Dharamnagar, Udaipur, Kailashor, Sylhet (Bangladesh), Kabaw Valley (Burma), should New Delhi apply the same yardstick and consider the same positively. What about the Assamese which had spread out upto New Delhi and New York? Greater Nagaland, Greater Mizoram and Greater Assam (Asom/Ahom) will produce more ethnic imbroglio.

NAGA SOVEREIGNTY TO NAGA-MANIPURI 'ETHNIC' EQUATION

In May-June 2005, the Government of India's peace talks with the NSCN (IM) almost came to a dead end. Manipur state declared 18 June as a State Holiday and coined it as State Integration Day. That brought the NSCN (IM) on the warpath under the camouflage of the All Naga Students Associations of Manipur (ANSAM) and the Naga Student Federation of Nagaland (NSF) with Manipur State. Mr Th Muivah and Mr Issac Chishi Swu who were having parleys with officials of the Government of India in New Delhi packed up and proceeded to Amsterdam as New Delhi refused to accept their demand for a quick solution to Naga

IM's Greater Lim theory draws flaks from other UG groups Nagalim an illusion: UNLF

"Reacting strongly to the demand for unification of Naga inhabited (area) by the NSCN-IM, the UNLF has today asserted that the stand of the IM group will do nothing except give rise to ethnic tension and plunge the entire North East region into endless conflict and chaos. ... ultimately Naga-exclusive 'Nagalim' of the NSCN-IM is anti-history and as such anti-Naga... The concept of Nagalim is nothing more than an illusion". ...

—Statement of UNLF, 29 January, 2005,
The Telerhaph, Kolkata

POLITICAL PENDULUM OF NAGA INSURGENCY MOVEMENT 1945-2008

1.	1945-1975	* Demand for Naga sovereignty/Naga independence * Shillong Accord * Naga insurgents divided
2.	1975-1997	* Demand for Naga sovereignty/Naga independent. * NSCN-IM and Govt of India Peace Accord. * Naga insurgents divided * Naga sovereignty buried.
3.	1997-2001	* Greater Nagaland demand. * Naga autonomy within India. * Political devolution. * Naga unification.
4.	2001-2008	* Insurgent outfits to political parties.

insurgency movement. To ensure Naga public support and highlighted Naga political problem, NH-39 and NH-53 were blocked indefinitely by the NSCN (IM) under cover of ANSAM. The agenda of the NSCN (IM) was to create a politico-ethnic crisis and clashes so that the foundation of Naga Unification can be completed. Naga Unification can be done by disintegration of Manipur and Assam. Disintegration can be done by a man-made ethnic crisis and clashes in the state between the Manipuri and the Manipuri Nagas and the Assamese and Nagas. Manipur was choked, starved and suffered due to ethnic politics of blockade of NH-39 and NH-53. Chief Minister of Nagaland, Mr N Rio refused to give guaranteed security to Manipur-bound vehicles passing through Nagaland on NH-39. Naga Manipuri ethnic equation went into full circle of political gimmicks, immaturity, archaic political adventures (misadventures), and ethnic war cry. Nagaland political leaders openly demanded that the hill districts of Manipur should be merged with Nagaland and even adopted resolution in the State Assembly on this account. Manipuri politicians say Disintegration of Manipur will not be accepted at all cost. In 2006, Mr. N. Rio 'secretly' intruded into Senapati, the northern district of Manipur and 'instigated' the Nagas to join Naga Unification movement. Thus the entire efforts of Naga Sovereignty, Naga Insurgency movement, Naga peace Talk, Naga unification, etc. tapered down to a single window system: Naga-Manipuri ethnic imbroglio. Analysts in Manipur, Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh etc. considered the acts of commission and omission of Naga insurgents and other ethnic stakeholders for Naga integration, not honouring the constitutional rights of other citizens, as a political hoax.

MANIPURI MEITEI-NAGA-KUKI ETHNIC TRIANGLE

The ethnic imbroglio in Manipur will survive as long as the ethnic insurgency movement remains in the centre court of ethnic politics. Maximum violences in the state were always related to politico-ethnic issues: Territorial integrity of Manipur; Naga unification; Kuki Homeland, Zeliangrong Union Territory, Kangleipak, and so on. The Manipuri Meiteis want to safeguard the Manipuri Nationalism and a composite Manipuri identity (Ancient Manipuri Independent Identity). The Nagas want to create a 'Naga Country' by means of Naga Unification with Nagaland as the centre of attraction. The Kukis want to lay the foundation stone of Kuki Homeland via formation of Sadar Hills Revenue district as Kuki's political watch-tower. They are keeping their eyes in the eastward direction towards western Burma where the Chin-Kuki stocks inhabited. Of late, the Meitei Pangal (Manipuri Muslims) identified themselves more with the Islamic tenets of the holy Q'uran (Koran) than the composite Manipuri society. They are aligning with the Rohingas in Burma and the Bangladesh-based Islamic fundamentalist groups who were trained by the Al Qaeda and others fundamentalists and fanatic groups in India and Afghanistan. Manipur, the strategic fulcrum of India in South East Asian politics will be plagued by ethnic imbroglio so long the insurgent, militants and Anti-social elements are involved in the mad race of ethnic politics, insurgency movement, terrorism and fundamentalism.

ASSAM-ARUNACHAL PRADESH-MANIPUR TRIANGLE (AAM GOLDEN TRIANGLE)

Ethnic politics is an old weapon used in world politics. In South East Asia, it was extensively used in Myanmar (Burma), Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Nepal and Bhutan. After 1947, in India, some states like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Haryana, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya were formed based on ethno-linguistic political ground. Assam has been vivisected many

a times, and facing further division. Arunachal Pradesh will not accept to ceded Changlang and Tirap districts to Nagaland for 'Greater Nagaland'. So as Assam and Manipur. Will Myanmar (Burma) cede one inch of Myanmar territory to form 'Greater Nagaland' or accept the politico-insurgency theory of "Tribes under one Single Administrative umbrella"? The answer leads clearly towards 'No! In the present South East Asian political scene, such political dream cannot be translated into reality by one political stroke. Ethnic politicians should look-up into the wider horizon before launching of a war of political rhetoric.

**Manipur Imbroglio
ULFA against Naga Truce Extension**

"Under no condition will the ULFA and the people of Assam negotiate on the present territorial boundary of Assam. The North Cachar area of Assam, to which the NSCN (IM) proposes to extend the ceasefire, is the ancestral home land of the Dimacha-Kachari people and is an integral part of Assam".

(A write-up in the latest issue of ULFA's mouthpiece: *Freedom*, May, 2001; *The Telegraph*, Kolkata 01 June 2001)

In February, 2008, during the State Assembly elections in Nagaland, Meghalaya, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh, the issue of 'Greater Nagaland', was raised by many political parties, which included the Indian National Congress (INC); the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Nagaland People's Front (NPF), the Democratic Alliances of Nagaland (DAN), Manipur State Government, the United Committee Manipur (UCM), the United Naga Council (UNC) sponsored Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) of Manipur; the NSCN-IM and many other NGOs and stake-holders in Nagaland and adjoining areas. The Manipur Pradesh Congress Committee (MPCC) urged the General Secretary, All India Congress Committee (AICC), Mr Siddarth Patil to erase the controversial remarks of 'Naga Integration', from the election manifesto of Congress Party in Nagaland. The AICC General Secretary, in-charge of Nagaland, Mrs. Margaret Alva, ruled out any changes in the party's manifesto for Nagaland as 'The 16-point Agreement adopted several years ago suggests the need for an integration of all Naga-inhabited areas'. Immediately, a private member bill was moved in the State Assembly of Manipur and unanimously adopted by the House as, "This House resolve to disapprove the reported statement made by Siddarth Patil, the AICC General Secretary and demands the AICC to cause manifesto which read as follows: The Indian National Congress in Nagaland will continue to urge upon the government of India the need to implement the 16-point agreement of 1959 in letter and spirit" (State Assembly Resolution, Government of Manipur 22 February, 2008). However, 5 Independent MLAs, sponsored by the UNC (Mr. Danny Shaiza, Mr. K Raina, Mr. Wungnaoshang Keishing, Mr. Awangbou Newmai and Dr. Khashim Ruivah) did not attend the Assembly Session, and maintained that they were against the resolution. Nagaland Congress Legislative Party (CLP) leader, Mr. I. Imkong said that the 16-point Agreement "is our main political agenda". In Manipur, President of the UCM (Mr. K. Langamba) felt that the Congress manifesto clearly revealed the party's intention to pull out four Naga-dominated districts—Ukhrul, Chandel, Tamenglong and Senapati from Manipur and integrated with Nagaland which was the No 1 agenda of the NSCN-IM. The BJP in Nagaland sang the same 16-point Agreement song and vowed to 'continue to pursue for the integration of Naga contiguous areas as committed in the 16-point Agreement'. New Delhi did not have a ready-made solution for the political imbroglio vis-à-vis the Naga Integration. "We have to find out a solution to the Naga problem, which is acceptable to all", used to be a standard reply by New Delhi for the last 40 years.

Politico-ethnic imbroglio in the AAM Golden Triangle will survive as long as the ethnic politics override and overshadow the National interest.

SYNCHRONIC EFFECTS

The ethnic imbroglio in Manipur will not affect only the people in the state but also will have a hydra-like effects to the entire North East India: horizontally and vertically. It will produce a synchronise sound to all ethnic group/community in the region: Manipuri, Naga, Kuki, Assamese, Dimassa, Arunachalese, Khasi, Garos, Tripuri, Bengali etc.

IMPLICATIONS

Futuristic implications of Ethnic imbroglio in Manipur are:-

- (a) It will remain so long the insurgent outfits interfere in ethnic politics of Manipur.
- (b) The political division of Nagaland Naga and the Manipuri Naga will remain forever in spite of high volume political rhetoric and brave faces.
- (c) The powerful Ao, Angami, Konyak, Sema, and the Lotha Nagas will keep their age-old historical, ancestral and traditional socio-political structure for ethnic equilibrium and not accept to break it by the Manipuri Nagas under the theme: Naga unification under one single Administrative Umbrella'.
- (d) The disintegration of Manipur, part of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh will have a catastrophic ethnic political upheaval in North East India, affecting India's vital national interest and security.
- (e) Manipur's imbroglio can be solved at political level by delinking it from the Naga peace talk. But New Delhi, from a wider political platform would like to solve the Naga problem in North East India by incorporating other states.
- (d) India's political option: satisfy partially Naga's demand and sacrifice some ethnic interest of the Manipuris, Assamese and the Arunachalese. However, this will tantamount to opening more Pandora's Box for the future generation.

New Delhi come to the conclusion, without any inhibition, that building up ethnic political empire by insurgents like greater Mizoram, greater Nagaland (Nagalim), greater Asom (Assam), greater Manipur, Bodoland, Dhimaaraji, Kuki Homeland etc. by means of ethnic immotive issues; threat; fear tactics and psychosis; selective wanton and inhuman killings, will be rejected in the long run by the common men and women in the region. Insurgents can only survive with a credible aim and objective, support and cooperation of the local people and communities. Ethnic rhetoric and propaganda, a weapon of short term gain, used by many insurgent outfits, cannot replace the developmental and socio-economic movement carried out by the government. Insurgency movement, which is anti-thesis to democratic movement, will not be able to achieve 'Nagalim', 'Kangleipak', 'Kukiland' etc. as they involved a galaxy of ethnic issues in the region. Under the bogey of ceasefire agreement, insurgent outfits are stockpiling arms and ammunitions; collected 'taxes' openly; punished and killed officials in broad day-light; threatened democratic state government; maintained parallel state governments, which did not give credits to the central and the state governments. New Delhi is, very much, one of the respondents for ethnic crisis and conflicts in Manipur, due to its unclear political approaches and adhocism.

ARMED FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT, 1958

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, passed by Parliament of the Democratic Republic of India, has become one of the most controversial and deeply hated Acts in the North Eastern Region of India. Many die-hard pundits of Human Rights Organisations, Social workers, Advocates, Non-Governmental Organisations etc. termed and depicted the Act as archaic in character; colonial in nature, brutal in colour and an instrument for license to kill. The Do's and Don't list of the Act issued by the Armed Forces of India as per direction given by the Honourable Supreme Court of India, has been described as a thin cosmetic to hide the drawbacks of the Act and a sugar-coated dangerous pill which could not be swallowed by the public. Human Rights groups in Manipur have been fighting for the repeal of the said Act from the soil of Manipur. In spite of several instances of Human Rights violations, the government and the Armed forces insists that insurgency movement cannot be controlled if the Army is made toothless and forced to stand on the firing line. Why has this Act, discussed by the various eminent persons of India in India's Parliament and passed as an Act has become so unpopular and hated by the citizens of India particularly in the North Eastern Region of India? Is it a propaganda and media warfare launched by various insurgent groups against the Democratic Government of India, particularly against the Armed Forces, or is it really a defected Act as bad as a worn-out shoe?

Manipur Imbroglio

"Crime is terribly revealing. Try and vary your method as you will, your tastes, your habits, your attitude of mind, and your soul is revealed by your actions".

—Agatha Christie

THE ACT

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, was passed by Parliament and became an Act in 1958. In August 1958, while discussing the passage of the Act, the then Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha expressed: "It pains me that we have an occasion in this House to give our assent to martial law which was forced on us by an Ordinance". Sri G.B.Pant, the then Home Minister of India, while

introducing the Bill, said, "There (Assam and Manipur) they (certain misguided sections of the Nagas) are indulging in arson, murder, loot, dacoity etc. So it has become necessary to adopt measures for the protection of the people living in those areas. In order to enable the Armed Forces to handle the situation effectively whenever such problem arises hereafter, it has been considered necessary to introduce this bill (Armed Forces Special Power Act)". Thus the Ordinance became an Act and applied in the North Eastern Region of India to empower the security forces while dealing with insurgents, guerillas, militants, anti-social elements etc. which they could not do so satisfactorily by the help of the normal law of the land. The Act has given them the necessary legal protection while operating against the insurgents in the counter-insurgency warfare. The Armed Forces effectively combated and controlled the menaces of insurgent outfits in Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Assam etc. However, by late 1980's, the insurgents took a different form of insurgency warfare by exploiting the advantages of propaganda and media fields with serious allegations against the Security Forces for extra Judicial Powers conferred on them by the provisions of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958. The allegations and charges against the members of the Armed Forces are mostly concerned in terms of Human Rights violations, tortures, rapes, gang rapes, custodial deaths, etc. By early 1990's a number of student organisations, Human Rights Organisations, Local Clubs, Women Volunteer Organisations etc. came out into the streets of Imphal demanding to repeal the application of the Act particularly in Manipur and generally in the North Eastern Region of India. Hunger strikes, *dharnas* (sit-in-protests), road blockades became a daily affair pressurizing the state and the central governments to withdraw the Act from Manipur. A number of legal luminaries, journalists, academicians, political leaders etc. joined the fray by filing a number of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the High Court of Assam, Manipur, Tripura, Nagaland and Mizoram and the Supreme Court of India. Various insurgent groups used propaganda warfare against the constitutional government



Who is Sharmila? The AFSPA girl from Manipur.

On 02 November, 2000 A.D., Troops of the Assam Rifles (A para military force of India), during counter-insurgency operation, involved in the killing of 10 innocent persons (insurgents?) at Malom, 10 kilometres to the south of Imphal, capital of Manipur state, India. The army did not accept to have a Magisterial Inquiry. They were empowered, under the power of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, 'to shoot even to the causing of death'. That incidence produced Miss Irom Chanu Sharmila, a young girl, residence of Kongpal, Imphal East, Manipur demanding to repeal the draconian act, by means of continuous fasting and hunger-strike. She was repeatedly arrested by police in Imphal and New Delhi; kept in judicial custody; confined to hospital; fed forcefully and through the nose. India's democratic power holders has got no time, interest, energy and political courtesy to listen and satisfy the demand of a young girl in the most democratic manner rarely seen in world politics. Sharmila is fasting for a cause for the last 8 years (2000-2008 AD) and still continuing. She is now reduced to a skeleton, with hoarse sound, alert eyes and a shacking body. Does UN convention on Human Rights not applicable to Sharmila, who has got similar spirit of Dow Aung San Suu Kyi (Burma)?

that the power conferred to the members of the Armed Forces, to 'fire upon' to the extent of 'causing death' is tantamount to commit extra-judicial execution.

POWERS UNDER THE ACT AND ITS LEGALITY

The Act provides immense powers to the members of the Armed Forces while operating in areas where the Act is enforced. Section 4(a) to (d) of the Act empowered any Commissioned Officer, Warrant Officer, non-commission officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the Armed Forces to fire upon or otherwise use force, even to causing of death, against any person, after giving due warning, if he believes that it is necessary for the maintenance of law and order. Section 6 of the said Act prohibits prosecution, suit, or other legal proceedings against any law enforcement personnel in any legal court except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The Act has been in vogue in the North Eastern Region of India since for the last 40 years or so. In early 1980, the constitutional validity of the Act was challenged in the Supreme Court of India but the petition could not be heard for a long time. In the mean time, insurgency movements in the North Eastern Region of India spread like wildfire covering the entire 7 states. Normal laws like Criminal Procedure Code (Cr PC) failed to subdue the armed powers of various insurgent groups. The State Government of Tripura amended Cr PC by doubling the period of detention without trial from 90 days to 180 days, though the same expired in 1995 without any fruitful result. On 16 February 1997, the State Government introduced Armed Forces (Special Power) Act 1958 to control the flare-up of various insurgent groups like the ATTF, the TUJS, the NLFT etc. The Act has been in vogue in Assam to subdue the menaces of ULFA and Bodo insurgency movement. In the meantime the Supreme Court of India was filed with petitions and litigations against the Armed Forces for violation of Human Rights and for withdrawal of the Act from the North Eastern Region of India. On 27 November 1997, the Honourable Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act on the ground that Parliament was competent to enact such laws. The Do's and don't's issued by the Armed Forces were adequate for its members to observe. The Honourable Court also observed that powers conferred on the personnel of the Armed Forces of India while operating under the Act were not unreasonable or arbitrary. However, the turning point came when the intensity, anger, and discontent of the Manipuris

Manipur Imbroglio

Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958

"The Army will not be in a position to tackle insurgency in the country without the provisions of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958. I am afraid that without the AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Power Act), the Army will not be able to function in insurgency situations. Without the Act, we will be a reactive force only. The militants will always get an upper hand".

—Lt Gen Arvind Sharma, GOC,
Eastern Command, Indian Army
03 January 2005

Manipur Imbroglio

Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958

"The stand of the Army officer reflects nothing but his military dictatorship mindset. Even the Prime Minister of India (Dr. Manmohan Singh) had admitted that AFSPA is indeed Draconian and such utterings by an Army is ample proof that the Military want to continue to target the innocent people of Manipur and go on with the agenda of terrorizing the people".

—Apunba Lup, 04 January, 2005.
The Sangai Express, Manipur

for repeal of the Act was exemplified by three incidences concerning the dignity, morality and courages of the women of Manipur. One was when Miss Irom Sharmila Chanu, a resident of Kongpal, Imphal East, Manipur took hunger-strike as a weapon of challenge demanding repeal of the said Act and also removal of the Armed forces of India from the state of Manipur. The second incidence was the custodial death of Miss. Thangjam Manorama Devi in the hand of the Armed forces of India (17 Assam Rifles) in a chilling and inhuman manner. The third incidence was one of rarest protest, never seen in the world History, staged by 13 naked Manipuri women, with banner, "Rape us, Indian Army", in front of the Kangla (Headquarters, 9 Sector Assam Rifles) in Imphal city. Those incidents completely shook the national psyche of India. Irom Sharmila is still continuing her fast unto death since November 2000, forced-fed by the authority through her nose, to keep her alive. In November 2006, even Shirin Ebadi, Iranian Human Rights lawyer and Nobel Peace laureate, got a shock when she saw her at the All India Institute of Medical Science, New Delhi and vowed to take her campaign against the Act to international fora. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) also urged New Delhi to repeal the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 and replace it "with a more humane act".

THE CONFLICT PARADIGM AND VIEWPOINTS

It is generally agreed that when a democratic state functions well, it guarantees rights, considers claims according to the stated policy, satisfies needs by sound administrative practices and regulates desires by encouraging or discouraging social and other customs. The insurgents, militants, guerillas, etc. have got their own desires, needs and claims. At the same time, the government has got its own social obligations, needs and desires for the nation and the insurgents who are very much important misguided citizens of this country. The law of the land is applicable to all and cannot be interpreted in order to adjudicate conflicting claims of various parties, groups, organisations, sectors etc. The interests and desires of the state sometimes collide with the desires of individuals, communities, ethnic groups, anti-national elements (ANES), insurgents etc. This is generally the area where conflicts started forcibly involving a part of the population or a region.

PUBLIC OPINIONS/VIEWS

In Manipur, and generally in the North Eastern Region of India, there is a strong demand to repeal the application of the Act. Various student organisations, Human Rights groups, social workers, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) had raised their voices against the Act and demanded to repeal the same from the region. Even the insurgent organisations that have got not locus standi had joined the fray. Important viewpoints are:-

- (a) Manipur, as a state of India with an elected Government and full-fledged elected Assembly is having the necessary infrastructures of law courts and the law enforcing agencies within the meaning and context of the Constitution of India.
- (b) The normal legal weapons like the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr PC) with other Acts and rules, promulgated from time to time by the government should handle the law and order situation of the state.
- (c) There is no need to apply a dangerous and unpopular Act like the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958.

- (d) The Act is draconian in character and its application in the state of Manipur is tantamount to giving license to kill innocent citizens of the state.
- (e) If arson, looting, murder, dacoity, insurgency, militancy etc. are the yardsticks for the imposition of the Act, then the Act has been imposed indiscriminately in Manipur and generally in the North Eastern Region of India.
- (f) Many innocent citizens of the State have been raped, tortured and killed by the law enforcing agencies under the umbrella of the Act. The people have suffered brutality and custodial deaths by the blessings of the Act.
- (g) The Act of commission and omission by the members of the Armed Forces under the Act will tantamount to illegal action, if they violated the instruction of Do's and Don't, which form part of the said Act. (Armed Forces Special Power) Act, 1958.
- (h) The Union Government and the members of the Armed Forces are bound by Human Rights obligations as India had signed the two Covenants of UN Human Rights on 10 April 1979. But the personnel of the Armed Forces are committing rights violations in the state under the shield of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958.
- (j) The law of the land is applicable to all, that is, to the citizens of the country, the Armed Forces, the Government, and the insurgents.
- (k) The Act should be repealed at the earliest from the state. The prolonged application of the Act is tantamount to state terrorism.

Manipur Insurgency

Do's and Don'ts under the Armed Force (Special Power) Act, 1958

- ▼ Act only in the area declared disturbed under the Act.
- ▼ Power to open fire, use of force or arrest only to be exercised by an officer/JCO/ WO and NCO.
- ▼ Arrest only those who have committed a cognizable offences or are about to commit an offence or against whom a reasonable ground exists to prove they have committed or are about to commit a cognizable offence.
- ▼ Ensure that troops don't harass innocent people or unnecessarily enter houses of people not linked with unlawful activities.
- ▼ Ensure women are not search/arrested without the presence of a female police.
- ▼ Handover arrested person to the nearest police station with least possible delay.
- ▼ Don't keep a person in custody for any period longer than the bare necessity for handing him over to the nearest police station.
- ▼ Don't use any force after having arrested a person except when he is trying to escape.

GOVERNMENT'S VIEW POINTS

The Central Government and the Security Forces have given their own perception and opinions in regard to the unresolved insurgency problems in the North Eastern Region of India. The requirement of the Act or any Act similar to such nature arises from the standpoint of counter-insurgency warfare, which is quite different from policing of normal law and order duty. The requirement of a stringent Act arises due to the following reasons:

- (a) It is the duty of each and every citizen of India to honour and accept the Constitution of India and the Acts, Rules, Regulations etc. passed by the Parliament within the purview of the Constitution of India. These Acts, Rules and Regulations are valid so long Parliament did not repeal the same by another Act or Law.
- (b) For maintenance of law and order, two main laws: the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) are used with the help of other Ordinances and Acts passed by the Parliament from time to time.
- (c) When the law enforcing agencies fail to subdue violences, insurrections, insurgency movement, militancy etc., the assistance of the Armed Forces are normally acquired/sought for in the form of Aid to Civil Authority.
- (d) Insurgency movement, militancy, insurrection, guerilla movement involved violence, acts of warfare, killings, tortures, assassinations, arsons, lootings; dacoity etc. In such a scenario, personnel of the Armed Forces need additional legal protection so that they can remove the element of threats from the insurgents to the civil populace.
- (e) The Act has been introduced in the region for the personnel of Armed Forces not to use as a trident to kill but as a legal shield to fight the insurgents and their acts of unlawful activities.
- (f) If the personnel of the Armed Forces committed any act of commission and omission against any citizen of the country, the forces have got their own legal systems to prosecute the offenders. Their decisions and verdicts (trial by the Court of the Armed Forces) can be challenged in the Supreme Court of India.
- (g) The Government and the Security Forces consider the insurgents and the militants as the biggest violators of Human Rights. A number of innocent people have lost their life due to insurgency movement and ethnic violence.
- (h) The Security Forces are fighting a Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) war against the insurgents. It has taken the form of proxy war due to the involvement of foreign countries and foreign agencies.
- (j) In a proxy-war, during counter-insurgency operation, some resentments and alienation are bound to occur to the local people and general public due to the prevailing insurgency environment.

HOLISTIC APPROACH

The state government of Manipur brought in the application of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 in the state, in early 1960's, particularly to give the Armed forces with additional legal weapons in their fight against the insurgents and the terrorists. When the public voices became shrills and deafening against the imposition of the Act for a prolonged period, successive Chief Ministers tried to repeal the same but failed. The state Government with a small police forces and weak law enforcing agencies could not match the menaces of the insurgents, thereby depending heavily on

the central security forces (particularly the Army). The central security forces want some additional legal shields for smooth counter-insurgency operation in the state and in the region. New Delhi has got no political problem, if Manipur state wants to remove the application of the Act in the state, so long they maintained Law and Order with the state law enforcing Agencies and released the services of the central security agencies. Successive state governments felt that the ground realities existed during various periods forced them to depend heavily on the Army and hence the application of the Act till the situation stabilized. New Delhi put a strong rider when Manipur state removed the application of the Act from Greater Imphal area that the Act could be re-imposed by the Central Government if the state government failed to stop extortion, intimidation, killings and assassinations.

Manipur Imbroglio

Armed Forces (Special Power) Act, 1958

Opinions and views of stakeholders

- ♦ Relook and then modified the Act.
- ♦ Repeal the Act.
- ♦ Repeat the Act and incorporate its clauses to other existing Acts.
- ♦ Repeal the Act and remove Armed forces from North East-India.

In 2004, New Delhi announced the constitution of Justice BP Jeevan Reddy Committee to study the provisions of the said Act and to submit its recommendations. Numerous sittings were held and the opinion and the ideas of the people of the North eastern region of India were recorded. The military establishment was also given the opportunity to state their opinion and views. The committee submitted its Report to the Government of India on 06 June 2005, and recommended that the Act be repealed. The Committee's report (as on May 2008) has not made official to the public, though *The Hindu* newspaper managed to leak its contents. "By and large the opinion is against the Act, though the range of opinion and views are diverse", said Justice BP Jeevan Reddy to the waiting reporters at the end of the two-day hearing at Guwahati (Assam). Justice Jeevan Reddy said that the focus of the Review Committee was not on the alleged excesses committed by the individuals of the Armed forces but on the Armed Forces (Special Power) Act, 1958 itself. To a query that the Act was seen as militarization of the North East India, a committee member, Lieutenant-General (Retired) VR Raghavan said "India is not a military state, so why should it attempt to militarise the region". People in the region have refused to accept the contentions of New Delhi (The Armed Forces) that normal legal canons has become redundant to fight insurgency movement in the general area. The Government has to analyse the impact of the Act on the target itself and not the benefits to the user agencies. How far the application of this Act been able to curbed, destroyed or damaged the impending targets, that is, the insurgents and the militants? If we use the normal law of the land, then what will be the degree of difference in the destruction? There is a need to understand the fact that the application of the Armed Forces (Special Power) Act, 1958 had caused serious collateral damages to innocent life and liberties in Manipur and surrounding areas with no tangible effects to the warring insurgents and the anti-social elements. No civilized people will accept the best argument put forward by the law enforcing agencies for its defence of rape, killings, tortures, custodial deaths against its citizens particularly the weaker sections, which they (SF) are supposed to give protection. On 26 June, 2007, the Administrative Reform Committee headed by Sri Veerapa Moily, the veteran parliamentarian, recommended for scrapping of the Act. Thus, there is an immediate need of cementing

a rapport and understandings between the Security Forces and the general public. The Government, the Security Forces, and the general public cannot function and operate in a watertight compartment and secretive manner in a LIC scenario. The Security Forces should ensure that the general public believes and finally accept what they were doing in CI operations. Various corrective measures of the Government's policy will reduce the public anger against the Government and the Security Forces. Armed Forces Special Power Act 1958 should not be projected as the bone of contention between the general public and the Security Forces. It should benefit the general public; if not, scrap it and formulate a new Act.

NOTES

Powers under section 4

[Naga People's Movement of Human Rights Vs Union of India 1998 (2) SCC, 109; Judgment; Supreme Court of India]

"Para 49, Under Clause (C) of Section 4 power has been conferred to arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence and the officer concerned is empowered to use such force as may be necessary to effect the arrest. The said power is not very different from the power which has been conferred on a police officer under section 5 of the Central Act which requires that any person arrested and taken into custody shall be made over to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay, together with a report of the circumstances occasioning the arrest. It has been urged that there is nothing in section 5 to indicate that the officer exercising the power of arrest under section 4(c) is obliged to comply with the requirements of clauses (a) and (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution. There is no basis for this contention. The power conferred under section 4(c) read with section 5 has to be exercised in consonance with the overriding requirements of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution which means that the person who is arrested by an officer specified in section 4 has to be made over to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station together with a report of the circumstances occasioning the arrest with the least possible delay so that the person arrested can be produced before the nearest Magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the Magistrate and no such person can be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a Magistrate'

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

"Nothing is ever done in this world until men are prepared to kill one another if it is not done"

—George Barnard Shaw

A study of the world history, legal framework and infrastructure, and legal codes shows that individual freedom is never free from state interferences. In the 10th Century, Kings, Princes and Feudal Assemblies used to fight for supremacy of rights of human beings. The right of free men (women) could be traced to Magna Carta, the English Charter, accepted by King John of Great Britain in 1215 AD, though the Feudal barons inserted a number of their selfish rights and interests. In the 17th century, Englishmen fought for their immemorial rights and right of human beings. Some of the landmark struggle and the Bills of Rights are the English Petition of Rights of 1628 AD; the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 AD; Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776; the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 and the American Bill of Rights of 1791, which at later stages formed the foundations of Human Rights.

In the 19th Century, the concept of the Bill of Rights, Treaties and the Conventions spread out in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Caribbean Islands. The doctrine of international law, international convention, Humanitarian angles, and ethnic and minority group, Labour Vs Human Rights etc. led to the formation of Geneva Convention 1864. In 1919, the League of Nations was formed and later on, the United Nations was established in 1945 at San Francisco. On 10th December 1948, the formal Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted, leading to the establishment of a series of Bill of rights, conventions, covenants and Universal declarations. In 1950, the European countries formed the European Court of Human Rights. In 1969, the American Convention on Human Rights was held at San Jose (Costa Rica), known as Pact of San Jose, to promote Human Rights throughout the globe.

India, as a sovereign democratic country, played an important role in all the deliberations of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Non-aligned movement. On 28 September, 1993,

the President of the Republic of India promulgated Human Rights Ordinance 1993. Immediately, a National Human Rights Commission of India, was established as a watch-dog of rights violations, though the country has got its own legal and constitutional frameworks and infrastructure to protect its sovereignty, integrity, and territorial identity within the context of the Charters of the United Nations. In chain, it formed State Human Rights Commissions in most of its states to monitor violations of Human rights and their remedial measures.

RIGHTS VIOLATORS

Manipur is one of the state in South East Asia where its citizens are facing rights violations with little knowledge and interest to the outside world. The outrageous acts and affront to the beleaguered simple people of Manipur remained unfazed to New Delhi and the Human Rights watch-dog in the world. New Delhi's strategy of domination of political system of North East India by military means has produced a series of Human Rights violations particularly in Manipur and Assam. The psychological power of the people to remain survived as a decent human being has been shattered by the act of Commission and omission of many stakeholders which included Insurgents; ethnic and sub-ethnic insurgent outfits; religious fanatics; terrorists; security forces and the State Government.

(a) Ethnic Politicians/Political Parties

- (i) Ethnic Platform.
- (ii) Ethnic cleansing agenda.
- (iii) Ethnic political initiation, instigation and provocation.
- (iv) Ethnic political war cry.

(b) Ethnic Insurgent Outfits

- (i) Threat to public life by means of gun culture.
- (ii) Ethnic warfare for ethnic supremacy.
- (iii) Proxy-War.
- (iv) Narco-Terrorism - a threat worst than the Atomic bomb.
- (v) Economic blockade and forced starvation.
- (vi) Torture, rape, molestation and extra-judicial killing.

(c) Security Forces

- (i) Torture, molestation, rape, custodial death and fake encounters.
- (ii) Excesses committed during counter-insurgency operations (CI ops).
- (iii) Prolonged detention.
- (iv) Excesses, restrictions, and controlled measures.
- (v) Failure to protect life and liberties of the people.

(d) Religious Institutions

- (i) Religious rhetoric which inflamed the masses.

- (ii) Religious leaders with political aprons.
- (iii) Diversion of religious related money to insurgent's coffer (God's Army).
- (c) **State/Federal Government**
 - (i) Failure to protect rights of the masses.
 - (ii) Prolong imposition of control measures and Acts.

RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

In May, 2007, the London-based Human Rights group Amnesty International, in its annual reports, cited several cases of Rights violations in India including in its north eastern region where a conflict situation existed. They called upon India to take up the issue of Human rights as seriously as it has taken those of economic progress and political power. In short, the world watch-dog body felt that India was not serious in the Human rights issues in its North eastern region and Jammu and Kashmir where a conflict situation had damaged the socio-cultural environment and the human dignity of the people.

Manipur is one of the most politically vibrant states on the earth where people are facing serious Human right violations for the last 60-65 years with little knowledge to the outside world. The Manipuris, the inhabitants of the state who strongly believed that Human right is a basic inalienable fundamental rights and freedom that every citizen enjoys irrespective of caste, creed and religion, are facing a turmoil social life and environment due to conflicts situation in the state. The people of the state are very sensitive to the concept of equal rights, rule of law of the land and Territorial integrity of state; National unity, secular politics, pride and prejudices and Manipuri Nationalism. Human values and Human rights have been violated by many stake holders by direct, indirect, intentional and non-intentional means with serious collateral effects.

The ingredients of Right violations in Manipur and the peripheral areas are complex in nature, frightening and chilling in its form, pathetic in its colour and destroyed the psyche of the general intelligentsia. Some of them are:-

- (a) Assassination/killing
- (b) Extra-judicial killing
- (c) Custodial death
- (d) Enforced Disappearances
- (e) Rape and molestation
- (f) Faked encounters
- (g) Torture and assault
- (h) Sub-ethnic killing
- (j) Ethnic cleansing agenda
- (k) Economic blockade/forced starvation
- (l) Intimidation.

TERROR DRILLS

In early 1950's, an Act, known as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, (AFSPA) which gives tremendous powers to the Indian Security Forces, during counter-insurgency warfare, including shoot to kill, was enacted by the Government of India, to curbed insurgency movement with special focus to the North eastern region of India. However, at later stages, the Act, which has been termed as draconian by many Human Rights Organisations and general intelligentsia, became a thorn in the flesh of the general public, particularly in the North Eastern region of India. Ministers, Central Government officials and Defence personal argued that the Act, is required by the security forces to curbed insurgency movement in the region. In November, 2006, Mr Pranab Mukherjee, Defence Minister of India, said that 'it is not possible for the Armed Forces to function', in the absence of the enabling provisions of the AFSPA. On the other hand, Dr Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, repeated his promises for amendment of AFSPA, which he made at Imphal and New Delhi in November 2004, to make it more humane. The final outcome of the general debate: the general public of Manipur were caught in between the security forces and the insurgents as it happened in Belfast, Jerusalem, Kabul, Rome and Chechnya, becoming the real victims of war on insurgency and terrorism.

In July 1987, one of the security posts of Assam Rifles (21 Assam Rifles), astride National Highway Number 39, situated at Oinam village, Senapati District, Manipur, approximately 85 kilometre to the north of Imphal, was attacked, looted and ransacked by the Naga insurgents, the NSCN, in the wee morning hour. By evening, the security forces, launched a military operation, code-named 'Operation Bluebird', under the direct supervision of Major General P Kukreti, Inspector General, Assam Rifles (South) to annihilate, kill and retrieve all arms and ammunitions looted by those Naga insurgents. Maximum weapons were recovered. But the collateral damages to the civil populace in Manipur, particularly in the general areas of Oinam village which included killing, torture, suspected rape, forced starvation, burning of thatched-roof houses, intimidation, spread of fear psychosis due to war-like situation etc, were not reported by the National and the International news media. The people of Manipur termed the tragic man-made incidence as Mini Mai-Lai massacre and celebrated the same every year as Anti-Repression Day. (My Lai/Mai Lai village is situated in Quang Ngai province, Central Vietnam. On 16 March, 1968, unarmed women and children of the village were killed by the American troops during Vietnam War. The photographs splashed by the Media shocked the conscience of the entire world).

"OPERATION BLUE-BIRD"
CARNAGES AT OINAM VILLAGE,
SENPATI, MANIPUR
11 JULY, 1987

On 07 August, 1995, one of the Infantry Battalion, 21 Rajputana Rifles (57 Mountain Division), while carrying out counter-insurgency operation at village Namtiram, Tamenglong district, Manipur, to the west and 170 kilometers away from Imphal, created a politico-military tornado in the State of Manipur. A column of troops of the Battalion was ambushed by the Naga insurgents in general area Namtiram village. Consequently, troops carried out counter-insurgency operation with a 'rampage in the Manipur village', having serious collateral effects and damages to the civil populace due to the 'act of indiscipline' by the protector of law and order (*The Telegraph*, 20 September, 1995).

Kolkata). General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command, Indian Army (GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, Indian Army) Lieutenant General RN Batra, admitted excesses committed by troops under his command. "I am not satisfied with what happened and the guilty will be punished", he said (Indian Express, 10 September 1995; New Delhi). The innocent villagers claimed that a number of people were kept inside the village Church building, tortured, punished with forced starvation. Women and young girl were molested and raped, though the same charges were negated by the security forces. General Shanker Roy Chowdhury, Chief of the Army Staff, (COAS) Indian Army took the incident very seriously and airdashed to Manipur to take a stock of the situation.

**MANIPUR INSURGENCY
TAMENGLONG RAMPAGE
TAMENGLONG DISTRICT
MANIPUR, 07 SEPTEMBER, 1995**

It was on 01 February 1997, that the tragic incidence of Human Rights violations by one ethnic insurgent group, that is, the NSCN-IM, against others carried out against three Zeliangrong and two Manipuri Meitei youths at Thawai village in Ukhrul district of Manipur, the home district of the NSCN-IM supremo Mr Th Muivah. Five innocent youths, which included one MBBS student of the Regional Institute of Medical Science (RIMS), Imphal, Manipur, went for picnic in the village, became victims to sub-ethnic rivalry and their dead bodies were recovered from village Loutei Riha of the same district in Manipur.

The Tonsen Lamkhai massacre (Tonsen cross-road massacre) in Sugnu was one of the most serious naked violations of Human Rights during 1999 in South east Asia. On 03 October, 1999, a convoy of the Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) stationed at Sugnu Bishenpur district, Manipur, was moving along National Highway Number 39. At the same time, some civil buses carrying polling personnel for duty for General Election in the State were also moving along the same road. Suddenly, while approaching Tonsen Lamkhai, a cross-section of the road, the CRPF personnel travelling in the convoy came under heavy fire from insurgents where seven CRPF personnel, including one Deputy Commandant were killed. One UNLF insurgent and 10 innocent civilians, including poll personnel were killed on that day. However, the facts came out that the CRPF personnel dragged out the polling personnel traveling in the buses and fired at them after making

**MANIPUR INSURGENCY
ETHNIC KILLING
THAWAI VILLAGE
INCIDENCE, UKHRUL
MANIPUR, 01 FEBRUARY, 1997**

them stand in one line. State Police Officers and even some military officials, who were involved in security in the general area, did not subscribe to the statement of the CRPF officials that the polling personnel traveling in the buses were killed during cross-firing. Eye witnesses in the incidence informed that, the CRPF personnel dragged down them personnel from the bus, made them run and fired at them from behind. Later on, Mr MN Sabherwal, the Director General of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Government of India, airdashed to Imphal to put off the fire and control the volatile situation. Mr W Nipamacha Singh, the Chief Minister of Manipur, ordered a Magisterial Inquiry into the incident.

**MANIPUR INSURGENCY
TONSEN LAMKHAH MASSACRE
THOUBAL DISTRICT, MANIPUR
03 OCTOBER, 1999**

In Manipur and generally in the North Eastern region of India, violation of Human Rights does not confine only to the security forces and the protector of law and order agencies in the State. On 04 November 2003, one young school going child age about 11 years, Miss Lungnila Elizabeth of Little Flower School, Imphal Manipur, daughter of Mr Francis Ngojokpa (Cabinet Minister, Government of Manipur) was kidnapped by unidentified persons. On 12 November, 2003, her dead body was found in a gunny bag. The incidence sent ripple in the entire state with serious sub-ethnic hatred, blaming the same to various insurgent outfits, combined with ransom. But the most surprise anecdote was the announcement of NSCN-IM insurgent group that the person (Mr. James Kuki and others) responsible for killing the young girl was in their custody for 'necessary trial'. On inquiry, it was alleged by the Kuki ethnic group that Francis Ngojokpa was involved in the Naga-Kuki ethnic crisis of 1992-1996 in Manipur and surrounding areas, particularly in Joupi village ethnic cleansing incidence, dominated by the Kuki tribe. The ethnic rhetoric and charges raised by the Kukis particularly by the Kuki insurgents was strongly refuted by the Naga and the Naga insurgents. Mr. Francis Ngajokpa, during that time was a young raising Manipuri Naga politician. The NSCN-IM carried out ethnic cleansing operation in the village by issuing mandatory 'Quit Notice' to the Kuki inhabitants where Mr. Francis Ngojokpa's involvement came up in a hush-hush tone. Accordingly the needle of suspicion for killing Miss Lungnila Elizabeth was pointed towards the Kuki insurgents. As a customary drill, the CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation) was roped in to investigate the crime, found out the culprit and punish the perpetrators as per the law of the land. Miss Lungnila Elizabeth is not going to come back. The case is now in the dustbin of sub-ethnic conflict and clashes, where the outcome, if at all, will be buried as history of violation of Human Rights.

MANIPUR INSURGENCY
CRIME AGAINST CHILDREN
MISS LUNGNILA Elizabeth
4 NOVEMBER 2003
MANIPUR

The World Conference on Human Rights is deeply concerned about violations of Human rights during armed conflicts, affecting civilian population, specially women, children, the elderly and the disabled. The conference, therefore, calls upon states and all parties to armed conflicts to observe strictly international humanitarian law, as set-forth in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other rules and principles of international law, as well as minimum standards of protection of human rights, as laid down in international conventions. In many occasions, villagers in Manipur are caught between the ding-dong battle between the security forces and the insurgents. In April, 2004, Indian Armed Forces carried out counter-insurgency operation in Sajik Tampak, 75 kilometers to the South West of Imphal, considered as 'Liberated Zone' of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the most powerful insurgent group in the general area. The Army has done their job, breaking the spine of the insurgents and chasing them across the Indo-Myanmar International border. But more than 1000 villagers had to flee their home to avoid the cross fire between the security forces, led by 44 Mountain Brigade, a crack, battle-hardened Brigade of 57 Mountain Division and the insurgents. The affected area of Chandel district, under the administrative control of the Deputy Commissioner of Chandel, Mr AK Sinha established relief camps and issued relief materials including

MANIPUR INSURGENCY
DEBRIS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
SAJIK TAMPK COUNTER-INSURGENCY
MILITARY OPERATION : MANIPUR
APRIL-DECEMBER, 2004

blankets, mosquito nets, foodstuffs, kerosene and edible oils. But a large number of villagers became refugees in their own areas facing shortage of daily necessary minimum items including life saving drugs and medicines. All schools and Government building were converted to Army barracks and ammunition dumps. The movement of villagers from one place to another was severely restricted in the name of counter-insurgency operations against the Manipuri Meitei insurgent outfits.

Insurgent outfits in Manipur and the North Eastern region of India committed Human Rights violations against the civil populace in many occasions, which could not be condoned in the name of revolutions, sovereignty, independence and freedom movement. On 16 August 2006, a bomb blast occurred at the ISKON Temple, situated on the Airport road at Imphal, Manipur, during Ras Lila performance on Janmashtami day. On that faithful day, an unidentified assailant hurled a Chinese-made hand grenade to the huge crowd and devotees which thronged the Temple. Six people, including a girl and two children were killed and 50 others wounded. Iskon leader Bhaktisvarupa Damodara Maharaja also sustained splinter injuries to his hands and ears and flown to Calcutta's Apollo Hospital for further treatment. On 02 October, 2006 he succumbed to his injuries. Doctors said his death was due to cardiac arrest. Fingers pointed to many insurgent outfit, who had got proximity and accessibility on the Burmese soil for their hit and run tactics. Bhaktisvarupa Damodara Maharaja was born in 1937, in Toubul, Bishenpur district, Manipur; trained as an engineer in India and USA, joined the ISKON movement; became a renowned leader in spreading the messages of Hinduism. Some people in Manipur, particularly insurgents in the region felt that the spread of ISKON movement in the tiny state has affected in building up of a broad-based Manipuri Nationalism based on Manipuri culture, tradition, religion and social life.

RAPE AND MOLESTATION

World legal literatures are full of rape and molestation cases which destroyed psychologically the individual and the societal consciences. The messages from various Honourable Courts are very clear, bold and loud: Rapists deserve no sympathy. Rape and molestation are serious subject-matter which concerned with human dignity and individual rights. Killing and murder after rape and molestation are the highest degree of Human Right violation. 'Rape is a crime more serious than murder as it destroys the very soul of the helpless female' (Sri A. S. Anand; former Chief Justice of India and Chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission, India). 'When a woman is raped, what is inflicted is not more physical injury but a deep sense of some deadless sense' (Justice Krishna Iyer, India).

On 11 May, 1997, troops of the 2 Mahar Regiment, which was under the command of 57 Mountain Division were carrying counter-insurgency operation at Takyel area, 10 kilometers away to the west of Imphal, capital of Manipur. During the military operation, two Army Jawans raped a middle aged woman, named Srimati Ahanjaobi Devi, who stayed in a small thatched-roof house with her husband and one handicapped child. The two Army personnel were tried by the Army authority under the Army Act and Rules, court martialled and sentence to 10 years Rigorous Imprisonment (RI). But the question

Rape and Molestation.
MANIPUR INSURGENCY
RAPE, RAPE AND RAPE
MS AHANJAObI DEVI
RAPE INCIDENCE
IMPHAL WEST,
MANIPUR, INDIA
11 MAY 1997

by the society and social intelligentsia are about the trauma, loss of dignity, loss of womanhood, silent societal castigation to the victim and her family. A simple mere punishment of 10 years RI to the offenders (the accused) cannot give much solace to the victim's family. Money, compensation and a simple prison terms cannot compensate the honour of the woman. The Government has to take effective measures to guarantee legal protection against the right violations of such nature in accordance with human rights norms and international law.

CUSTODIAL VIOLENCES

The UN Convention against Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (UNCAT) came into force on 26 Jun 1987. As per Article 1 of UNCAT, torture is defined as "Any act by which severe pain or suffering whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person with a view to obtain information or a confession". Article 2 (2) stipulated that "No exceptional circumstances, whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture". Torture invokes not only physical suffering but also mental agony. Custodial torture is a naked violation of human dignity and destruction of human personality. Custodial death is one of the worst crimes in civilized society. The Honourable Supreme Court of India has laid down guidelines in this respect and also observed that custodial violence, torture, rape, death in police custody and lock-up infringes Article 21 of the Constitution of India as well as basic Human Rights. In 1997, the Honourable Court observed that custodial violence strike a blow to the rule of law (*Sri D. K. Basu Vs State of West Bengal*, 1 SCC 416; 1997). From legal angle, even the practice of deprivation to sleep to suspected insurgents, militants and terrorists falls into the orbit of torture and inhuman treatment (European Commission of Human Rights, 1976). In 2003-2007, a number of Rights groups focused their attention to the treatment meted out by US troops to those detainees in the Guantanamo Bay and the Abu Ghraib prison (Iraq) and termed them as inhuman, brutal, violates Human Rights and unacceptable in international law.

In 1994, 17 Rajputana Rifles, (57 Mountain Division), carried out counter-insurgency operation in Yairipok area, Imphal East, Manipur. During the military operation, it was alleged that one young boy, named Yumlembam Sanamacha Singh, resident of Keirao, Yairipok, Imphal East, who was studying in a school, was picked up, interrogated and tortured by the troops of 17 Rajputana Rifles. The people from village Keirao approached the Army authorities in Manipur (India) to release the boy. But he was not released. Finally, the family of the victim approached the Honourable Guwahati High Court, Imphal Bench, Manipur. However, the Army authority flatly refused the charges that they ever arrested Shri Y Sanamacha Singh. The case attracted the attention of International Human Rights Organisations. UN Declaration on Human Rights has reaffirms to protect all persons from Enforced Disappearance and calls upon all states to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent, terminate and punish acts of such disappearances. They also calls upon the states make investigation of such case and, if allegations re-confirmed, to prosecute its perpetrators. As on today, the parents of the individual is facing a silent suffering, hoping that one day their son will come back.

In conflict environment in the North eastern of India, the state or the Central Government should not paint the insurgents and the misguided Anti-social elements as 'Enemy' and the security forces

should avoid the application of rule-book of 'war' against them. They have to be considered as the citizen of this country and the rules of law of the land have to take care to their misadventures and forays into the jungle of insurgency movement. In August, 1996, troops of 18 Rastriya Rifles Battalion, operating in Senapati and Tamenglong districts, Manipur, apprehended a self-styled 2/Lt T. Graceson, an insurgent cadre of the NSCN-IM from a hotel in Senapati Bazar, Manipur. As per contentions of

the security forces, he was taken to a place to identify the location of hideouts of other insurgents. During the operations, he tried to run away to escape from the clutches of troops. In the bargain, he was shot dead. However, the wife of the deceased, totally refused to accept the allegations made by the security forces against her husband. She contended that her husband was simple pastor working for the religious welfare of the people. She filed a writ petition in the Honourable Guwahati High Court, Imphal Bench, Manipur against the Union of India and others for the killing of her husband by the Indian security forces. On 23 May, 2006, the Honourable Court directed the Union of India and others to pay a compensation of Rs. 5.00 Lakhs to the petitioner (CR No 142/1997; Smt Vipila Vs Union of India and others; Guwahati High Court, Imphal Bench, Manipur).

In a conflict situation and environment like Manipur, the dividing line between the war on insurgency and militancy and the rule of Law has become very thin. On 24 September, 1998, at Kadamtala, Jiribam sub-division, Manipur, 210 kilometers to the west of Imphal and 45 kilometers to the east of Silchar, troops of 317 Field Regiment (Artillery) of the Indian Army, carried out counter-insurgency operation in the general area. While doing so, they arrested one person, named Mr Churchill Singh,

son of Sri Nabachandra Singh alongwith some other persons. The family members and the people in the general area approach the Army authority to release Mr. Churchill Singh who was innocent. However, he was not released. Later on, the mother of the individual filed a writ petition to the Honourable Guwahati High Court, Imphal Bench, Manipur for the release of her son from the custody of the Army authority. The Army authority refused to accept the allegations that they arrested Mr. Churchill Singh at all. On 08 June, 2006, the Honourable Guwahati High Court, Imphal Bench, Manipur directed the Union of India and the security forces to pay a compensation of an amount of Rs. 3.00 Lakhs to the petitioner to meet end of justice (Civil Rule 32 of 1998; Srimati Khundrakpam Ongbi Ibetombi Devi Vs Union of India and others; Guwahati High Court, Imphal Bench, Manipur).

In counter-insurgency operations, cases of kidnap by the security forces, interrogation, torture and finally 'finished off' the individual is very common, not only in Manipur but also in other parts of the South East Asia. However, such cases, in legal jurisprudence of International law attracted

MANIPUR INSURGENCY

Enforced Disappearance

- * Name : Y. Sanamacha Singh
- * Residence : Keirao, Imphal East, Manipur
- * Date of Occurrence : 1994
- * Status : Student

MANIPUR INSURGENCY

Custodial Death

- * Name : Self-styled 2/LT. T. Graceon
- * Residence : Senapati District, Manipur
- * Date of Occurrence : August 1996
- * Status : Member of NSCN (IM)

serious Rights violations which could not be condoned by concocted legal arguments, improvised, indigenous legal evidences not in conformity with the international law and legal Jurisprudences. Sometimes, the claims of the victim/victims and the counter-claims of the security forces became very contradictory and the evidences produced by the defendant became inadmissible. Thus it became necessary for the intervention of a third party/ Agency which could investigate the same in a transparent manner

so that the perpetrator/perpetrators do not have the courage and liberty to repeat the same. On 25 July, 1999, it was alleged that one Mohammad Tayeb Ali of Thoubal district, Manipur, was kidnapped by troops of 17 Assam Rifles located inside the Kangla, in Imphal, Manipur. As per reports of the family members and the locals, the troops came in civil dresses, took the individual in the military garrison (The Kangla) on that fateful day. Repeated request and inquiry about the whereabouts of the individual was not answered by the military authority (Assam Rifles). After a few months, the dead body of Mohammad Tayeb Ali was handed over to the police by the security forces. A case was filed by the wife of the deceased in the Honourable Guwahati High Court, Imphal Bench, Manipur. The court has given direction that 'it is a fit case to be handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for further investigation. [Writ petition (civil) Number 5/2005; FIDAM (Families of the Involuntary Disappeared Association, Manipur and others Vs Union of India and others: Guwahati High Court, Imphal Bench, Manipur]. The security forces (Assam Rifles) either, should deny the charges leveled by the family of the deceased or accept the procedural mistakes, and take necessary action for end of justice. They should not behave like a hybrid of the mule and the donkey.

MANIPUR INSURGENCY
ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCE
 NOT TREACEABLE
 MR CHURCHILL SINGH
 MANIPUR, 24 SEP 1998

Torture and cruel act, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary and arbitrary executions, and disappearances are considered as serious obstacles to the full enjoyment of all human rights. The case of the custodial death of Miss Thangjam Monorama Devi in the hands of security forces in Manipur is a classic example of Right violations in the history of Human Rights movement in the world. In July 2004, Miss Thangjam Manorama Devi was arrested

MANIPUR INSURGENCY

Custodial Death

- * Name : Md Tayeb Ali
- * Residence : Thoubal District, Manipur
- * Date of Occurrence : 25 July 1999
- * Status : Innocent Citizen (Unless proved otherwise)

by troops of 17 Assam Rifles from Bamon Kampu village 12 kilometer to the south-east of Imphal, during night time. She was interrogated, tortured and shot dead by troops of 17 Assam Rifles. Her dead body with the damage part of her vagina was handed over to the state police officials of Manipur. The security forces (Assam Rifles) claimed that she was a member of an outlawed insurgent outfit, arrested on some specific information from her house, taken to an area to identify insurgent's hideouts; tried to run away; and in doing so was shot dead. The general public in Manipur rose against the 'concocted stories' and custodial death of Miss Thangjam Manorama Devi and the state came to a grinding halt. The entire general public, particularly in Manipur and generally in North eastern region of India refused to accept the statements of the security forces and termed it as concocted and

fabricated. They alleged that Miss Thangjam Manorama Devi was arrested from her house at Bamon Kampu at night and the security forces issued Arrest Memo on that effect. She was taken forcibly by them on that fateful day. The villagers approached the Army official of 17 Assam Rifles and higher Headquarters of the Army to release the individual as she was innocent. On the next day, her family was informed by the state police officers to collect the dead body of Miss Manorama Devi, which was handed over by the troops of 17 Assam Rifles. The family members,

claimed that she was raped before she was shot dead and her vagina was mutilated so that the evidence of rape could be destroyed. The state Government of Manipur orders a Judicial Inquiry Commission known as Upendra Commission, under Justice C Upendra Singh (Retired). Justice C Upendra Singh submitted his report to the State Government of Manipur. The case is now sub-judice.

On 20 February 2006, four Manipur Police Commandos were ambushed and killed by PLA insurgents at Thoubal Bazar, 25 kilometers south of Imphal, capital of Manipur. One of the PLA cadre died in the ensuing gun-battle. The loss of personnel of the police commando team included one police Inspector, Mr. Lokhon Singh, known as Commando Lokhon, a popular person among the commando groups, a dare-devil, and loosely controlled by higher-up. The death of commando Lokhon nosedived the image of the Manipur police commando but celebrated by the insurgents as a 'Victory Day'. That infuriated the entire police forces in Manipur, ready to pounced back on any suspect for rightful revenge. Later on, Ms Naobi Chanu, a young girl, was arrested by the Thoubal police on the charge of having close relationships with the dead PLA cadre involved in the ambush. It was alleged that she was subjected to extra physical and mental torture for 10 days including sexual harassments and rape. The state Government of Manipur ordered a commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances, under Justice Rajkhowa. Justice Rajkhowa Inquiry Commission Report was submitted to the state Government of Manipur, but the same has not yet been published. Notwithstanding with the outcome of report of the Inquiry Commission, facts remained that Ms Naobi Chanu lost dignity of womanhood due to conflict situation in Manipur.

The world has seen many inhuman acts leading to gruesome killing or summary execution, crossing the boundary of International conventions, Rules, Acts and Laws. In many occasions, the perpetrators were caught after a long innings, tried and punished within the parameters of the rule of law: (Nazi war crimes; trial of Khmer Ruch Insurgents; Al Qaeda in Gaultanamo Bay; Saddam Hussain?). In February, 2009, people in Manipur, rather in North East India, saw one of the most inhuman and degrading act of summary execution of Government officials (Manipur Sate) by one

MANIPUR INSURGENCY

Custodial Death

- * Name : Miss Thangjam Monorama Devi
- * Residence : Bamon Kampu Village, Keirao, Imphal East- 795001, Manipur (India)
- * Date of Occurrence : July 2004
- * Status : Suspected insurgent cadre

Debris of Conflict.

MANIPUR INSURGENCY VICTIM OF ARMED CONFLICT

Ms NAOBI CHANU
THOUBAL MANIPUR
20 FEBRUARY 2007

Naga insurgent outfit, the NSCN(IM), who was having ceasefire agreement with the Government of India as well as Nagaland State. On 13 February, 2009, Dr. Thingnam Kishan Singh, Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), Kasom Khullen, Ukhrul District, Manipur; Y. Token Singh; A. Rajen Sharma (all Manipuri Meiteis) and three other Tangkhul government servants were abducted from the gate of the office of the Deputy Commissioner (DC), Ukhrul district, during day-light. The three government officials (Manipuri Meiteis) were taken near Taphou Kuki village, astride NH-39, in Senapati district via Siroy village, Tuinem, Tora and then to Kangpokpi. After three days their mutilated bodies were recovered from general area Taphou Kuki village. The NSCN (IM) declared that their cadres killed those three Manipuri government officials. However, to give ethnic colour and tensions, the other three Tangkhul government officials were not touched and reported to be 'rescued' by the security forces. The Kuki tribal became angry with the NSCN (IM) for their grand design to create ethnic crisis and clashes between the Manipuri Meiteis and the Kukis by dumping the dead bodies in Kuki dominated area, that is, Taphou Kuki village. The act of commission and omission of the NSCN(IM) against the unarmed civil government officials of Manipur cannot be condoned by any ethnic argument; religious cannons; and projecting themselves as the 'saviour of the Naga people', an archaic philosophy not tenable under the legal lexicon of the country. The NSCN(IM) committed one of the highest degree of Human Rights violation. They converted their ceasefire agreement with the Government of India into a license for brutalism, torture, killing, and arbitrary execution of innocent people in Manipur.

On 30 Sep 2007, column of troops of 21 Assam Rifles was ambushed by the valley-based Manipur insurgents at Umathel village in Kakching Khunou, Thoubal district, approximate 45 kilometers to the south of Manipur. Two personnel of the security forces lost their lives in the incidence. As a follow-up action, the security forces carried out counter-insurgency operations to arrest those perpetrators. During the follow-up action, it was reported that, the troops went on rampage in the villages, beating, kicking, abusing and molesting large number of the villagers in the most inhuman manner. "We will shoot you in your private part. Come out all the women. We will rape you", shouted a Manipuri speaking jawan (troop) of 21 Assam Rifles (Ms Ibechoubi Devi, Secretary, Meira Paibis, Umathel; *The Sangai Express*; 02 November, 2007). On 07 January, 1995, some personnel of the Central Reserve Police (CRPF) who were near the gate of the Regional Institute of Medical Science (RIMS), Imphal, Manipur, were suddenly fired upon by underground personnel. In that, one person of the CRPF succumbed to bullet injury. The area was crowded with civilian patients, Autorichshaw drivers, Doctors, Medical college students, and other people who came for Medical treatment. In panic, anger and revengeful manner, the CRPF personnel opened fire in a wanton manner, inside

Manipur Imbroglio

Heinous Crime against Human beings by Naga Insurgent Outfit, the NSCN(IM), February 2009

1. Name of victims : * Dr. Thingnam Kishan Singh, SDO
Kasom Khullen,
Ukhrul, Manipur
* Y. Token Singh
* A. Rajen Sharma
2. Place of incidence : Ukhrul district &
Senapati district
3. Date of incidence : 13-17 February, 2009
4. Status : Bludgeoned to death by
cadres of NSCN(IM)

the campus of the college and 9 civilian including one graduate medical student lost their lives in the carnage. It was a serious act of rights violations by the central police force against the innocent people of Manipur.

POST MORTEM

Many glittering and full-proofed crimes of Right violations are facing by the general public in Manipur due to conflict situation in the state. The blame cannot be pointed towards one stakeholder only: the state government; the insurgents; the Armed Forces; or the general public. The Armed forces claimed that SS 2/Lt T Graceson of NSCN-IM was killed by them while he was trying to run away from their custody. Miss Thangjam Manorama Devi was arrested, tortured and molested (suspected rape!) and finally suffered custodial death. It was a clear-cut summary and arbitrary execution of cruel act committed by the security forces of India which completely negated the tenets of full enjoyment of all human rights. The security forces claimed that she was shot dead while trying to run away from their custody. It is all rubbish!! The Manipur police claimed that Ms Naobi Chanu, maintained intimate relation with the dead PLA cadre who killed 4 police commandos in Thoubal district Manipur (20 February 2007). So she was sexually harassed, robbed her woman dignity and integrity. Such approaches are not accepted in a democratic society. The police: protector of law and order cannot make a mockery of the society and the democratic foundation of rule of law by sexual harassment of a girl. It does not improve the images of the police force as a whole. Srimati Tongbram Bimola Devi (Salam Konjil Leikai, Thanga, near Moirang, Bishenpur District, Manipur), mother of 4 children, was shot dead by the UNLF cadres on 16 Oct 2007, at Kwakeithel Laishram Leikai, Imphal, Manipur for being an informer of the security forces. One cannot kill anyone and everyone, taking the law into their hands, in the name of revolution. Have anybody analyse why the woman has become an informer, if it was so. In October, 2008, at Kakopathar in Sibsagar district, Assam famous for its explosive outbursts against the Indian Army for its atrocities, turned their fury and anger against the ULFA for killing five Assamese youths, whose decomposed dead bodies and skeletons were found in Kumsang reserve forest. Mr. Jiten Dutta, who belonged to 28 Battalion (Alpha and Charlie Companies) of the ULFA, accepted that the killings were carried out by the cadres of the outfit as 'they were actively involved as spies and were working for the Army and Government-run intelligence agencies'. 'ULFA has got no right to kill the youths even if they were involved in 'spying' (Depanjali Kakoty, General Secretary, Moran Jatiya Mahila parishad, Assam; 21 october 2008). It was a great crime and Right violations that the para-military forces, the Assam Rifles (1 Assam Rifles), forced the Sorbung villagers (Kamjong sub-division, Ukhrul district, Manipur) to cut the undergrowths and bushes on the roadside (Kasung-Phungyar Road) and in doing so a bomb blasted and injured three youths seriously (03 November, 2007). The acts of the Assam Rifles personnel in forcing the villagers to clear a road after an ambush (31 Oct 2007) cannot be justified by any legal means and statement, except alienating the people from the mainstream of the Indian society.

On 17th and 18th March, 2008, migrant workers were killed in Manipur, in a chaotic, mindless and aimless manner in close steps when the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS) led by Mr Raj Thackeray, told the North Indian migrants and workers in Maharashtra to leave the state. At the back of the dead bodies, label were put up like 'Go back to your state', suggesting that it was a bigger

game-plan rather than a simple law and order problem concerning insurgency movement. The security forces, the Intelligence Agencies, the state Government pointed fingers towards the Insurgent outfits for the mayhem against the migrants. A deeper scrutiny put many analysts in a fox-hole. Who actually carried out the heinous crime and what for? The Director General of Police (DGP), Manipur boldly stated that it was the handiwork of the proscribed insurgent outfit, the KYKL, who got no love-lost for migrants swamping the state in gradual steps. But it was alleged in a hush-hush public discussion that the same was the handiwork of the Intelligence and the security Agencies who wanted to neutralize the activities of the various insurgents outfits by secondary methods. Some personnel of the Manipur Rifles, the State Armed Police force, particularly those surrenderees, who joined the forces, were involved in 'collection of taxes' and in several cases they were caught red-handed. In this field, people suspected even the personnel of the Armed forces and the Para-military forces who carried out counter-insurgency operation in vehicles which carried no number plate (Identification), probably to hide their identity. Thus in simple term, the general public could not distinguish between the security forces and the insurgents who terrorized the people of Manipur in a calibrated and systematic manner.

On 24 March, 2008, three youths including two girls identified as Mr. Th. Romesh Singh, Th. Promila Devi and L. Nirmala Devi, died due to gun-shot at Heirok part II, Laikon Maning, Thoubal district, Manipur, 30 Kilometers to the South-East of Imphal. The tragic incident occurred when the proscribed Insurgent outfit, the PREPAK cadres, attempted to overpower one individual during the 'Thabal chongba celebration' related to the Holi festival, where a large number of boys and girls merrily danced together in open ground. The tragedy shocked the entire people of Manipur valley. Later on, the Insurgent outfit, the PREPAK gave a public apology for their mistake. However, the apology could not bring back the loving smile of the parents of those young daffodils. It was a crime against human beings which could not be condoned in the name of revolution or Independent movement.

NOTES

Custodial Death

1. [State of MP vs Shyamsunder Trivedi, 1995, SSC, 262; Judgement reiterated in Abdul Gafar Khan and Munshi Singh Gautam (Supra), Supreme Court of India]

"Rarely in case of police torture or custodial death, direct ocular evidence of the complicity of the police personnel would be available . . . often results in miscarriage of justice and make the justice delivery system a suspect. In the ultimate analysis the society suffers and the criminal get encouraged. Tortures in police custody which of late are on the increase, receive encouragement by this type of the courts because it reinforces the (sic) in the mind of the police that no harm would come to them, if an odd prisoner dies in the lock-up, because there would hardly be any evidence available to the prosecution to directly implicate them with the torture".

2. [D.K. Basu Vs State of West Bengal, 1997, 1 SSC 610; Judgement; Supreme Court of India]

"Para 22. Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes in civilized society governed by the Rules of Law. The rights inherent in Article 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution require

to be jealously and scrupulously protected. If the functionaries of the Government become law breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become law unto himself thereby leading to anarchism. No civilised nation can permit that to happen."

3. Compensation to aggrieved person

[D.K. Basu Vs State of West Bengal, 1997, 1 SSC 416; Judgement; Supreme Court of India]

"Claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and property, the protection of which is guaranteed under the constitution (Constitution of India), is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortuous acts of public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purposes than the private law proceedings. Award compensation for establishment of indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the Fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the state which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen."

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION




Mass nudity protest is the manifestation of the existence of extreme social sensuality in a cause: Forced naked protest by women of Manipur, 2004.

In July 2004, Miss Thangjam Monorama Devi was arrested and killed by troops of 17 Assam Rifles in Imphal East, Manipur (India). It was alleged that she was raped before killing. Women in Manipur rose in revolt in naked form, never seen anywhere in the world. They carried playcards "Indian Army, rape us"



Most Heinous Human Rights violation in South East Asia in 2004.

Arrested, alleged raped and killing of Miss Thangjam Monorama Devi, Bamon Kampu Village, Imphal East, Manipur (India), by troops of 17 Assam Rifles (Para-military force) during counter-insurgency operation in 2004, under the power of Armed Forces(Special Power) Act, 1953, in 2004.




War on Insurgency Movement and terrorism: The naked violations of Human Rights.

On 03 October, 1999, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel opened fire and killed 10 civilians and one insurgent at Tonsem Lamkhai (Tonseng crossing), Bishenpur district, Manipur. The incident happened as a backlashes of an ambush by the Manipur insurgent group, the UNLF, where seven CRPF personnel, including a Deputy Commandant were killed.



Hundreds of people including senior citizens of the state protested against the wanton killings of civilians in panic mode. It was alleged that the CRPF jawans dragged down the poll personnels from the bus, made them run and then fired at them from behind.

The ten innocent people became the debris of conflict situation in North East India which did not deserve them.





Two young children Hriini Hubert (10 years old) and Moheni Hubert of Senapati district, Manipur were abducted on 14 December, 2006. Their dead bodies were recovered on 27 March, 2007, from a gorge from the same district. Manipur Government (Chief Judicial Magistrate, Senapati district, Manipur) issued arrest warrants and directed Dimapur police (Nagaland) to arrest and produce NSCN (IM) leaders K. Chawang and A. Puni in court on or before 14 May, 2007. The two leaders were charged with sheltering murder suspects

(NSCN-IM cadres in Hebron camp, Dimapur). Request from Manipur Government to execute the arrest warrants drew a blank from Nagaland state Government and the Nagaland police. Government of India, State Government of Nagaland and the State Government of Manipur remained as 'silent spectators'. Both the children became the debris of ethnic crisis and clashes.



License for brutality, torture, ethnic division and killing to NSCN-IM by virtue of cease-fire agreement between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM. (The assassin of Dr. Th. Kishan Singh along two other staffs of State Government of Manipur)



Gift of Brutalism (unknown victims)

The gift of brutality offered by the state, the security forces, insurgents, terrorists and the anti-national elements to the people of North East India are of High value. Kidnapping, tortures, maiming, faked encounters and killing are the common scene. There is no limit for the same. The conflict situation has to come to an end.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION: CIVIL POPULACE AND THE ARMED FORCES IN CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT (NORTH-EAST INDIA)

In early 1940's, when comrade Jananeta Hijam Irabot Singh raised the communist red flag and slogan for the first time in Manipur, the simple illiterate village womenfolk thought that the movement was a legitimate fight between the riches and the poor and the have and have-not. They were quite concerned with the pathetic socio-economic environment of the state and joined the movement for equitable land distribution among the masses rather than cracking their heads to understand the meaning of Capitalism, Democracy, Fascism and Communism, which had got no immediate material benefits to them. In 1950's, when Mr AZ Phizo, the legendary leader of Naga insurgency movement, lectured the villagers in the farflung hilltops and remote villagers in Naga Hills (now Nagaland) for 'Naga sovereignty', 'Naga Independence', and 'Naga freedom', the entire crowds, including women and children, listened but remained in pin-drop silence. However, at the end, when he said that land will be distributed to them; agriculture field will be owned by them; ownerships of rivers, streams and forest will be their absolute right; villagers will decide their own faiths etc. all of them spontaneously and simultaneously clapped their hands, jumped up joyfully with a loud sound 'aha!' and break off happily for the village community lunch. Phizo won the day.

Since many decades, research scholars, social scientists, academicians and psychologists have studied the general profile and psychological perception of human beings and the general public in war, warlike situation, revolution, sudden uprising, high intensity insurgency warfare, low intensity Insurgency warfare and guerilla movement. War is as old as human beings, and was in existence in one form or the others. "*Insurgency is the pursuit of the polity of a party inside a country by every means*" (Clausewitz). Many people believed that insurgency is an efforts to obtained political goals by an organized and primarily and indigenous group (groups) using protracted, irregular warfare and allied political techniques. Some analysts opined that insurgency movement is always took the

form of civil war, though there were always differences. It is also believed that insurgency movement is an irregular warfare waged by the depressed and deprived people in a country against its own Government. It has got both political and military meaning.

COUNTER-INSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT

Counter-insurgency operations (CI ops) on the other hand is one form of warfare adopted and launched by country/state against the insurgents, Guerillas, Militants and Anti-social elements (ANEs) generally through the medium of its Armed Forces. To most of the laymen, counter-insurgency operations has got a thick military bearing and meaning rather than the political and administrative actions. Counter-insurgency is not purely a military solution, because insurgency is not primarily a military activity. At the same time, there is no such element which could be termed wholly as a political solution. A state of insurgency movement existed implied that violence was involved and the same has to be countered by legal means.

Insurgency movement and the counter-insurgency operations (CI ops) are synonym to each other. They are the two faces of the same coin. Counter-insurgency environment is the general social phenomena produced by the counter-insurgent forces/elements to subdue or neutralise the insurgents. A number of countries are now facing this environment due to the emergence of insurgency, Guerilla movement, terrorism, Fundamentalism, Fanaticism, Ethnic crisis and clashes. Russia is having problem in Chechnya; Palestinians in Middle East; Indonesians in Aceh region; Philippines in Mindanao Island; Pakistan in North West Frontier Province (NWFP); American, British, Afghan soldiers in Afghanistan; Sri Lankan in Northern Sri Lanka; Iraqis in Iraq. India is facing the same problem in Jammu and Kashmir and the North Eastern region of India.

Countries, region and the states affected by counter-insurgency and counter-militancy operations presented a scenario of uneven social life; subdued political movement; violations of Human Rights; broken legal infrastructures and shattered socio-economic movement. The worst affected societal spectrum is the younger lots which will form the pillars of the future generation. The more the spectrum is stretched and become larger, the end result will always be awful and catastrophic. It will destroy an entire generation in term of education, socio-economic development, political movement, and socio-cultural life. Countries like Vietnam, Somalia, Rwanda, Burma, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Sri Lanka etc. who involved in Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism are paying a heavy price for the same. The psychological trauma faced by the young children in the region will have a serious societal repercussion in the near future. Western countries, including USA, Britain, France, Germany and other cannot be an exception and they also will face the dangerous fall-out of war on terrorism and insurgency in an unprecedented manner.

MANIPUR

Insurgency movement in the North Eastern region of India did not develop overnight. It came up into the region in a gradual and phased manner since 1947-50. The various progression consists of the Manipur Revolutionary movement (1940-1952); the Naga insurgency movement (1950's and onwards); the Mizo insurgency movement (1960-19080's); the Manipuri insurgency movement (1950's and onwards); the Assam insurgency movement (1960's and onwards) etc. By 1990's, the Garos,

the Khasis, the Boros, the Kukis, the Dimasas joined the mad race of insurgency movement with different voices, tune and colour but with the same political card: sovereignty, Independence, and self-determination. People in Manipur found themselves that they are caught in between the two conflicting giants: the insurgent and security forces. By 1994-95, the security forces notched limited successes. By 1997-98, a ray of hope was seen when the NSCM-IM signed a ceasefire in Nagaland with the Government of India. But the Manipur insurgent outfits hardened their stand; Kuki uphold Sadar Hill issue, the Army and the State Government (separately) offered Manipur rebels with Holi Truce (February 2001) and New Delhi tested Kashmir Truce model to North East India (March-April 2001). In January 2003, the Manipur raised their voices against the wishful thinking of New Delhi, if possible to split the state to accommodate 'Greater Nagaland concept'. "Separation from India if Manipur is broken up" rent the air as torch-bearing demonstrators rallied at Imphal on the issue of the state's integrity (16 Jan 2003). The NSCN-IM leaders made their desire to bring all Naga tribes living in the adjoining states of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh under a single administrative unit with Nagaland. In the meantime the Naga peace talk skidded and recovered several times. Chief Minister of Mizoram, Mr. C Zoramthanga's political adventure (misadventure?) for the formation of a boundary commission for States of North East India so that Mizo inhabited areas of Manipur could be merged with Mizoram, was flayed by AMUCO (All Manipur United Clubs Organisation). "*Manipur was not formed by either the MNF or the Government of India. It is historically-evolved land*" (29 January 2003, *the Telegraph, Kolkata*). *The entire Manipur populace, without exception, demanded the lifting of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958, which was described as a "Draconian Law", from the State of Manipur.* The emergence of new Insurgent outfits, based on ethnic and religious configurations complicated the counter-insurgency operations in the State and adjoining areas. By 2004-05, the intra-fratricidal clashes among the insurgent outfits erupted: KNA and the KLA says they are against Greater Nagalim; UNLF asserted that Nagalim is an illusion; plebiscite proposal laid by the UNLF; war cries between the NSCN-IM the NSCN-K broke out; and the question of fake encounter raised its head in the entire State. The Armed Forces show their anguish when Disturbed Area Act was annulled from 7 constituencies in Greater Imphal area by the Congress-I led SPF (Secular Progressive Front) State Government.

During all these imbroglio, civil populace suffered without the knowledge of the outside world in terms of their fundamental freedoms; political, social and cultural systems; gross violations of Human rights; threatening Territorial Integrity; Ethnic cleansing agenda by Naga insurgent outfit; rape of women in warlike situations etc. In 2004, in Manipur, 50 civilians lost their lives due to insurgency related incidents. In 2005, out of the 331 death, 138 were civilians, which was quite high by any standard. By January 2006, the crossfire between the UNLF and the HPC (D) started with lot of charges and counter-charges which entirely affected south Manipur. The security forces claimed that Manipuri insurgents has been cleared from six districts of Manipur under "Operation Dragnet". In the meantime, Chief Minister of Manipur claimed in the State assembly that 377 militants which belongs to 18 insurgent outfits had surrendered to the Government since 1990 (19 Sep 2006, *The Telegraph*). The suspension of operation and firing (ceasefire) between the Army and the 8 Kuki insurgent outfits (later on 10) which came into force from 01 Aug 2005, became a political playcard for the Kuki and the Zomi community, a non-Naga group in the State of Manipur. New Delhi pressurized

Manipur to implement the suspension of operation, which was already in operation with the Indian Army, with the Kuki insurgent outfits with an accepted text of ceasefire ground rules.

PSYCHO-WINDOW OF CIVIL POPULACE

"Over 700 villagers of Sajik Tampak in Manipur's Chandel district have fled their home fearing gun battles between the Army troops and the militants. Moiphei village which is a good three kilometers away from Sajik Tampak, which has got 46 households have been bombarded with 3 inch Mortars. Rocket Launchers and bombs in the gun battle between the security forces and the militants and the area of the village has been turned into a barren land". (27 Apr 2004, *The Sangai Express*, Manipur). "A Defence release, today, stated that the basic rule of engagement of the Army in Counter-insurgency operation was the 'use of minimum force' and denied reports of use of Artillery guns and helicopters gunships in the operations (Sajik Tampak Operation) (09 May 2004, *op cit.*).

The general feeling of the masses in Manipur and adjoining areas on the ongoing counter-insurgency warfare in the region during the period 1980-2007 are:

- Total disruption of Law and Order machinery.
- Military Martial Law environment.
- Retardation of active political movement.
- Ascendancy of politico-ethnic insurgency movement.
- Politico-strategic interest of foreign countries.
- Violation of Human Rights.
- Feeling of separatism and alienation.

SENSE OF INSECURITY

In North-east India, the general public has got a lurking fear for the dark shadow of the insurgents, within the age bracket of 15 to 50 years, with an AK-47 Rifle or M-16 Rifle and with beautifully typed Demand letters in their hand. The senses of insecurity are more compounded for those innocent and simple villagers living in the far-flung areas away from the cities and towns. On the other hand, the security forces, with their fingers on the trigger, ready to shoot at sight, presented a frightening scene equal with the same degree of sense of insecurity as those of insurgents. The civil populace is very clear that the Armed forces are not going to give security measures to them in continuum. Once the Army leave, the insurgents will fill-up the gap. The writing on the wall is very clear: you cannot believe the insurgents and at the same time you cannot depend on the Security Forces.

FEAR PSYCHOSIS

In insurgency and counter-insurgency environment, the general public cannot make the insurgents their bed-fellow, because they do not follow rule of law of the land. They have got a perennial fear of those anti-national elements. The insurgents believed in the communist doctrine of revolution, propounded by Mao-Tse-Tung that "power flows from the barrel of a gun", which was adopted by Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Pol Pot of Cambodia, President Idi Admin, Saddam Hussein, Gulbuddin

Hekmatier, Taliban insurgents; Al Qaeda and many Muslim Fundamentalist groups. But why the general public in Manipur and North Eastern region of India are also having a perennial fear psychosis of the Armed Forces of India!! The people in the region feel that Indian security forces did not consider them as the citizen of India, brothers and sisters of the same family, whom they will think 101 times before they molest, rape and kill them. Women and children are very much afraid of the body language of the troops, brute behaviours, unfriendly approaches, beating and torturing of arrested persons in front of public, extra judicial killing thereby enacting the scene of the genocide of the Manipur Meiteis by the invading Burmese Army during 1819-1825. In short, the people believe New Delhi and its security agencies did not believe the short-statured, flattened noses, small-eyed Mongoloid people of the region. So the fear psychosis hangs on till date.

APPROACHABILITY/ACCESSIBILITY

During early 1960's, it was just like a dream, if the simple Vietnamese could have accessibility to the American bureaucrats and the Armed forces operating on the Vietnamese soil and expressed their untold miseries. Similar politico-military scene re-run in Afghanistan and Iraq. When the American troops closed their doors, the insurgents and the militants opened their one to the general public. In North East India, newspaper column were filled with request, prayers and appeals from the simple and poor citizen to various insurgent outfits to redress their grievances and problems which had failed to do so by the civil administrations and the security forces. The general public find the security forces too stiff and too arrogant for approach and accessibility. The common excuse from the security forces is to raise the playcards of security and security problem, a mindset which has become as obsolete as a .303 Rifle of 1940's vintage.

RESTRICTIONS AND CONTROLS

In a democratic society, citizen enjoyed various fundamental rights. The same rights are also applicable to members of various insurgent outfits. Any act of restriction, curtailment, debarment, control and annulment of such rights led to serious reaction from the general public. New Delhi has promulgated some legal measures to control the insurgency movement in the North eastern region of India, which the people classified as Draconian; selective in nature; violate Human Rights; unlawful in nature etc. Some of them are:

- Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 and its misuses thereto.
- Imposition of curfew and application of 144 Act of CrPC in repeated mode.
- Prolonged detention and Identification parade.
- Cordon and search operation in continuum mode.
- Restriction on Media/Freedom of Expression not in conformity with the purposes and principles of international law.

ALIEN FORCES

One of the primary aim and objective of the insurgents and the militants is to pin-down the security forces by projecting them as the wrong horse for the general public. 'Alien Forces', 'Foreign

invaders', 'Reactionary forces', 'Foreign occupiers' and 'Occupational Forces', are some name-tag coined by the insurgents for Indian Armed forces operating in North-east India. Members of Armed forces are shown as the dirty agents of New Delhi, inducted into the region to complete their mission, with no love-lost for the inhabitants of the region. The public gradually believed the propaganda of the insurgents and drifted towards them from the neutral zone.

LAW AND ORDER MACHINERY

A successful counter-insurgency warfare requires a strong and credible Government, police, para-military and Armed forces; strong legal infrastructures, and vibrant political parties and politicians. Counter-insurgency and militancy in Afghanistan, Iraq, Burma, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka etc. are slipping away from the hands of counter-insurgency forces due to the absence of credible ingredients to tackle the same. In North East India, the general public believed that most of the state's administration are controlled on dual system by the state and the insurgent outfits. They feel that the police forces are weak and strong political-insurgent-Police nexus existed in all the states in the region.

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

In July 1989, during the Tien-A-Mien square incident, the western countries termed the firing by the Chinese troops against the unarmed Chinese demonstrators, as one of the extreme act of violation of Human Rights. In 1988, in Rangoon (Yangon) and the other places in Burma (Myanmar) the Burmese Military Junta (Burma Socialist Programme Party) crack down on the member of pro-democracy movement led Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, with terrible human tragedy. Since 1960's, the conflict situation in North-east India had created a surmountable human tragedy in the general area. The unfortunate and unlucky sufferers are the people of Manipur who cry in vain for justice. A large number of innocent citizens have lost their lives to the bullets of the Armed forces. Murder, killing, rape, extra-judicial killing, custodial death etc. formed highest degree of atrocities against the civil populace. Fake encounters are very common and they are repeatedly used to terrorise the civil populace so that they were drifted away from the influences of insurgents and terrorists. The cases of enforced disappearances and the extra judicial killings have changed the psychological perception of the masses from cooperation and positive attitude towards the Government and the security forces to a non-cooperation, negative attitude and non-committed one. Miss Sharmila Devi, the Iron lady of North East India is still fasting for the last 8 years, a National shame of Indian politics. She is demanding the repeal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, which is described as 'draconian', and gives tremendous legal powers to troops, including shoot to kill, from the soil of Manipur. Indian politics has forced Miss Sharmila Devi to take the extreme steps of fasting till the Act is removed from Manipur.

ENFORCED ALIENATIONS

The National interest and attentions of New Delhi and the Armed forces of India are focused mainly on the Indian mainland rather than the fringe areas like the North Eastern region of India. Their mindset are closer towards the gangetic Brahmanical lexicon, Dravidian cultures, martial races and martial traditions of the alluvial Brahmaputra, the Barak and Imphal valley never attracted their eyes and ears. Indian mainland never tries to bring the North Easterners into their group except giving some lip services and sermons from New Delhi.

SECURITY FORCES: PSYCHO ANALYSIS

In early 1960s, New Delhi dispatched its Armed forces into the North eastern region of India, particularly to Naga Hills (a district of Assam), now Nagaland, to annihilate or captured by any means, those insurgents operating against India. Thousands of troops roamed around the entire inhospitable jungle and hilly terrain, trying to catch those ubiquitous insurgents and guerillas. By 1980, more than 70,000-80,000 troops consisting of

"War is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter, as is the case with the mechanical arts or at matters which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the case with the human mind and emotions in the fine arts. In war, the will is directed to an animate object that reacts."
(Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 19th Century)

Police, Para-Military and the Armed Forces, pitted against the Naga, Mizo, Manipuri, Assamese and Tripuri insurgent outfits. By 2005-06, the number of security forces available for counter-insurgency and counter-militancy reached almost 1,20,000 fighting against more than 30 insurgent outfits operating in the seven states of the region. The complex nature of insurgency, Guerillas, terrorists and Fundamentalist movement gave the soldiers the taste of disillusion, bitter memory, stress and strains, fatigue, and anguish. The incessant pressure of the counter-insurgency warfare affected normal life style of troops, even taking the extreme steps of committing suicide.

Members of the Armed forces of India operating in the sensitive areas of Manipur and adjoining areas for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, are facing tremendous psychological problem due to complex nature of ethnic and sub-ethnic insurgent outfits; multiple societal culture; religious complexities; community and ethnic ethos vs National ethos; clashes of community vs sub-communities; and lack of clarity of aim and objective at higher level. Sometimes questions arise, if the people of India or the Armed forces are serious enough about fighting insurgency and terrorism in the region!! If the answer is yes, then why the troops are still groping and murking around among the civil populace with half-naked policy programme. Is there any deficiency in the National policy to tackle the problem of the region!! Such type of complex questions and answers affected the spirit of troops on the ground who are fighting an unseen adversary all around.

CHANGE OF ENVIRONMENT

In early 1940's, when the British and the American troop inducted into the jungle of 'Far East Asia' (South East Asia), initially they became a redundant fighting force as good as scare-crows. The sudden change of environment contributed 70%-80% to the impotency in their fighting capability. The same scenario repeated in Vietnam (1964-68) and Afganistan (2001-2003) to the American troops. Geographical contours, flora and fauna, and sudden change of environment play a great role in the performance rating of soldiers particularly in high intensity conflict zone. They played an important role in the behaviour of personnel of the Defence forces particularly in High altitude area and counter-insurgency environment. Soldiers take time to settle down in a new environment with different work culture, new faces and new role. Counter-insurgency environment, in turn, affected morale of troops as the same is involved with many ingredients: Flora and fauna, climate changes, inhabitants, social culture, language, proximity to civil populace. Some troops can adjust to the change environment quickly and some others take more time.

PSYCHOLOGICAL MINDSET

In an insurgency warfare, the insurgents always maintained the advantage of initiative and the chances of shooting with the first bullet. Troops suffered with the syndrome of 'unseen enemy all around; where they cannot identify friend or foe. They cannot resort to speculative fire and forget the consequences like in a conventional war. Soldiers, particularly when they are lonely, feels the fear of the unknown and the darkness, which is human psychological factor. Sometimes, they opened fire to control fear psychosis. Such type of psychological behaviour are very common in Manipur and adjoining areas. American troops never believed the Viet Cong; they do not believe the Afghanis and the Iraqis fanatics; the Burmese troops do not believe the Kachins, the Karens, the Arakanese; the Sri Lankans troops do not believe the Tamil insurgents in the North. Indian troops do not believe the North easterners in their counter-insurgency operations in the region.

STRESS AND STRAIN

Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations drain out the capabilities and effectiveness of troops after prolonged deployment. Unless properly looked into, it further led to mental retardation and fatigue. When the human aspects is not taken care, incidents like suicides, soldier-killing-soldier, soldier-killing officer (fragging), running amok, etc. occurred at regular intervals. There are lot of pressure on troops deployed for counter-insurgency warfare which required psychological counseling to reduce the stress level. "Till the human aspect is taken care of, all attempts at modernization of the forces, providing better pay and allowances, training and discipline will not be able to achieve the desired result" (A.K. Antony, Defence Minister, India; 16 Apr 2007, *The Telegraph*, Kolkata).

ETHNIC FACTORS

The Armed forces of India can be comfortably identified as a multi-ethnic organisation with personnel of diverse culture, tradition, religion, social and racial background. There are differences in the basic traits and behaviour pattern of troops hailing from South India, plains of Punjab, Central India, Eastern Coastal areas; the Gurkhas, the Kumaoni, the Garhwali and the stocky troops of North East India. Some troops have got the natural tendencies to assimilate quickly and understanding the ethnic aspiration of the people. In spite of all high talk of equality, no distinction in caste, creed and religion by the Defence officials, Generals and Commanders at all levels, the ethnic background of troops played a great role in the moderation of success and debacle of counter-insurgency operations. The world had seen such historical episodes in USSR, Britain, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Burma etc.

PERSONALITY

Personality of Military commanders at all levels played an important role in counter-insurgency operations. It has got a direct bearing to troops and to some extent to civil populace. There are military commander, classified as 'Hawk' who are by nature impatient, impulsive, intolerant, brash, Gung-Ho style who would bulldoze their way everywhere, forgetting the traffic rules for his dozens of vehicles. On the other hand, there are commander of 'Dove' nature, who never believed in showmanship and roughshod but maintained tremendous rapport with the civil populace and his own troops. Their's approach are tactful, and generally carry a good impression with the troops and civil

populace. Finally, in the long run, they produced a good result without much expenditure in bullets, manpower, blood and toil.

'SUPERIORITY' COMPLEX

In democracy, members of the Armed forces are the servant of the people. In a Military Martial Law environment and in a militarized region, troops momentarily forget their basic role in Democracy. They start expressing their 'Superiority' complex by body language, behaviour, action and attitude which could be seen by the local populace. American soldiers in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq; Russian troops in Chechnya, Sri Lankan troops in Northern Sri Lanka; Indian troops in North East India, considered the local populace as 'those people'. They consider that whatever they do is always

SUICIDE CASES : INDIAN ARMY (2003-2007)

	Year	Numbers
❖	2003	120
❖	2004	116
❖	2005	119
❖	2006	120
❖	2007 (Upto June)	55

right and should be considered as right. The syndrome of 'Army can do no wrong' always exists in an archaic manner. Naturally, such MacArthur syndrome, chin-up attitude, no withdrawal gesticulation, created an uneasy atmosphere among the bureaucrats, the army and the civil populace.

OPPOSITE SEX

Involvement of women pressure groups in counter-insurgency warfare is a serious challenge to the Armed forces. Such involvement are seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Philippines, and India where they raised voices against the act of commission and omission of the security forces. In North east India, women's groups/organizations played an important role in conflict environment and carried lot of weight. In Manipur, the 'Meira Paibis' (Women torch-bearers), the women pressure groups are capable of yielding a lot of social power in the field of social justice; Human Rights; Abuses of powers; Rape and molestation etc. In 2004, for the first time in the history of counter-insurgency warfare, 11 naked women of Manipur, challenged troops located at the Kangla (Imphal) with banner "Indian Army, Rape Us", which stunned the world. Presence of women among the general populace during counter-insurgency warfare always affects the performance of troops.

GLOBAL TERROR EYES ON NORTH-EAST INDIA

*"Nothing is ever done in this world until men are
prepared to kill one another if it is not done."*

—George Bernard Shaw

A close study of insurgency, terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism shows that the world is not going to be free from them in the near future. They are going to survive like a parasite at various forms, stages and level, so long mankind existed on this Earth. They will follow human beings whenever they establish new civilization on the Moon, the Mars and even the Saturn, creating havoc and disaster far greater than the 9/11, 2001 World Trade Center and 26/11, 2008 war on Mumbai incidents and producing a number of Osama bin Laden. Thousands of people have lost their lives in the hands of terrorists, insurgents, fundamentalists, fanatics and Anti-National elements where they have got no direct grievances. They have defied everything and anything: International law, Judicial Canons, Human sympathy, Human institutions, Religion and God. The 15 year old boy, who learned the teaching of God from the Devil, is ready to kill anything and everything on this earth including himself with dynamite and detonators, under the fanatical and mad banner, "you will be entering paradise". But, remember in heaven, nobody wants terrorists and insurgents, including Osama bin Laden.

In early 1960's, western countries were totally absorbed in western cultures and Christian religious teaching and did not pay much attention to Asian continent, particularly South East Asia which carried little political significance in world politics. The political and strategic interest of USA, Britain, France, Canada, and Germany were to neutralise the spread of communism in Asian continent particularly in Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos and Malaysia by the two communists giants, USSR and China. In South East Asian politics, Burma (Bama or Myanmar or Doh-Myanma Asiayone), Bhutan (Land of the Bhoti/Bhotias), East-Pakistan (a neglected segment of Pakistan, more homogeneous to India), and North East India (Assam State/Assam Areas or simply Assam) remained incognito from

world politico-military radar and considered as a non-priority areas. USA and many western countries with their myopic eye saw only two targets in this region: Vietnam and communism.

In 1970's, the world saw the bitter cold war between the Western Bloc countries under the USA flag and the Communist Bloc countries under USSR. In-between, the Islamic fundamentalists and the fanatics raised their heads in Central Asia and South East Asia, challenging the power of the western countries and negating the spread of communism. Western countries were absorbed in their political hate-campaign of communism and was completely blind to the dangerous impending trends of the spread of Pan-Islamic Revolution which draws its inspirations from the Holy book; the *Q'uran* (*Koran*).

By 1980's, Asian continent saw a great sea-changes in real politics. Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt were in politico-religious turmoil. Insurgency, extremism, ethnic imbroglio and fundamentalism set into motion in South-East Asia in gradual paces. Central Asian Muslim countries, who championed for Islamic revolution on the globe, focused their attention to millions of Muslim inhabitants in the region particularly Muslim political organizations and leaders; Religious heads (Imam); societal organizations and known sympathizers for international Jihad and Pan-Islamic Revolution. Western democratic countries completely misread the politico-religious tornado blowing from the west towards the Eastern sub-continent. Cold war came to an end; Non-aligned platform was marginalized; Muslim Brotherhood's activities created more militant groups; USA produced and nurtured a number of Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan to serve their national and international interest.

In 1990's, the number of Jihadis (Jihad groups), extremists, terrorists, guerillas and fundamentalist groups expanded horizontally and vertically. The clashes between the west (those believed in Christianity and their crusades) and the Islam (those believed in the Holy *Q'uran*, the words of Allah as revealed to Mohammad, who is the Rasul Allah, the prophet of God) continued in real earnest with new thought and fundamental ideas. The western countries considered the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, revolution, militancy and fanaticism as an anti-thesis to the peaceful existence of mankind on the globe and challenge to western culture and religion. On the other hand, the Jihadis felt that Islam was in danger due to onslaught by Christianity from the west, Mongolian culture and traditions in the East, Hinduism and Buddhism from the Asian soil. They vigorously propagated that Islamic revolution or transformation should have more emphasis on ideology and belief rather than territorial and regional identification. Taliban culture swept the entire Muslim population on the globe. Al Qaeda (the base), the brain child of USA (1979), became a globalised terror organization. Pakistan's landscape was dotted with a number of Madrassas, with rejoices and smile from Osama bin Laden.

By 2000 AD, with the globalization of terror networks, the conflict paradigm also changed dramatically on the globe. The US invasion of Afghanistan; the destruction of Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq; the USA and its allied partner's management (mismanagement) of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, brought a great politico-strategic change in International fora. The entire populace of Pakistan, under a military dictator General Pervez Musharaff, was infected by the 'rabid rabble rousing Mullahs' (Khushwant Singh, *Hindustan Times*, 28 July 2007), and the same spreaded towards the East in multiple numbers. Kafeel Ahmed, the 27 year old Bangalore Engineer boy, who was studying for

a Ph.D. degree on "Computational Approach to Ink-Jet printing of Tactile Maps" in the Department of Design and Technology at Anglia Ruskin University (Anglia Polytechnic University) at Cambridge, was brainwashed to turn into a potential mass-murderer by the sheer weight of Islamic religion. On 30 June 2007, Ahmed drove a blazing Jeep into the departure terminal of Glasgow International Airport, sustained 90% burns injury; and died on 02 Aug 2007, robbing the British police information of terrorist conspiracy stretches across countries and continents. On 02 August 2007, a new Al Qaeda website (Propaganda advertisement) *As Sahab*, headlined "Wait for the Big Surprise", featuring digital photograph of the then President of United States of America, Mr. George W. Bush, Jr. and then President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf, standing in front of a burning White House, brought the US Intelligence Agencies on their toes for possible clues. On 31 July 2007, the trial of the Bombay Bomb blast in India in 1993 came to an end, with a series of legal punishment, ranging from capital punishment to minor punishment/acquittal. On 02 August 2007, 73 persons were convicted for the Coimbatore serial bomb blasts, codenamed operation 'Allah-O-Akbar', which occurred on 14 February 1998, at the industrial city of Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, India, killing 58 people hours before the arrival of India's Home Minister, Sri LK Advani, who was targeted by the Muslim terrorists of Al-Umma for elimination. Advani's flight was delayed and the blast occurred half a mile away where he was supposed to speak.

"Pakistan ki jitni total population hai, us se zyada population hai Indian Muslim Ki (population of Muslims in India is more than the total population of Pakistan). You should be knowing this. . . . If you know this, then you should also know that Indian Muslims have the capability to solve their problems. We don't need your advise. Don't try to alienate Indian Muslims, by your remarks, here or in Pakistan". [A blunt message, in the form of questions, conveyed to General Pervez Musharraf, former President of Pakistan, when he was attending *India Today Conclave, 2009*, in New Delhi, by Indian Muslim leader Maulana Mahmood Madani, Rajya Sabha Member and former General Secretary, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, India, on March, 2009]. There is no doubt that the Indian Muslim populace was affected politically, culturally and socially by the acts of global fundamentalist and fanatics, propagated by Islamic Jihad from Saudi Arabia (Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami); Al-Jihad and Al-Gamaa-al-Islamiyya, (Egypt). In turn, Pakistan (read as ISI) exploited the Indian Muslims, particularly those who were poor and illiterate, mainly through the existing 70,000 Madrassas (2004-2005 AD) existing on Indian soil. Gradually, they turned their attention to the soft areas of North East India for Pan-Islamic revolution in South East Asia, specially by means of terror.

FERTILE BASIN CONCEPT

Islamic fundamentalists, fanatics and terrorists always try to propagate and promote their teachings and concepts to new green field to internationalise their movement. History would reveal that pan-Islamic countries were involved in the dirty politics of ethnic insurgency movement in North East India, starting with the Naga insurgency movement (1956-57); the Mizo insurgency movement (1960); and the Assamese insurgency movement (1970's). Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, in his book 'The Myth of Independence', claimed Assam and some parts of the North East India to form part of Pakistan. North East India, particularly Assam, was considered as the most suitable area to form a base for Islamic revolution in oriental regions. In 1950, Sardar BS Mann,

while speaking on a debate in India's Parliament on the introduction of the immigrant expulsion Bill, said very clearly : "*I have not considered opinion of the Assam Government that during Muslim League regime there was a conspiracy to convert Assam, which was a Hindu province into a Muslim majority province. It was deep seated, deep-rooted and well-planned conspiracy of the Muslim League when Mr Saadullah was the Premier of Assam and as a result of this the large-scale migration was started. . . .*" (*The Upheaval Years in North East India*, Saroj Chakrabarty; 1989). Bangladesh, which emerged in 1971, has got political inhibition of having nuclear power India as its big brother neighbour. The country has become a power-house of terrorism, insurgency and fundamentalism and the same trends is spreading towards North East India. Anti-India activities from Bangladesh to India was very simple, easy and not very costly due to the presence of millions of illegal immigrant Bangladeshi population in North East India. Large number of migrants from Burma, Nepal and Bhutan has already flooded the region taking the advantage of liberal democratic society and the ethno-cultural commonality.

China has always got special politico-strategic prying eyes for North East India, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh. In early 1960's, China supported insurgent outfits from North East India in their insurgency movement against India. The same trends continued till 1980's. They wanted to check-mate India by making bridges with Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh, and Nepal as a counterweight to India in their South East Asian politics. Keeping North East India in turmoil insurgency environment will give China tremendous politico-strategic advantages *vis-à-vis* India. From 1990's, China changed its strategic priorities in South East Asia. India emerged as a strong Nuclear power country, closed to USA and a power-block in Asian continent. As a politico-strategic compulsion, China changed its India policy from an active hostile posture to passive hostility and finally to neutrality polity. However, any time, China can recharge the batteries to light-up North East India.

CROSS FERTILISATION DOCTRINE

In early 1960's, USA and the American soldiers forcibly converted thousands of simple Vietnamese young boys and girls into die-hard Vietcong guerillas due to their arrogant human attitude, blatant

Report focus on ISI rebel links

New Delhi, December 1: Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has developed a close network with insurgent outfits in the North East, according to a government report that has been circulated to Indian embassies abroad.

The association goes back to the early 1950's, says the report, Pakistan Involvement in terrorism against India, six pages of which talk of the ISI's link in the region. . . .

The ISI's ties with the region began in 1956 an invitation to Zhukuto Sema, the self styled Intelligence director of the Naga Federal Government (NFG), to come to Pakistan and explore possibilities of getting help for the underground movement. Later, Pakistan advised Phizo to go to UK.

The Pakistan government arranged everything for his journey and promised to give moral support and military aid in the form of arms and training in return for concessions which Pakistan was to receive as and when the Naga achieve their Independence. . . .

—"Pakistan's Involvement in Terrorism Against India"; Report published before Yashwant Sinha, Foreign Minister, India, statement in Lok Sabha in November, 2002; *The Telegraph*, Kolkata.

and rampant human rights violations, Gung-ho military style and attitude, complex superior human behaviour and hate for anything red (communism). They tried to marry up American democracy with Vietnamese communism, which jealously guarded by Dr. Hoh-Chi-Minh, the bearded communist leader, who was born with Vietnamese Nationalism. The American failed. In 1980's, they exfiltrated from Vietnam peninsula, turned towards Central Asia and bedded-in Afghanistan-Pakistan region. They raised a number of Mujahideen and Jihadi groups in Afghanistan just to kick-out the Russian troops and destroy the communist political infrastructures from the soil of Afghanistan. Billions of dollars were poured into the Afghan-Pakistan soil, to support and assist the Razakars, the Mujahideen, the Talibans, the ISI of Pakistan, Pakistani troops in Mujahideen uniform, and the CIA, who finally drove-out the Russian troops from the Afghan soil. After that what? There was a political vacuum, chaos, ethnic Nationalism, emergence of fundamentalism and fanaticism, and Islamic Terrorism. The American and the western world produced the Al Qaeda (the base) with Osama bin Laden as its supreme head. The Al Qaeda terrorists who became redundant and surplus in Afghanistan, rushed towards India, Indonesia, China, Burma, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Britain, USA, African continent and of course Pakistan, to start their new adventures (misadventures). Pakistan absorbed a large number of Afghan Mujahideen, whom they comfortably pushed into Jammu and Kashmir. By 1999-2000 AD, Bangladesh, Burma, Jammu and Kashmir, North East India were affected by insurgent and terrorist groups as a backlashes of post-Afghan crisis. In September-October 2001, police officials of Assam State claimed that they have traced links between Al Qaeda and the militant outfits of the North Eastern region of India. Military Intelligence Directorate in New Delhi also reported that as many as 25 militant outfits in the region might be funded directly or indirectly by Osama bin Laden or channelised from underworld element like the Dubai-based Dawood Ibrahim (*The Telegraph*, 16 October 2001).

BANGLADESH

The country, with its large number of Muslim population has become one of the safest ground for the propagation of Islamic revolution by fundamentalists, Fanatics and terrorists outfits. Historical facts show that successive Bangladesh Government, whether it is BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party), The Military dictators, or the Awami League, failed to control the extremist Muslim outfits operating on its soil, with millions of dollars aids from other Arab countries, particularly from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, Al Qaeda and the ISI of Pakistan. By 1999-2000 AD, Al Qaeda set up their bases, married-up with the regional fundamentalist groups, spread out their wings towards North East India. By 2000-2001, the ISI of Pakistan trained nearly 5000 Bangladesh youths under the supervision and patronage of the Director General of Field Intelligence ((DGFI) and the Jamait-e-Islami of Bangladesh to conduct Kargil type operation in North East India. More than 13 ISI modules were formed in the region under a former Army Officer, Major Rustom Ali. 11 modules were busted, though 2 are believed to be still active (*The Telegraph*, 16 Oct 2001). Despite India's strong protests, Bangladesh Government and its Security forces were non-committal to the existences of more than 141 training camps of insurgent groups from North East India on Bangladesh soil. Peoples along the Indo-Bangladesh border were experiencing poor living standard and socio-economic life. The insurgent group from North East India, which included the ULFA, NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, PLA, UNLF, NLFT, ATTF, ANVC, HNLF etc. exploited those people by doing out money and other welfare assistances. They also

greased the palms of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) and the local police authorizes for their comfortable stay, training schedule, establishment of training camps and infiltration and exfiltration from Bangladesh which cost nothing to Bangladesh's security and their political adventure.

BURMA (MYANMAR)

The country, which is rated as underdeveloped by the western countries, has got a number of ethnic insurgent outfits demanding autonomy, independence and sovereignty. Insurgency outfits like the Kachin Independent Army (KIA), the Chin National Army (CNA), the Arakanese Revolutionary Army (ARA), the Shan State Army (SSA), the Arakanese Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO), the United Wa State Army (AWSA), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) etc. formed a formidable power bloc not only in Burma but also in South East Asia. A number of insurgent outfits from North East India has got close working relations with these groups which could be manifested as a dangerous trends in South East Asian politics. In early 1980's, the Naga, the Assamese and the Manipur insurgent outfits were trained by the KIA, the SSA, the Chin insurgent groups, the Arakan insurgent groups and the BCP. In 1978-80, a number of cadres of the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Mr BA Zafar, launched insurgency operations against the Burmese Military authorities. Arakanese Muslim Rohigya extremist groups, who are anti to Buddhist populations in the region are now getting political, moral and financial support from Al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaaf extremist group and fanatics terrorists groups from Central Asia countries. They have got close working relations with many insurgent groups in Bangladesh and the North Eastern region of India.

The local Burmese inhabiting along the Indo-Burma International border, astride Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland, maintained close relations with the insurgent outfits from the North East India. The levels of poverty of the local people along the International border are quite pathetic and lamentable. The entire general areas are underdeveloped and most of the inhabitants are not exposed to the outside world. That was the general areas where various insurgent outfits come into play. They used to influence the local inhabitants with assistances of daily needs where the Government officials could not ventured into. The PLA, UNLF, KYKL, NSCN-K, ULFA and many Kuki insurgent cadres remained survived on the Burmese soil, so long they did not disturb the Rangoon's (Yangon) political interest and rocket the Indo-Burma relations. Intelligence sources reported, since early 1960's, that the Indian Insurgent outfits from North East India used to pay heavy amount of money to the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) and the Burmese Intelligence Agencies for their base camps, training camps and free movement on the Burmese soil. To maintain their insurgency movement, the insurgent outfits dole-out sufficient money to the local inhabitants. In 2007-08, the Manipuri insurgents suffered militarily, when the Indian security forces, launced a series of counter-insurgency operations against them and pushed them towards Burma along the Indo-Burma International border. India requested Burma to take necessary action against those fleeing insurgents. However, the Burmese security forces did not launched any military operation to crack down on the Manipuri and the Assamese insurgents. Intelligence sources reported that the Manipur insurgents who took shelter in area Khampat, Falam, Phaisat, Tamu, Minya, Tonzang etc. were told by the Burmese Army not to attack the Indian Army after crossing the International boundary which would lead to the deterioration of Burma-India relations. It was also reported that the Manipuri insurgent outfits paid heavy amount of money to the Burmese security forces posted along the Indo-Burma International border for their stay on the Burmese soil.

NORTH EAST INDIA

The region which comprises the seven sisters has got more than 30 concrete and forceful ethnic and sub-ethnic insurgent and terrorist groups. The Naga insurgent outfits, from the very beginning, are closely associated with the ISI of Pakistan, China and the Kachin insurgents. The Assamese insurgents has got close link with Bangladesh, its extremist and fundamentalists groups and the ISI of Pakistan. Insurgent groups from Tripura, Manipur and Meghalaya are having hideouts in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Burma. A number of Madrassas has come up in the entire region, where some of them had been misused and served as a terror factory for terrorist movement. Since early 1990's, funds from foreign countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Kuwait, Indonesia and UK are pumping in regularly into these Madrassas in the form of religious donations. Jihadis groups from Pakistan and other Arab countries who are already imbedded in India were able to sneak into the region, contacted the local Muslim youths, provided huge financial assistances and even got married with the local *burkha*-clad Muslim girls in the name of Islamic revolution. The aims of foreign Jihadis groups are to find out a common platform for cross fertilization of various Islamic revolutionaries so that a Pan-Islamic State could be formed in the North East India-Bangladesh-Burma loop. On 15 August, 2007, in a sensational development, 15 suspected Al Qaeda activists were rounded up from Moreh, the sensitive border town of India along the Indo-Burma international border town by Indian security forces (24 Assam Rifles). By September, 2007 it was reported that some Muslim youths from Manipur, who were suspected to be Al Qaeda activists, were arrested on the western border of Jammu and Kashmir, by Indian security forces.

The Pan-Islamic revolutionary vision, born out basically from Turkey, later on hijacked by the Arab and the Indian Muslims, adopted now by the Islamic terrorist organizations like the Al Qaeda, Abu Sayyef groups, and many others have got their foot-print in North East India. Pan Islamic revolution does not confine to the narrow lane of Pakistan's proxy war against India and its Hindu culture. It involves the grand strategy of Islamic revivalism, mobilizing the Muslim masses to focuss their attention to the tenets of Islam and Prophet Mohammad, so that their lost glories could be retrieved and revived.

RELIGION VS RELIGION

The Chinese believed and rightly said that "Religion is the opium of the masses" and tried to replace it very wisely, wittingly and conveniently by communism. Upto 19th century, people from outside North East India considered the inhabitants of the region as uncivilized naked people who believe in 'Animism'. Later on, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism invaded the region; changed the people's mind and throw out the age old religious practices of the native peoples. By 1940's, Hinduism flourished in the region; Christianity spread out and converted a large numbers of tribal peoples; Islam surged ahead and Buddhism followed in slow-speed. By early 1980's, majority of the inhabitants in Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya were converted to Christianity en masse leaving behind the unwanted 'Animism tag'. Assam, Manipur and Tripura remained as the bastion of Hinduism, in spite of onslaught from Christianity and Islam. Islam spread in Assam and Buddhism in parts of Arunachal Pradesh. The religious configuration of the neighbouring countries also shows great sea-change and played a crucial role in the politico-religious upheavals in the region.

In People's Republic of Bangladesh, 83% of the population believed in Islam, 16% in Hinduism and 1% in others. In Burma, 89% of the population believed in Buddhism; 4% in Islam; 4% in Christianity; 3% in Hinduism and others. In Bhutan, 75% of the population believed in Lamaistic Buddhism and 25% in Hinduism. But the various religious configurations practiced by many ethnic, sub-ethnic and minority groups played an important role in the insurgency and terrorist movement in the region. The great concern in the region is that religion has been used as a tool by insurgents, fundamentalists and terrorist outfits to achieve their grand design and objective. In early 1970's, the Naga insurgent outfits raised the "Nagaland for Christ" banner, encouraged the construction of large number of churches, mixing religion with politics, and involving in crisis and clashes of State Vs the churches. The same religion has been exploited by the HNLC, ANVC, Kuki insurgent outfits, MNF (now dysfunctional), Tribal Tripura insurgents etc. 'Islam is in danger' flag has been used extensively by the PULF, and others Islamic terrorist organizations in the region. They are encouraging existing religious tanzems for promotions of militant ideologies; liberal funding for construction of Madrassas and Mosques, Renovation of old mosques; scholarships for study of the Holy Q'uran (Koran) in India and abroad; encouragement for burqa costumes; arrange sufficient funds for Islamic revolutions and ensure Madrassas produced future Talibans for Jihad in the region. From 1990's, in Manipur, there was an upswing in Madrassas and Mosques activities in Imphal East, Imphal West, Thoubal district and Jiribam sub-division. In 2005-06, the Government and the security forces raised

their eyebrows and questioned the rationale for the sudden construction of new Mosques and the Madrassas. But the Islamic radicals countered the same by asking what action the Government and the people took when the 'Christian tribals' constructed not only one but hundreds of the churches and cathedrals in every nook and corner of Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam and other areas, including public places and premises. Why single out the Muslims and their religion Islam. So far Hinduism is concerned, in North East India, the same is considered as a slow moving Holy cow owned by a poor holy man. It is the oldest religion practiced by the inhabitants in the region. It flourished in Assam, Manipur, Tripura and part of Arunachal Pradesh. However, it failed

NORTH EAST INDIA		
Name of State	Name of Religions	Religion in %
Assam	Hinduism	55%
	Muslim	35%
	Christian	7%
	Others	3%
Manipur	Hinduism	60%
	Muslim	8%
	Christian	25%
	Others	7%
Nagaland	Hinduism	2%
	Muslim	3%
	Christian	90%
	Others	5%
Mizoram	Hinduism	2%
	Muslim	4%
	Christian	92%
	Others	5%
Meghalaya	Hinduism	4%
	Muslim	4%
	Christian	90%
	Others	2%
Tripura	Hinduism	70%
	Muslim	10%
	Christian	15%
	Others	5%
Arunachal Pradesh	Hinduism	50%
	Muslim	10%
	Christian	30%
	Others	10%

to attract the tribal inhabitants into its Treasure Chest, probably due to its strict religious rights, do's and don'ts, and the supremacy of the gangetic Brahmins over other human beings in the region.

Up to 1960's, most of the countries in South East Asia were classified as underdeveloped and undeveloped by developed western countries in their politico-strategic world politics. They restricted supply of sophisticated military hardwares and weapon systems into the fragile region inhabited by the Mongoloid people except some quantity of small arms to neutralize the spread of communism. USSR and China, the torch-bearers of communism, inducted large quantities of small arms which included the famous AK-47 Rifles and its series to communist

regimes and friendly countries in the region to neutralise the influence of the western countries and their political hegemony. They supplied arms and ammunitions to the insurgent outfits operating on the soil of Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam Peninsula, Laos, Malaysia and North East India. By 1970's, USA and other western countries introduced small arms into the region which included the common M-16 Rifles series. By 1980's, small arms proliferated in South-East Asia in an unprecedented manner, creating a politico-strategic wave in world political scenario. Insurgent outfits, drug warlords, ethnic insurgent groups, communist guerillas like Vietcong and the communist party of Burma (CPB), armed themselves heavily with illegal sophisticated small arms. Major players in the Golden Triangle (Thailand-Laos-Burma); Yunan province of China; the Chittagong Hills Tracts in Bangladesh; Sagaing, Kachin State and Arakan region in Burma (Myanmar); Chiang Mai region of Thailand; Kmer Rouge of Cambodia etc. engaged themselves in the trade of small arms guns, drugs and narcotics which created a serious politico-socio-economic turmoil in the region. By 1990's, illegal small arms industries flourished in mass scale and became a lucrative business with large number of clandestine buyers, particularly insurgents, militants, drug warlords, guerillas and terrorists. Bangladesh got more than 40 local arms factories which supplied mainly to the insurgents in Burma, Nepal, Sri Lanka and North East India. In Burma, every drug warlords and insurgent outfits have got their own local small arms factories and repairing shops. Supply of small arms to North East India are basically carried out through main entry points along with the India-Burma-Bangladesh International border which includes Sylhet-Dawki axis; Tammu-Moreh; Thingsai-Farkawn axis; Khonsa-Pangsaw pass; Mon border; Sonamura-Barjala (Tripura Sector); Kailashahar border (Tripura); Cox Bazar-Sylhet-Dawki-Shillong; Andaman and Nicobar Islands-Cox Bazar; Chittagong Hill Tracts-Lungleh-Aijawl; Mandalay-Falam-Churachandpur (Manipur) etc. The present trends of small arms proliferation in North East India are alarming and dangerous. By 2015 AD, it may surpass the total illegal small

PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA (2000-2005 AD)

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Total illegal Arms in : 7.50 Crores
South East Asia | |
| 2. Total illegal Arms in : 6.30 Crores
Pakistan and India | |
| 3. Weapons Variety | |
| ➤ M-16 | ➤ Assorted Ammunitions |
| ➤ AK-47 | ➤ RL (Rocket Launchers) |
| ➤ AK-56 | ➤ Wireless Sets |
| ➤ AK-81 | ➤ Missiles (Shoulder Fire) |
| ➤ Pistol | ➤ Booby Traps |
| ➤ Revolvers | ➤ Lethode Guns |
| ➤ Grenades | ➤ AGL (Automatic
Grenade Launchers) |
| ➤ LMG | |
| ➤ Mines | |
| ➤ @Report of International Action Network of Small
Arms - IANSA | |

arms available in Burma. By a conservative study, the total illegal small arms available in Assam are 4.5 lakhs; Nagaland 1.2 lakhs; Tripura 1.00 lakh; Mizoram 0.4 lakhs; Manipur 0.4 lakhs; Meghalaya 0.3 lakhs; Arunachal Pradesh 0.2 lakhs; North Bengal 1.5 lakhs; and Sikkim 0.05 lakhs.

INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN (IM) IN NORTH EAST INDIA LOOP

"Eye for an eye, the dust will never settle down", was the stern warning reflected in the manifesto issued by the Indian Mujahideen (IM) in 2008. The email sent by them contained full-scale assault on the Indian National Congress (INC); Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and other saffron outfits of the Indian political realm.

By end of 2007, Indian Intelligence Agencies and police officials came to the conclusion that Indian Mujahideen was not a hoax outfit for terrorism. The outfit drew its cadres from the banned Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), with closed links and working relations with terrorist groups like the LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba), HUJI (Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islamic) and HUJI-B (Harkat-ul Jihad-e-Islami, Bangladesh). They used full venom against New Delhi for 'treacherously hurting Muslim interests' and not taking any action 'for the mainstream issues of the Muslims' in India. They tried to build up their strength by constant rhetoric with emotional and religious appeals: 'Hypocrisy of Indian Secularism'; Babri Masjid demolition; Alleged oppression of Muslims' in India; Alleged blaming of 'innocent Muslims as terrorist'; Danger of Islam in India etc. "To dreadfully terrorise you this time, by the will and help of Almighty Allah, we are about to devastate your very first metropolitan centre [New Delhi], your most strategic 'Hindutva hub', your green zone-yes! It is your own capital." (email from Abdul Subhan @ Al Arbi, 2008).

It was in early 2006, that the Indian security forces suspected that the cadres of HUJI, LeT, HUJI-B and other Anti-national elements (ANEs) had penetrated deeply into Assam and other States of North East India through Bangladesh. A large number of cadres of banned SIMI organization interacted with those terrorist outfits to establish terror module in North East India by incorporating and soliciting the sizeable Muslim population in the region, with the power of Islamic religious flag, money power, and political supports. Most of the top leaders of Indian Mujahideen used to visit Bangladesh, Dubai, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Burma before they came down to North East India. They criss-crossed between Guwahati, Imphal, Dimapur, Shillong, Agartala, Itanagar, Silchar, Naogong, Dhubri, Gangtok etc. to establish credible footholds by having alliances and establishing working relations with the local and ethnic insurgent outfits in the region. It was also reported that Al umma, the Tamil Nadu-based Islamic terrorist outfit, who was behind the 1998 Coimbatore bomb



Safdar Nagori

Leader of Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Founded in 1977; banned in India in 2002 but continued clandestinely; considered as platform base for Indian Mujahideen (IM). Fed LeT, HUJI, HUM and other Islamic terrorist groups in North East India with 'volunteers'.

blasts and very close to SIMI, had penetrated Assam, Manipur and Tripura. Mr Ali Hussain Badr, Field Commander, North East, Indian Mujahideen, threatened to kill Mr. L.K. Advani, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader, when he later visited Guwahati and Shillong on 28-29 October, 2008. The email sent by the outfit from a cyber café on Howell Road, Laban, Shillong to two local dailies of Shillong, warned the people to stay away from Mr. L.K. Advani's September 29 (29 September, 2008) rally in Shillong.

By early 2008, Indian Intelligence Agencies and the security forces found that Indian Mujahideen (IM) was working very closely with the HUJI, HUJI-B and LeT to create Kashmir type Islamic political environment in North East India. On 26 September, 2008, Indian Security forces intercepted and killed seven suspected HUJI militants in Dhubri district of Assam, while intruding to Assam from Bangladesh. A letter found on one of the dead body, written in Bengali, alleged that the condition of Muslim in India, since the demolition of Babri Masjid, was going from bad to worse, because of 'oppression by the Government of India'. "We will have to teach Hindustan a lesson and for that you are requested to send more trained and motivated persons [Read as Militants] to India" (Commandant, *Harkat-ul Jihadi-e-Islami*, Kurigram District, Bangladesh; 2008). In Manipur, on the night of 21 October, 2008, there was a bomb blast in Pandon (Ragailong) and Namthilok village area, close to the complex of Manipur Police Commando living accommodation and the transit camp of Assam Rifles in Greater Imphal area. 4 Luna Moped two-wheelers filled with explosive (RDX), parked near the crowded area, when people were enjoying *Lagao* (A popular dice game of Manipur), exploded by remote control mechanism, killing 17 people and injuring more than 30 people. The valley-based insurgent outfit KCP-MC (Kangleipak Communist Party, Military Council) claimed responsibility for the same. However, the pattern of the blast, the magnitude, type of explosive, the number of casualties, show that the local outfit / outfits must have got assistance and expertise from outside the State. On 30 October, 2008, Assam was rocked with serial bomb blasts claiming 84 lives and injuries to several people, with deafening noises of Islamisation of North East India and a mockery to secular politics. The terrorist group selected four important places: Guwahati, Kokrajhar, Barpeta and Bongaigaon, which represented the heterogeneous socio-political demographic contours of Assam. A group called Islamic security forces (Indian Mujahideen) claimed responsibility for the blasts. [According to US portal ISF (IM) was formed in 2000 AD to avenge attacks on Muslims by the Bodo (Boro) militants in Assam] "We, ISF (IM) take responsibility of Thursday blasts [30 October, 2008]. We warn all of Assam and India for situation like this in future. We thank all our holy members and partners, Amin (Text message to a TV channel, India). When New Delhi pointed their fingers correctly to HUJI in Bangladesh for the carnage Dhaka termed it as 'irresponsible'.


The insurgent group in North East India did not maintain large chunk of explosive due to security reasons, cost effectiveness, difficulties in learning the technology to clone SIM cards and the smooth method of assembling the various parts for maximum casualties. Cadres of the Indian Mujahideen and small groups of ISI agents working as sleeping module in various Muslim concentrated areas, marrying the local Muslim women, carrying out lucrative business of Cyber Café, Hotel business, salesman, mason, carpenter, taxi drivers, local Maulavi, community leaders, religious teachers etc. flourished in all States of North East India. The biggest advantages to Indian Mujahideen, Jihadis, ISI agents and others was the discontent among the local inhabitants, the ethnic and sub-ethnic clashes

among the Assamese, the Nagas, the Manipuris, the Tripuris, the Khasis and the Garos, the Bodos and many other groups of communities in the region. It will not be a wrong prediction that by 2025-30 AD, Islamic terrorism will neutralised and shattered all 'ethnic revolutions' and 'Revolutionaries'. Subsequently, North East India will become a lucrative target for a mini-nuclear bomb from western countries to save South East Asia from Islamic holocaust. Iraqi syndrome may repeat in North East India, though we pray that this prophecy should be wrong drastically in the near future.

DAY OF JUDGEMENT

In the long run, the insurgency movement and propagation of terror in North East India will be more on the Holy platform of Christianity Vs. Islam, Hinduism vs Islam, Christianity vs. Hinduism, and Ancient religious practices ("Animism") Vs modern religions. Buddhism and Jainism which are found in Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Manipur has not yet been exploited by the insurgents and the terrorists. The western Christian countries are interested of having a concrete Christianised culture and religion in North East India, under a generic term as 'Western religious culture'. They are patronizing Christian religious movement in South East Asia particularly in Indonesia, Phillippines, Combodia, Singapore, Laos, Thailand, Burma and North East India. A number of Insurgent groups in the region used to form a common agenda in Insurgency movement via Christianity. Naga, Kuki, Kachin, Shan, Mizo, Chin, Karen insurgents etc. heavily depended on common religious euphoria combined with emotional ethnic playcards. Christian religious culture has already overtaken the social psychology of many tribal inhabitants in the general area. Insurgents, terrorists and other 'non-state actors' have exploited the same for propagation of their 'sovereignty agenda' and other terror drills.

Many Muslim fundamentalists who believed in the principle of Nizam-e-Mustafa (Rule of the Shariah) do not believe the Indian Constitution and termed it as cipher when compared to the religious tenets of the Holy Q'uran. 'Islamist' terrorist (terrorists) in India, generally followed the Deobandi - Tablighi, Ahl-e-Hadees, or Wahhabism (Saudia Arabia fundamentalist culture) religious culture for a modern jihad. Deobandism (Non-Wahhabism) formed more than 70% of the Muslim community in North East India and 80% in the whole of India. The formation of a pan Islamic theocratic state in South East Asia will be difficult without full support from the Muslim inhabitants in North East India. The ISI of Pakistan, Al Qaeda, HUJI, HUJI-B, JEM, Indian Mujahideen (IM) etc. read and understood the importance of North East India for 'Islamisation of South East Asia'. One of the hidden agenda of all Islamic fanatic groups and terrorist outfits is balkanization of India, starting with the religious flag in Jammu and Kashmir, North East India and South India. Kashmir is burning with the sound of 'we want



The Babri Masjid: A historical nemesis. Islamic countries on Asian soil took active politico-religious interest on the Babri Masjid imbroglio rather than the Indian Muslim. Volatile religious rhetoric and frenzy acts from the Hindus and the Muslims automatically affected the political environment and the socio-communal harmony of North East India and South Asia.

freedom; Long live Islam'. Secular politics in India is in danger. '*kaan Khol ke sun lo, jo qaum tunhe takhto taj pe bitha sakti hai, wohi qaum tumhare janaazai bhi nikaal sakti hai (A community which can place you on a pedestal can also take out your funeral procession)*' [Mufti Mohammed Ismail; A prominent cleric; Malegaon, Maharashtra, India; Idgah Maidan; 3 October 2008]. Islamic terrorist had already planted 'Azadi flag' in Assam, Manipur, Tripura, Nagaland and West Bengal and propagated that 'The crusaders of the east and the west have united in a cohesive onslaught against Muslims' [Mohammed Hafeez Saeed; supreme religious and political head; Lashkar-e-Taiba; Jamaat-ud-Dawah; Jamia Masjid al-Qudsia, Lahore, Pakistan; 6 October 2008].

Hinduism is followed and practiced by majority in North East India. They feel that due to the encroachment by the Christianity and the Islam, the religion is now in danger. In North East India, Hinduism has got no visible link with terrorism and fanaticism and as such no relevance to 'Hindu terrorist' [terrorists]. But the statement and religious rhetoric, fired by a section of Indian politicians and politico-religious intellectuals, has brought a sudden awakening in the mind of the general public. There is no guarantee that the religion will not be exploited in a visible manner by the ethnic and sub-ethnic insurgent outfits and terrorists. In Manipur, Assam, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh and North Bengal, the 'Hindutva culture' is coming up as a torrential rain, having serious clashes with Christianity and the Islam. Some Muslim organizations are trying to expose the 'Hindutva terror' activities with Ayodhya and the Malegaon (Maharashtra) blast as the starting points. On 05 December, the Supreme Court of India rejected at the admission stage itself a Writ petition filed by Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind (JUH) Delhi Unit President, Maulana Arshad Madani for a probe by an independent agency into all acts of 'Hindutva terror' since 2001. Chief Justice of Supreme Court of India, Justice KG Balakrishnan asked Mr. Madani's counsel: 'Have you got evidence against any of them?' (*The Hindu*, 6 December, 2008; New Delhi).

North East India, in the near future is going to face serious politico-religious problems and crisis from many angles: militants; ethnic insurgent outfits; Indian Islamists; Hindutva groups and 'non-state actors'. Every ethno-religious groups have got their own limited narrow ethnic interest. The same will be exploited by the bigger shark and they (local ethnic groups) will be reduced to the power of a pawn in the game of chess. When religion and religious fanaticism overrule the existence of states, democracy and the rule of law, the day can be counted as the beginning for human disaster. Religion will be superimposed over human intelligence; faith will replace rightful thinking, terror and terrorism will dictate the terms of state policy; and Rule of law will replace by the cannons of religion. There will be no court of law for the people except the law court of God; no time and place for any judgement. The day of judgement will be decided by the fanatics, fundamentalist, terrorists and Insurgents after the destruction of life of a human being.

NOTES

Terrorist Act

[The unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), para 15, as amended by the unlawful Activities (prevention) Amendment Act, 2004 (29 of 2004)]

"Whoever, with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country, does any act by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature, in such a manner as to cause, or likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, properly or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country or causes damage or destruction of any property or equipment used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any state government or any of their agencies, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government of India or the Government of a foreign country or any other person to do so or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act."

Terrorism /Terrorist

"Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' shall be construed as per the meaning of Terrorist act assigned in section 15' [The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967)]

Philosophy of Terrorism

[Philosophy of Terrorism: A Historical perepspective; Sunil Adam, *Strategic Analysis*, December, 1986]

"Notwithstanding the apprehensions of the classical Marxist thinkers, the greatest contribution to the ideology or philosophy of terrorism came from the neo-Marxist intellectual of Africa, Frantz Fanon. A native of Martinique and a psychiatrist by profession, Fanon authored the wretched of the Earth which inflamed the radicals of not only Africa but the entire western world. Though not a violent man himself, Fanon was consumed with hatred for colonialism and racial oppression. His violent preachings set a pattern of thought among leftward looking intellectuals of the western world."

Terrorism


["Terror as a political weapon" in Harry Ecktein ed, *Internal War*, Thomas Perry, Thornton, 1964]

"Since terror is a weapon having political implication, it should be considered in the light of its relationship, to the entire spectrum of political agitation."

[*Insurgency and Counter-insurgency: A Study of Modern Guerilla Warfare*, New Delhi, 1971]

"In this age of sophisticated techniques, Insurgency has acquired a modern approach. Yet in another sense, it can be regarded as the same old guerilla warfare in the struggle between man and man."

FLOW-IN OF FUNDS FOR INSURGENT AND TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS IN
NORTH EAST INDIA (MANIPUR INSURGENCY MOVEMENT)





Osama Bin Laden, Supreme Head of Al Qaeda (The base)

In early 1980's, Osama bin Laden, a young, charismatic, tall and lanky Arab was put on the rostrum of Afghan war as king of Mujahideen by the CIA, ISI of Pakistan and other Intelligence Agencies of the Arab world just to throw out USSR's Red Army from Afganistan. Bin Laden co-founded the Maktab al Kidmat in mid 1980's; Al Qaeda (The base) in 1988; and propagated abolition of state's boundaries in Muslim world. He devastated USA (9/11, 2001); threatened United Kingdom and Israel with horrific scenario; transformed Islamic Pakistan into a den of Al Qaeda; warned India for its honeymoon with USA and looked towards South East Asia for Islamic resurgence. By 2006-2007 AD, Bin Laden, the king of terror, Islamic crusader, saviour of Holy Q'uran, became the most hunted terrorist in the world, with modest expenditure of 100-110 billions US dollars per annum, in 50-60 countries on the globe, with 1100-1200 human bags everyday. Is Osama Bin Laden still alive?

[Ref. *Global Terror Eye on North East India*]




LTTE Cadres walk past bodies of Sri Lankan soldier at Uruththirapuram, a village near Killinochchi, on 23rd November, 2008

The demise of the LTTE (Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam), the architect of suicide terrorism and the brainchild of IED Warfare (Indigenous Explosive Device), has brought out a new strategic thinking on war on terrorism. The organization was/is responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister of India, Sri Rajiv Gandhi; Appapillai Amirthalingam (TULF); Neelan Tiruchelvam (TULF); K. Padmanabha (EPRLF); unprecedented damages to Sri Lanka's economy; blasted (though survived); Ms Chandrika Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka and Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, Chief of Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF). Later on (January-May 2009), it was General Fonseka, who put the 'ruthless LTTE Chief', Mr. Vellupillai Prabhakaran into a fox-hole of six square kilometers area in the North of Mullaitivu, Northern Province of Sri Lanka, and finally put him to eternal rest, with lot of noises from Tamils in Tamilnadu (India). Though worked for the 'rights of Sri Lankan Tamil' and 'Tamil Eelam', V. Prabhakaran, cannot be anointed and worshipped as a revolutionary or Saint. India declared LTTE as a terrorist organization.

The chances of proliferation of arms, ammunition and equipment of the LTTE into the hands of insurgents of North East India via Bangladesh, Burma, and Nepal are very high. That will certainly pose a new threat perception on the ongoing Insurgency movement in the region. The crumbling down of the LTTE, with a call for surrender or face destruction from President of Sri Lanka, Mahindra Rajapakse should be a lesson for insurgents of North East India.

[Ref: Global Terror Eye on North East India]




China under Terror Attack

[Bomb blast in Yangpu, Shanghai, on 05 May 2008, carried out by Uighur (Xinjiang Uygur) separatist group]

China with a sizeable Muslim inhabitants in Xinjiang Uighur (Uygur) region, long international border with India, Nepal, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Kazakhstan, Russia and Mongolia, must not have the wrong view of global terrorism. Democratic countries on the Asian soil which includes India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, Thailand etc. are severely dented and damaged by global and regional Insurgency movement and terrorism. In the near future, terrorism are likely to destroy communism, because communism is not the safety valve against global terrorism. On the other hand terrorism is not the brainchild of democracy, nor a concept of Western democracy, but clearly a global phenomena. Terrorist has attacked targets in New York, London, Italy, New Delhi, Bombay and Guwahati. Tomorrow, Beijing, Shanghai, Urumqi, Lhasa, Tianjin and Qingdao may face global terrorism leading to balkanisation of China with serious politico-military implication to North East India, Burma, Laos and Nepal. China should discourage the Insurgency movement and terrorism launched by many ethnic groups and communities from the region.

[Ref: Global Terror Eye on North East India]



War on Mumbai (Bombay)

The burning TAJ MAHAL (Taj) Hotel on 27-29 November, 2008. Terrorist attacked Mumbai (India) in March, 1993; July 2005, and November 2008. The next attack (2011-2012)!!

[Ref. Global Terror Eye on North East India]



Ajmal Kasab (Pakistan) at CST

The golden boy who was cursed by Pakistan's ISI as 'non-state actor'; caught during Mumbai attack on 28-29 November, 2008. Ajmal Kasab remained as Achilles heel of Pakistan.

[Ref. Global Terror eye on North East India]



National Security Guard (NSG), India (Operation Black Tornado Nov. 2008)


Inadequacies: Vision; political willpower, common and control, and logistics. Require long journey for war on terrorism and the National security.



Bleeding of India's Global Adventure

*Indian embassy attacked in Kabul (Afghanistan) on 7 July, 2008
by terrorists with assistance from ISI of Pakistan.*

[Ref. Global Terror Eye on North East India]



Gujarat (India) under Terror Attack

Bomb blast at Ahmedabad (India) on 27 July, 2008. Birth of terror drills: Jihadism, Blasts of revenge, shocks and awe, soft targets. Indian Mujahideen, SIMI and HUJI responsible.

North East India is going to face such scenario within a few years in a gradual manner.

[Ref. Global Terror Eye on North East India]

Maulana Masood Azhar (Pakistan)

Chief of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)

The man who walked out from Indian jail with a great smile and upright position during the hijacking of Indian Airlines aircraft to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Founded Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), a terrorist group in Pakistan in 2000 AD; under complete control of ISI of Pakistan. Operates in Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and Middle East Islamic countries. Attacked India's parliament building in 2001 and Ayodhya in July, 2005. India is demanding Pakistan to handover Masood Azhar to India for trial.

[Ref. Global Terror Eye on North East India]



Mohamad Yusuf Shah@Syed Salahuddin (Pakistan) (1st from right)

Chief of Hizbul Mujahideen (HUM), founded in 1989, a militant wing of Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI); Active in J & K, South India and North East India; proposed integration of J & K with Pakistan.

[Ref. Global Terror Eye on North East India]

REVOLUTION IN DEMOCRACY

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

A study of the history of mankind shows that revolutionary movement invariably started by the masses when they suffered in terms of politics, socio-economic, culture, religion and Human Rights. A revolutionary movement may change the existing ruler/ Dictator / Government, provided their demands were legitimate and accepted by the general public. The movement in most of the cases, contained plots, assassinations, violence, guerilla warfare, bloods and tears. The people recognized the gravity of such movement by the quantum of violence they produced. People may raise their arms for a political right, cultural rights, socio-economic rights or religious rights which was their fundamental right but denied to them. Even, a simple and strong willpower monk could change the history of China's revolutionary movement. In early 1330's, monk Chu-Yuan-Chang, the son of a Chinese peasant in Anhwei province of China formed an organization known as the White Lotus Society along with other 13-14 local monks, when the powerful dictatorial Mongol rulers denied them all sorts of basic Human rights. In 1368, he led the Chinese peasants, conquered Nanking, and defeated the powerful Mongol King, leading to the end of Mongol dynasty in China. Later on, he took the name of Emperor Hung Wu and established the Ming dynasty in China. That was a classic form of revolution.

A number of revolutionary movement has taken place in this world from time to time. In the sixteenth century, in Germany, Martin Luther King, a Christian priest, revolted against Rome, leading to the split of Roman Church into two factions: Catholic and Protestant. In the middle of 18th century, Industrial revolution took place in Britain, when the Britishers (East-India Company) were busy and fighting in India and Canada. In 1775-76, the American, by means of revolution, broke away from Britain and declared American Independence. During 1789-1794, the French revolution erupted on the European soil, with far-reaching consequences for mankind: Revolution and Counter-revolution. By the revolution, the Frenchman got Republican France, Freedom and concepts of Rights of Man. The counter-revolution produced many autocrats, dictators, selfish politicians and bourgeois government. During the revolution, more than 4,000 persons, including French intellectuals were guillotined, which the country paid very dearly after the revolution.

The history of revolution and revolutionary movement took a dramatic turn, when Karl Marx, a German Jew, born in 1818 and lived in Paris, was expelled from France by the French Government ruled by Louis Philippe. He went to London, met another German, named Friedrich Engels, a rich factory owner and a crusader for socialism. They became close comrades, developed their own theory of socialism and communism, wrote and published the 'Communist Manifesto'. In 1867, Marx published his book, the *Das Kapital* (Capital) and discussed the issue of Industrial civilisation, class conflicts, trade unions, socialism, Marxism etc. Later on V.I. Lenin of

Russia became a great exponent of Marxism but cautioned every worker that 'in no sense do we regard the Marxist theory as something complete and unassailable'. In November, 1917, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, under Lenin and Trotsky brought a great change in the Marxist theory of revolution. In 1930's, the illiterate and poverty stricken Chinese peasants, found Mao-Tse-Tung, who led them with the communist red book in their fight against the dictatorial Chinese ruler. The same trends spread out in South East-Asia which included Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Malaysia and Burma.

A forcible overthrow of a Government or a social order in favour of a new system with blood and tears is normally considered as the nearest acts close to revolution. Revolutionary movement contained a high-pitched political agenda; political rhetoric; dislike of incumbent ruling classes; upheaval of public sentiments; believe in public uprising and do not mind in changing the old system or government with the power of gun. They believed that victory in a revolution would come only with the blood of the people. Mao-Tse-Tung believed that "power flows from the barrel of a gun" and propagated communist doctrine of revolution on the Asian soil by means of mass people's uprising. Many Insurgent groups in South East Asia respected and immortalized the last minute outbursts of General Hideki Tojo (Prime Minister of Japan) in December, 1943, that 'Victory in war cannot be won with folded arms' (Tojo: The Last Banzai; Courtney Browne). Many people believe that, Revolution, per se, is not only a political war with guns and blood but also contained forces of people's power.

DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

The world community is indebted to great philosophers like Plato who taught the king and the common people alike what were Republic and Democracy. Every human being is borne free. The prophetic word of Abraham Lincoln that 'Democracy

REVOLUTION

"Yet, we must not forget that a sixth power exists in Europe, maintaining at certain moments, its domination over all five so-called 'Great powers', and causing them all to tremble. This power is revolution.

—Karl Marx; 1854; *New York Newspaper*

Fascism

Fascism does not believe in the necessity or utility of perpetual peace. Therefore, it repudiates pacifism, which conceals a refusal to struggle and an essential cowardice- in face of sacrifice. War, and war only, raises human energies to the maximum of tension and seals with its nobility the people who have the courage to accept it. All other trials are substitutes; they do not place the individual before the choice of life and death.

—Benito Mussolini, *Encyclopedia Italiana: Glimpse of World History*, 855

is for the people, by the people, and of the people' is still the non-changeable legitimate definition of Democracy. The American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution, with popular words and phrases, gave tremendous hope to millions of people on the earth for Liberties, Rights and equal opportunities. In 1900's, the Tsar's Government in Russia promised to establish the Constitutional Assembly (Duma) and democratic franchise to the people. The great world leaders right from Mahatma Gandhi, President Franklin, D. Roosevelt, Sir Winston Churchill, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr. Martin Luther King, Dr. Nelson Mandela; Late U. Than (Former Secretary General, UNO) etc. strongly believed in world democratic movement. Die-hard communist leaders like Mr. Nikita S.Khrushchev, Mr. S. Gorbachov, Camrade Chou-En-Lai, Cuba's strongman Fidel Castro; Mohammad Gadaffi of Libya etc. respected the principle of democracy adopted by other countries.

The finest ingredient of democracy is the people's mandate, which is considered as the hallmark of democracy. Today, India is the largest democratic country in the world and the main torch-bearer in Asian continent. It has got a concrete full-proofed written constitution and the people's representatives are elected democratically by the people to represent them in the Indian parliament. The Indian democracy movement and the developmental process are going on a synchronize volume and sound. There is no doubt, that, corruption and nepotism, which are universal phenomena, exists on the Indian democratic platform like a parasite. However, such unwanted phenomena could be kept at zero-level tolerance by means of: A sound and alert judicial systems; Good governance; political willpower; viable administrative infrastructures; Active role of the NGOs; vibrant media blitzkrieg etc. Indian constitution has got a sound checks and balances system, though complex, to avoid abuses of power and threat to constitutional order. The people believed that the politics of National Security of India requires a strong political consensus and political willpower, regardless of the party in power, so that the democratic flag could fly atop the parliamentary building of India, the seat of people's power.

CULTURE OF VIOLENCE

Asian continent has experienced a number of frightening violence for the last 90-100 years or so. Most of the wars which turned the faith and destiny of the people of the world fought on its soil: World War I, World War II, Korean War (1953), Vietnam War (1964-68), Arab-Israeli War (1948, 1967, 1971), Iraq-Iran War (1980's), Afghanistan War (1972, 2001-2008), Iraq War (2003) etc. In world history, no country had faced the test of a nuclear bomb except Japan, the Asian Samurai. Korean peninsula missed to become the second country to test the bomb, during the Korean War, when President D.D Eisenhower refused to give permission to General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, United Nations force in Korea, when the latter advocated for using the same against the 'red-ant' communist troops of North Korea. Vietnamese people and their socio-cultural activities were shattered for more than 20-25 years during the Vietnam imbroglio. During 1990's, children in Burma, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Iran and Pakistan were affected by the wave of violence in the form of insurgency movement, fundamentalism, fanaticism, and terrorism. Pakistan tested military dictatorship, fanaticism, fundamentalism and democracy. Democracy came out as a poor choice as compared to theocratic Islamic form of Government, Talibanism and Military dictatorship. The culture of supremacy of Islamic clerics; Islamic tenets; Taliban culture; ethnic and religious loyalties superimposed over the functioning of the judicial system, social institutions, defence forces

and the democratic form of government. Terrorism with the Islamic flag has become the biggest threat for peace, tranquility and rule of law in Pakistan. Bangladesh, after 1980s', has been plagued by political and social violence. Islamic religious culture and its religious flag 'Islam is in danger' had taken over the form of government and shakes the foundation of democracy. Bangladesh had transformed itself into a breeding pond of a number of terrorist, insurgent and *Jihadi* groups.

NORTH-EAST INDIA

The period of 1990-2005 AD. show the North Eastern region of India on the verge of losing everything they fought for: political, cultural, socio-economic, demography and religion. A culture of violence and intolerance swept the environment of the region due to abductions, killings, threats, extortions, ethnic hatred and ethnic cleansing agendas. Insurgents regularly abducted and 'executed' summarily innocent people and threatened many high-profile citizens, Administrators, Bureaucrats and politicians. It continued as a regular drill in the society, making the region a dangerous place for improvement of human habitations.

In Manipur, the insurgents, and the anti-national elements made regular threats to ministers, politicians, judicial officials, and bureaucrats, calling them to 'surrender' to them to explain the 'charges' leveled against them. Intimidation and warning included acts like placing of live hand grenade and IED (Indigenous explosive devices) at the gates of such Ministers, politicians general public and government's officials. Firing at the residences of Government officials, to show the power of violence, used to be very common. The environment of violence becomes more and more murkier due to the stand-off between the security forces and the insurgents. On 15 July 2004, dozen of Manipuri women, in extreme anger and desperation, shed their clothes and stormed the Indian Army base (9 Sector, Assam Rifles) at the Kangla, in protest against the custodial death and suspected rape of Miss Thangjam Manorama. In July 2008, about 15 boys in the age group of between 4 to 8, shedding their clothes, protested against the abduction and kidnapping of children by the insurgent outfits in Manipur. The play-cards and banners carried by them sent the correct message. "We do not want to hold guns but we want pens". "Please do not abduct us". Gradually, the socio-cultural environment, peace and tranquility of the State was dented and damaged by the Naga-Manipuri political and ethnic stand-off. Hawkish, tainted and burnt-out political leaders, ethnic supremos and power brokers who had influences and authority over many of the insurgent outfits for their political game-plan and survival, put the faith of the people of Manipur into the frying pan.

In Nagaland, the neighbouring State of Manipur, the same culture of violence and intolerance, continued in a rampant manner and shattered the peaceful life and liberty of the people. The Naga society suffered immeasurably due to the perennial conflicts and clashes among the sub-ethnic Naga groups. Ethnic Naga insurgent outfits were shooting and killing among themselves, in broad daylight, when children were going to schools and Naga citizens were rushing from one place to another for their daily earnings. The Chief Minister, the DGP (Director General of Police), Church leaders and many NGOs were intimidated and threatened for 'Summary execution,' if they did not tow their (Insurgent outfits) principle of Insurgency movement (Naga National Movement!). The acts of commissions and omissions of the various stakeholders made a serious division among the sub-ethnic groups, leading to hatred and heinous crimes which found difficult to be classified as a Revolutionary

Movement, Independent movement or Sovereignty movement. By 1980-2008, the culture of violence took over the Naga society, giving a serious socio-psychological impact to the mind of the young Naga children. The concept of Naga unification under one single Administrative umbrella produced more bloodsheds, tear, hatred and burial grounds, not only in Nagaland, but also in other parts of North East India. The daily nerve shattering factional clashes and killings among the Naga insurgent outfits, left the innocent citizen and young children

NAGALAND: CULTURE OF INTOLERANCE

Dr. Shurhozelie (Minister for Urban Development and Higher Education, Government of Nagaland) criticized the mindless act of factional killings in the State and warned that if the present rate of factional violence continued, the Nagas cannot survive. "Even if these two underground factions (NSCN-IM, NSCN-U) are allowed to fight each other for 100 years to come, they know they cannot finish one another. So what was the intention behind this kind of fighting amongst them? The big question is who is behind them."

(7 May, 2008; Kohima, Nagaland)

of Nagaland, in a terrified and horrified socio-cultural environment. By 2006-2007 AD, the index of culture of violence and intolerance of Nagaland took over that of Gaza strip in West Bank and Jerusalem in Israel. Naga politics, by 2007-2008, hang on a thin rope with heavy loads: - Nagalim; Naga unification; unification of Naga insurgent outfits; Naga insurgency to Naga terrorism; sub-ethnic Naga movement; political stand-off with Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam; and Naga society and religion.

Assam is crying for foul-play due to step-motherly treatment by New Delhi and the mainstream of Indian society against the Assamese. No one was listening to the suffering of the Assamese society. Since early 1950's the socio-psychology of the Assamese masses were full with anger, fear, uncertainty, doomed kaleidoscope with repeated vivisection of Assam. There was a perennial social fear of the incessant demographic invasion from outside

the state. The ULFA, the Bodo insurgent outfits and the Karbi insurgent groups rocked the state with the sound of sovereignty and independence. The political parties and politicians in the state contributed handsomely in the imbroglio of Assam. The Bangladesh migrants in Assam and elsewhere, who are likely to form the main ingredients for the movement of International terrorism in the region and South East Asia, had embedded in Assam permanently. Many politicians and political parties in Assam gave the migrants protective umbrellas for their vote-bank, forgetting the political complication of turning the state into a hot-seat or fountain head of pan-Islamic revolution. The security forces,

who were involved in counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations contributed their shares in the imbroglio of the state and in the field of Human Rights violations. By 2003-2004 AD index, the culture of violence and intolerance in Assam reached an unimaginable levels of human minds:

Assam Imbroglio:

Parties deny role in Illegal Infiltration Assam, 2008

Guwahati High Court, while hearing a writ petition on illegal migration into the State (Assam), has taken cognizance of a report by former Governor SK Sinha, that some political parties were encouraging illegal migration for vote bank benefits. The raging issue of illegal migration for decades finally received the judicial stamp in the High court's judgment on July 27, 2008, on a writ petition filed by 61 petitioners challenging orders by Foreigner's tribunal declaring them as foreigners.

(*Times of India*; 31 July 2008, Guwahati)

Bomb blasts; SULFA (Surrendered United Liberation Front of Assam) chasing and killing ULFA cadres; Fake encounters; extortions; Abductions; and threat of summary execution. Peace process in the state were bogged down several times due to political dichotomy and lack of political willpower. The socio-cultural psychology of the young Assamese children were affected seriously by the daily prevailing environment of culture of intolerance. The political agenda of New Delhi and the security forces, that once the ULFA is 'finish of'; peace and tranquility would prevailed in Assam might turned out to be a fable. ULFA insurgency movement formed only 15% of the ingredients of the imbroglio in Assam. Other core issues of Assam imbroglio are: Migrants problems (25%); socio-economic problems (25%); political issue of the Bodos (10%); political issue of Karbi Anglong and the NC Hills (10%); Boundaries disputes with Nagaland and Meghalaya (5%); Religious issue (5%); and others (5%). Today, the people of Assam are suffering an enforced culture of violence and intolerance.

Tripura, since early 1950's is in turmoil. The basic cause is the political stand-off between the original majority settlers, the tribal Tripuris (Twiparas) and migrants Bengali who swamped the state. By 1960's the majority tribal peoples were reduced to minority and the Bengali became the majority population in Tripura. Within a few span, a number of ethnic tribal insurgent outfits came into the scene demanding sovereignty and independence of Tripura. The Communist Party of India ruled the state for a considerable long period with the Indian National Congress in between. The political clashes between the majority Bengali and the minority tribal inhabitants became the main ingredient for the culture of violence in Tripura. The Tripura imbroglio can be classified as a socio-ethnic conflict for ethnic supremacy.

REVOLUTION: YESTERDAY

A few years back, upto 1930's, Revolution or Revolutionary movement used to be the spontaneous outcry of the masses against the ruling classes when there was a long gap between the riches and poor. The masses used to be the backbone of any successful revolutionary movement. When the ruling Government failed, the revolutionary movement succeeded. Till early 1940's, revolutionary movement in South East Asia and Latin America saw successes because the ruling classes were autocratic, dictatorship or fundamentalists. People believed Mahatma Gandhi, Mao-Tse-Tung, General Aung Sang, U-Nu, Hoh-Chi-Minh, General Von ghuen Giap, President Shukarno, etc. who led their people against the corrupted, autocratic and unjustified ruling classes. India's long revolutionary movements against the oppressed British rulers was justified. However, when the people got their own power, overthrow the ruling classes, transformed themselves into democratic form of Government, then Revolution become redundant and non-applicable in our society.

In early 1976, in Burma, Mr. Brang Seng, a former High School teacher in Kachin area, became President of one of the most powerful insurgent groups in South East Asia:- The Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) of Burma. In 1980's, he visited several European and Asian countries, including Britain, West Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Hongkong, Taiwan and sought political and military assistance for the establishment of a sovereign and Independent Kachinland (Kachin State). He called the Kachin insurgency movement a Revolutionary Movement against the Burmese Military Government. But he failed, when General Ne Win and then General Than Swe, the Burmese military strongman (SPDC) marginally improved the socio-economic conditions of the Kachins. Many die-hard politicians,

extremists and fundamentalists, in the initial stages, characterized imbroglio in Jammu and Kashmir as 'Kashmiri Revolution'. Today, the situation had changed. Fundamentalists, fanatics, insurgents and terrorists had hijacked the Kashmiri issue and transformed it into an agenda of World terrorist movement. It is no more a revolution. It is a war by terrorists and fundamentalists to change the legitimate democratic government by means of terrorism.

In early 1950's, it was the legendary Communist leader Jananeta Irabot Singh in Manipur, and the Naga leader Angami Zapu Phizo, in Naga Hills who put North East India on fire with the sound of Revolution. Comrade Irabot Singh (Uncle Irabot to outsiders) faced an untimely death (26 September, 1952). Mr. A.Z. Phizo continued with the flag of Revolution till he breathed his last in London. The great pathfinders Mr. Laldenga (Mizoram) and Mr. Arambam Samarendro Singh (Manipur) came out into the open with anger, anguish and desperations when New Delhi totally neglected the people of North East India. But when the purchasing power of the Manipuris and Mizos skyrocketed, Revolution and sovereignty receded from the horizon of North East India. Gradually the Nagas in Nagaland, Khasi and Garos in Meghalaya and the Tripuris in Tripura, Manipuris in Manipur, Assamese in Assam and the Mizos in Mizoram drifted towards the principle of Democracy.

REVOLUTION IN DEMOCRATIC INDIA

When India was under the British colonial rule, the word revolution was closely connected with the 'concept' of patriots and Martyrs. But when the country became Independent, the word has lost its colour and texture. Many other words like insurgents, guerillas, fundamentalism, fanaticism, anti-national elements, terrorists etc. has taken the place of revolution and revolutionary movement. India is now the largest democratic country in the world. Thus the question arises, if 'revolution' is still an acceptable playcard in the Indian democratic political infrastructure. If so how, if not why not?

Revolution is not a dream of fantasy of a child. It is a serious socio-political process which will decide the faith of not only a few people but for the whole masses. Revolution cannot be invented at every nook and corner to fight a legitimate government. It is a spontaneous acts by the hunted, depressed and hungry people. But when the people has got the full rights to governed themselves in the form of democracy, then the question of revolution or revolutionary movement become debatable. By 2006-07, standard, North East India has got more then 30-35 ethnic insurgent outfits. All of them called their movement, 'Revolutionary Movement'. All the seven States in North East India (Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura) have got State Legislative Assemblies and the Representatives (Member of the State Legislative Assembly) are elected by the people themselves. Any citizen of India can fight election and joined the Indian political democratic movement. Indian Democracy welcomes those people who raised the 'Revolutionary play-card' to join the mainstream of the society.

In early 1980's, Mr. Laldenga, the MNF Chief renounced violence, baptized with democracy and became the Chief Minister of Mizoram. His bête noire, Mr. C. Zoramthanga, the self-styled commander-in-chief of the MNF also followed his foot-steps and became the Chief Minister of Mizoram by means of democracy and please remembers, not by Revolution. In March, 1983, Mr. Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl told the people of Tripura, that 'Armed Insurgency was necessary to reach your heart' to the people.

Immediately, he wrote to the Chief Minister of Tripura that there is no conspiracy to secede from India, though he took up armed insurgency so that the down-trodden, Tripuri tribals could resurge and join Indian mainstreams on equal terms. In October 1989, he signed a peace Accord with the Government, baptized with democracy, plunged into politics and shared powers with the State ruling government. In July, 1997, the NSCN-IM under Mr. Issac Chisi Swu and Mr. Th. Muivah signed an agreement for ceasefire in Nagaland after waging a protracted insurgency movement since 1950's. The day heralded, in complete secrecy, the burial of the long demand of Naga Sovereignty, Independence and secessionism. Immediately, the NSCN-IM moved into the political gallery of India to transform itself into a Naga political platform with a politico-ethnic card. Insurgent outfits and their leaders which included Mr. SS Khaplang (NSCN-K), Mr. Dilip Nunisa (DHD); Mr Gobinda Basumatry, Mr. Ranjan Daimary (NDFB); 10 splinters Kuki insurgent outfits of Manipur; a faction of the ULFA insurgent outfit has one foot stepped into the Indian democratic political field. They are trying to become people's leader (political leader) through democracy. By 2006-2008 AD index, a small percentage of Insurgents from many Insurgent outfits in the region, surrendered to the security agencies of India. They included personals from the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB); the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Issac-Muivah group (NSCN-IM); the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang group (NSCN-K); People's United Liberation Front (UNLF); Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLFF); All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA); Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC); Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP); People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK); United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA); National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT). Mass surrenders by insurgents can be considered as the acceptance of principle of democracy and rejection of the myth of revolutionary movement. It shows the serious erosion of faith of the various insurgents' outfits to their own ideology and their clarion call of Revolution. "ULFA has lost its ideology and is least bothered about the people and the problems of the State. Both Paresh Barua and Jiten Dutta asked me to join their parties but I preferred to surrender and join the mainstream" (SS Corporal Bastav Gogoi @ Prabitra, 28th Battalion, 'A' Company, ULFA, who surrendered to General-Officer-Commanding, 2 Mountain Division of the Indian Army in Dinjan, Assam on 28 July 2008)

FOURTH DAY

There are a number of misguided brothers and sisters who still believed that sovereignty and independence could be achieved in North East India by means of 'Revolution' against the 'Colonial rule by India'. They included ULFA (Mr. Arabindra Rajkhowa, Mr. Anup Chetia, Mr. Paresh Baruah etc.); UNLF (Mr. R.K. Meghen, SS Brigadier A. Wangba etc); PLA (Mr. Irengbam Chaoren, SS Brigadier Provin Kumar); NNC and FGN. In Nagaland, the NNC and FGN outfits are marginalized by the NSCN-IM and NSCN-K. In Assam, the ULFA is fractured due to politico-military pressure and movement by New Delhi and Dispur. In Manipur, the Manipuri insurgents marginally isolated themselves from the general public not by the security forces but by their (insurgents) own follies and series of mistakes against the public—a road leading to 'Decay of Revolution'. By 2008 Assam

If you feed people with revolutionary slogans they will listen today, they will listen tomorrow, they will listen the day after tomorrow, but on the forth day they will say, "To hell with you".

—Nikita. S. Khrushchev

Government raised approximately 1000 surrendered militants from six major militant outfits, including ULFA, and deployed them alongwith security forces in anti-insurgency operations in the State. In Manipur, the State Government recruited almost 300 young persons as Special Police Officers (SPOs) for Heirok village in Thoubal District and Chajing village in Imphal West District, Manipur after militants killed villagers in those areas. It was a bold police action tried out by the State Government of Assam and Manipur respectively with a strategy of fight the insurgents with the masses, but with a loud cry for foul play from many Human Rights activists, NGOs and intellectuals.

By 2007-08 standard, many analysts felt that repeated beagle calls by the insurgents and the extremists has become a shrill sound to the public ears. Outfits asking village chiefs to provide computer-savvy youths to join the insurgency movement amounted to forcible and coercive act. In 2008, in Manipur, the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) admitted that they recruited children between 13 and 16 years as revolutionary but specified that they came 'voluntarily' and were not abducted as claimed by the general public in the state. Kidnapping of school-going children to make them Martyr or patriot are unthinkable. You cannot build up a revolutionary movement by kidnapping and recruiting innocent children and making them child soldiers. In 2007, the residents of Mon and the Phek districts of Nagaland, rallied against the Naga insurgents (NSCN-IM and NSCN-K) and forced them to leave the area. In May 2008, the same scenario was repeated in Dimapur, (Diphupar and the 4th Mile), Nagaland where the people poured out into the streets to drive away two groups of Naga insurgents (NSCN-IM and NSCN-K). In Assam, the Assamese, literally, revolted against the ULFA outfit when they carried out bomb blasts during the Republic Day parade in Guwahati, killing and injuring many school-going children and civilian spectators. The Bodos has got Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), but now demanding a bigger cake by vivisectioning Assam. There is no doubt that North East India is facing a conflict situation between the State and the anti-state stakeholders, thereby giving supremacy to violence rather than to the democratic ballot boxes. Yesterday, martyrs, revolutionaries, patriots and political leaders like Abraham Lincoln, V.I. Lenin, Dr. Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi, Dag Hammarskjold fought for freedom of mankind; freedom of religion and Human dignity; equal Human Rights, and the concept of labour-power. Today peoples are fighting for their democratic and fundamental rights; socio-economic advancement; secularism and Human Rights by means of ballot boxes, dialogue, discussions and peaceful means. When democracy stand on a strong foundation, revolution, insurgency movement, fundamentalism and terrorism become meaningless and will not be accepted by the future generation. Tomorrow, in the name of revolution, Jihad, and freedom struggle, millions of lives of young children, right from Trincomalee to Tora Bora; Pakistan to Sulu archipelago; London to New York; and Bangladesh-Burma-Nepal triangle, are going to perish with zero return benefits for Human beings. Recruiting, training, brainwashing or forcing a 13 years old child to commit suicide (Martyrdom!!!) or become a suicide bomber by wrapping with dynamite on the belly, covered with a firan or shawl, exploding the same in a crowded area, killing hundred of innocent peoples including young school children, with their mutilated bodies hanging around in the surrounding trees, with a loud voice, 'God is Great', does not form the true essence of revolution. If you shout day and night with the same old chorus, Revolution, Revolution and Revolution, on the fourth day, the answer from the young children, including your own, will be a Khrushchevian one: 'To hell with you'.

NOTES

1. Revolutionary Movement

"Strategic problems of China's Revolutionary war, December, 1936"; Mao Tse Tung, China]

Mao stated:

"The Laws of War—this is a problem that anyone directing a Revolutionary war must study and solve."

"The Laws of China's Revolutionary War—this is a problem that anyone directing a revolutionary war in China must study and solve."

2. Protracted War

[Statement of Truong Chinh, Secretary General, Vietnamese Communist Party, 1947]

"To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? Because if we compare our forces with those of the enemy, it is obvious that the enemy is still strong, and we are still weak. . . . The more we fight, the more united our people at home will be, and the more the world democratic movement will support us from the outside. On the other hand, the more the enemy fights, the more the anti-war and democratic movement . . . will check his hands; the revolutionary movement in the . . . colonies will oblige the enemy to divide his forces; and he will find himself in a position of isolation in the international arena. To achieve all these results, the war must be prolonged, and we must have time."

3. Culture of Violence

[Battle of Algiers; Revolutionary Movement in Algeria 1957 - 58. Statement by Bel Kasem Karim, the tough Algerian rebel leader who fought the formidable French troops in Algeria.]

Karim summarized revolutionary terror as under:

"I tried to avoid [intimidation] at first because it is not efficient. . . . You cannot hold a population by terror and we need the population on our side. But we have traitors among us. And we have to answer . . . repressions, too—massacres, torture, bombardments. This is a hard war, but perhaps that is a good thing." [Karim later on disapprove terror acts.]

PART IV

HOPE, RESOLUTION AND SOLUTION

General intelligentsia and political observers feels that a viable, durable, honourable and concrete solution have to be found out for North East India's imbroglio, taking into consideration of all stakeholders. Since early 1960's, New Delhi has applied a number of political agenda; half-backed political menu prepared by seasoned bureaucrats; and mistfit military agenda proposed by hawkist military statagists. The imbroglio of the region is not purely of a military problem and as such the solution should not be of an exclusive military nature. Solution of the region's problem will be closely linked to the geo-political upheavals in South East Asia, particularly in Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Nepal and Bhutan. On the other hand, the insurgents, anti-national elements (ANEs), fundamentalists, fanatics and terrorists should analyse that gun culture, violence, killing and assassinations is not the best weapon for a solution. They should listen to the call of the people; come for a dialogue process; bade farewell to arms; joined the mainstream of democratic movement; and contribute handsomely in the politico-sociocultural progression of the region. Democracy and the rule of law is the ultimate vision of the people of Manipur and North-east India.

POLITICAL MEASURES APPROACHES TO SOLUTION

A close scrutiny and analysis of India's National Security Policy show that there is a need to have a comprehensive, viable, fool-proof, concrete National political agenda for the strategic North-eastern region of India, which occupy an important geo-strategic position in South-East Asian region. In 1947, India gained freedom and independence after a long and protracted non-violence movement against the British rule, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the Nation. When the Britishers left India, they left behind the British legacy of divide and rule policy, dividing the country into many segments on religious, language and ethnic barriers. In the course of its long history since early 1940's, the country has seen four major wars; a number of major and minor clashes and skirmishes, internally and externally; ethnic flare-up and clashes; politico-military conflicts with its neighbours etc. India has defended its territorial integrity and safeguarded its honour with blood, toil and tears. The Constitution of India guaranteed to every citizen of India the right to defend the sovereignty; liberty; unity; integrity; the socialist, secular, and democratic character and structure of the Republic of India. India, as one of the largest democratic country in the world has got its National vital interest, which includes many important ingredients and elements. *"In specific terms, the National vital interests include safeguarding all the territory that historically, legally, constitutionally, traditionally, customarily and by de-facto possession belong to India."* (National Security, Gen KV Krishna Rao).

To form a National political agenda for National security, many elements and ingredients have to be considered, analysed, discussed and put down in the correct perspective for meaningful application and implementation. Important areas which require detailed analysis and discussion are the elements of national vital interests; internal security environment; external threats; strategic parameters; strength and weaknesses of the Nation etc. The security of a nation can be threatened in many ways by various means from many angle and direction. First and foremost, the external threat from other country/ countries or a neighbouring/adjacent country formed an important threat perception. The second important element is the internal threat created by the communal clashes and conflicts, caste-based socio-political movement, linguistic turmoil, ethnic political aspirations and upheaval, organized politico-

criminal nexus, drugs and nareco-politics. Sometimes, the external and internal factors and ingredients formed a dangerous movement and merry up to form a common politico-strategic front, which represents the third category of National security threat perception.

POLITICAL AGENDA

The erstwhile president of the United States of America, Mr. Bill Clinton, in his first National Security review of the United States of America emphasized, "Protecting our National security: our people, our territory, our ways of life, is my administration's foremost mission and constitutional duty". The North-eastern region of India has a population of over 38.50 millions spread over an area of 2,53,000 square kilometers, having international borders with China (1100 km); Bangladesh (4,011 km); Bhutan (410 km) and Burma (1644 km). There are three major Indian languages, more than 130 dialects and 230 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups sandwiched by a large number of cultural groups and sub-groups. That makes the region not only a unique place but also a complex one from the National political and security point of view. A deep study and analysis showed that the region formed an important national vital interest of India. In the near future, it will play an important role in the politico-strategic game in South East Asia. India cannot set aside the looming threat to the region from neighbouring countries. Out of the seven countries which surrounded India geographically, China and Pakistan are nuclear power states. China is having fundamental politico-strategic differences with India. Burma, due to its geo-strategic location and political compulsion is closer to China than to India. Bangladesh, due to its discomfiture of encirclement from three directions by 'big brother India' is trying not to identify itself as a satellite of India. Thus, India have to formulate and adopt a concrete, viable and transparent political agenda for the region, keeping in view the international threat paradigm, strategic interest of developed and developing countries in South East Asia, terrorism, insurgencies, sub-ethnic aspirations etc.

APPROACH AND STRATEGY

National Problem

For quite sometimes, political parties, politicians, general intelligentsia and social scientists, have analysed and scrutinized the vexed problem of the North Eastern region of India from different platform and angle. Some identified it as a National problem, because, the region formed a vital national interest from political, strategic and socio-economic angle. Any political and strategic damages of the region will have a collateral effects on the whole of India as well as to South East Asia. The region with approximately 3.75% of the total population of India, cannot be left and neglected at the national and the regional level. Insurgency, militancy, terrorism and ethnic crisis had gone too deep into the societal environment in the region in a complex phenomenon. It requires deep pathological understanding, analysis and deduction at the highest level for meaningful agenda, approaches and strategy. The problem of the region should not be downgraded as a simple regional or state issue. It should be identified as a National problem. On 12 May 2000, the Chief Ministers of the seven states of the region met in Shillong and decided to urge the Government of India to recognize the insurgency and militancy problem in the region as a National problem. The resolution known as the 'Shillong Declaration' jointly stated that the prevailing insurgency problems in the region has to be tackled on a broader front and not as a law and order problem in a restricted angle.

Political Problem

Since a long period, most of the ethnic groups in North East India had very high ethnic aspiration and as such were itching for political freedom. The Manipuris are agitating and fighting for revocation of their accession to India on 21 September 1949 and termed it "forced merger of the princely independent state of Manipur" under the most tragic circumstances. They are now raising the banner of Greater Manipur, which was in existence before 1947, with areas up to Doyang river to the North, Cachar valley to the west and the entire Kabaw Valley (Myanmar) to the east (gifted to Burma under Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and Mr U. Nu undertaking and accord). The Naga talked of Naga sovereignty and the Naga unification. The Bodos are demanding a separate 'Bodoland' to be carved out of Assam. The Dimasas in Assam want to restore their lost glory, historical and political rights and establish Dimasas Raj (Dimasas Kingdom) with its capital at Dimapur. The Dima Haram Daoga (DHD) has been waging an armed insurgency war against India, demanding separate state comprising the Dimasas dominated areas in the New Cachar Hills (NC Hills) and Karbi Anglong districts up to the Indo-Bangladesh border to the south. The Assamese want to restore their historical and political rights and 'liberate Assam' from India. Assam had faced several incidence of political dismemberment. Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh had been created in a systematic and gradual manner out of Assam. Tripuris in Tripura which has been reduced to a minority position are fighting to regain tribal supremacy over the Bengali population. Meghalaya is embroiled with the loud voice of independent state of Garoland. Bru (Broo) National movement is demanding the political rights of the Bru (Chakma tribals) ethnic group in Mizoram. The Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) came out as the torch bearer of the Bru political problem. Though surrendered in 2005, they are still the 'live force' in Mizoram. Arunachal Pradesh, a strategic and sensitive state in the region is now involved in insurgency and militancy with the formation of Arunachal Dragon Forces (ADF) renamed as the East India Liberation Front (EILF). They are waging a low intensity armed struggle of recreating the pre-British era 'Teola country' of the Tai-Khamtis, an indigenous tribe of the country's eastern frontiers, which included areas of the Lohit and Dibang district and the subdivision of Tinsukia (Assam). Every state in the region has got their's own problem. The asymmetry among the states are that all of them are affected by insurgency, militancy, and ethnic upheavals. Therefore the region's imbroglio should be identified as a political problem.

Socioeconomic Problem

Many analysts and politicians focused their attention to the economic backwardness of the region, geographical location; demographic structures; cultural activities; rich natural and mineral resources available in the area. Growth of socio-economic development in the region are very slow and tardy. Many insurgency and militancy movement in the region are the manifestation of the socio-economic backwardness of the region. They argued that it was impossible to put the region at par with other states of the country until it was pulled out of the prisoner's den in which it was languishing. "With the North East being cut off from the rest of India twice—first during partition [India's Independence, 1947] and later, and more particularly, in 1965 when access through East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was denied – development of the region will never be at par with the rest of India unless we are able to pull it out from this prisoner's den (Mani Shanker Aiyar, Union Minister for Development,

North East India, June, 2008). Many economists and politicians believed that Bangladesh was the single most important problem for the North Eastern region for socio-economic development in spite of India's contribution towards the liberation of that country in 1971. India's foreign policy, till early 1990's was also responsible for the socio-economic backwardness of the region. India should have look towards the south east Asian horizon 40-50 years ago, so that the North Eastern region of India formed a concrete base for India's National and Foreign policy for South Asia, particularly in the field of socioeconomic development. India's faulty National policy has robbed the legitimate rights and privileges for socio-economic upheaval of the region. Thus, the imbroglio in the region should be identified as a socio-economic problem and socioeconomic development should form the core issue for a change in political perception of the region.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC UPHEAVAL

GENERAL

Till early 1950's or so, Manipur had never heard the phrase 'starvation death' and the state was above Bihar and Orissa in terms of per capita income. The agricultural product of the state was more than sufficient to feed the entire population of the state. However, with the changing time, population explosion, refugee's influxes, internal displacement of sub-ethnic groups, insurgency and militancy etc., the state economy headed towards a catastrophic scenario. By 1999-2000, the situation became so critical that all activities of economic development came to halt and money was borrowed to pay the salaries and allowances of the state government employees. The reasons for such economic, financial doldrums was analyzed pathologically and assessed in details by many economists and social scientists and viable prescriptions were recommended. The economic development of 24 lakh population of the state, situated along the India-Myanmar border has to be carried out in conjunction with other states in the region. It has to be dovetailed with the ongoing economic vibration in the region and business opportunities available in Southeast Asian region.

"Corporate social responsibility (CSR) should be defined within the framework of a corporate philosophy which factors the needs of the community and the regions in which the corporate entity functions."

In: Manmohan Singh

ECONOMIC MARKET AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

Northeast India with an emerging market of 38.50 million people (2001 AD) has 38% of India's hydropower potential and significantly large reserve of natural gas, crude oil and coal. Apart from abundant minerals, it has 25% of India's forest cover. The potential in the agro and processed food sector, tourism and energy sector is immense. Almost 98% of its borders form India's international boundaries, a strategic gateway of India to Southeast Asia and the world. Global economic giants and foreign investors had identified the vast market opportunities in Myanmar (Burma), China, Thailand, Laos, Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh etc. Among the SAARC countries, strong movement for trade and commerce, collective economic development, concept of

Most Favoured Nation (MFN), a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) etc. has been discussed to translate into reality. There is a great chance and hope of emerging Northeast India as a focal point in the South Asian Regional economic cooperation, with its abundant natural energy resource. Manipur, the spring-board for socio-economic development in the region cannot be left far behind.

The economy of Manipur will move forward in good speed, once the economy of Northeastern region of India becomes vibrant. The state economy will get a boost as and when the TKK Road (Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo Road) in Myanmar (Burma) become fully operational for Trade and Commerce and the proposed Asian Highway connect the state with Myanmar, Thailand and beyond. The aim and objective of the 1400 kms long Asian Highway is to convert the already existing road, broken at various places, into a mega international Highway for speedy movement of goods, trade and commerce, linking Bangladesh, India (through Silchar and Imphal), Myanmar and Thailand. These will certainly benefit not only Manipur but also all the people in the Northeastern region of India. Manipur can have access to Chittagong harbour once India and Bangladesh finalized bilateral agreement for accessibility of Chittagong port by the states of Northeastern region of India.

‘LOOK EAST’ ECONOMIC POLICY

India has adopted a policy to have strong economic cooperation and bilateral relations with ASEAN countries (ASEAN consists of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam). In early 1990's, India embarked on a substantial and wide ranging economic restructures, reforms and liberalization, and became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN. In April 1995, an Indo-Myanmar trade agreement was signed between India and Myanmar, legalizing trades in 25 items, which includes pulses, mustard oil, rape-seed, beans, vegetables, fruits, garlic, onions, chilies, spices and minor forest products. Trading centers along the international border of India and Myanmar, covering Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland states on the Indian side and the Kabaw Valley on the Myanmar side were opened to facilitate trade and commerce. In 1996, India became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN and also joined the ASEAN regional Forum (ARF). On 4-6 November 2002, the first ASEAN-India summit was held in Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia, and India proposed for the creation of an ASEAN-India free trade zone by the year 2012 and some specific initiative to strengthen cooperation and trade with Laos and Cambodia. The formation of MGC group (Mekong-Ganga Cooperation) involving India, China, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos are likely to have substantial socio-economic benefit to Manipur and other states in the region. From 22 to 28 September 2007, as a part of its policy, India organized a North East Investment conclave in New York under the DONER (Department of the North Eastern Region) Ministry, Government of India in collaboration with the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) to attract foreign investors in the region. Chief Ministers of states and some other Ministers attended the meet. *"Innovative foreign policy is not enough to solve our problems of developments and growth and a policy framework in the domestic context also has to be in place to fully exploit the opportunity presented by geography. Accordingly, modifications have been made in the North East Industrial Policy 1997, with the objective of matching the aspiration level of these states through the North East Industrial and Investment Promotion Policy, 2007, after discussions with the states",* stated Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, the then External Affairs Minister, India, in a National Conference on India's Look

East Policy, held at Guwahati, Assam on 7-9 October 2007. Mr. Mani Shanker Aiyar, Union Minister for DONER, Government of India, stated that *"Delhi's Look East Policy cannot be successful without the involvement of North Eastern region. The policy has to be linked with the dynamics of North East. Unless we consider the North East as part of the dynamics of South East Asia, the Look East Policy cannot be successful"*.

STILLWELL ROAD

There is a regular and loud yearning to revive the legendary Stillwell Road, 1726 km in length, known also as the Burma Road. During World War II, the Allied Forces Commander, Major-General Joseph Stillwell, constructed the road from Ledo in Assam to Kunming (Western Yunnan in China) passing through the rugged mountains and dense forest areas of Burma in Myitkyina. After early 1950's, the road was disused for a long time, blocked at various places by landslides and became non-operational due to wear and tear. The drug mafia, drug warlords, insurgent outfits and ethnic groups of the Kachin tribe used to control those portions in the Myanmar sector. The revival of the road, can link up important cities in India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and China and give tremendous economic benefits to Southeast Asian Region.

SILK ROUTE

China is in favour of reviving the ancient silk route so that trade links can be established between China, Burma and India. The road travelled from Yunnan province (Southwest China) to Burma. One branch turns towards the city of Myitkyina in Northern Burma, crossed over Hukawng Valley, passed the Patkai hills and entered into India. Another branch travelled to Ruili (China) then to Sweli River into Burma, crossed over the Irrawaddy to the south of Myitkyina and enter into Manipur after crossing the Chindwin River. In 1896, the British India authorities surveyed the Indo-Burma region for construction of the Assam-Bengal railway line and found out three alternative routes. Two of the routes they considered for extension of the railway line from India to Burma followed almost the same silk route. The first one was Luming-Naga Hill-Manipur-Kabaw Valley and the second was Margherita-Patkai Hill-Hukawng Valley, Moguaung and Myitkyina. The third one was the western route which follow the axis of Chittagong-Akyab-Aengpass (Arakan Yomma)-Orine (Central Burma). China's interest of revival the old Silk Route is guided by political and sound strategic reasoning. India can exploit the economic advantages by reviving the route, keeping in view our national strategic interest particularly the Northeastern region of India. Manipur stand out as a major focal point from political angle.

EMERGING GROWTH ZONE

India, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh collectively constitute 35% of the world population. Bilateral trade between China and India was around 2.6 billion dollars in 2001-2002 and 5 billions dollars in 2002-2003. In 2005-2006, it touched around 10 billion and 44 billion dollars in 2008, though India's balance of trade shows a deficit of 16 billion dollars. On 15 July 2003, India and Myanmar signed an agreement to improve trade and commerce. In 2002-2003, bilateral trade was 500 millions dollars. By 2005-2006 they reached one billion mark. Up to 2002-2003, trade between India and Bangladesh were not buoyant and encouraging due to differences in political perceptions and aberrations.

India, on the other hand, has improved its trade relations with Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia and Nepal. On 6 January 2004 at the Islamabad summit of SAARC Nations, a historic framework agreement to establish free trade among the member countries, called SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Agreement) was signed which came into force from 1 January 2006. On 8 February 2004, India also signed BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) agreement for joint ventures in Trade, Technology, Tourism and Industry, and Human Resources Cooperations. On the same day, Nepal and Bhutan also joined the group. Under the framework of the agreement, tariffs will be reducing to zero by the year 2012 for developed countries (that is, India and Thailand) and by 2017 for the developing nations of the grouping. The SAFTA and BIMSTEC have given new hope in the region raising the expectation level of business community. Apart from the BIMSTEC and the SAPTA, India's bilateral relations with Burma and Bangladesh will benefit New Delhi, Rangoon and Dacca. On 02 April, 2008, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit-cum Transport project was signed by India with Burma (Myanmar), attended by the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the visiting Deputy leader of the Burmese Military Junta (SPDC), Vice Senior General Maung Aye, in New Delhi. The project costing Rs. 536 crores (2006-07), would link Kolkota (India)-Sittwe(Burma)-Mizoram (North East-India) along Kaladan River and eased out virtual blockade of North East-India by Bangladesh. India, in turn, can off-set China's pressure for their strategic corridor plan along river Irrawaddy linking the same to Sittwe port in the Bay of Bengal. The distance between Kolkota and the Sittwe port (Burma) is 539 Kilometres.

Bangladesh due to its compulsions for its political and the national interest did not take much interest for transit link along Kolkota-Dacca-North East India. The regional interest of Bangladesh in South East Asia *vis-à-vis* India is closely linked with China, Pakistan and other Muslim countries in Central and South East Asia. In 2008, the Bangladesh caretaker Government, backed by the Armed forces, came close to New Delhi, giving a positive signal for improved bilateral relations, including the visit by General Moeen U Ahmed, Chief of Staff of Bangladesh's Army to India. Bangladesh economic growth rate could be improved reasonably by having a close trade relations with all the states of India in its North Eastern region and West Bengal. Bangladesh should avoid the inhibition and the fear psychosis that the Muslim countries and the world fundamentalist groups would paint the country as a pliant and piggy rider state of India if they become bed-fellows in South East Asian politics. That was one reason why there was an active political vacuum and lack of political interaction between the two neighbouring countries though the opportunity for economic growth was tremendous, challenging and wide-ranging. New Delhi and Dacca need to look into the immense economic opportunity available in the region and harness the same for the economic welfare of the less advanced people. A positive growth rate in the field of economy in South East Asia will benefit the North eastern region of India. The opportunities presented by the globalization in South East Asia, can benefit North East India by having access to global markets and technologies. Manipur should try to exploit the opportunity by pro-active economic strategy and mobilization of regional resources.

CHINA SYNDROME

Strategic analysts normally posed the question of National Security when the topic of India's Look East Policy discussed in National platform. India is still less enthusiastic of having a giant leap

in trades and communication with its North Eastern neighbours: China, Burma, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. In the long run, India is going to fight a war with China in trade, commerce, and business in South Asia. On 23 June 2003, in Beijing, India signed a joint declaration with China on resumption of trade along Nathu-La in Sikkim-Tibet international border. India needs to take a bold approach to make its 'Look East Policy' a success, shacking off its China syndrome so that the region can be developed economically and socially. Divergence of issues should not form a roadblock to expand bilateral trade relations with China which was a few millions US dollars in 1959. India's foreign trade projection of US\$ 60-65 billions in 2010 could be counted as an appropriate daring strategy of foreign policy. Small states like Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh will benefit dramatically in the long run. However, New Delhi have to take special economic attention to check low-priced Chinese stuffs, which are 30-35 percent cheaper (2007-2008 AD Index) than Indian stuffs (Linen fabrics, Radio, torches, DVD players, batteries, compact fluorescent lamps, tyres etc.). The region should not be converted into a dumping ground of cheap stuffs exported from South East Asian countries. In India, Chinese silk cost \$ 25 per metric tonnes as compared to India's selling price of \$ 36.20 per metric tonnes. Banning of such stuffs is not the ultimate solution, considering the global trade scenario. The government has to initiate a series of actions under anti-dumping laws; more incentives to local industries; and other corrective measures so that the Chinese trade war did not massacre domestic Indian Industry in a calibrated manner. India has to challenge China in trade war by protecting Indian industry. Indian industrialists have to play a great role in global scenario on this national agenda. By 2025 AD, India can come into business parity with China and by 2040-45 AD can overtake them in Asian continent. In South Asian's venture, North East India will play a pivotal role and the strategic state of Manipur cannot be left far behind. Mandalay-Moreh-Imphal can be converted into a hub-centre for East-West corridor trade movement in Southeast Asia.

ECONOMIC UPLIFTMENT

There is tremendous scope where the Northeastern region of India in general and particularly Manipur can exploit the economic boom in Southeast Asian region. In the near future, Manipur is likely to be the epicenter of trade and commerce in Southeast Asian region. There is no doubt that India's policy of 'Look East', if properly planned and executed, will benefit the entire Northeastern region of India. However, Manipur should guard that the border trade and commerce doesn't have a negative impact on its own economy. A closer look of the Indo-Myanmar trade and its modus operandi show that a large number of clandestine traders, black marketeers, gangsters, insurgent, militants outfits etc. have joined the economic blood sucking in the most blizzard manner. Millions of rupees are exchanged on clandestine basis along the international border particularly at Moreh (Manipur), Champhai (Mizoram), Namphalong (Myanmar) and Tamu (Myanmar). From the Myanmar side, the Burmese, the Chinese, the Thais etc. with the assistance of drug warlords and the Burmese security forces are dumping cheap electronic gadgets on North East India. Those commercial items are routed from Yunan province of China to the trade town of Muse in North Eastern Burma (Sino-Burma border trade entry point) then to Mandalay and finally to Moreh town in Manipur. Chinese fabric and silk clothes, banned drugs, heroin, ganja etc. were dumped in the market of Northeast India. The drug warlords on both sides of the international border has gained and benefited tremendously in their clandestine business. In 1995-96, the value of heroin drugs smuggled from Myanmar to South

Asia, West Asia and western countries through Indo-Myanmar international border touches the magic figure of rupees one lakh crores (*Time Magazine*, New York, 23 December 1996). The amount is fifteen times more than the total amount of packages of aids to the Northeastern region of India offered by the then Prime Minister of India, Sri HD Deve Gowda (1996). Another group of people who gained tremendously from the border trades are the large number of insurgent and militants outfits, who extorted huge amount of money as 'taxes' from businessmen. For a meaningful socio-economic development, the state and the Central Government has to address the policy weaknesses and find out a solution. The law and order machinery have to be gear up and an environment have to be created where business activities, trade and commerce could be carried out without any inhibition. Moreh, the clandestine trade and commerce centre, with daily exchange of millions of dollars (Rs 5 crores per day by 2006-07 index) should be converted into a goldmine for socio-economic development centre not only for Manipur but also for the whole of Northeast India. In the near future, India's Foreign policy has to be dovetailed meticulously with the political, economic and strategic considerations of ASEAN countries.

ECONOMIC VISION

The North East India will require a whopping budgetary support of Rs. 70,000-Rs. 80,000 crores by 2015-2016 AD and Rs. 1,20,000-1,40,000 crores by 2020-2021 AD and a growth rate of 12.95 percent per year to catch up with the rest of India and other countries in south east Asia. The socio-economic vision needs to focus on banishing of poverty and hunger. Manipur should have its own economic vision and in turn economic direction. A vision has to be laid out by the political leaders, keeping in view the aspirations of the people, available natural resources, strength and weaknesses at various field, and the trend of socio-economic upheaval in the neighbouring areas. It should have the following core ingredients.

- (a) Establishment of viable state economic planning board.
- (b) Mobilisation of budgetary support of Rs. 30,000-35,000 crores for socio-economic development by 2020-2021 AD.
- (c) Focus on power, water resources, local resources and agro-industries.
- (d) Industrial growth centres.
- (e) Uniform Land Revenue Act.
- (f) Single window clearance approach.
- (g) Focus on banking system, FDI, Corporate Houses and flow of funds into the states.
- (h) Focus on Law and order environment.

MANIPUR TOURISM

"When the British scaled earth's highest peak, the exploit was widely hailed as the 'conquest of the Everest'. It was not realised and is often not realized still, that the word 'conquest' was totally out of place in the context of the peak which is considered an object of reverence by many. One does not 'conquer' nature. Nature humours at times, man's curiosity. Conquest is, therefore, an irreverent word"

—Guy Sorman, French Scholar.

Manipur is a land-locked, mountainous and lush green state situated majestically along the Indo-Burma (Myanmar) International border. The states along with other states of North East India show a great potential for Tourism industry. However, the same has not yet been exploited fully to attract large number of tourists in the region. The region has failed to exploit tourism industry in spite of having all tourist attractions. According to the Annual Report of the industry of Tourism, Government of India (2000-2001), the North eastern region of India shares only 0.5% of the total tourist traffic in India. There is a need that all the eight states (including Sikkim) in the region should form a consolidated Master plan to attract foreign and domestic tourists.

LACK OF TOURIST INTEREST

Manipur is a land rich in flora and fauna, thick forests, criss-cross by rivers, nallahs, tributaries, gorges and water spring and a paradise for anthropologists and tourists. It is a place of magical beauty, a pride for cultural and ecological diversity, ancient heritages, with wonderful geographical features. However, the state has failed to attract tourists' in spite of having wonderful tourist spots, attractions, and the most hospitable people in the world.

The main reasons for the same are:

- (a) Underdeveloped tourist spots, shopping facilities and infrastructures.

- (b) Lack of systematic and scientific development of flora and fauna.
- (c) Lack of communication and transport.
- (d) Lack of proper accommodation of national and international standards for domestic and foreign tourists.
- (e) Absence of vibrant department of tourism, publicity, and advertisement.

Manipur Tourism		
Visit of Domestic and Foreign Tourists		
Year	Domestic Tourist	Foreign Tourist
1998	0.9 lakhs	173
2003	1.3 lakhs	410
2006	1.4 lakhs	316

- (f) Restrictions imposed at various level: Restricted Area Permit (RAP); Inner Line Permit; Foreigners Acts etc.
- (g) Law and order problems: insurgency, militancy, ethnic violence and security hazards.

STRATEGY AND APPROACHES

Manipur needs to formulate a long-term policy and planning for tourism industry with a campaign to promote, facilitate, and attracts private firms, investors, promoters and business houses. They should take the advantages of interest subsidy available for 3-star hotels and heritage category of hotels for loan given by many financial institutions like Tourism Finance Corporation of India, Industrial Finance Corporation of India, ICICI, SIDBI, IDBI etc. The state government should interact with the Ministry of Tourism, Government of India and the Ministry of Home to remove restrictions imposed on domestic and foreign tourists visiting the state. The aim and objective should be how to make Manipur one of the major tourists destinations in India.

The policy, planning and agenda for tourism should have the following main ingredients:-

- (a) A long term vision statement, and sound tourist roadmap.
- (b) A master plan for development of tourism industry.
- (c) Action plan to make Manipur major tourist destination of India.
- (d) Establishment of tourist accommodation, wayside amenities, improvement and establishment of low-budgeted hotels and restaurants near tourist spots.
- (e) Renovation/refurbishment of historical monuments, roads, and tracts.
- (f) A master plan to attract private capitals, business and corporate houses, financial institutions, to establish tourism infrastructures in the state.
- (g) Actions to improve law and order situation of the state to give assurance for security to domestic and foreign visitors.
- (h) Promotion of wildlife tourism by the forest department in consultation with TV channels like discovery and the National Geographic, Doordarshan, Private TV channels.
- (j) Removal of Restricted Area Permit (RAP).

PROMOTION AND DEVELOPMENT VISION 2025

The rich natural beauty, serenity and exotic flora and fauna of Manipur are invaluable resources for the development of eco-tourism in the state. The government of India has given great importance to the development of tourist infrastructure in the Northeastern region of India. Ministry of Tourism, Government of India had taken many steps, policy and planning to promote tourism in the region. A chapter of Indian institute of Tourism and Travel management was opened at Guwahati to boost-up tourism activities in the Northeastern region of India.

Tourism can bring a new life style to the people of Manipur and improve the socio-economic life of the populace. However, there is a need to promote the same in a wider scale. Tourism concerning the historical, the pilgrimages, and the heritage sites have to be develop in a gradual, esthetic, and scientific manner keeping in view the environment and social angle of the people in the state. New areas for tourist spots and attractions should be identified and developed in a phase manner.

HISTORICAL TOURISM

Imphal: Historical Goldmine

During World War II, the entire world did not know where is Manipur, which played a prominent role in the campaign in South East Asia. If anyone asked a British, American, Chinese or Japanese Army Officer, 'where is Manipur', his answer would be a blind look and head-shaking. He would suggest that it might be somewhere in Manchuria and advised to open a map of Mongolia or China. It was easier to find out a needle in a haystack rather than finding out Imphal, the legendary capital of Manipur on a South East Asian map.

However, by 1944-45, when the war progressed, Manipur shot up in the world map. The British knew it by heart, the Japanese Army knew it as the palm of their hand and the American noted it permanently in their map. The name of Imphal became as prominent as the Dunkirk in Europe; Stalingrad in Russia; Somme in France; Kunming in China and Pearls harbour in Pacific Ocean. The young, energetic and faithful Japanese soldiers had a yearning to see Imphal, the capital city of Manipur which was ruled by a single dynasty since time immemorial, like the Japanese Imperial kingdom. The dream of Lieutenant-General Kawabe, Commander, Japanese forces in Burma, who heard the name of Imphal more than Kremlin, New York, Berlin, Rome, and London could not be fulfilled. When General Kawabe's boys failed to capture Imphal—the impregnable fortress, General Tozo, the Supreme Commander of the Imperial Japanese forces, groaned, lamented and retorted: 'What is there in Imphal'. Imphal-valley, a bowl-shaped landscape with small-hillock and green fields is one of most enchanting and attractive valley in South East Asia which bridged India and Burma. In early 1940's, the British India Government saw the politico-strategic importance of Manipur. Admiral Earl Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander, Far East Asia; General Wavell, Governor-General of India; Lieutenant-General Slim (Later on Field Marshal) and other British and American officials knew that the faith of the Allied troops of winning the war in Far East Asia against oriental Japanese Samurai troops largely depended on who possessed and controlled Imphal, the magical queen of South East Asia. The Britishers hold Imphal till the last. The Indian National Army (INA), known as 'Jiffs' in the British vocabulary, and Major-General Tanaka, General Officer Commanding, the 33th Japanese

division failed to capture Imphal except planting Indian Tricolour at Moirang 45 Kms to the south of Imphal. The mighty Imperial Japanese Army, the rising sun from the East, failed their dream of subjugating South Asian continent when they could not touch Imphal, the majestic queen. The Samurai troops raised from the East and set in Imphal.

All tourists would love to see Imphal which has got a long legendary history. The young Japanese tourists would love to study Manipur where the entire military hierarchy of Japan in South East Asia was shaken-up; General's Kawabe's head rolled-down; Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi was kicked out and General Yamamoto faded out, due to one single important cause: failed to capture Imphal. The history of military campaign, during World War II in South East Asia cannot be considered as complete without having the battle of Imphal. The Japanese historians mentioned Imphal-Kohima battle as "the disaster, which was perhaps the worst of its kind yet chronicled in the annals of war".

The Loktak Lake

It is the biggest lake in Manipur, situated 45 kilometres to the south of Imphal, at Moirang, the legendary birth-place of Khamba and Thoibi of the Manipuri folklore. In ancient time, the people of Moirang and the surrounding villages were dependent for their livelihood on the Loktak lake. The lake is full of aquatic birds, fishes, non-poisonous as well as poisonous serpents. It is a natural, rain fed lake with floating reeds, laberinthine boat routes and colourful water plants. The lake supplied 60%-70% of the requirement of fishes of the state. It is also rich in aquatic plants. Lotus of different colours and the Thanging, another water plant with thorn all around the leaf and the stem are found in abundance. Water fowls available in the lake includes wild duck, partridges, wild geese and other smaller types of local birds. During summer, some of the birds migrated towards the North east of Manipur presumably heading for cooler place in Burma and Tibet. Development of the lake as a tourist destination in North East India will improve the socio-economic life infrastructures, communication, tourist accommodations, wayside amenities, low-budgeted hotels and restaurants in and around the lake areas (expected yearly earning: Rs. 35-40 crores).

INA Memorial

It is situated at Moirang, 45 km to the south of Imphal, the first place on Indian soil where the Indian National Army (INA) under Netaji Subash Chandra Bose raised the Indian National Flag during World War II. The memorial needs expansion, modernization, display of historical facts and figures which attracts National and International attention and interest. Reconstructions, renovation and promotion of the area will increased the image of the state (expected yearly earning: Rs. 5-6 crores).

War Cemeteries

Two identical World War II cemeteries are existing at Imphal. They are looked after by the Commonwealth War Grave Committee. There is a need of area get-up surrounding both the cemeteries. It is strongly recommended that the state government pay more attention to stop encroachment, and construct approaches roads to the area. Renovation, beautification and landscaping of the same will attracts international tourists particularly from United Kingdom, USA and Japan (expected annual earning: Rs. 2-3 crores).

PILGRIMAGE TOURISM

Nongmaiching Hill Aka Longmaiching aka Baruniching

It is one of the majestic, serene and beautiful hill feature situated 20 kilometres away to the east of Imphal, where the famous temple of God Mahadev existed. The hill feature run in North-South direction, covering an area of 150-160 square kilometres, the highest top being 1500 metres from MSL (Mean Sea Level). Close on the southern spur, the Iril river flows from North to south direction, making the general area a tempting place for human habitation. It is believed that, during ancient time, the hill feature including the general areas around it, was in possession ('ruled') of Longmai Ningthou (king Longmai Ningthou (king Longmai, a local ruler, like in a Greek city state). On the top of the mountain, there is a place called khalong (literal meaning being, a shade or a shelter, with overhead protection from rain and sun). It is believed that the place is a sacred place for all the seven clans of the Meitei (Mangang, Luwang, Khuman, Angom, Moirang, Khaba-Nganba, and Sarang Leisangthem). It was a general practice for the king of Manipur go to Khalong, every year and erected an iron ladle (khabei) for the prosperity, good rainfall and excellence productions of crops in the kingdom. The Manipuri folklore describes the place as the spot where the coronation ceremony of Nongpok Ningthou and Panthoibi took place. At later stages, the hill feature was generally known as Nongmaiching, probably a corrupted word of Longmaiching (whenever cloud covers the hill feature, people in Manipur valley predicted rainfall. In Manipuri, Nong=rainfall; Mai=face; ching=hill. The hill feature took the form of weather forecasting agent and hence Nongmaiching). Every year, young boys and girls used to go for pilgrimage and climbed the hill feature with a time-frame of 10-16 hours, covering a distance of 8 - 10 kilometres, as an annual ritual for a prosperous life in future. Development of the site will involve construction of approach roads and tracts from the foothills to the top; construction of pilgrimage site on top of the hills; power supply; provision of water; wayside amenities, hotels, rest houses for the devotees. On the foothills, the state government has already mooted plan for the construction of an eco-tourism complex including a Golf Course to attract National and the International tourists. The area can be developed as a bio-diversity tourist spot and attractions (expected annual yearly earning: Rs 20-26 crores).

Koubru Ching (Koubru Hill)

It is situated to the North of Manipur, at a distance of 25 Kms from Imphal, astride National Highway 39. It is the sacred religious place for the Manipuri. The temple of God Koubru Mahadev is situated at *Koubru Leikha* (Down slope of Koubru Hill). The area is adjacent to Leimakhong Military Station of the Indian Army. It is an ideal location for the establishment of Eco-tourism. Tourist attraction will be Koubru Hill Top, springs, primary and secondary jungle undergrowths, and scenic view of Imphal Valley. The temple complex can be improved to attract tourists. Thick secondary jungle which can be converted into bio-diversity and ecological spot are still existing without any attention. Koubru Hill-top is the magical spot where one can see the beautiful landscape of Imphal valley. The highest hill top is known as *San Marum* (Hump of a cow). Since time immemorial all travellers (including vehicles) along NH-39, used to halt at Koubru Mahadev temple to give their obeisance and for blessing in their journey further ahead. Proper maintenance, development and promotion of the area will create communal harmony among various communities/groups. It will

attract national and international tourists due to its easy approaches and communication facilities. The area can be developed as a bio-diversity park and tourist attraction. (Expected yearly earning: 10 crores).

HERITAGE SITES

Andro Heritage Site

Andro, a *Chakpa* village, is situated, on the foothills of *Nongmaiching* hill, 25 kilometres to the east of Imphal, capital of Manipur. The villagers have a unique identity of their own: Nature loving; worshipping of fire; and maintenance of pollution free eco-system. Tourist attraction consists of a cultural heritage complex, initiated originally by Mutua Museum in early 1990's. The complex is having different traditional houses of different indigenous communities of Manipur; rare cultural items of North East India; textile products of South East Asia, to give any visitors a glimpse of the way of life of the communities inhabiting in the region. With some assistance from the Government, participations and involvement of scholars and academicians, the area can be converted into a National centre for material cultural studies of different groups and communities of South East Asia. This will help in the development and promotion of tourism in Manipur and adjoining area. (expected Annual earning: Rs. 2-3 crores).

The Kangla

Since time immemorial, the political and the socio-economic activities of the kingdom of Manipur was concentrated to Imphal, the capital city of Manipur. The Kangla, the Royal fort, situated in the middle of Imphal city, acted as the citadel of the Manipuri kingdom. Spread out in an areas of approximately 185 acres, with important historical monuments and sites of the ancient Royal Palace of Manipur, the Kangla, was occupied by the Assam Rifles (a para-military force of India) from early 1830's till 2004. From 2005-06, with the assistances and funds from the Central Government, renovation and reconstruction of the Heritage site started.

The Kangla is related umbilically to the reign of Pakhangba, the snake King-God of Manipur (33 AD) and further to a long list of King/Maharaja of the kingdom of Manipur. It formed the apex of the Anglo-Manipuri War of 1891. It was on 24 May, 1891, exactly at 12 O'Clock at midnight, that the British officials Mr. J.S. Quinton, Chief Commissioner of Assam and Mr. Frank Clair Grimwood, Political Agent of Manipur, who were principal architect of the war against the Manipuris, were beheaded accompanied by the lowering of the Union Jack, though temporarily, from the soil of Manipur.

During World War II, when war progressed in South East Asia, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, established temporarily his tactical Headquarters inside the Kangla fort; constructed a small British-style brick and teak-wood house and named it as "Slim Cottage" (Still existing in tact). The Kangla acted as the springboard of 14th Army (Eastern Army, India) operations in South East Asian campaign. There is no doubt that the Kangla which includes all peripheral like the Imphal Pologround, Women Market, Gobindaji Temples, Palace areas etc. has become as important as the Ankor Vat of Thailand, and more precious than the Majuli in Assam (India). Many countries have kept important historical and environment sites in tact for the benefits of future generation. The restoration and preservation

of such old historical sites may sometimes clash with the advancement in science and technology. socio-economic movement and industrialization. A number of heritage sites have been destroyed throughout the world, due to lack of interest, willpower and knowledge. Sometimes such sites have been swamped by concrete jungle and sky scrappers in the name of industrialization and modernization. Their argument is that either you stay 2000-2500 years behind in the name of preservation of heritage sites or try to progress by 2000 years ahead with industrializations and globalization. Classification, preservations and protection of heritage site is not an act of anti-industrialization and globalization. It is a natural process of human beings to keep age-old important places so that it achieves tremendous cost benefit to the future generation in understanding the world in a better form. Preservation of heritage site, in one form or the other, is to increase power of knowledge and understanding. In such scenario and environment, there is a need that the Kangla, one of the rare site for cultural and historical heritage, should be kept as heritage site for future generation. It will attract tremendous interest to the younger generation particularly from oriental countries. In later stage, it can become one of the biggest tourist destinations for world heritage in South East Asia. Thus the need arises to declare Imphal as a world heritage site for the benefit of millions of people particularly in South East Asia.

DEVELOPMENT OF NEW AREAS

Khoupum Tampak

It is situated at a distance of 60 kilometres to the south-west of Manipur, in an enchanting raised valley platform. In olden days, Khoupum Tampak (Khoupum valley) acted as an important halting place, along the famous land route of Tongjei Maril for onward journey from Imphal to Silchar through Jirighat. Khoupum valley can be reached by traveling to Bishenpur, then to Leimatak and Leimatol hill area. This is the legendary route where Mrs. St. Clair Grimwood, wife of Political Agent of Manipur walked on foot [during the Anglo-Manipur war of 1891]. On 25th March, 1981, she escaped from the British Residency at Imphal and reached Khoupum on 26-27th March. During the reign of Maharaja of Manipur, the princely kingdom used to maintain a police thana (police outpost) at Khoupum valley to provide security of Manipur-British India territorial border at Cachar (Silchar). Today, Khoupum valley has got all the ingredients to transform itself into a National tourist spot. It can be developed and promoted as a beautiful tourist spot and attraction. It will create job opportunities for various communities/groups in the region and improved socio-economic life. It can be developed as a bio-diversity park with minimum efforts (expected yearly earning : Rs. 5-6 crores).

Khankhui Cave

It is a lovely and beautiful cave situated close to Siroy Hill in Ukhrul districts of Manipur. Construction, development and landscaping of the area will enhance tourism industry in Manipur. (expected yearly earning : Rs. 1 crore).

Tharon Cave

A famous and beautiful cave tucked in the hilly site in Tamenglong district in North West Manipur, has attracted the attention of many tourists. Developing and landscaping the surroundings greenery areas can develop it as National tourist attractions. (expected yearly earning: Rs. 1 crore).

Dzuko Valley

It is situated on Manipur-Nagaland border astride National Highway 39 in Senapati district (Mao Area) in Manipur. It is a small bowl-shaped valley area on top of High Mountain. It can be developed as beautiful and enchanting bio-diversity areas.

Moreh : The Eastern Gate

Moreh is a small Indian border town, 106 Kms to the South-east of Imphal has come up as an important International trading centre along the Indo-Burma international border. It is the gateway of India to Burma and other South East Asian countries. The area with its evergreen forest and enchanting greenery can be converted into an international tourist spot. The area is inhabited by the Manipuri Meities, the Kukis, the Nagas and other business communities. It is a beautiful semi-hilly areas close to the Kabaw valley of Burma. The state government have to chalk out a mega plan form tourist attraction which includes tourist friendly accommodations; wayside amenities; construction of International trading centres; Indo-Burma cultural activities; Banking system; improvement of law and orders and free movement between Moreh and Tamu. (Expected yearly earning: 35-40 crores).

IMAGE INDUSTRY

In today's environment, tourism is closely related to socio-economic life of the people. Socio-economic development is related to economic growth, social changes and social awakening of the people. In developed and developing countries economic growth has brought great social changes and quality of life. Tourism has brought a great change in the social life of human being. People to people contact, seeing each other areas and important places, understanding each other way of life, has brought tremendous rapport amongst different communities. It has generated employment, increases per capita income, improves social images and enhanced foreign exchange earnings. Many countries have accepted tourism as an industry.


As a social priority, Manipur should develop and promote tourism industry in the state on priority. The government has to create the facilities and infrastructures for the same, with close co-operation with the financial institutions and the NGOs. The state has to attract corporate houses for resources mobilization. Business houses will not invest their money in areas where the law and order are too unfavourable in business transactions. Enforcement of regulations and other social actions like Restricted Area Permit (RAP) and the Inner Line Permit (ILP) requires a relook and reassessment from National angle. Such regulations should not act as an impediment and roadblock to development and promotion of tourism in the region.

Tourism industry requires a sound and meaningful market linkages. Tour and travel operators can contribute tremendously by undertaking market survey and linking up all tourist agencies in the region. Manipur should have close business understanding with other states in the region including Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, Bhutan etc. A positive image has to be form to attract tourist in the state. In today's environment, tourism has become an images industry, a shows case box, attracting large number of people by incessant and steady means.



**Main Gate (Western Side)
of the 'Kangla', 2004**

The Main gate of the Kangla started construction in 2000 AD when the Indian security forces (The Assam Rifles) was garrisoned inside the complex. The Kangla fort was handed over to the people of Manipur by Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India in December, 2004. The gesture cool down the national emotional upheavals of the Manipuris



**Shree Shree Gobindajee
Temple, Imphal, Manipur
(India).**

The oldest Hindu temple in Manipur, visited by hundred of devotees everyday, a gold coated domed structure on the top. The sping-board for preservation, revival and spread of socio-cultural Hinduism. Needs extensive renovation, expansion and landscaping to attract devotees and tourists



Manipur Palace

The neglected ancestral cultural heritage site in South East Asia.

The Royal family of Manipur used to stay in the palace till early 1972. Built in 19th century; occupied a little more than 125 acres; housed successive Royal family of Manipur. The surrounding areas has been encroached by power brokers, businessmen, scrupulous politicians, bureaucrats and 'social workers'. Require political will power to restore the historical National pride of the majestic cultural building. Recommended to be converted to world heritage centre.




Andro Cultural Heritage Site, Manipur

Situated 25 kilometres to the east of Imphal, at Andro hillocks; presented homogenous ethnic cultures of Manipur of the Meitei, the Naga, the Kuki and other communities.

Kangla Fort, Manipur

Since time immemorial, it was considered as the citadel of the kingdom of Manipur. The Kangla Fort covered an approximate area of 198 acres. During World War II, Field Marshal Sir William Slim established his tactical Headquarters inside the Kangla for 14th British Army. Since 2004 A.D., renovation is going on. Needs extensive strategy to attract tourists.



The Sangai

(The animal who look at you).

The brow-antlered deer found in and around the Loktak lake area. If not protected the animal is likely to extinct from the soil of the earth. It is the mascot of the state Government of Manipur.




Loktak Lake, Manipur, 2007

The serenity, peaceful environment and pride of the lake has been impaired due to insurgency imbroglia in the region. Security forces carrying out counter-insurgency operation in Loktak lake.



Loktak Lake of Manipur

A paradise for International tourism. Moirang, the legendary birth-place of Khamba and Thoibi of the Manipuri folklore is situated on the edge of the Loktak. It is a natural, rain feed lake with floating reeds and colourful water plants. Wild ducks, partridges, wild geese and water fowls are available.



The Game of Kang

It is an indigenous game play only in Manipur. Two sides contested the game with dices. Require a smooth area of mud, so that the dice can be thrown on the opposite side. A side consists of 7 persons.



Hockey-cum-Wrestling Game of Manipur
An indigenous game play of Manipur with hockey sticks, hockey ball accompanied with wrestling.



Polo, the Game Invented by Manipuris
The game of polo was originated from Manipur, though western country claimed for the same. In olden days, the Manipur horses (ponies) were bred in the kingdom and extensively used for the game.



The Mao-Maram Dance (Manipur)
An ethnic group of the Tibeto-Burman group of the Mongoloid stock. Believed to be migrated from Central and South China region, entered Burma and settled down in Manipur. The Mao sub-tribe is also known as Saproma (Shipfumei), and quasi-Angami. 'Shepoumaramith' identifies their culture, traditions, customs, land and religion. Majority of them (90%-95%) converted to Christianity. They are non-vegetarian.



Kabui Dance of Manipur
The Kabui tribe belongs to Tibeto-Burman family of Mongoloid stock. One of the most gaily, cultured and energetic ethnic group of Manipur. Spread out in Manipur, Assam and Nagaland. Form a close mosaic with the Manipuri Meitei socio-economic culture and traditions.

Majority of them (80%-85%) converted to Christianity. They are non-vegetarian.



Radha-Krishna Dance of Manipur (Raas Lila)



Khamba Thoibi Dance of Manipur



Lai Haraoba Dance of Manipur
One of the oldest dance in Southeast Asia, practised in Manipur since time immemorial.



Radha Krishna Dance of Manipur

The Meiteis (The Manipuri Meiteis)

The Manipuri Meiteis (The Meiteis) is one of the oldest and finest ethnic groups in South East Asia. Belongs to Tibeto-Burman group; impeccable cultural similarity with Mongoloid race, Tibetan and pro-Thais group. Asymmetric racial relations with ethnic groups in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Yunnan, Eastern Bangladesh and Laos. Evidence of Pleistocene man seen in Khankhui cave in Manipur. Stone age culture and traditions found in the state. Umbilically related to the Naga and the Chin-Lushei-Kuki stocks.

Mostly believed in Hinduism; practised vegetarianism and believe in oriental cultures. High literacy rate 80%-85% from 1970s to 2008. They are at the cross-road of Manipuri Nationalism, socio-cultural identity and territorial integrity of Manipur.



The Tangkhul Dance of Manipur.

The Tangkhul tribe belongs to Tibeto-Burman group of the Mongoloid race. Place of origin believed to be Makhel (North Manipur). Sirohifurer (Shiroi Hillis) in Ukhrul District Manipur, played important role in Tangkhul eschatology. Social system is built around clan system, known as 'Shangnao' (descendant group from the same ancestors through genealogical links). In olden days, practiced Head hunting. By 2000 AD, 95% of Tangkhul converted to Christianity. They are non-vegetarian.

The Bamboo dance of the Zomi (Manipur).

The Zomi (Zoumi) ethnic group belongs to Chin-Lushai-Kuki group of the Tibeto-Burman family of Mongoloid stock. Their place of origin is believed to be central China. Migrated towards Irrawaddy and the Chindwin rivers basin, entered Mizoram, Manipur and Assam. Zomi means Highlanders (Man from the cold: Zo means cold, Mi means Man). The Zomi were known as Chin in Burma; Lushai in Mizoram; Kuki in Assam, Manipur and Naga Hills (Nagaland). Closely linked to Laimi in Burma (Haka, Falam, Matupi).

They converted to Christianity (90%-95%) en masse. They are non-vegetarian.



The Anal Dance of Manipur.

The Anal sub-tribe belongs to Tibeto-Burman group of the Mongoloid race. In olden days, Anal, Moyon, Mon, Lamkang, Chothe and the Tarao were known as Pakan. They migrated from China towards Irrawaddy and the Chindwin rivers basin; entered Kabaw valley and the Chin Hills and divided into small groups. The Pakan (Anal) migrated towards south, entered Mizoram and Manipur. In Mizoram, they were driven out by the powerful Pawis (Pois) and the Lushais. Finally, they settled down in Eastern Manipur along with the Maring (Marring) tribe. The name Anal (Nanba=slippery) was given by the Manipuri Meitei to the nomadic tribe (Ningthourol Lambuba, ancient chronicle of Manipur).

Majority of them (90%-95%) converted to Christianity. They are non-vegetarian.



CROSSING THE TERRITORIAL MINEFIELD OF STATE INTEGRITY

*"A great war leaves the country with three Armies: An Army of cripples,
an army of mourners and an army of thieves."*

—American Proverb

In early 1970's the issue of territorial identity and integrity of Manipur came up as a dormant volcano, which led to serious political repercussions due to lack of political maturity, understanding and foresight. It produced a plethora of questions rather than the answer. In 1980's, it surcharged not only the politico-ethnic-insurgency/turmoil in the state but also produce a ripple in the whole of Northeast India. The people used to be on the street, whenever the Central Government in New Delhi analyzed and contemplated the feasibility of vivisection of the state to solve other ethnic issues—the Greater Nagaland, Southern Nagaland, Kuki Homeland, Greater Mizoram, independent state of Zeliangrong, Unification of Nagas under one single administrative unit etc. By 1990's the entire Manipuri, particularly the younger generation almost lost their future direction; political parties and politicians became dysfunctional; and the general intelligentsia failed to give light to the society. There was a total societal crisis in confidence. Protection of territorial integrity and identity became the most important issue in the state, affecting the emotional state of the Manipuri psyche. However, the thorny politico-ethnic issue was hijacked by the insurgent and militant outfits and used them as the most powerful and strongest trident for insurgency movement.

PEACE PROCESS: POLITICAL GUNFIRE

The Government of India had taken a number of politico-military and socio-economic actions to solve insurgency and ethnic problem in the Northeastern region of India. The Shillong Accord (1975); the Bodo Accord; the NSCN (IM)—Central government ceasefire (1997); BNLFF—Mizoram Peace Accord (2005) etc. were considered as positive political action to solve long outstanding politico-ethnic issues in the region. Politicians and social workers from Manipur welcomed the Mizo accord

of 1986, when the Mizo National Front (MNF) under late Pu Laldenga sorted out the Mizo insurgency problem. A number of Tangkhul Naga from Manipur were involved in the Shillong Accord of 1975, which tried to end the Naga insurgency problem. However, the Post-Shillong Accord show the emergence of the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN (K) as separate Naga insurgent outfits. The Central Government tried to sort out the Bodo ethnic problem from two approaches—political as well as military. Finally it succeeded, substantially.

However, Manipur felt that New Delhi has not taken a holistic legitimate action to solve the politico-ethnic imbroglio of the state. The state has been neglected from political angle. New Delhi has applied more military measures to solve the issues in Manipur and Assam, which may have some short-term gains. But it will have serious political back-blast in the long run, if the territorial integrity of the state is left in political wilderness to be solve by the magical hand of Might is right.

MANIPURI MEITEIS (MANIPURI) VIEW POINTS

"You are at home here, in this city where men are born and live free and equal and where no one is condemned for their views" (Mr. Bertrand Delanoe, Mayor of Paris, France to Ms. Taslima Nasreen, Bangladesh novelist; 07 July, 2008, Paris City Council Meeting). The Manipuri Meiteis who formed 70% of the total population in Manipur feels that the Central government should have a strong, non-ethnic, non-biased political agenda, approaches and strategy to solve the explosive territorial integrity and identity of Manipur. Manipur belongs to all communities, irrespective of caste, creed and religions: the Manipuri Meiteis, the Tangkhul, the Kuki, the Zeliangrong, the Kabuis, the Thadous, the Vaiphei, the Paite, the Zomi, the Manipuri Muslims, the Nepalis, the Sikhs (Punjabis), the Marwaris etc.

In Manipur, there is no 'Naga'. The word was used in the state when the Naga insurgents and ethnic politicians rocked Nagaland and tried to consolidate other tribes to their fold. There are 33 scheduled tribes as per the state government records. Kuki will remain as Kukis; Kabui as Kabui; Vaphei as Vaphei; Marring as Marring; Tangkhul as Tangkhul and so on. The concept of Nagaism is of recent origin, trying to form a Naga political platform for political ascendancy.

It is the democratic rights and privileges of any citizen of India to move/migrate from one place to another or from one state to another. However, it will be one of the biggest political blunders if the Assamese Muslims started demanding division of Assam to form 'Greater Bangladesh'. It will also be an unwise, illogical political step for the Mizos to demand the formation of 'Greater Mizoram'; by merging all Mizo inhabited areas in Myanmar (Burma), Bangladesh, Manipur and Tripura. In the present day context, the formation of Greater Manipur by merging all Manipuri inhabited areas in Myanmar (Burma), Tripura, Assam and Bangladesh (particularly Sylhet division) is not politically actionable. Who will make the Gordian knot to tie the entire area in one loop? The Nagas should analyses and understand that the same logic is applicable to 'Greater Nagaland'. 'Unification of all Naga areas' may be 'legitimate and non-negotiable'. But it cannot be done at the cost of other ethnic groups, sub-groups and states, trampling the law of human beings. Manipur cannot be divided like a hot cake and handed over the whole or part of it or merged the same with other state/states in the form of marriage gift or a birthday present.

Historical records clearly show that Manipur was not created or carved out from any state during the British rule or after India became a democratic sovereign socialist state in 1947. It was not formed by the influence or pressure of any ethnic group, sub-group or insurgent outfits. Mizoram, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh were all carved out of Assam under political, ethnic and sub-ethnic lines, thereby having perennial boundaries disputes and problem of ethnic adjustments. Since time immemorial no land/areas has been incorporated to Manipur from any states/areas. Its territorial boundary were not changed, altered or redrawn till 1949 when the state merged with the Union of India. Therefore, the ethnic-politico gimmick and war game strategy and approaches adopted by the Naga insurgent outfits, ethnic political leaders and the Central government of India should lay off at the earliest.

The Manipuri Meiteis have all the goodwill, respect and honour for other ethnic groups/sub-groups/communities in and outside the states. "The simple but-firm stand of the Meiteis vis-à-vis the demand of the Naga rebel leaders is, have anything even the Sun or the Moon but don't trample on or twist our history while imagining and constructing yours. Don't do anything to make the Meiteis extinct". (Radhabinod Koijam, former Chief Minister of Manipur). The Manipur Meiteis once push to the wall will fight for survival. "Will Nagaland accept to integrate Manipur and Nagaland and call the new Indian state as Maninagapur?" (Lieutenant Colonel H Bhubon Singh).

The Manipuri strongly advocated that the problem of the state should be solved by the Manipuri by means of mutual agreement, discussions and talks. It is their historical and birthright to project the problem of their own state. Each and every Manipuri irrespective of caste, creed and religion have got full political, constitutional and legal rights to protect the territorial identity and integrity of Manipur. The age old socio-political birth right and interest of the Manipuri will be irreversibly affected if New Delhi tried to provide substantial, unimaginative, imbalance political accommodation to the Naga insurgent outfits.

MANIPURI NAGA'S VIEWPOINTS

The Manipuri's Naga—the Tangkhul, the Mao-Maram, the Zeliangrong etc. advocated that they have got the right to come under one single administrative umbrella. They accepted the call for 'Greater Nagaland', conceptualized by the Naga insurgent outfits in Nagaland. They say that historically Nagas has wanted to live as one group, under one political roof. All Naga inhabited areas in Manipur should be merged with Nagaland so that Nagaisation could be flourished in the region.

The Manipuri Nagas claimed that the majority Manipuri Meitei community in Manipur has 'concocted' Manipuri history to oppose the demand for unification of Naga dominated areas in Manipur

Who is a Naga?

"Frankly, if we are honest with ourselves, none of us have straight answers for if we did have straight answers, today our society and state would have been free of the divisions that are reflected in our politics, overground or underground. Let us be honest and search our souls and confront reality as it is today. . . . None of us really have the answer to who is a Naga because we are, let us admit it, yet to agree on what are the criteria on who qualifies to be a Naga and the matter is compounded by numerous other obvious factors. Under the circumstances, who can claim authority to decide and assert on who is a Naga?" . . .

—*Nagaland Page*, Saturday, 17 May 2003; Editorial

to Nagaland state. The Manipuri Meiteis strongly opposed to any move aimed at slicing parts of Manipur's territory for 'Greater Nagaland'.

Another section of Manipuri Nagas feels that, they will not get any political advantages by joining Nagaland state, which consists of powerful ethnic Naga tribes-the Ao Naga, the Sema Naga, the Angami Naga, and the Lotha Naga etc. Manipuri Naga will not be treated at par with the Nagaland Naga. Moreover, they will never be able to control the Nagaland politics in the near future. The Tangkhul Naga has already become persona-non-grata in Nagaland and particularly in Konyak Naga inhabited areas. The declaration of Hebron camp (near Dimapur) on 20-21 January 2005, regarding unification of 'Naga Areas' became very rosy and shinning. But the dormant volcano among the ethnic Manipuri Nagas could not be neglected in one go. Therefore, some of them advocated that considering the politico-ethnic environment, the Manipuri Naga should form a separate state/Union territory consisting of mainly Ukhrul district, part of Senapati, and Tamenglong district of Manipur, instead of shouting with the banner of 'Naga unification'. The views of those Naga intelligentsia who favoured Union Territory status were severely reprimanded by the Naga insurgents as the concept became a cynide pill for 'Greater Nagaland'.

Union Territory status for Manipuri Nagas

Union territory Issue: Manipur Chief Secretary apologizes

1. Manipur Chief Secretary H. Jel Shyam has apologized to Chief Minister W. Nipamacha Singh for not apprising him on the "Union Territory Issue". The anomaly surfaced when the state home department sought certain data on scheduled tribe reservation from the higher education department by using a caption "Creation of union territory for the tribal people residing in hill areas".
2. The state home department (Manipur) issued the circular after the union home ministry passed on a Memorandum by the All Tribal Students' Union, Manipur (ATSUM). The Memorandum was submitted to the President KR Narayanan and the President Office directed it to the Union Home Ministry without any comment.

—*The Telegraph*, 22 October, 1999

However, another third group of Manipuri Nagas consisting of mainly politicians, general intelligentsia and fence-sitters advocated to maintain status-quo-ante and preferred to remain in Manipur. They feel that the Tangkhul, the Kabuis, the Mao, the Manipuri Muslims etc. had enjoyed full political, cultural and religious rights and privileges in the state by occupying even the chair of the Chief Minister with the full cooperation and confidence of the majority Manipuri Meiteis. The Manipuri Nagas should not disown Manipur under the threat and coercion of Naga insurgent outfits from Nagaland. If they do so, that will be a great political blunder for future generation. In a 'United Naga Area' with centre of gravity as Kohima or Dimapur, tribal groups from Manipur particularly the smaller sub-groups will be treated as second class citizen.

KUKI'S VIEWPOINTS

The Kukis claimed that they have got a distinct ethnic character, culture and traditions and ancient age-old religion of their own. Since time immemorial, Kukis have been existing in the Northeastern region of India and Indo-Burma (Chin-Lushai Hill areas) region. In early 1970's, the Kuki's were found in Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, Tripura and Myanmar (Burma). The political and social history of Manipur is closely related to the ethnic Kuki tribe.

The relations between the Kuki and the Manipuri Nagas (particularly the Tangkhul Naga) became strained when the Naga insurgent outfits, the NSCN (IM) advocated that the Kuki should identify themselves as the 'Naga'. Because the Kuki stood like a stumbling block in the Naga ethnic concept of 'Greater Nagaland'. The Naga-Kuki ethnic clashes during 1992-96 permanently severed the ethnic tie and relations between the two-groups. The Kukis felt that the Manipuri Nagas with the active support of Naga insurgents are carrying out ethnic cleansing Agenda where large number of Kuki tribes from Ukhrul, Senapati and Tamenglong districts of Manipur had been intimidated, dislocated, scattered and evicted from their original area of settlements.

As a political measures, the Kuki politicians and Kuki social organisations demanded the upgradation of the Sadar Hills district into a revenue district of Manipur. The Kuki felt that the Manipuri Nagas had blocked the same fearing that it might form the foundation stone of 'Kuki Homeland' which would certainly retard the momentum of 'Greater Nagaland'. They also strongly denounced the dirty game of the Manipuri Naga particularly the Naga politicians who tried to slice Manipuri's (inhabitant of Manipur state) territory and merged it with Nagaland. The Kukis disclosed that during the Naga-Kuki ethnic crisis and clashes, more than 1500 Kukis killed, 25,000-30,000 were dislocated, 10,000 to 12,000 house were burned by the Nagas spearheaded by the NSCN(IM), in Manipur, Assam and Nagaland. The Naga insurgent group had committed the highest degree of Human Rights violations. The Government of India, the State Governments and the security forces failed to protect the fundamental rights of the Kukis. The Kuki ethnic groups are entitled to basic human rights. The Manipuri Naga under the influence of the NSCN (IM) is trying to divide the Kukis physically, socially, ethnically and politically. Many sub-Kuki groups and clans had been intimidated, coerced and forced to divorce from the main Kuki tribe and joined the Naga ethnic group. The NSCN(IM) had created some anti-Kuki insurgent groups from within the Kuki tribe under the doctrine of old British policy of divide and rule so that Naganisation dream could be translated into reality.

NEW DELHI'S DILEMMA

For a long period, New Delhi considered the Naga issue as a law and order problem. Notwithstanding the activities of the Naga insurgent outfits, the Naga problem has been more or less recognized as a politico-ethnic issue. In January 2003, the Central Government analysed the Naga problem and came to the conclusion that a positive result of peace talk with the NSCN(IM) might bring a reasonable peace environment in Nagaland and the surrounding areas, similar on the line of Mizoram Accord of 1986. However, the territorial integrity and identity issue of Manipur came up as a political, legal and constitutional issue which could not be discarded at all. The Manipur government declares, "We will not opt for a compromise on the issue (safeguarding the territorial integrity of Manipur) under any circumstance. We have made it clear to the Centre (Central Government) on several occasions that the Manipur's boundary should not be tampered with in a bid to clinch a deal with the Naga outfit". On the other hand, the NSCN(IM) wanted contiguous Naga-inhabited areas of Northeast India to be brought under one single administrative set-up to pacify the Naga. The dilemma of the Central Government vis-à-vis the territorial integrity and identity of Manipur are:

- (a) A democratic and powerful nuclear power country like India cannot usher in peace and tranquility to the Northeastern region of India in general and particularly to the Nagas, by

burning and destroying the territorial integrity of Manipur and other states like Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The solution of the Naga ethnic problem should not produce a political Frankenstein in Manipur and surrounding areas in the near future.

- (b) New Delhi cannot afford to lose the initiative achieved with the Naga insurgent group, the NSCN (IM) for a lasting peace in Nagaland. A positive Central government-NSCN (IM) accord, resulting in surrender (voluntary deposit) of arms and equipment would help New Delhi's future course of actions of dealing with other insurgent outfits in the region.
- (c) Can the territorial integrity and identity issue of Manipur be delinked from the politico-ethnic-insurgency issue in Nagaland and if so, how and if not, why not?
- (d) The vivisection of Manipur, starting with the introduction of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India, leaving aside Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, as an option to a solution of Manipuri-Naga political détente?

CROSSING THE MINEFIELD

Conflict for Territorial boundaries and areas, ethnic issues and ethnic identities of the North eastern region of India has become major political burden and headache for New Delhi. Peace and tranquility are missing from the region for the last 50 years or so. In 2002-03, the Government of India realized that peace in the region could be achieved with careful political steps, long-termed political agenda and wider politico-ethnic understanding of the region. The policy, approaches and strategy of the Government of India should be based on the following parameters:-

- (a) Considering the political and strategic importance of the Northeastern region of India, 'sovereignty' to the Nagas, the Manipuris, the Assamese, the Mizos, the Meghalayas, the Kukis, the Dimassas etc. are rule out in toto.
- (b) Greater Mizoram; Greater Manipur; Greater Assam and Greater Nagaland are not feasible and actionable from wider political and strategic consideration. If accepted, it will lead to the opening of Pandora's box, in the region.
- (c) The issue of Manipur's territorial integrity and identity and other states which included Assam and Arunachal Pradesh are closely related to the demand of the Naga Unification led by the Naga insurgent outfit, the NSCN (IM).
- (d) Bifurcation of the Naga issue in Nagaland from the Naga issue in Manipur should form the logical political strategy and policy.
- (e) Manipur's politics involved the majority Manipuri Meitei, the Tangkhul, the Mao, the Maram, the Zeliangrong, the Kukis, the Manipuri Muslims and more than 33 other smaller sub-ethnic groups. Nagaland ethnic politics show that they will never accept other tribal communities and groups from outside the state to control the Naga politics in Nagaland.
- (f) Manipur's Naga tribes want to have a piggy right on the Nagaland Nagas for their political advancement. The weapon and means used by them is the Naga insurgent outfits and the Naga NGOs.

Manipur formed an important part and parcel of the general area of the Northeastern region of India and identified itself as one of the National vital interest of India from long-termed politico-strategic angle. A turmoil insurgency environment in the state with heavy political tone will not serve India's interest in south East Asian region. It is not very difficult to understand Manipuri's anxiety over the Naga unification demand and its likely politico-ethnic fall-out in the region. Therefore, there is a need that the Government of India handle the political issue of Manipur *vis-à-vis* Nagaland in an extreme judicious manner. The issue is too sensitive to be left to some bureaucrats, defence personnel and ethnic politicians.

New Delhi should identify the politico-ethnic issue of Manipur as a National problem and not merely a law and order problem of the state. The issue of the state should be delinked from other states. Indian lawmakers should analyse and identify the feasibility to insert a new clause to Article

371 of the Constitution of India to safeguard the Territorial Integrity of states in the country, particularly in the Northeastern region of India, including Manipur. The political issues of Manipur and Nagaland should not be transformed into a perennial ethnic issue and the archaic doctrine of changing of boundaries and areas of states based on ethnic line should be avoided as far as possible. New Delhi should not contemplate to divide Manipur or any states in the region based on religion, linguistic and ethnic equation.



A Naga Chief of Nagaland (India)
with the Author

STATE POLICE FORCES

The constitution of India clearly defined that law and order is a state subject and as such should be handled by the State Government. The available instruments to maintain peace and tranquility for the Union of India are the legal courts and its infrastructures; state police forces; central police forces; para-military forces and the Armed forces of the country. Generally, New Delhi does not interface in the law and order problem of a state Government unless it is warranted to do so or the concerned state requested for assistance. The Central Government assisted state Government by deploying central police, para-military and the Armed forces to control, subdue and neutralize acts of violence, sudden public uprising and disorder, insurgency movement, militancy and terrorism under a common phrase known as Aid to Civil Authorities.

The 8 states (including Sikkim) in the Northeastern region of India have got separate state police organizations. Upto early 1960's, they were in an archaic form, and by 1970's, reached a manageable standard. By 1980's their images and the biting power was shattered by insurgency movement, ethnic accords and discords, and external influences. By 2000 AD the entire forces in the region was classified as a weak law and order enforcing agency requiring resuscitation at regular intervals. Manipur is not an exception.

PUBLIC POLICING

On 21 May 2007, Mr VK Patil, a police Sub-Inspector of Maharashtra State in India was sentenced to life (imprisonment) in Jail by a TADA court (Terrorist and Disruptive Act) for letting a truck loaded with arms entered Mumbai by taking a bribe of Rs 7.00 lakh, which led to the 9th January 1993 Bombay serial bomb blast, orchestrated by Dawood Ibrahim a fundamentalist international gang leader and smuggler, who terrorized common citizen with remote control. Special Judge, Mr Pramode Kode, who announced the verdict said that he (Mr VK Patil) did not deserve any leniency as he had misused and abused his official position and sarcastically remarked that Patil and his team had 'shown high courage on part of public servant for special personal gains'. In democratic India, the police force is seen as the guardian and custodian of law and order. After independent in 1947, India adopted the police system based on the British model of public policing. The present system of police

organization, administration, political supremacy, and civil-police relationships are still continuing since early 1950's. However, with increased act of violence, insurgency, militancy, terrorism, ethnic imbroglio, armed private Senas (organisations), the concept of public policing has become a complex and delicate public issue. Wider political implications, expectations and demands, the global concerns of Human Rights and Rights violations has put up a challenging task on public policing.

In 1977, the Government of India, constituted the National Police Commission (NPC-1977), to remove many of the grey areas of the Indian police system. The Commission highlighted the drawbacks and suggested many remedial actions. A number of Academicians, Research scholars, Indian Police Service Officers (IPS), who had done yeoman service for the country, agreed that public policing is an art.

BRIEF SKETCH

In early 33AD, Manipur used to maintain law and order by establishing civil court known as Chairap and the Patcha Phaid (women organization). The Chairap functioned for both the Judicial and the Executive wings; tried summarily all cases except murder and high treason; and could inflict all type of punishment except death sentences which was exclusively within the power of the Maharaja. The King of Manipur (Maharaja) remained as the highest appellate authority in the kingdom. Patcha Phaida (consist of 10-11 women members) was formed to handle cases which involved women; apprehended person on specific charges; tried summarily cases which included adultery, assault on women, kidnapping, rape, divorce, peace in women bazar (women market) etc. The common punishment for women charge with adultery was to shaved of her head; smeared with line and turmeric; and paraded her from one place to another in the women market. However, punishment of imprisonment in jail was not in vogue. Thus, Pacha Phaida, could be generally consider as the base for the origin of women police organization in Manipur.

In early 664 AD, Jail, known as '*Keisumsang*' (Kei = tiger; Sumba = Making effort to sleep; sang = a house, a secluded area) was first established, where convicts for heinous offences were imprisoned. In 1074 AD, the rights and privileges of the people of Manipur were regulated after the introduction of the Constitution of Manipur (*Loiyumba Sillen*), before king John of Great Britain accepted Magna Carta in 1215 AD. To commensurate with the charters given in the constitution (constitution of Manipur), many changes were made in the functioning of 'Law enforcement Agencies'. In 1475 A.D., powerful and strong police posts were established along the present Indo-Burma International border, when Manipur annexed Kabaw (Kabow) valley, to check primarily infiltration of foreigners (Awa or Kathe). Moreh, prowy and Kongal Thana were manned day and night by one officer and 10-12 sepoys to collect intelligences which were detrimental to the security of the kingdom.

In early 1620's, (Maharaja Khagemba, 1596-1651 AD), the civil and the criminal courts were mixed up and a post known as the Dolaipaibas (Police official with judicial powers) were appointed instead of Loisanglakpa or Loisongloi (civil official). It was a great achievement that the post of Dolaipaibas continued till early 1947, when Manipur merged with the Union of India. In early 1826, during the time of Maharaja Gambhir Singh (1826-1834), a state militia known as the state military police (SMP) was established as an armed wing of the state civil forces. During the reign of Maharaja

Chandrakirti Singh (1834-44 and 1851-86) there was considerable reorganization, improvement, training and rationalization of pay and allowances. In 1857, the Maharaja assisted the British Government in suppressing the revolt by the Nagas in Thigomei (Naga Hills) by sending a contingent of 2,000 men under the command of Bir Tikendrajit Singh and Major General Thangal, at the request of the British Government. On 12 August, 1879, Sir SC Bayley, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, in his note, wrote:

"Manipur has got an estimated army of 5,000 or 6,000 strong. The men are said to be of good physique and possessed of many soldierly qualities, and political agent thinks, that with assistance of a few European officers, they might be made of very great use in the case of complication arising with Burma, and even as they are now may be very useful auxiliaries against the Nagas on one side or the Lushais on the other."

Post-1891 period

After Anglo-Manipuri war of 1891, the British Government took over the administration of Manipur and correspondingly the state military police underwent a radical change. The system of granting land in lieu of pay and the hereditary appointment (son succeeding father) were abolished and payment of regular pay were introduced. The strength of the state military police as on 31 March, 1893 were one European officer, 14 Local Officers, 48 Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), and 320 sepoys. The total cost of maintenance of the force during the year 1892-93 was Rs. 39,057. In 1873, a separate wing of the civil police was established at Imphal Police station with 13 police personnel (one Sub-Inspector, one Head Constable and 11 Constables) with an annual budget of Rs. 404 (Rupees four hundred and four). The Indian Penal Code was brought in the state in 1904 and the Manipur state Durbar framed regulations for working of the civil police. During World War I, a special police force, known as the Hill Lambus was organized under the Sub-divisional officers of Ukhrul, Tamenglong and Churachandpur. During the Nupilal agitation (29 December, 1939) at Imphal, the small strength of the Manipur police became ineffective in controlling the crowd and correspondingly 74 constables were recruited on emergency basis. In 1941, Mr. E.E. Hughes-Hughes, IP (Indian Police), was appointed as the first Superintendent of Police of Manipur (SP) with a force strength of 111 personnel. In 1947, the strength of the civil police reached 397 (including 248 village chowkidars, but less the hill Lambus). On 21 January 1972 when Manipur became the 20th state of the Union of India, Manipur Police came out from its cocoon with rudimentary police infrastructure, limited manpower and a large gaping hole of police-public relations.

POLICE IN INSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT

In early 1980's after the emergence of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) in Manipur, the state police forces suffered heavily in public policing. They could not challenge and control the insurgency and militancy movement in the state, particularly in the hill districts of Ukhrul, Tamenglong, and Chandel. The state government depended heavily on the Armed forces for public security and even of routine administrations of remote areas, thereby having a setback to police images. By early 1990s, the Manipuri Meetei, the Naga and the Kuki insurgency movement transformed themselves into a politico-ethnic bandwagon, with separate compartments, making the task of the police forces a delicate and complicated one. The political crisis between the Manipuri and the Nagas also seriously affected the

public policing concept of Manipur police. In 2000 AD, the dynamics of security environment in Manipur could be classified, from security angle (Police forces) as High Intensity Conflict (HIC). The state government took up a few steps and efforts to make a strong police forces to commensurate with the level of violence. However, the sophisticated arms and ammunitions used by more than 24-25 undergrounds groups with lethal and powerful ethnic political agenda could not be matched by the under-dog police personnel with outdated arms and equipment of 1960's vintages. From 1990-2005, the state police forces faced many politico-ethnic-insurgency issues which affected its overall performances in the field of public policing. Some of them are:-

- (a) Naga-Kuki ethnic crisis and clashes.
- (b) Manipur's uprising against the issue of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958.
- (c) Politico-ethnic problem of Manipur and Nagaland and the role of Manipur police forces.
- (d) The Manipur script issue (Meitei Mayek).
- (e) Arms, drugs, and narcotics smuggling, infiltration, and exfiltration along the porous Indo-Myanmar international border.
- (f) High voltage issue of territorial integrity of Manipur Vs the Naga integration movement in Nagaland.
- (g) Spread of ISI network in North East India and Manipur.

PROFILE OF FORCES

The profile of force level of Manipur police will show that there is a wide gap of public-police ratio of the state as compared to the task in an environment of insurgency movement. It has got just 15,000 police personnel to handle a state with a population of 23,00,000, sandwiched by sophisticated arms of 10,000 used by the insurgents and the militants. The profile of force level of Manipur police (2004-2005) were given in Tables 31.1 and 31.2 below:

Table 31.1: Manipur Police : At a Glance (2004-2005)

1.	Director General of Police (DGP)	:	01
2.	Additional Director General of Police (ADGP)	:	01
3.	Inspector General of Police (IGP)	:	07
4.	Police districts	:	09
5.	Police sub-divisions	:	21
6.	Police stations	:	58
7.	Armed Battalion (Manipur Rifles)	:	06
8.	Armed Battalion (Indian Reserve Battalion)	:	04
9.	Police stations	:	59

Table 31.2: Manipur Police : At a Glance (2004-2005)

Sl. No.	Posts	Sanctioned Posted	Posted No.
1.	Civil Police	4997	4160
2.	Armed Police		
	(a) Manipur Rifles (MR)	5624	4838
	(b) Indian Reserve Battalion (IRB)	3852	2723
3.	Wireless Staffs (Communications)	619	471
4.	Medical Staffs	104	75
5.	Ministerial Staff	238	212
6.	FSL 17	11	
7.	CMTW	43	39
Total Strength		15494	12529

PROFILES OF MANIPUR INSURGENT OUTFITS

There are more than 25 underground outfits operating inside the state which have to be handled by Manipur police with assistance from the Armed Forces, Central Police Forces and Para-Military Forces. Some of them are:

Valley Based			Hill Based		
Organisation	Strength	Weapon	Organisation	Strength	Weapon
UNLF	3000	3000	NSCN-IM	1500* (5000)	1500
PLA/RPF	2200	2200	NSCN-K	800* (3500)	800
PREPAK	500	500	ZRA	350	300
KYKL	650	650	KNF	250	200
KCP	250	150	KNA	200	200
			KRA	200	150
			KLA	150	150
			UKLF	200	200
			HPC (D)	250	200
Total	6700	6700		3900	3700

Total Strength : 10,600

Total Weapons : 10,400

1. Base year : 2002-2004.

2.* Weapons and Manpower's in Manipur state only.

3. Overground workers and sympathizers excluded from calculations of strength.

4. NSCN-IM, NSCN-K and the Kuki insurgent are having ceasefire with the Government, but retaining their arms, weapons and ammunition with them.

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATIONS

Due to prevailing environment of insurgency, militancy, terrorism, and anti-national elements, the police images suffered directly and indirectly by many ingredients and factors. The role of the police constable as visualized by the Police Act of 1861 and 1902, Police Commission Report and amendment carried out from time to time failed to apply correctly at the present day environment. Since early 1970's, the handling and management of law and order in the state and other areas of North East India were heavily shared between the security forces and the police. State Government started dependence on the army to control law and order which was basically the turf area of the state police forces. By early 1980's, public policing in the hill districts became dysfunctional due to the emergence of ethnic insurgent groups, tacitly supported by ethnic and sub-ethnic politicians, political parties, community groups and village headmen. To control insurgency movement, New Delhi inducted large number of personnel from the army, para-military, and the Central Police organizations. The people in the region lost their faith on the capabilities and functioning of the police and their assured continuum public security. By

1990's, Manipur police drifted away from the general public as their role and function were almost taken over by the Indian Army, para-military and other Central security organizations. Non-implementation, at the National level of the recommendations of the police reform committees (Dharma Vira, Soli Sorabjee, and others) also affected the reorganizations and reforms of police force in Manipur. Gradually, public policing in the Hill districts became a mockery as their role were taken over by the insurgents. Public policing in Ukhrul, Tamenglong and Chandel were totally paralysed and partially in Senapati, and Churachandpur districts. The only viable tools of governance system of democracy was the flag of the Indian security forces. Manipur police failed to show their power of police flag and

the age-old archaic police *danda* (a stick made from cane or bamboo) to the far flung areas in the state, inhabited by poor people, mesmerized and look after by many insurgent outfits for their daily needs. In such areas, the inhabitants preferred to maintain a cordial relations with the unknown warriors (Insurgents) rather than hoping for the moon from the Manipur Police—a person they had never seen in their life.



Manipur Police: Public Policing

Manipur Police, with a force level of a little more than 15,000 personnel (2005-2006 AD), with limited arms and equipments, lack of scientific intelligence and investigative infrastructure, is not the viable answer to challenge the insurgency movement and terrorism. Notwithstanding with its limitation, the performance of the force can be rated as satisfactory, in the conflict environment of North East India and South East Asia.

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Public policing in High Intensity conflict areas, like Manipur became a nightmare, with outdated weapons, limited manpower, old communication equipments, never ending demand for security cover from each and every village and the intense political pressure from politicians and ethnic leaders. Under the Constitution of India, 'public order' is a state subject but there are many occasions/incidents where the Central Government played a decisive primary/secondary role. However, this dual turf got politicised, diluted, constraints and became strained when the Centre (Central Government) and the state are ruled by different/rival parties. In such environment, politics become the prime driver and the public order, the principal task of the law enforcing agencies got diluted and in turn the common man suffered miserably. The images of police in Manipur and in the Northeastern region of India have been dented by many factors and ingredients.

Political

- (a) The force is seen as the willing tools of politicians, bureaucrats, corrupt businessmen and Anti-social elements.
- (b) Increase politicisation of the force.
- (c) Unwarranted pressure and interference.

Social

- (a) Pressure from general public on ethnic lines.
- (b) Politico-religious crisis and conflict.
- (c) Ethnic rhetoric against police forces.

System Drawbacks

- (a) Corruption (Top to down) syndrome.
- (b) Politician-Bureaucrat-police nexus.
- (c) Drawbacks and system failure of public policing in hill areas.
- (d) Lack of scientific investigations.

Organisational Deficiencies

- (a) Low police budget.
- (b) Inadequate of modern arms and equipments.
- (c) Sub-standard recruitment policy and drive.
- (d) Lack of modern training facilities and infrastructures.
- (e) Low police-civilian ratio (Insurgency and counter insurgency environment).

Command Deficiencies

- (a) Lack of professionalism.

- (b) Low morale particularly in counter-insurgency environment.
- (c) Lack of decentralization of command and control.

MODERNISATION: VISION-2025 AD

The Government of India has taken up many steps for modernization of state police forces in the Northeastern region of India, keeping in view the strategic importance of the region. Population explosion; mobile population; refugees influxes; national and international drug mafia and warlords; arms trafficking; ethnic crisis; religious extremism; insurgency movement; militancy; and terrorism has put up a great challenge to state police forces in public policing. Ethnic politics, crisis and conflict is affecting all the state in the region and is going to affect the functioning of state police forces. In the near future, Manipur police is going to handle a population of 30 lakhs people of which 60% are Manipuri Hindus; 30% are Christian tribals (recognized tribes); 7.5 Meitei Pangals (Manipur Muslims) and 2.5% other communities. As such, it should concentrate to some of the important social cost and benefits. Important focus areas includes community policing (valley and hill areas); Urban policing, Modern technology and technique to combat crime and terror; Anti-terrorism strategy and tactics; Walling policy (not wailing) against political and ethnic interferences; and a strong police influences along the Indo-Burma International border.

MODEL POLICE FORCES

- (a) Blue print for modernization : Vision-2025 AD.
- (b) Strong political agenda to delink police forces from criminalization of politics.
- (c) No political interference in routine police administration.
- (d) Drive against corruption. No protection against criminal politicians, bureaucrats, and anti-social elements.
- (e) Police to remain as apolitical.
- (f) Project police images as "Friend of the people".

ORGANISATIONAL UPGRADATION

- (a) Priority on police budget.
- (b) Provision of modern arms, equipment and communication infrastructures, communication equipments; transports etc.
- (c) Increase mobility, manpower and police outposts in valley and hill areas on war-footing.
- (d) Recruit the best person for public safety and public confidence.
- (e) Establishment of highly professional strong Public Relations Department to project police forces as the protectors and guardian of Law and Order, general public, younger generation and student community.
- (f) Establishment of District police complaints and grievances cells.

Public policing in High Intensity conflict areas, like Manipur became a nightmare, with outdated weapons, limited manpower, old communication equipments, never ending demand for security cover from each and every village and the intense political pressure from politicians and ethnic leaders. Under the Constitution of India, 'public order' is a state subject but there are many occasions/incidents where the Central Government played a decisive primary/secondary role. However, this dual turf got politicised, diluted, constraints and became strained when the Centre (Central Government) and the state are ruled by different/rival parties. In such environment, politics become the prime driver and the public order, the principal task of the law enforcing agencies got diluted and in turn the common man suffered miserably. The images of police in Manipur and in the Northeastern region of India have been dented by many factors and ingredients.

Political

- (a) The force is seen as the willing tools of politicians, bureaucrats, corrupt businessmen and Anti-social elements.
- (b) Increase politicisation of the force.
- (c) Unwarranted pressure and interference.

Social

- (a) Pressure from general public on ethnic lines.
- (b) Politico-religious crisis and conflict.
- (c) Ethnic rhetoric against police forces.

System Drawbacks

- (a) Corruption (Top to down) syndrome.
- (b) Politician-Bureaucrat-police nexus.
- (c) Drawbacks and system failure of public policing in hill areas.
- (d) Lack of scientific investigations.

Organisational Deficiencies

- (a) Low police budget.
- (b) Inadequate of modern arms and equipments.
- (c) Sub-standard recruitment policy and drive.
- (d) Lack of modern training facilities and infrastructures.
- (e) Low police-civilian ratio (Insurgency and counter insurgency environment).

Command Deficiencies

- (a) Lack of professionalism.

- (b) Low morale particularly in counter-insurgency environment.
- (c) Lack of decentralization of command and control.

MODERNISATION: VISION-2025 AD

The Government of India has taken up many steps for modernization of state police forces in the Northeastern region of India, keeping in view the strategic importance of the region. Population explosion; mobile population; refugees influxes; national and international drug mafia and warlords; arms trafficking; ethnic crisis; religious extremism; insurgency movement; militancy; and terrorism has put up a great challenge to state police forces in public policing. Ethnic politics, crisis and conflict is affecting all the state in the region and is going to affect the functioning of state police forces. In the near future, Manipur police is going to handle a population of 30 lakhs people of which 60% are Manipuri Hindus; 30% are Christian tribals (recognized tribes); 7.5 Meitei Pangals (Manipur Muslims) and 2.5% other communities. As such, it should concentrate to some of the important social cost and benefits. Important focus areas includes community policing (valley and hill areas); Urban policing, Modern technology and technique to combat crime and terror; Anti-terrorism strategy and tactics; Walling policy (not wailing) against political and ethnic interferences; and a strong police influences along the Indo-Burma International border.

MODEL POLICE FORCES

- (a) Blue print for modernization : Vision-2025 AD.
- (b) Strong political agenda to delink police forces from criminalization of politics.
- (c) No political interference in routine police administration.
- (d) Drive against corruption. No protection against criminal politicians, bureaucrats, and anti-social elements.
- (e) Police to remain as apolitical.
- (f) Project police images as "Friend of the people".

ORGANISATIONAL UPGRADATION

- (a) Priority on police budget.
- (b) Provision of modern arms, equipment and communication infrastructures, communication equipments; transports etc.
- (c) Increase mobility, manpower and police outposts in valley and hill areas on war-footing.
- (d) Recruit the best person for public safety and public confidence.
- (e) Establishment of highly professional strong Public Relations Department to project police forces as the protectors and guardian of Law and Order, general public, younger generation and student community.
- (f) Establishment of District police complaints and grievances cells.

- (g) Resuscitation, reorganization and revamping of state police vigilance department to act as the vanguard for state security.
- (h) Reorganisation and reestablishment of police beat posts in remote/hill areas for public security.
- (i) No compromise on legal and administrative angle to remove dead-wood police personnel.

SPECIAL OPERATION GROUP (SOG)

- (a) Formation of Special Operation Group (SOG).
- (b) Provision of specialized training to selected police personnel.
- (c) Incentive to SOG personnel.

COMMAND, CONTROL AND TRAINING

- (a) Establishment of High standard, scientific and modern training facilities, for maximizing competence of its personnel.
- (b) Regular brain-storming session, seminar on public policing, and focus on public participation in public policing.
- (c) Decentralise command and control.
- (d) Regular interaction between police officers and lower police personnel.
- (e) Synergized police operations with concrete strategy, tactics and humane angle.

SOCIAL ACTIONS PLAN

In Manipur and other states in the North Eastern region of India, rocked by an environment of insurgency movement, militancy, terrorism, ethnic politics and clashes, the police needs to establish non-statutory/statutory body like the police accountability commission as a strategy of confidence building measures between the people and the police. Such commission, as in vogue, in other parts of the globe, can enhance the relations between the general public and the police forces. The commission should be able to take action for serious complaints and lapses, inquiry into serious misconduct and allegations, monitoring of departmental inquiry, issue of fresh inquiry etc. against police personnel. The commission should also have the power to recommend to the state Government mandatory judicial inquiry or inquiry or any other preventive actions within the law of the land, for any act of commission and omission, which involved:

- (a) Death in police custody.
- (b) Rape or attempt to commit rape.
- (c) Grievous hurt (section 320 of the Indian Penal Code).
- (d) Fake encounter.
- (e) Violation of Human Rights.
- (f) Arrest or detention without due process of law.
- (g) Allegation of corruption.

WELFARE OF PERSONNEL

In an organization, welfare of personnel played an important role in the optimum contributions by men and women for making a better society. Performance is normally related to welfare angle. In a security related organization, welfare of personnel played a crucial role in winning or loosing a battle. The police force, the umbilical cord between the people and the state, requires a holistic, judicious and humane eye from the Government and the general public, so that they dedicate their lives for public security. In 1962, when China invaded India, the Indian troops along the Indo-China international border in North East India could not find even a single police personnel to depend upon for maintenance of law and order. In 1971, the Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) saw the crumbling down of Pakistan's police forces which contributed heavily to the defeat of Pakistan and the Liberation of Bangladesh. In 1984, during the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) operation in northern Sri Lanka, the Indian Peace Keeping troops found that there was a complete vacuum of the presence of the Sri Lanka's police forces to maintain law and order. The same scenario occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan. In 2007-08, Pakistan's police forces in NWFP faced the highest degree of desertion and low morale. When the Al Qaeda and the Taliban cough, the Pak police forces used to freeze like an ice cube in North Pole. Public policing in these regions became non-existents due to various reasons. One of the most glaring reasons is the absence of the concept of welfare of police forces.

The performance index of the police force are closely related to the graph of satisfaction level of their morale and welfare aspects. Indian police forces are actively under pressure from political, social, religious, insurgents, terrorists, and ethnic elements. Slander political outbursts, ethnic propaganda, religious outcry and petty myopic regional pot-shot against the police forces had severely affected their morale, the will to fight, and professionalism. Till 1990's, the police forces in the North Eastern region of India used to fight anti-social elements, who got the latest new weapons and gadgets with half-empty stomach, a long bamboo stick, .303 rifle and an oversized accoustres. That automatically retarded the performance graph of a police constable as compared to a young well-equipped insurgent, leading to a high decay of morale factor. A police personnel is a human being, which requires rest, proper housing and sanitation, health care services, and strong public support and sympathy (not apathy). The morale of the police force which is closely related to societal environment and his job satisfaction card, should not be shattered by man-made disaster and finally made him drowned into the Ganges, the Narmada, the Brahmaputra and the Manipur river. The government should review, streamline and refine the welfare of the police forces in regular interval with proper vision and foundation. The battle is going to be won by the man who is on the ground.

POLICE ON WAR ON TERRORISM

Upto 1980's, many police forces and intelligence agencies in the world had a hazy knowledge of the chemistry of Taliban; Al Qaeda; Jihadicism; Abu Sayyaaf Group (ASG); Red Brigade; Muslim Brotherhood and Osama bin Laden, except USA, Britain, Israel and a few European countries who never shared classified information/documents with others unless it affected seriously their national interest. Upto 1990's, New Delhi did not have any centralized police datas (Federal datas) on insurgents, terrorists and fundamentalists, where the state police agencies could have easy access. Insurgency

movement, fundamentalism and terrorism flourished in great speed overtaking the paces and strides of the police and the intelligence agencies. By 2005-2006 AD standard, the police forces of the North Eastern region of India used to fight insurgent with their backs to the wall.

By 2020-2025 AD, or lesser than that, by a conservative analysis and assessment, the entire region of North East India are likely to involve heavily on war against terrorism (war on terror). There may be global accord and discord (agreement and disagreement) on the meaning, phraseology and context of the delicate word 'war on terrorism', which started shining after 9/11, 2001. 'However, terrorism was not invented or started on 9/11. Terrorism is a deadly tactic, not an institution or an ideology' (David Milliband, Foreign Secretary, Britain; January 2009). Indian security agencies are facing the hidden face of terrorists since early 1980's in the form of cross-border terrorism, particularly from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Burma. In the near future, a number of scenario may arise in North East India, putting the politico-strategic interest of the region in great danger. The insurgency movement and the ethnic crisis may come to a manageable end result but the vacuum will be filled-up by global terrorism. Ethnic politicians will hold the ethno-religious flag; marry-up with the internal and external terrorist groups and create a fire-ball in the general area. That may lead to the fragmentation of North East India, laying the foundation stone for the balkanization of India.

DIRTY NUISANCE WAR

By 2009-2010 AD benchmark, the police forces in North Eastern region of India were found unfit for fighting terrorism of any kind. They should gear-up to challenge the same with a long-term doctrine. Fighting terrorism is quite different from the daily ding-dong battle with the local insurgent outfits. Time, place and space will be dictated by the terrorists (New York, Bombay, New Delhi, Guwahati or Imphal?). For war on terror, police forces should not have the wrong impression of the existence of a clear, unified and national (transnational) target (enemy?). It requires a gradual balance and matured approaches: due respect to all communities; Accomodation of views, opinions and expressions; acceptance of dissents; guarding against communalism and religious outcries (outbursts); and balancing media frenzy. The 'war' should not produce more harm for the masses rather than to the target (targets). India has already established a National Investigation Agency (NIA) with wide ranging functional and legal powers. There is a need that the police force in North East India liaise with the National Investigation Agency and prepare for war against terror. As terrorists are the most unpredictable dirty human species, the police needs to have a viable counter-terrorism force with a nodal centre (centres) for quick response. They should give serious attention to high tech intelligence network involving identification, dissemination, tracking and elimination of terrorists and insurgents before they blew up themselves as human suicide bomber in Guwahati, Imphal, Agartala, Dimapur, Shillong, Itanagar and Aizawl. The state police force should not allow the Indian Mujahideen to destroy age-old residence of the governor of Manipur with the assistance of the local insurgents, which would give them enough advantages in their image projection. Being a border state along the Indo-Burma International border, grass root level indigenous action like the revamping of local police beat system, with wide human intelligence network; viable communication system; modern weaponry; adequate manpower and a close relations with the general public, should form the bases for establishment of Nodal Agencies across the state. 'Police empowerment' (not police power or brutality) with strong political backing across party line is the need of the hour. A huge investment has to be made at

the level of police station in terms of logistics, mobility, fire-power, manpower and communication network. Adequate secret service funds should be percolated right down to the local beat system and not concentrated at the hands of higher up. In an environment of insurgency movement and terrorism, the aim of the whole exercise of the police force should be to make the local police personnel attained confidence, pride and satisfaction in the performance of their duty which would form the base for a successful war on terrorism. In Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, North Bengal, Sikkim etc. the police should try invariably to gain confidences of the various ethnic, sub-ethnic, communities and religious groups and leaders for excellence in public policing. No police force in the world can effectively perform its duty without the expressed cooperation, willingness and assistances from the general public. There is no reason why the Manipur police should not be able to challenge, contained and 'defeated' the terrorists in and around the state with a long-term planning, strategy and vision.

NOTES

1. Peter Clarke, Former Head of Anti-terror Branch, Scotland Yard; How can we be secure in the age of terror? (*India Today Conclave*, March 2009, New Delhi)

"The key change in the last few years has been the development of an entirely complementary relationship between intelligence and the law enforcement; that you need to have laws which fit the 21st century and not the 19th century. The judiciary need to be viciously impartial but also seriously robust. We need to raise the level of public debate and the media needs to take a slightly longer view. In the six-seven years that I headed counter-terrorism investigations, I never had political interference."

2. Daniel Glaser; Acting Assistant Secretary (Terrorist Financing), Department of the Treasury, USA; How can we be secure in the age of terror? [*India Today Conclave*, March 2009, New Delhi]

"The primary activity of any terrorist organisation is fund raising. A ranking Al Qaeda leader recently called funding 'The Mainstay of Jihad'. Transparency is the key to closing vulnerabilities in the international financing system that allows terrorist organisation to move money around the world and to raise funds and finance their nefarious activities through charities. In this region, there is hawala which is not transparent. This is what makes it attractive to terrorist organisations. We are working to extend affordable financial services to communities and attempting to register money service business like Hawala."

The financial system is constantly updating itself to defend from misuse. The offence side – identifying financial networks, disrupting them, and shutting them down – relies on international cooperation. UN Security Council resolution 1267 imposes sanctions on Osama bin Laden, Taliban and Al Qaeda. This resolution was part of the international response to the recent terrorist attacks in India where sanctions were imposed on JUD, a front for the LeT."

COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN MANIPUR ENVIRONMENT



*"Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver.
The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver,
the less he demands in slaughter."*

—Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, 1923

The primary duty of the Armed forces of a country is to keep its sovereignty and independence in tact so that the citizens can have a sound sleep with no nightmare, fear and illusion. However, with the changing time, the security environments of the world have seen a great sea-change. International frontiers; traditional and age-old boundary; regional barrier; Maritime zones etc. have become blurred and redundant with the emergence of insurgency, militancy and terrorism. Such scenario has affected the administrative, security and intelligence apparatus of many European, Central Asia, Communist blocs, Latin American and South East Asian countries. The United States of America (the world

Policemen); Russia; France; Great Britain, (the buddy of USA); Pakistan, (the third eye of Al Qaeda); Indonesia; Thailand; Burma (the cauldron of ethnic insurgency outfits); China and India have been dented by the emergence of terrorism and insurgency. Sri Lanka's defence forces are now bleeding and the Maoist Communist uprising under the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Nepal has reduced the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) of Nepal to ash. The Iraq's Armed Forces trained by the modernized American troops with latest new gadgets and psychological warfare technology, has come out from the factory as good as the village defence forces of India. People have seen a new world order and role of the Armed Forces in such an environment have become delicate and challenging due to involvement of many ingredients. Automatically, the response from the Armed forces will be unpalatable to the general public because it will affect their rights and freedom. Hot pursuit of insurgents, terrorists and militants on the globe by powerful countries, crossing the international boundaries will become debatable as it transgressed into the political matrix of many countries, their freedom and sovereignty.

In February 2007, US Lawmakers raised the question if, international law would allow US forces to strike at terrorist targets inside Pakistan on the rationale that they were supporting those people (terrorists) or they were not assuring control over their country (Republican Senator Jeff Sessions, during Senate hearing on 01 Mar 2007). The world security environment has become more and more murkier with the blending of politics with ethnic and sub-ethnic nationalism never happened before on this globe.

The aim and objective of insurgents, terrorists and militants are generally focussed to achieve sovereignty, independence, self-determination, change of Government, religious chauvinism, ethnic subjugation and domination etc. The modus operandi, strategy and tactics to achieve their goals are insurgency movement; dreadful acts of militancy; fearful and inhuman acts of terrorism and Anti-National acts, which put the legitimate and lawful Government in dysfunctional dustbin. They are basically directed against the political parties, political systems and politicians who formed the political fortune of their own country, region and the world.

During 1960's, most of the western countries did not pay much attention to counter-terrorism policy as incidence of terrorism normally ended with negotiations with the country behind the terrorists.



Indian Armed Forces: Anti-terror Drill

The Indian Armed Forces, the 4th largest army in the world, with 1.15 million strength; nuclear weapons; a formidable land forces, with increasing Air and Naval arsenals; posed itself as a powerful force in Asian continent. By 2025 AD, the gap between the conventional war and war against terror will become narrower. Indian armed forces should prepare to defeat global terrorism, insurgency movement, fundamentalism and anti-national elements. India can do it.

But by 1970's the global scenario had sudden changes. In June, 1976, Palestinian terrorists seized an Air France plane carrying 105 passengers which consisted of large number of Israeli citizens, forced landed at Entebbe (Uganda), holding them as hostages. An Israeli special commando force, flew a long circuitous route, landed at Entebbe Airport, stormed the aircraft and rescued all the hostages except one. In October, 1977, a Lufthansa aircraft was hijacked and forced land at Mogadishu. A West German Special Force flew a long route, landed at Mogadishu, stormed the aircraft, killed all the terrorists, and brought back all hostages safely to West Germany. It was during this time that the President of the United States of America, Members of the Congress, the Senators and general public asked the Pentagon, whether they were prepared for such similar action. The answer by Pentagon was: No. The United States of America immediately set up a special force: the Delta Force, whose mission was hostage rescue. *"The 1986 air strike against Libya by US Air Forces and 1993 attack on Iraq symbolized for the military establishment effective use of military power for counter-terrorism: limited retaliation with air power, aimed at deterrence. What remained was the hard question of how deterrence could be effective when the adversary was a loose transnational network"* (the 9/11 Commission Report; Final Report of the National Commission on terrorists attacks upon the United States; p. 98). The world wake up to the new pattern of warfare launched by a few against the millions of people.

Most of the developed and developing countries which included USA, Britain, Germany, France, Australia, Israel etc. had formulated their own military doctrine and strategy for war against insurgency and terrorism, keeping in view the global security scenario. India also has got its own doctrine for conventional, non-conventional and the Nuclear war to be followed by its Armed forces during war and peace. However, insurgency, terrorism and militancy has created a new front in military strategy in the form of sub-conventional warfare: war against militants, terrorists, insurgents, guerillas and the Anti-National Elements (ANEs) which requires formulation of a new doctrine, keeping in view the National and the International interests. India has suffered tremendously in its polity, socio-economic, National security and societal images in international fora due to insurgency, terrorism, cross-border terrorism and militancy on its soil. It has dented the integrity, loyalty, pride and the apolitical textures and images of the Armed forces.

INDIA KALEIDOSCOPE

Indian Armed Forces, the 4th largest in the world, an emerging military power in Asian continent, with a total manpower of 1.15 millions has done yeoman service on internal security measures and on the foreign soil under the blue berry-cap of the UNO for conflict management and resolutions. It has maintained and established a sound political and military relations with western super-power blocs and the neighbouring countries. However, India's democracy in general and its Armed Forces in particular have suffered in its image projection in world politics due to its imbroglio in low intensity conflict particularly in its North Eastern region and the Jammu and Kashmir. The act of commission and omission of the insurgents had weakened the nerve of the legitimate Government; drained out valuable time and energy of the security forces; create ethnic conflict and clashes; transform a mole into a mountain; and internationalize the same by means of media and publicity.

Insurgency and militancy existing in India particularly in its North Eastern region can be classified as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), an armed conflict for political purpose, short of a combat between

the Armed forces and the insurgents. The main dynamics are violence, instability, discontentment, societal desperations, disillusionments, anger and frustrations, and yearning for changes of the existing orders. The degree of violence is directly proportionate to the perceived injustice (real or imaginary) and political indiscriminations. They are trying to achieve their goal/goals by means of political, religious, economic, cultural, psychological, media, insurgency and militancy cards. They are also raising the popular flag of the national survival of ethnic and the sub-ethnic groups and check-mated the Armed forces with play-cards like 'Violation of Human Rights', 'custodial dead', 'genocide', 'political terrorism', 'state terrorism', right to self-determination', etc. The act of commission and omission of the Armed forces will be internationalized by means of media and publicity, creating a sense of war-like situation and insecurity among the general public. Unfriendly and rogue countries are trying to exploit India's delirium and resorted to active proxy-war to destabilize its democratic foundation by raising fundamentalist flags at the Red-Fort, Gateway of India, Fort William, Cellular Jail and the Kangla.

India's war on insurgency movements, terrorism, cross-border terrorism and militancy were seriously hampered by the dichotomic policy of USA, Western bloc countries, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Islamic countries which breeds terrorists. In early 1990s, USA never accepted India's sensible plea to declare Pakistan a terrorist state, who carried out cross-border terrorism to Jammu and Kashmir of India and then proliferated them to other countries in South East Asia. Britain, France and Germany closed their eyes telling India to produce proof of the same. In turn, the Armed forces of India used to bleed fighting cancerous groups of Islamic Jihadis. In December 1999, the Jihadis fighting against Indian democracy hijacked Indian Airlines aircraft while flying from Kathmandu to New Delhi and flew the same to Kandahar, leading to the hostages swap which included release of Maulana Masood Azhar and Omar Sheikh who later on, formed the terrorist group Jais-e-Mohammad. USA, Britain, and other powerful NATO countries who championed for war against hijacking by terrorists closed their eyes. On 11 September, 2001, the National psyche of USA changed 180 degree when Mohammad Atta, Omar Sheikh and others destroyed the World Trade Center in New York by ramming the same with hijacked civil aircrafts. USA and its Armed forces noted down that the Islamic Jihadis were fighting against them and the western countries and not only against India. On 01 October 2001, a suicide truck-bomb attacked the Legislative Assembly building of Jammu and Kashmir and 36 people lost their lives. It shocked the Armed forces and the Intelligence Community of India. On 13 December 2001, Pakistan-based terrorists attacked the parliament building of India in New Delhi when it was in session. It shook the National Security of India and the pride of the country. The Indians came together as the citizen of a great nation, but could not destroy the target. Mr George Fernandez, the Defence Minister of India, order massive troops mobilization along the Indo-Pak international border (Operation Parakram), sending a message to the world and Pakistan that India would not accept terrorism and cross-border terrorism on its soil. The military mobilization was accompanied by a wishful thinking for activation of nuclear arms if the need arises, automatically, reached the snooping eyes of the American CIA and British Intelligence Agencies. India failed again to pressurize USA to declare Pakistan a Terrorist state. However, in 2001-2002, the American policy makers and the general public tentatively accepted Bush doctrine of war against terrorism on the principle that "we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those

who harbour them" (a terse comment after the Al Qaeda terrorists attacked on 11 September 2001 on World Trade Center, New York). On 22 January, 2002, gunmen (Islamic terrorists?) attacked some West Bengal policemen guarding the office of US Information Services in Kolkata. The American and the western bloc countries presumption that Jihadis were fighting only against India was proved as wrong, in spite of the best high handedness policy adopted by the CIA.

Considering the global scenario and regional upheavals, the Armed forces of India visualized that they are going to involve actively in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations not only in North East-India but also in its peripheral areas which included Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan and Nepal. Bangladesh and Burma will remain as trouble countries till democratic polity comes into play. Till then, it will be affected by insurgency, ethnic movements, fundamentalism, terrorism and Islamic movement. Bhutan's security will be disturbed by insurgents and terrorists from the region. Nepal politics will remain in turbulent state due to Maoist Communist political agenda, China's strategic interests, Pakistan long term political agenda to envelope India, and India's National interest to keep the Hindu kingdom on its political orbit. China will always play the North East Card in its South East Asian politics.

RESPONSE ANALYSIS

Political Response

Insurgency movement in North East and Manipur are basically concerned with political problems of the general masses. The existing imbroglio consists of political ingredients which includes historical, social, demographic, ethnic and religion. It is generally related to politico-societal conflicts, ethnic and sub-ethnic aspirations, and yearning for religious dominations. Peace and political tranquility cannot be brought by means of guns or ruthless crushing of the political aspiration of the Manipuris. "It may be proper constantly and strongly to impress upon the Army that they are mere agents of civil power; that out of camp, they are no other authority than other citizens, that offence against the laws are to be examined, not by a military officer, but by a Magistrate; that they are not exempted from arrests and indictments for violation of the laws" (General of the Army George Washington, 27 March 1795; letter to Daniel Morgan; writing XXXIV, 1940, p. 160). In Manipur insurgency, the political solution will dominate the military solution. As such, the Armed forces, should not play a continuum role for a solution of the same. They should assist the political response of New Delhi and try to avoid all political entanglements which does not pay good dividend in national interest.

Military Response

In many parts of the world, quick military response had brought short term fruitful result to curtail insurgency movement, terrorism, militancy and anti-national acts when there was no reaction time for political response. In early 1960's, India adopted military response against the Naga and Mizo insurgency movements. Many people believe that Insurgency and militancy movement involve violence and the same (violence) can be negated by means of force. In North East India, the threat posed by insurgents, militants, terrorists and the Anti-National Elements (ANEs), criss-crossing the 1644 kilometres long Indo-Burma (Myanmar) international border; and 410 kilometres Indo-Bhutan international border cannot be left only to political response. Military means, at some stages, have

to play pivotal roles to remove the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists. However, considering the national and strategic interest of India, the political response will always remain supreme above the Military response.

"There was a constant infiltration of enemy forces from the Laotian border, who were protected by the political restrictions from Washington that prevented from knocking out their reinforcement bases or supply lines. We would constantly be pushing them back, but they had a damned sanctuary across the border guaranteed by American politicians. So we had to take back the same areas over and over again. I don't think there was a guy, from private to General, who did not have a stench in his mouth from the politics of the war (Major-General James Day; Bushido Code; Al Santoli, Ed; leading the way; How Vietnam Veterans rebuilt the US thinking; 1993). In the second week of September 2001, American President, Mr George W Bush



Testing time of Indian Armed Forces

Considering the global scenario, the armed forces needs to improve its military response against terrorism. The response should be quick, swift, stunning and fruitful. Failure should be consider as an exception on extreme situation but not as a drill.

But the early briefing to the President and Secretary Rumsfeld (Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence, USA) on military options were 'disappointing'. Tommy Frank, the Commanding General of Central Command (CENTCOM), told the National Commission on Terrorist attack upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report) that the President was dissatisfied. "The US military, Frank said, did not have an off-the-self plan to eliminate the Al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan. The existing Infinite Resolve options did not, in his view, amount to such a plan" (9/11 Commission Report; p. 333; USA). The USA used all military efforts to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan and pursued the Al Qaeda terrorists wherever they were found. But insurgency and terrorism has not yet come to an end in Afghanistan.

Indian Armed Forces have to note that insurgency and terrorism is a tactic used by individuals or organization to kill, destroy and incapacitated a target. What should they do against the insurgents who are fighting against the legitimate State Government with violence? The answer is: remove the violence elements. For this the Armed forces have to identify and prioritise the actual, potential and likely insurgents threat in and around North East India. The same has to be neutralised by means of legal force.

Politico-Military Response

Insurgency, militancy and terrorist movements, during its long journey, took different routes, colour and textures. In some periods, it is dominated completely by political ingredients and at others by military ingredients. Per force, the responses from the Government and the security forces have to be a mix-match of political and the military means in the form of carrots and the sticks. Such

policy and strategies were widely used in Vietnam, Malaysia, Latin America, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Indonesia, West Bank, and Iraq. Sometimes it succeeded and at other it failed. In India, New Delhi used Politico-Military response batons in Jammu and Kashmir and the North Eastern region of India with mixed end result. Politics and military ingredients have become a necessary ingredient for war against insurgency and terrorism. Though the Armed forces does not want to marry up with politics, in the present day environment, both the entities have to work together to bring peace and tranquility. "My life is a mixture of politics and war. The latter is bad enough, but I have been trained for it! The former is straight and unadulterated venom ! But I have to devote lots of my time, and much more of my good disposition to it" (General Dwight D Eisenhower; 27 September, 1943; letter to his wife). In North East India, Indian Army had carried out politico-military response against the insurgents in Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. However, we believe the same have to be launched in a perfect synchronised and harmonic tune and volumes. The politicians should understand the role of the Armed forces in such complex arena and the personnel of the security forces should know the role of the Government in National security of India. Any misunderstanding and rhetoric should be avoided. *"The Army will not hear nothing of politics from me, and in turn I expect to hear nothing of politics from the Army"* (Herbert Asquith; speech at Ladybank, England, 4 April 1914). The Indian Armed forces should ponder and extracts the hints from Mao-Tse-Tung statement that 'War cannot for a single minute be separated from politics' (1938 Lecture).

Role Dissections

Since early 1980's, there were enough debates, and intellectual discussions by civil and defence analysts regarding possible roles of the Armed forces of India in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. That was the time where Indian Armed forces were fighting insurgents, terrorists and cross-border terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir and the North Eastern region of India. However, the April, 1980 incidence of Iranian hostage crisis, when Navy helicopters of USA, carrying the Delta Force Commandos, landed to 'Desert One', 200 kilometre southeast of Tehran, lost eight aircrafts, five airmen and three marines, led to the changes of US policy in counter-terrorism drill. Certainly, Indian Armed forces learned the lesson of the fiasco of US Army. However, in early 1990's, many



Politico-Military Response

(Vietnam, 17 May 1967. US Marine evacuating wounded colleague, in Con Thien, Vietnam towards a waiting helicopter)
In Iraq (2002-2006), US Army suffered more than 3,000 killed; in Vietnam (1961-1975) 58,000; and one million American during American Civil War (1861-1865). Can USA continue the wars on Asian soil with non-Americans and un-Americans human life!!

defence analysts harped on that the Armed forces should not involve in the internal security measures. But by 2000 AD, India show that the dividing line between the external security and the internal security threat has become very blurred and thin with the emergence of sub-conventional warfare. The Armed forces have to analyse the global, regional and the National security environment and be prepared for war against insurgency and terrorism in the near future.

Fighting Principle

The insurgency movement in Manipur and the North Eastern region of India is of a complex nature dominated more by political ingredients rather than the military might. As such, counter-insurgency operation also will be a complex one as it involves many stakeholders; delicate as it concerned with misguided 'brothers and sisters', sensitive because many ethnic groups, communities, caste, creed and religion have to be handled. *"Counter-insurgency operations are a difficult and complex operation against one's own countrymen who are misled, no well-defined battle lines are drawn, no clearly identifiable adversary, the necessity to use minimum force, avoiding collateral damage and no violation of human rights whatsoever"* (Lieutenant General Gurpreet Singh, Director General, Infantry, Indian Army; 1997). The sub-conventional warfare doctrine, the baby-child of General JJ Singh, should be applied, study, defined and redefined as the Armed forces move on from time to time. The Army should ensure that the threats posed by the insurgents in Manipur and North East India are neutralised so that political agenda could be ushered in for a meaningful end result.

Intelligence

Intelligence is one of the key factor for successful end result in counter-insurgency operations. The defeat and annihilation of insurgents and terrorists will depend heavily on the effective use of intelligence in sub-conventional war. Counter-insurgency intelligence does not cover only the organisations, operations and capabilities of the insurgents but also covered the important political and psychological orientation; political mindsets; motive; morale and support bases. Considering the fragile demographic contour in North East India, personnel of Indian Armed forces operating in the area should give special attention to Human Intelligence; objective and balanced analysis; avoidance of underassessment and overassessment; overreaction by counter-intelligence agencies; avoidable perennial rivalries among the Intelligence Agencies; and needs for frequent Intelligence exercise of reverse analysis (analysis as an irrational insurgent/terrorist/guerilla). In 1964-67, in Vietnam, General William C Westmoreland, Commander of the United States of American troops, a flamboyant Army officer, could not see those areas except his profound and arrogant American strategy of annihilating and defeating the ubiquitous Vietcongs and the red flag bearers troops of North Vietnam. General William Westmoreland and his subordinates neglected to analyse the important intelligence inputs of the mindset of the Vietcong, their political and psychological orientation, and finally their motive of fighting the war in the inhospitable jungle. At later stages, the American troops faced an ignominious retreat from Vietnam because they failed in their intelligence assessment of the Vietnam War. Counter-insurgency warfare in North East India requires an effective and coordinated action plans for intelligence collections, dissections, interpretations and sharing of the same by those personnel which require the same.

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

In today's world security environment, particularly in a multi-ethnic scenario, combating insurgency, guerilla, terrorism and fanaticism has become a complicated politico-military agenda. In 1964-65,

American troops under General William Westmoreland, with finest war-machine and latest technology suffered a humiliating military debacle in Vietnam Peninsula due to faulty politico-military strategy. In 1971, Indian Defence Force, under the towering and dominating figure, General (later on Field Marshal) SHFJ Manekshaw, with a sound

"A battle is a complicated operation that you prepare laboriously. If the enemy does this, you say you yourself, I will do that . . . you think out every possible development and decide on the way to deal with the situation created".

—Ferdinand Foch, April 1919.

military strategy of joint command and control led to the birth of Bangladesh. In 1989, in Latin America, General Max Thurmond, Commander, Southern Command, USA Army and Lieutenant General Gary Luck, Commander XVIII. Airborne Corps, USA Army formed a concrete joint operational command which brought the downfall of Noreiga regime in Panama. In 1990-92, during the Gulf war, the American General Norman Schwarzkopf, who baffled the American children to spell his name correctly, refused to integrate Special Forces (SF) of US Army into the overall Iraq campaign plan thereby creating military hiccup in strategic discussion during the operation. In 1999-2000, in Kargil war (Operation), the Indian Armed Forces suffered avoidable losses in men and materials due to their failure to form a joint command and control infrastructure. In 2001-2004, during the Iraq war, Lieutenant General Anthony Zeni, Commander, Central Commands US Army, strongly believed in the principle of joint command and control and applied the same which finally led to the destruction of Saddam's regime and his Bath's Party. Indian Armed forces is fighting insurgents, guerillas, terrorists, and fundamentalists in its North Eastern region since 1950's. Basically the military operations are undertaken by the security forces which includes (2000-2001 index) Army (55%), Assam Rifles (30%) Border Security Forces ((5%); Central Reserve Police Force, State Armed Police, Intelligence Bureau, State Police Forces (10%). In Manipur, Military operation like 'Operation Blue Bird' (1978) : Operation Sunny Vale (1995): 'Operation Golden Bird' (1987) could not achieve maximum benefits and success due to lack of joint command and control structure, mistrust among the security forces, intelligence agencies, State Police forces and bureaucrats; lack of political support, egotism and inhibition of the Indian Army for internal security duties (normally not discuss in the open). Formation of Joint Command Council (JCC) can remove such irritants and aberrations and give excellent advantage in Politico-Psychological warfare; intelligent sharing; removal of inter-personal rivalries; formulation of consensus; improvement of role identification; and calibrated Civic-military action.

Apolitical Forces

The Armed forces of India, the fourth largest Defence forces in the world, has emerged as a formidable regional power in Asian continent. The dynamics and structures of the forces consist of a large number of ethnic groups and communities, having different cultures, customs, habits, traditions and religions. Since 1947, when India became independent, the Armed forces followed the British model of Defence structures, acted as the protector of the Constitution of India, sovereignty, and

the territorial integrity of India. It has taken part in the external and the internal security measures without having any inhibitions in caste, creed and religion. India has shielded its Armed forces from political influences and judiciously maintained its apolitical images in the National and the international arena. In the United Nations Agenda of peace-keeping in the world, the Indian troops has become the envy of many war-torned countries in African Continent. However, when Indian troops operated for internal security duties in areas like Jammu and Kashmir and the North Eastern region of India, they always comes under ethnic, sub-ethnic and religious pressure. North East India is a jungle of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups with different ethnic political, social and religious aspirations. During counter-insurgency operations, they will be sucked into the whirlpool of the politics of various communities, normally instigated and tutored by the ethnic insurgent outfits and the ethnic politicians. At times, the ethnic politicians will try to twist the hand of the security force to complete their ethnic political agenda and dreams. In turn, the Armed forces will be blamed and their apolitical images will be tarnished. In 1993-1997, the Naga insurgents (NSCN-IM) blamed the security forces of India for siding with the Kukis ethnic groups during the Naga-Kuki ethnic crisis in Manipur and Nagaland and directly using Kuki insurgents to crush the Naga insurgent movement. In 2000-2002, the security forces, after the July 1997 Naga insurgents—Government of India ceasefire in Nagaland, stopped military operations against the NSCN-IM cadres, except when they broke the ceasefire rules. Others ethnic groups which included the Assamese, the Tripuris, the Manipuri Meiteis, the Kukis, the Garos, the Khasi etc. blamed the security forces for their political-military aberrations and pro-Naga political role. In 2003-2005, during the Economic Blockade of Manipur along the two National Highways of the state (NH-39 and NH-53), civil transports plying along the routes were attacked, looted, ransacked, and burnt down to ashes by the Nagas under the overall supervisions of NSCN-IM cadres. They even blasted the Irang bridge, one of the important road-bridge along National Highway Number 53, choking the economy of the state and virtually launching an Economic-terrorism against the rightful citizens in the region. The people in Manipur state felt that New Delhi viewed the politico-terror havoc created by the NSCN-IM very lightly and generally read the same as pro-Naga policy. The Manipuri Meiteis, the Kukis, and the Manipuri Muslims outburst against the security forces, particularly the Assam Rifles (para-military forces) for their pro-Naga policy during the Economic Blockade of Manipur (2002-2005). However, they denied the allegations of the general populace in the region. Another area of political conflict was the alleged outcry of the citizen of Manipur for the involvement of the security forces in the sub-ethnic crisis and clashes of the Hmar Vs the Manipuri Meitei insurgents; the NSCN-IM Vs the NSCN-K; Kuki Vs the NSCN-IM; Kukis Vs Kukis etc. which was an age-old strategy and tactics of intrigues. The general public felt that such military politics and strategy would achieve substantial short-term gains but produced a catastrophic long term end result for National security. In such politico-ethnic Jingoism, the Armed forces have to play its age-old apolitical and non-ethnic role, remained above the board but certainly not out of the board.

Network-Centric Warfare

Modernisation of Armed forces is a continues process. Many western countries have made progress on modern war doctrine consisting of command, control, communication, computer and intelligence. Indian Armed forces had taken a long stride to train its soldiers for C4I (command, control, communication, computer and intelligence). This requires both modernization and reorganization of

the Armed forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) as a whole. Modernisation in most of the cases faced acute suffering due to resources constraints and lack of budgetary support. However, after the Kargil fiasco and changes in the world security environment after 9/11, 2001, Indian Armed forces felt the needs of a Network-Centric warfare on priority based on National security interest. In North East India, the following security forces are fighting the violence of insurgents and terrorists:

- The Army.
- The Assam Rifles.
- The Border Security Forces (BSF).
- The Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF).
- The State Police Forces.
- The Intelligence Bureau (IB).
- The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).
- The Special Security Bureau (SSB).



There is a need of having a centralized warfare strategy against the various ethnic insurgent outfits to achieve optimum result.

Urban Counter-Insurgency Operation

India is one of the countries in the world where its Armed forces had fought conventional war, insurgency movement, guerilla warfare, cross-border terrorism and terrorism for the last 50 years or so. It can be rated as one of the unique fighting force in the world covering both the internal and the external security threat elements. However, its degree of operational readiness became questionable during the Kargil war when Pakistani Armed forces disguised as irregular forces intruded into its Northern frontier region in large number. By 2001-2002, it became very clear that the Indian Armed forces are not going to fight insurgents, militants, terrorists and the Anti-National Elements (ANEs) in the mountains, hilly areas, jungle terrain and desert areas only. In the near future, they are going to fight them in the crowded market areas of New Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai, Kolkata etc. There is no guarantee that they are not going to involve in urban insurgency movement in Dhaka, Chittagong, Mandalay, Rangoon, Thimpu, Kathmandu, Lahore, Kandahar and Kabul. Closer to North East India, Indian Armed forces are involved in urban counter-insurgency warfare in Guwahati, Shillong, Imphal, Agartala and Itanagar. This has certainly disoriented the psychological bearings of troops. Urban insurgency movement are quite different from normal insurgency movement in the hills and the jungle (rural scenario) and as such the urban counter-insurgency operations have to be entirely on a different strategy and tactics. One of the reasons is that the culture, behaviour and environment of urban cities and towns tends to be different from that of the rural societies. The situation becomes more complex with the involvement of terrorists which has got no boundaries, time and space. Troops taking part in urban counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations will face problems due to the presence of the following ingredients:

- Populated civil areas.
- High buildings and skyscrapers.
- An ancillary of wide Highways, roads and lanes.
- Important civic areas.
- Crowded school areas.
- Hospitals, Government offices and public places.
- Macro and micro industrial building and structures.
- Important temples, churches, mosques and gurudwaras.
- High value target areas.
- Airports.
- Communication centres.

The presence or existence of an ancillary of school buildings or religious institution will affect in the operations of urban counter-insurgency operations. Ethnic urban insurgency movement in Chechnya and Grozny has put the Russian Armed forces in extreme military discomfiture. The Russian troops, under the then the President Vladimir Putin tried to show a brave face but could not find an answer for a solution. The British elite forces bogged down in Belfast because they could not find out a doctrine for the urban counter-insurgency and guerilla operation for the British Armed forces. Sri Lankan Armed forces are fighting the LTTE in urban areas of Northern Sri Lanka by a fire-fighting military doctrine. Urban insurgency movements are going by in Bosnia, Bali, Mindanao Island, Uighur, Karachi, Iraq, Jerusalem etc. During urban counter-insurgency operations, the Armed forces should give special attention to avoid mass casualties to civilian populace. Troops should avoid panic and speculative fire, engage the insurgents in swift operations, disengage themselves from the areas to avoid mob and public reactions. They should try to repair any public damages to avoid gap and hole in public-security forces relations. This can be achieved by means of good military leadership; good command and control; excellent on-job training; sound civic-military relations; crowd control mechanism and humane angle.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations anywhere on the globe will always involve violation of Human Rights though the degree of violations would differ from one place to another, and from one region to another. Two regions in India prominently attracted the attentions of Right groups: the North eastern region of India and the Jammu and Kashmir. Indian Armed forces during its counter-insurgency operations against the insurgents, terrorists, fundamentalists and the Anti-National elements committed Human Rights violations which enraged the civil populace. These violations finally led to serious collateral effects and damages to the civil populace due to the conflict environment created by the conflicts between the insurgents and the security forces. Personnel of the security forces, particularly at the officer's levels, have to be very careful and thoughtful on this front. Right

violations during counter-insurgency operation should be avoided as far as possible to keep the images of the Armed forces as a National Army of the people and not a brute force. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (AFSPA), an Act enacted by the Government of India, to give special additional powers to the security forces operating in the North-eastern region of India and other places for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, has become a bone of contention between the civil populace and the central government. Notwithstanding with the intricacies, textures, meaning, positive and negative views, applicability and non-applicability of the Act, there is a need that troops operating in the North eastern region of India have to ensure that collateral damages are maintained to zero level of tolerance during counter-insurgency operations. This is one area where the Armed forces can win the heart and mind of the people.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

Counter-insurgency operation requires constant and gradual public interactions by the security forces to close loopholes and setback, which affected its images. Security forces require a strong media support in its war against terrorism, a war against the unknown. Insurgency movement and terrorism, after all, is not a magical road-side drama which has not been seen by the world. Indian Army is witnessing the same for the last 50-60 years like in other parts of the world. They, with their high standard of professional, leadership, apolitical concept, secularism and motivation has done yeoman service wherever called upon by the civil administration for 'Aid to Civil Authority'. In many states in North East India, they are trying to curb disturbances in tandem with the state Police forces who are the custodian of law and order of state as per the constitution of India. But, repeated performance of Police duties by the security forces will always have negative collateral effects as it happened to the USA's Army in Vietnam and Iraq; Russian troops in Chechnya and Grozny, British troops in Belfast; Chinese troops in Tien-An-Square; Indian troops in Jaffna (Northern Sri Lanka) etc. with a tact of brutalism and killer. This is the area where Media can play a vital role for projecting a positive images of the Armed forces while dealing with the insurgents and the terrorists.

NOTES

Military Response

A democratic government may succeed in elimination of Insurgents, terrorists and revolutionaries. But the problem arises when the end is not justified the means.

"In 1957-58, during the Algiers revolutionary movement, French General Jacques Massu and his 10th parachute division successfully eliminated terrorism (Algerian Revolution) in Algiers by means of inhumane wholesale detention, lightening raids, killing, infiltration of the rebel organization and organization of the population for a democratic process. The battle of Algiers saved thousand of human lives which would have been lost to terrorism. However it damaged the National morale, prestige and the International image of France."

[*"Can We Win Revolutionary Wars?"*, Colonel John J. McCuen, *Army Magazine*, December 1969; USA]

Urban Guerilla

[Urban Guerilla Warfare, 1970; Military Review, USA; Major Philip D Cane]

"The less dense the population, the less numerous the terrorists because there are fewer people to dealt with, and they encounters more difficulties for survival. . . . The actual combating of an urban Insurgency presents a demand for both new ideas and the refinement of old ones. There is a need for both police and military forces trained extensively in the techniques peculiar to urban warfare. Also required are more refined techniques of riot control that can gain, or at least maintain at a reasonable level, popular support. Up to date and complete knowledge of cities that could present potential problems is also necessary. This should include complete maps and information on both surface and underground facilities, population distribution, transportation routes, and areas of possible unrest."

PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM

"If civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationship—the ability of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together, in the same world at peace."

—Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The charter of the United Nations contains the affirmation of the solemn commitment of all states to fulfill their obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance for all. The world body vested responsibilities to the General Assembly for guarantee of Human Rights. Promoting and encouraging respect for Human Rights and assisting on the realization of Human Rights and fundamental freedom, are words that appear, with some variations in different context, at several places in the charter of the United Nations. Every year, the international community celebrates 10 December as the Human Rights Day. When the United Nations was engaging for promotion of Human Rights, USA and many other European countries took up the issue in many regional platforms. In 1993, the UN made a declaration known as the 'United Nations Vienna Declaration and programme of Action-1993', which deliberated on equal rights and self-determination. It also declared 1998 as the "Year of Human Rights for All".

HUMAN RIGHTS VS DOMESTIC JURISDICTION

Every country has got their own judicial canons for dealing with their citizens inside and outside their own legal territory. A state has got the full rights to decide its own destiny and dignity : type of Government; form of constitution; legal infrastructures; civil and political rights; social and cultural rights and duty, and fundamental Human Rights. In early 1960's, communist bloc, Afro-Asian, and South East Asian countries emphasized that the country's interest and integrity carried more weight rather than the individual's interest. Moreover, in most of the Islamic countries, religion and religious factors are considered as the primary fundamental interest and rights of the state as compared to the non-incognito concept of Human Rights. In such countries, religion is the bedrock of the society

and the people. In most of the underdeveloped countries, the meaning of Human Rights violation has got no significant impact as compared to the burning issues which included socio-economic development, religious fundamentalism, fascism, dictatorship, ethnic movement, insurgency and militancy movement. Iran, Iraq, Burma (Myanmar), North Korea, Cambodia, Libya, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Laos, Somalia are some countries which are tagged with poor Human Rights records.

Most of the communists, Islamic and Latin American countries had given interpretation of Human Rights from the National interest of their country. On the other hand, western countries and countries with democratic governments are taking fundamental Human Rights as supreme of all and non-negotiable. They strongly reiterated that individual rights could not be curtailed in the name of religion, sex, caste, creed and ethnicity. Such countries strongly believed that violation of fundamental rights by any country, state and ethnic groups within and outside its territory could not be left unattended under the caption of 'its own internal matter'. Fundamental Human Rights is the rights of individual and not country-wise, sex-wise and religion-wise.

INDIA CHAPTER

India as a sovereign democratic country is playing an important role in all deliberations of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Non-aligned movement, SAARC and ASEAN. It has got the full legal and constitutional rights to protect its citizen, territorial integrity and identity. It is fighting against a proxy war launched by Pakistan and other in the form of cross-border terrorism. It is also fighting ethnic insurgency movement in its Northeastern region abetted by Bangladesh, Myanmar, China and of course Pakistan. It has expended huge energy in terms of money, men and materials to maintain peace and tranquility particularly in North East India. India is trying to safeguard its National honour by waging a war on terrorism and insurgency movement. The country is fighting insurgency movement and terrorism from politico-military angle. Security Forces (SF) are automatically involved in the logjam. Western countries feel that Indian security forces committed excess in Counter-Insurgency Operations (CI Ops) in Jammu and Kashmir, where Al Qaeda of Osama bin Laden has bedded-in comfortably for terrorism against India and the western countries. The tentacle of Al Qaeda has already been expanded to Northeastern region of India. The Counter-Insurgency Operations (CI Ops) carried out by the security forces, sometime lead to collateral damages to the civil populace. This is the general area where the domestic compulsion and jurisdiction sometimes clashes with the international expectations and interpretations.

"I would like to reiterate that our government is totally committed to upholding the dignity of the individual and the protection of basic human rights in Kashmir."

—Dr Manmohan Singh,
Prime Minister of India; April, 2007

The security forces of India are fighting many unseen opponents in the Northeastern region of India. The ingredients involved large number of communities and ethnic groups having a play-card for 'sovereignty', 'Independence', and 'self-determination'. They are led by ethnic politicians and ethnic insurgent outfits, who give sleepless nights to the security personnel. Political assassinations, killing, rape, molestation, strikes, blockade of National Highway, destruction of Government's properties, clashes and killings among the Nagas, the Kukis, the Assamese, the Bodos, the Karbis and the Dimasas

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are the routine environment in the region. Ambushes and firing against the security posts, ROP (Road Opening Party) and Patrol parties by the insurgents are the routine gifts in the area. Some Security forces were got killed, some got serious permanent injuries, some are lucky to come back to the Army barrack to write to their family at home what happened in Manipur, Nagaland or Assam on any fateful day.

How do Riflemen Sri Nivas Rao from Colmbatore (South India) and Naik Dharam Singh from Sri Ganganagar (Rajasthan) feel and understand the complexities of the problem in Manipur within a period of 2 years (normal field service tenure) and contributes in building the Army's images in the field of Human Rights. What about the role of Yankee style Major Dhan Cumer (who hailed from Jammu and Kashmir) who see everything red in his eyes and charged on the first opportunity on the bushes? But Colonel Keen Kumar, who hailed from Tirupati (Ahdhra Pradesh), the famous religious Tirupati Temple read the complexities from 3 dimensional angles and try to come to a solution purely from human angle.

VIABLE APPROACHES

Grey Areas

Many ethnic groups in North East India, particularly in Manipur, have shown extreme sensitivity to any infringement on their freedom, religion, customs and culture. During Counter-Insurgency Operations, the Security Forces (SF) and the general public maintained a stiff conflicting and divergent opinion in the field of Human Rights and Rights violations. The Armed Forces as the primary agent of the country has been given the constitutional legal rights to guard, protect and ensure the security, honour and integrity of India. However, during Counter-Insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, there are bound to have some collateral damages to the civil populace with variations in its magnitudes. Sometimes they suffered heavily due to cross-fire between the insurgents and the Security Forces. Regional, National and International Human Rights Watchers and groups magnified such incidents and termed it as Human Rights violations by the Security Forces. On the other hand, the Security Forces claimed that no unilateral actions are taken by them unless the insurgents raised the Anti-state flag to the government and the people. The insurgents created an easy play-field for conflict between the state (Armed Forces) and the general public (Human rights groups). The primary gainer is the Insurgents and the biggest loser, the security forces. In such cases, many stakeholders hold their point of view which become the grey area for promotion of Human Rights.

Green Area

One of the finest tradition, customs and culture of the Indian Armed Forces is that they always responded to operational mistakes committed by troops during counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. Such traditions are not found, even in the Armed Forces of USA, Russia, China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Latin America etc. In North East India, Indian Security Forces, who is the principal agent to subdue, control and remove violence perpetrated by the insurgents, terrorists and militants normally, makes stray and unfortunate mistakes during counter-insurgency operations. Such incidents are normally investigated, probed, punished the defaulter(s), make corrective and remedial action for future guidelines and application. "This was a very unfortunate thing to happen. I am shocked. This should not have

taken place. ... we know we have done wrong. We have not come here to compensate you by giving some money, we have come here to meet you purely on humanitarian grounds" (Lieutenant-General Arvind Sharma, General Officer Commanding in Chief, Eastern Command, Indian Army, Gohgaigaon, Tinsukia, Assam, 13 February 2009). On 04 February, 2006, Mr. Ajit Mahanta was picked up by the Army from Kakopthar, branded him as "ULFA linkman" and suffered custodial death. Finally, he turned out to be an innocent person. "The killing of Budheswar Moran was an unfortunate incident and my heart goes out to the innocent family members of the victim. Let me assure you that all those found guilty will face strict and exemplary punishment." (Major General NC Marwah, General Officer Commanding, 2 Mountain Division; press conference at Tinsukia Circuit House, Assam; 09 May 2007). A team of 6 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, posted at Laopatty, Tinsukia shot dead Budheswar Moran, 24, in an 'encounter', branded him as an ULFA militant; fired from his pistol, tried to escape; refused to stop, forcing the soldiers to retaliate and brought him down. The temporary tea worker finally turned out to be an innocent person.

Human Angle

New Delhi should not try to eliminate or subdue the aspirations of ethnic groups/community in Northeastern region of India, through the medium of security forces (SF), by inflicting heavy psychological injuries to the civil populace. Deliberate, harse, and inhuman doctrine of warfare against members of own ethnic groups/communities will lead to negative end result. The principle and strategy of using one community/Religious groups against another will produce more complex problems and attract the clauses of Human Rights violations. Such incidents were seen in Vietnam (Mai Lai Massacre; Vietcong Vs South Vietnamese); Iran (Shia and Sunnis); Iraq (Muslim Vs Kurds); Bangladesh (Chakma tribal and the Bengali Muslims); Myanmar (Rohingyas Muslim and the Burmese Buddhists); and Bhutan (Bhuties and the Nepali). The security forces should not try to solve political problem existing in Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, Tripura and Mizoram by wearing the hard political glove. It will produce a series of suffering to the general public and produce a Frankenstein in the near future.

Soft Gloves

The records of the India's Security Forces in the field of Human Rights can be rated as good, though some of the western Human Rights watch groups may have reservations. The American and the Russian troops committed many rights violations in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kossova etc. against the civil populace. Indian Security forces is fighting a difficult, serious, and uncharted battle against the anti-national elements in North East India. The most comedic parts is that the components are our own brothers and sisters and not the 'Enemy' which Rifleman Srinivas Rao and Naik Dharam Singh were thought of. Both of them are wearing the psychological iron gloves in their steel hands for the kill. They have got their discomfiture of wearing the soft gloves of Human Rights in such battlefield.

There is a strong need that the personnel of the Armed forces have to be introduced, taught and make understand Human Rights lessons from the recruit training stages itself. They are going to face North East India scenario in the near future, may be in some other parts of India or even outside India. Psychologically, they should have the confidence to handle such a complicated situation in different manner and not as a war-like situation. For members of the Armed forces, there is no different between Nagaland and Goa, Manipur and Andhra Pradesh, and Assam and Punjab (Dr

Manmohan Singh is a member of Parliament, Rajiya Sabha, from Assam). They only see the changes in culture, tradition, customs, habits, language and religion during their movement from one place to another. Language/Dialects formed the main ingredient for successful CI Operations, and it reduced suffering to the local populace. In fact, it make a cementing factor between the security forces and the general public and reduced rights violations dramatically.

Successive Chiefs of the Army Staffs of India have issued instructions to troops 'what to do and what not to do in CI Operations' particularly in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East India. A concerted effort on promotion of Human Rights by means of regular seminars, group discussion, interaction with National and International Human Rights Organisation and concerned NGOs will benefit Indian Security Forces. On the other hand, members of the Security Forces will be able to bring out security-related problems during counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations in a multi-ethnic region/areas like North East India and its collateral effects to the civil populace.

NOTES

1. Justice Rajinder Sachhar, 'International convention for the restoration of Democracy in Burma', January 1996.

To a question from one Mr. Christopher Dietrich, Justice Rajinder Sachhar replied: "You surely don't think I suggested that my country did not have human rights. As a matter of fact the National Human Rights Commission has done nothing. We have the fundamental rights which are as strong as the Human Rights, right from our Constitution in 1950. . . . By our Constitution of 1950 we have a fundamental rights chapter which gives all these human rights which are put in the covenant, of freedom of speech, freedom of Association, freedom from arbitrary arrest, not only that we have a right to go to our High Court and the Supreme Court to interfere with the Government order which is not to be found in many of the countries which have ratified the civil covenant. This has been done as an extra thing nothing very special, this was frankly done because somehow people were shouting why we don't have the Human Rights Commission."

2. Peremptory in scope

"Article 32 [Article 32 of the Constitution of India] is not only injunctive in ambit but also peremptory in scope. It is not powerless to redress a person while his fundamental right has been violated, it includes the power to award compensation."

[The Constitutional Bench in *M.C Metha vs Union of India*, reported in AIR 1987 SC - 1086.]

3. Custodial Violence - remedy.

"Custodial violence requires to be tackled from two ends, that is, by taking measures that are remedial and preventive. Award of compensation is one of the remedial measures after the event. Effort should be made to remove the very cause, which lead to custodial violence, so as to prevent such occurrences. . . ."

[*State of MP vs Shyamsunder Trivedi*, 1995 ssc - 262, reiterated in *Abdul Gafar Khan and Munshi Singh Gautam* (supra), Supreme Court of India.]

MEDIA AND PUBLICITY IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM WARFARE

"What America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have. Our Islamic nation has been tasting the same for more than 80 years of humiliation and disgrace, its sons killed and their blood spilled, its sanctities desecrated."

—Bin Laden, December 2001, *Al Zazeera TV*

"Their operation are supported by drug trafficking, money laundering and arms smuggling. Some states follow a policy of sponsoring and sheltering them. They can only be countered through closely coordinated efforts of the international community."


—Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India,
56th Session of the UN General Assembly, 10 November, 2001).

Publicity, propaganda, media and psychological warfare has become the inescapable principle ingredients for formulation of doctrine, strategy, policy and approaches to influence public opinion for war against insurgents and terrorists. During insurgency; secessionist and liberation movement; ethnic crisis and clashes; fundamentalist religious upheavals; the psychological perception and thinking of the general public can be swayed by means of well-calibrated media warfare blended with patriotic flavour, national immotion, political rhetoric, threat, intimidation and diplomatic coercion. During World War I, countries and states did not pay much attention to the power of media, publicity and propaganda. But, during World War II, Dr Goebbel and the Nazi Armed forces applied the punching power of the Media and build up Nazism. In 1960's, the Americans learnt the hard lesson from Vietnam fiasco and applied it correctly during the 1991-92 Gulf War. Britain and the British Army exploited the power of the media during the Falkland War. Indian media contributed 50-70% of the

war efforts for the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971; 80-85% during the Kargil War; 90-95% on terrorists attack on India's Parliament building and subsequent quick reaction by India's security forces.

ROLE ANALYSIS

The long arms of the media with its punching glove like the Breaking News, Head Lines, Great Exposure, Sensational News, Latest News etc. has changed the mosaic of world politics. It can comfortably make or break the policy, strategy and programmes of war on insurgency and terrorism of many powerful states and other stakeholders. Revolutionary groups, insurgent outfits, militant group and terrorist organization require a medium to express their view points and 'act of valour' of upholding the banner of freedom, independence, self-determination, religious supremacy and 'humanity'. The policymakers and the lawmakers normally groped, crawled and rushed for neutralization of the perpetrators and their act of commission and omission. The media feeds the hungry public. The Government and the insurgents reacted, sometimes to their great discomfiture, when the reports and disclosures is not in their favour. Thus, the media played a vital role in the triangular three-sum war-field of the insurgent, the Government and the public



MEDIA-INSURGENT INTERFACES

For insurgents, terrorists and militants, publicity and propaganda is their life blood for survival. The insurgents, like the fleas, want to reach the general public. The best medium is the media. Insurgent outfits who maintained a cordial relations with the media can achieved the following:-

- (a) Worldwide public attention.
- (b) Quick response from the Government.
- (c) Recognition of demand.
- (d) Respectability and sympathy.
- (e) Full/partial acceptance of their demand.

In early 1960's, in Vietnam, the Vietcong guerillas under Dr. Hoh-Chi-Minh and General Von Nguen Giap welcomed and hugged the journalists, newsreporters, TV crews and NGOs in their hideouts and guerilla bases and explained the reasons for their liberation movement. The world media bled the American Army more severely than did by the communists guerillas. Al Jazeera, the Television channel, founded in 1996 in the Emirate of Qatar, won huge viewership in the Arab world within a span of 5-6 years. It immortalized Osama bin Laden, the supreme leader of Al Qaeda network "talking to you from Mount Jihad, his camouflage jacket in perfect harmony with the monochromatic

mountain, his automatic weapon pointed in anticipation, his thin finger wagging in the air, his sports watch staring at the camera" (*India Today*; the Osama Chick: 2001).

In Sri Lanka, the LTTE (The Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam) maintained a close relations with the media to the great dismay and discomfitures of the Colombo Government and the Sri Lankan Armed forces. In Nepal, during 2005-2006, king Gyanendra lost his political battle due to the close interactions between the News reporters and the Maoist insurgents (MCC) of Nepal. The Al Jazeera TV News channel was accessible to the terrorist outfit, the Al Qaeda, whereas the BBC, the CNN and the NBC could not do much.

MEDIA-GOVERNMENT INTERFACES

In the present day context, politicians, policymakers, lawmakers, bureaucrats and diplomats needs the assistance of the general public for war against insurgents and the terrorists. The Government have to convinced the masses that they are fighting an unpleasant and forced war initiated by the insurgents. They have to publicized and propagated their policy and approaches, convinced the general public and try to bring them in their homeside. This act can be done by means of publicity and propaganda warfare. It needs a credible agenda, policy and programme and further an excellent media-government interface.

In 1987, during the Falkland War, the British Government raised the banner of National security interest of Great Britain and maintained an excellent Media-Government interface. During the Gulf War (1991), Ted Turner's Cable News Network (CNN) covered the war zone alive, brought it into the kitchen and dining rooms of millions of American people, showing the scene of raining of missiles on Iraq's capital, Baghdad. USA and the CNN won the war with an impressive display of Information Technology. The war against the Taliban by the USA's forces in Afghanistan are well supported by world opinion, courtesy the world media. However, the International media has not given full marks on American policy and approaches on Iraq. During 2000-2007 AD, the people of Pakistan were not on the same wavelength with Pakistan Government, led by General Pervez Musharraf on its war on terrorism (the Al Qaeda). Because, the media always suspected General Pervez Musharaff's strategy on war on terrorism via Washington's traffic point.

GOVERNMENT-INSURGENT INTERFACE

Today, a number of countries are trying to have a peaceful political and diplomatic solution to various conflicts affecting the world community: Insurgency movement, terrorism, cross-border terrorism, militancy, religious fundamentalist movement, fanaticism and anti-human activities. Many politicians and policymakers feel shy and considered talk with insurgents and militants as political taboo, pointless and fruitless. But, it is not so. The Israeli branded the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation) and the Hamas as terrorist organisations and late Yasser Arafat as a terrorist. Successive Israeli Prime Ministers David Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, General Moshe Dayan etc. refused to see eye to eye with the Palestinian leaders. However, with the intervention of world leaders particularly successive leaders of USA, Britain, Russia and France the Israeli and Palestinian interacted and came to a tangible solution to the long Israeli-Palestinian political imbroglio. The British Government burnt many midnight candle to solve the IRA (Irish Republican Army) problem in overt and covert form. In early 1970's, Washington wanted to push-out Russian Forces from Afghanistan with the assistance of Insurgent

and terrorist groups, spending billions of dollars through CIA and ISI of Pakistan. However, Osama bin Laden came out as the wrong product from the American global political factory in Afghanistan.

Since early 1970's, the Burmese (Myanmar) Military Government is having direct political interface with the Kachin, Shan, Karen, Wa, Arakanese, Chin insurgent organisations with carrot and stick political diplomacy. The Indonesian Government is adopting the strategy of direct talk with the insurgent outfits. The Colombo Government is trying to come to a solution to the long ethnic political problem of the Tamils in Sri Lanka with the LTTE. The Russians are trying to reach out to the Chechen insurgents, who are demanding an independent Chechen insurgents State. The Thimpu Government had a long parleys with the insurgent outfits of North East India when their action affected the sovereignty of Bhutan. In 2006, king Gyanendra of Nepal failed to see eye to eye, with the Maosts communist guerillas.

Since early 1970, India is trying to find out political a solution in Jammu and Kashmir and North East India. In 1980's, New Delhi opened up channels for direct and indirect talks with many insurgent groups in its eastern fuselages. They included the Assamese, the Nagas, the Bodos, the Tribal Tripuris, the Manipuris and the Khasis and the Garos. In such parleys, the Government keep the media out of the play field to avoid premature revelations of confidentiality and secrecy. The Government of India is having an open-secret talk with the NSCN-IM since 1997; with the NSCN-K since 2000; with the DHD, the NDFB, the UPDS, the ANVC, the ULFA, the Kuki insurgent outfits etc. New Delhi has opened up a strong and viable Government insurgent interface which could bring positive end result in the North Eastern region of India.

MEDIA MANAGEMENT

In the journalistic community, one hesitate to use and hear the phrase 'Media Management'. Democracy is considered as a green meadow for freedom of speech. That automatically includes freedom of the Media. Freedom of the press is an important element for smooth functioning of a democratic country. Policymakers and lawmakers formed the National Agenda for media so that press reporting and briefing can be controlled, curtailed, censored and managed keeping in view the national interest of a country/state. Many government try to managed the media and push through their own interest by various means and appliances, like Censorship; Official Secret Acts; Special Power Acts; Homeland Security Acts etc.

Censorship

Dictatorial State, communist countries, Fundamentalist and theocratic states, Military regime etc. normally followed iron-curtailed policy. Even democratic countries sometimes adopted this policy during national crisis and interest. In 1971, during the Indo-Pak war (Liberation of Bangladesh) the Government of India, kept its plan in secrecy and confidence for a lightening attack to the great dismay and disappointment of President Richard Nixon and his bete noire, Dr. Henry Kissinger. India repeated the same in 1976-77 but for a different ball-game: Declaration of National Emergency for political power-game. On 4 June 1989, China imposed censorship on Tiananmen square massacre in Beijing under Mao's theory "power flows from the barrel of the gun". The world press lost but Beijing gain politically. In 1988, the Myanmar Military (Junta) Government camouflaged their act of ostracisation of pro-democracy movement launched by Daw Aung Shan Swu Kyi to the great

dismay of democratic countries of the world. In 2005-06, US law and orders enforcing agencies literally roasted the Iraqi Prisoners of War (PoW) in Guantanamo Bay and other secret places in European countries. Even during the trial of Saddam Hussain (Trial of the Century), the media was kept at arm length except for some selective leakouts.

Press censorship, at some stages of crisis and conflict, keeping in view the national interest, is considered as a useful political act but a double-edged sword. Many countries applied this therapy for a duration where the disclosure of various events would affected National interest. On the other hand, prolonged censorship will automatically destroy the concept of freedom of information and the press. It contained more negative value rather than the positive one.

In today's world, insurgents and terrorists are yearning for maximum publicity of their cause and the freedom movement. In North East India, media has been bulldozed by those renegades to publish their war against the 'Colonial rule by India'. On the other hand, New Delhi wants and 'advised' the press not to succumb to the threat and pressure of the terrorists/insurgents. The government officials and Defence personnel want that the media should not act as the mouthpiece of the insurgent outfits. So, sometimes, the tricky question of the censorship arises when the situation goes out of hands of the Government.

Controlled Reporting

The American policymakers and lawmakers are still cursing the televised coverage of the Vietnam war in early 1960's, leading to the crest fallen exit of American soldiers from Vietnam as ragtag. They felt that it was the biggest political-mistake and wrong strategy made by the American administration and the root cause of public anger against Washington, and the USA's Army. During 1986, in Falkland war, the British Army told the media to report what the British Army wanted to report. It succeeded and benefited the British Government. During 2001-2002, in Afghanistan, Washington and Pentagon curtailed the reporting of the plight of the Afghan citizen including women and children who faced repeated American bombing and live a slavish life. After the World Trade Center (WTC) attack by the Al-Qaeda (9/11/2001), the US Media was literally controlled by Washington and all sensitive news were curtailed in the name of National security and American honour. The National Security Adviser (later on Secretary of State of USA), Ms Condoleeza Rice, 'suggested' to the journalists to abridged any Al-Qaeda tape and remove inflammatory remarks and language while reporting and broadcasting. World media baron, Rupert Murdoch, later on, have to say, 'we will do what is our patriotic duty'. In Pakistan, all successive Military ruler, since early 1960's, never allowed the media to have a free run. In 1970's, the same scenario was adopted by Ferdinand Marcos in Phillipines, General Ne win in Burma, President Sukarno in Indonesia and President Ho-Chi-Minh in North Vietnam and the Bangladesh Government in Dacca. Up to 1980's, many countries in Asian continent never allowed the media to taste 'Freedom of the press'.

In India, during 1992, Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao, appealed to the media not to publish any inflammatory remarks and rhetoric made by leaders of different groups and communities during the Babri Majjid incident in Ayodhya. On 13 December, 2002, when Pak-based terrorists tried to blow up India's Parliament building, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee appealed and cautioned the media not to transform the incident into a communal issue. India's Media community understood the message and played a positive role in national interest.

In North East India, media was considered as an infant till early 2000. The Government, from time to time appealed and cautioned them not to publish any rhetoric by ethnic and communal groups which could lead to ethnic crisis and conflicts. The stakeholders and consumers of media warfare in the region are the Government, the insurgents, the security forces and the general public. Controlled reporting, keeping in view of the national vital interest of India can be done by having a concrete Government-Media interface and the rights of the general public to public information.


PRESS FREEDOM

In 1964-65, the American and the world media blasted both Mr. Nikita S. Khruchev and Mr. John F. Kennedy for their political misadventure (adventure) during the Cuban missile crisis. In 1966-67, the American troops, considered to be the champion of Human Rights, were caught on the wrong foot by World Media and TV in Vietnam for Mai Lai massacres and the yellow agents warfare. Successive Prime Ministers of Great Britain bogged down in Northern Ireland's issue because they could not manage the media in their war against the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In 1999, the world press reported the destruction of the Belgrade TV Station and killing of many journalists due to the bombing by the NATO's aircrafts. In November 2005, the *Washington Post* revealed the existence of secret jails and Interrogation Centres in Europe (Poland, Romania and others) for interrogation of hard core Al Qaeda terrorists, during American war on terrorism. Even the powerful and liberal secretary of state of USA, Ms Condoleezza Rice have to say, "We recognize that any policy will sometimes result in errors" (*The Hindu*, 8 December 2005). In 2005, in Bangladesh, the media blasted the Khaleda Zia's BNP (Bangladesh National Party) Government for failing to control the Islamist extremists who killed two judges and even threatened to "bury the law Minister alive, in his home district, Naokhali" (*The Frontline*, 16 December 2005).

Free speech for a free debate sometimes lead to a tricky issue. It is not only for the common people but also for the enlightened elite group of educated crowds. The veteran investigative journalist who broke the Abu Ghraib scandal against the wishes of the American lawmakers, attracted criticism from different angle. In 2006 an International controversy was created in Trans-Atlantic form when Mr John Mearsheimer of Chicago University and Mr. Stephen Walt of Harvard, wrote in the *London Review of Books*, that American foreign policy, especially in West Asia, was heavily influenced by a powerful Israeli lobby, against US National interest.

MEDIA IN NATIONAL SECURITY VS HUMAN RIGHTS LOOP

In 1950's, the Chinese Communist Government under Mao-Tse-Tung, literally mowed down the Tibetan Buddhists and the sturdy Khampha rebels, leading to their mass exodus to India under their



spiritual leader, His Holiness, the Dalai Lama. The Chinese raised the supreme importance of the National Security of the People's Republic of China vis-à-vis the question of Human Rights of a small section of Tibetan Buddhists Lamas. The world closed their eyes, the media and the Human Rights champion remained stand-still like a mute donkey. The importance of Human Rights got a shot in its arm with the evolution of international terrorism. Carlos Marighella in 1975; George Habash of PFLP in early 1980; and Osama bin Laden in 1998, shook the world, particularly the western countries with catastrophic act of terrorism and militancy. In 1995, the Russian Government was in panic when the Chechen rebels (terrorists) threatened to seize control of a nuclear power station in Russia. In 1998, International Islamic Front for Jihad (IIFJ) which consists of the Al Qaeda, the Taliban (Afghanistan), Uzbekistan insurgent groups, Xinjiang insurgent groups (China), Abu Sayyaf of Southern Philippines, decided to undertake punishment terrorism against USA, Israel and other western countries. A series of destructive terrorism continued: explosions in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998; attack on USS Cole in Aden in 2000; terrorists strike in New York and Washington DC on 9-11 September 2001. Insurgency movement, militancy and terrorism gradually consumed thousands of human lives, abused Human Rights, and threatened the peace and development of many countries/states. They seriously threatened the National and the International security of the world as a whole.

Insurgency and terrorism in turn has produced counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, involving the state, the people and the insurgents (terrorists). Many countries propounded that the National Security of their country could not be compromised at all cost. On 16 April 2004, President George W Bush of USA and Prime Minister of Britain Mr Tony Blair, discussed the viability of bombing the Al Jazeera Television Headquarters in the Gulf of Qatar, as it became the mouth-piece of Anti-US sentiments by airing statements from Al Qaeda leaders and showing footages of hostages beheading innocent peoples in Iraq and other places. Both the leaders felt that the act of commission of the Al Jazeera involved the security of the world and the National securities of many countries/states. Al Qaeda is a serious threat to international peace and tranquility. The same is applicable to those Islamic Jihadi groups including those operating in Jammu and Kashmir in the form of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan. Any action against them from the National security angle will always produce some collateral damages to the inhabitants in the region as seen in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jerusalem, Jaffna, and the North East India. This is the critical areas where media have to play a big role. Media cannot completely disown its supreme role for the protection of Human Rights keeping in view the importance to guard the National interest of the country. In July-

Manipur Imbroglio: Role of Media

Army terrorising Villagers: UNLF

Accusing the the security forces of letting loose of reign of terror in the interior parts of CCpur (Churachandpur), ever since the launching of operation All Clear sometimes in October last year [October, 2004], the UNLF said that the time has come to unmask the real face of the Indian Army before the world.

Speaking to newsmen, somewhere at CCpur a spokesman of the outfit said that the security forces has debarred the villagers from transporting goods and even life saving drugs into the villages and subjected the villagers to force labour. . . . accused the security personnel of resorting to indiscriminate bombings of the area, affecting the villagers.

—UNLF reactions against Indian Army Counter-Insurgency Operation code-name Operation All Clear in South Manipur, October, 2004;

December 2004, the media took a pro-active role against the security forces (The Assam Rifles) of India when they violated Human Rights in the case of Miss Thangjam Manorama Devi custodial killing and suspected rape in Imphal East (Manipur State) and hastened the shifting of the Assam Rifles from the Kangla Fort. In that conflict environment, the media in Manipur refused to come under pressure from all stateholders. They played the primary role of their profession (freedom of expression; freedom of thought; Independent investigation etc.) in a meaningful and professional manner, bringing out the truth to the doors of everybody's houses. They retained the right to be critical of the state government, the security forces and the insurgent outfits, keeping in view the national vital interest of India.

The United Nations Organization has already formed the counter-terrorism commit-tee of the world body. They also have created a Special Rapporteur on the protection of Human Rights and



Chief Minister of Manipur, Sri Okram Ibobi Singh with media men of Manipur (2009)

'Public Interest' is a vital organ of Democracy. The public has got a fundamental right to know the act of commission and omission of the Government. On the other hand, it is the unassailable duty of the Government to safeguard the vital National interest and the fundamental principles of the Constitution of India. The Media has to play a crucial role in such conflict environment.

Manipur Imbroglio: Role of Media **UNLF Charges Baseless: Army**

Refuting the reports which appeared in the state [Manipur] dailies on January 3 [3 January 2005] detailing the hardships faced by the villagers of CCpur (Churachandpur district) district following the counter-insurgency operations launched there, the army authority has clarified that the allegations raised against the security force are false and a malicious design to malign the image of the security force, . . .

The control measures taken up by the security personnel are basically to cut off the supply chain of the militants in the interiors . . . army has taken up a number of welfare measures for the villagers including water supply scheme at Tuilaphai, extension of football grounds, training of local youth for recruitment rally and medical assistance including free medicines.

—PIB, Defence Wing, 04 January 2005,
rejoinder to UNLF charges against security
forces during 'Operation All Clear'
in South Manipur.

Fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. Because, upholding Human Rights in the fight against terrorism remains a fundamental Human Rights issue, with civil society continuing to document and publicize severe Human Rights abuses committed within the context of the "War on Terrorism". The debate and discussion on National Security Vs Human Rights have got divergent viewpoints and opinions, at International, National, Regional and ethnic levels. But there is no doubt that the media (the fourth estate) is not an arm of the state, the security forces, the insurgents and the terrorists. Therefore, any infringement on its freedom in the name of National security, secularism, sovereignty, revolution and ethnic politics will tantamount to violation of Human Rights.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MANIPUR

*"It is better to attack the enemy's mind
than to attack his fortified cities."*

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

In early, 1940s, during World War II period, the entire world was divided into two segments—the Allied and the Axis groups. There was a serious politico-military conflict among the power blocs with stress for foundation of a superpower; military bloc, destruction of Nazism; uprooting of 'Axis power', Trial of war crimes by International Tribunal and setting up of the United Nations Organization (UNO) as the apex body for peace and security in the world. By early 1960s, the period of cold war came into play: Western bloc countries, on one side under the umbrella of USA, Britain, France, West Germany and on the other USSR, China, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and other Latin American Communist countries. Another groups, known as the Non-Aligned Bloc which consisted of India, Egypt, Indonesia, Sri Lanka etc. played a powerful political role on the floor of the UNO but with limited punching power. By early 1990s, USSR disintegrated and the United States of America came up as the lone Policeman of the World Security Movement. The power of the UNO, particularly the veto power of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council became questionable when other developed and economic powers like India, Brazil, Japan, South Africa etc. raised the issue for expansion of the Security Council and their inclusion thereto for maintenance of peace and security throughout the globe. By 2000 AD, the American global leadership and the centrality of its role in world affairs, were affected due to the emergence of China as a super-power in Real Politic; and the rise of the 'Axis of evil' and their refusal to crawl with bended knees. By 2005-07, the American military diplomatic and economic power declined. North Korea tested its Atomic bomb; Iran carried out production of Nuclear fuel uninterrupted; China came up as a global super-power to the great dismay of USA; and Pakistan an ally of the Americans played hide and seek policy for Al-Qaeda and its leader Osama-bin-Laden. India throw out the Non-Aligned gown, came close to the ambit of USA, tried to occupy the seat of regional power in Asia, with a serious challenge from China, the economic giant of Asia.

Gradually many countries realized that there was no global mechanism for resolution of conflict, clashes and crisis in the world. Peace-keeping under the blue flag of the United Nations Organization became more complex as it involved many stakeholders. The conflict paradigm changed from region to region with heavy doses of military, diplomatic, economic and religious ingredients. During 2003-2007, USA consistently blamed Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Iran, Syria for fuelling and funding the insurgency in Iraq. In 2007, it was reported by the Government Accountability office of USA that military officials did not know what happened to an estimated 1,90,000 AK-47 Assault Rifles and pistols that were provided to the Iraqi security forces. Since 2003, more than \$2.3 billion has been spent on equipping the Iraqi forces and 30% of those arms (small arms?) could not be accounted for, leading to the wide belief that 'US arming Iraqi insurgents?' indirectly. (09 August 2007; the *Indian Express*, Kolkata).

Asian countries, which is the abode of thousands of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups of people, has faced and are facing intra-conflict and inter-conflict scenario on its soil for many years. Insurgency, Guerilla movement, militancy, State terrorism, genocide, ethnic upheavals, crisis and conflict, and proxy-war has rocked the region with terrible and horrible-backlashes. Affected countries in South East Asian region includes Thailand, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and India.

North East India is a beautiful and wonderful region inhabited by hundreds of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, mostly of Tibeto-Burman and Pan-Mongoloid stocks. The ethnic chemistry of the people are closely related to the inhabitants of Mekhong Delta, the Salween basin, the Yangtze and Irrawaddy valley, the Tibetan hill ranges, and the Mongoloid races on the Chinese plateau. Hundreds of ethnic and minority groups spread out from Siliguri corridor right up to Moreh in East-West direction, and from Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh) to Tuipang (Mizoram) in North-South direction. There are more than 500 dialects sometimes incognito to each other with no alphabets of their own. In this region, English and Bengali alphabets normally used to write ethnic language and dialects.

MANIPUR KALEIDOSCOPE

Since time immemorial, Manipur with a total population of 30 lakhs or so (2006-2007) and land area measuring 22,327 square kilometers played an important role in the politico-societal movement in the region. There are more than 35 ethnic, sub-ethnic and minority communities in the state with the Manipuri Meitei (65%), the Naga (15%), the Kuki (10%), and others (10%) playing the dominant role. The Tribal sub-ethnic groups inhabits most of the hill areas in the state. The Maipuri Meiteis are concentrated in the plain areas and the valley area. Manipuri language, which included in the 8th schedule of the Constitution of India, is the lingua franca of the state, though still used Bengali scripts.

Up to early 1940s, ethnic concept and imbroglio was not seen on the soil of Manipur. Differences among the sub-tribes and communities were mostly concentrated on religious matters, way of sub-community life and their way of living. Outsiders could not differentiate between a Naga and Kuki, a Kuki and a Tangkhul and a Maram, a Mao-Naga and an Angami Naga etc. The name 'Manipur' was considered and used as the generic name of all inhabitants of Manipur. At later stages, when the Naga started the campaign of Nagaisation, the hard-core Manipuris took out the concept of Manipuri Meitei Nationalism or simply the Meitei Nationalism to consolidate and protect the extinction

of the age-old Manipuri Meitei community from the soil of the earth. By 1980, the division of the inhabitants of the state as the Manipuri Meitei, the Naga and Kuki were seen on the socio-political horizon of the state. By 2000-01, with the emerging political, social and economic upheavals in South East Asia and the global pressures on insurgency movement, terrorism and fundamentalism, the euphoria of Greater Nagaland and Naga Nationalism; Sovereign Assam and Assamese Nationalism; Sovereign Manipur and Manipur Nationalism; Khasi Nationalism; Tripuri Tribal Nationalism, became blurred and transformed into a bloated theory on paper, difficult to translate into reality without affecting the ethnic layers inhabiting the region.

CAUSATIONS

History show that ethnic imbroglio is always related to political aspirations and upheavals; social awareness; socio-economic movements; societal aspirations and religious upheavals. In the last 50 years or so, many tribes, sub-tribes and minority groups of North East India and Manipur have lost their age-old religions, customs and traditions. In a dramatic scenario, large sections of tribal inhabitants have converted to Christianity en masse. Islam has embedded with its green flag and trying to expand horizontally and vertically. Hinduism, which exists in Manipur, Assam, Tripura and part of Arunachal Pradesh, are trying to maintain its own house. The gradual influxes of immigrants and refugees from outside the region have overtaken the original inhabitants in many parts of the region and has changes the socio-ethnic environment and life of the people.

The emergence of separatist movement in the region with a long-term political objective has brought an unpleasant social relations amongst the various ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. It has become impossible to climb the political ladder to reach the top without having an ethnic base and close identification with ethnic insurgent outfits. It is applicable to all: the Nagas, the Kukis, the Assamese, the Mizos, the Manipuri and several other minority communities.

In North East India and Manipur, generally ethnic politics and ethnic insurgent outfits hold keys for political movement and its functioning in the region. Since 1960s, the region has suffered 10,000 killed, 30,000-35,000 injured, Rs. 780-800 crores of property lost, due to ethnic crisis and clashes. The main causes of the same are:

- Ethnic and sub-ethnic consciousness.
- Cultural, customs and traditional awareness.
- Aspirations for ethnic supremacy rather than national honour and interest.
- Socio-economic imbalance, which increase social chauvinism.
- Fear psychosis of politically left-behind, societal segments.
- Emergence of ethnic insurgent outfits, militant groups, terrorism and Anti-National Elements (ANEs), based on ethnic lines.
- Religious Imbroglio; emergence of fundamentalism and fanaticism, religio-insurgency mixed-match.
- Communal hatrednesses.

INGREDIENTS

10. There are number of ingredients, factors and actors who handsomely contributed to the cause of conflict and crisis in North East India and particularly in Manipur. Main ingredients are:-
- Die-hard ethnic, sub-ethnic and community-based politicians.
 - Insurgent and hardcore militant and terrorist outfits (Naga, Kuki, Manipur Meitei and Meitei Pangal).
 - Fundamentalists, religious Zealots, and *gurus* (preachers) who transformed god's money into insurgent's budget.
 - Drug Mafias (from within and outside the region).
 - Businessmen who sucked the poor men blood with unethical business principle.

AGENDA: CONFLICT RESOLUTION

11. Manipur, the home of more than 35 ethnic groups, sub-groups, community, and clans, presents a complex scenario for conflict resolution. Ethnic loyalty and honour carry full marks and considers supreme in all socio-economic deliberations. Main agenda for a meaningful solution are:
- Viable political policy, programmes and strategies for peace, unity and tranquility.
 - Active involvement of society, social groups, community and cultural organizations for social harmony.
 - Participatory development and equal distribution of socio-economic benefits.
 - Religious independence and interdependence.
 - Non-acceptance of ethnic/sub-ethnic-community politics which shake-up the foundation of democracy.
12. As on today, the world has not produced a ready-made solution for ethnic crisis and clashes on its globe. Because it is a natural progression and vibrations linked with a group of human beings. For a solution, the political guns have to be targeted towards the ethnic societies and communities. Someone have been born in Manipur, have got a mother tongue; belong to some religion (Hinduism, Christianity, Islam and Jainism). One has become a resident of Manipur, a proud citizen of India. Thus it is the constitutional, legal and societal rights of the peoples of Manipur to find out a solution to solve the perennial conflict environment existing on its soil. The strategy and approaches cannot be on a single window concept but should include political, socio-economic, administrative, cultural, educational, religion, social action and Media's blitzkrieg.

POLITICAL APPLIANCES

Political Parties

Political parties at National, Regional and ethnic level have to play a pivotal role in the arena for a meaningful solution of ethnic conflicts and crisis. Ethnic politics is the **germ**, which caused

the diseases. On pathological investigation, ethnic politics and rhetoric was found to be more dangerous than terrorism, insurgency and fundamentalism. It has got more lethal power than Polonium 320. Manipur belongs to the Manipuri (Manipuri Meitei, Tangkhul, Mao, Maram, Kuki, Meitei Pangal and other communities) as India belongs to Indian. The theme should be "No ethnic politics".

Politicians

A constructive and positive role by all politicians is the supreme necessity for a meaningful dialogue and solution. Manipuri, Naga and Kuki politicians should not beat the wrong political drums, which may bring catastrophic end results to the younger generations. Politicians should remain above 'ethnic line' in a multi-ethnic state like Manipur.

Insurgent Outfits

The Naga, Kuki and the Meitei insurgent outfits/extremists groups are directly responsible for ethnic imbroglio in the state. Ethnic sentiments should not be exploited for insurgency movement. The Nagas should not wage an ethnic war by exploiting the NSCN (IM), the NSCN (K), NNC, FGN for Naga ethnic issue; the Kuki should delink from the KNF, KRA, UKLF, KLA etc. the Manipuri Meitei politicians should distance itself from the UNLF, PLA, PREPAK, KYKL; and the Muslim from the PULF, ISI, and Anti-Social elements etc.

Ethnic Cleansing

The act of ethnic cleansing is an old form of political warfare adopted by many powerful ethnic groups of people against smaller group, sub-group and community. History is replete with this type of warfare particularly in China, Germany, France, Middle-East and Far East Asia. During World War II, the German adopted this strategy against the Jews. At later stages, many insurgent outfits in Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri-Lanka etc. adopted this dangerous agenda for political subjugation and domination. The same strategy was adopted by the NSCM (IM) in Manipur and Nagaland, the ULFA in Assam, the Kukis in Manipur, the Bodos in Assam, and the Mizos in Mizoram, which led to serious politico-social havoc. The Naga and the Kuki should buried this mad political agenda which will not bring them to any meaningful solution. The majority Manipuri Meitei should not join the ethnic provocation launched by people from neighbouring states. As a majority community they should remain above the board.

De-Criminalisation of Politics

Criminalisation of politics is a global phenomenon which has affected the entire socio-political structure of the world. With emergence and involvement of insurgent outfits, terrorism and militancy, the problems have become more complex and accepted viable solutions are missing from the world political radar. Money power, muscle power, money bags, black marketeers, drug warlords and insurgent-politician nexus which are unethical means, has been identified as dangerous ingredients which should be discarded from the state politics. It is a short-term gain but a long term curse for the future generation.

Free and Fair Elections

The bed-rock of democracy is to have free and fair elections. Elections of candidate base on loyalty to some ethnic insurgent outfits or ethnic groups will have a far-reaching repercussion in future

democratic political environment of Manipur. Since early 1960s, elected representatives in the North Eastern region of India have effectually taken the insurgent ladder to win Election: 60%-65% in Nagaland; 40%-45% in Mizoram; 20%-25% in Assam; 15%-20% in Tripura; 5%-8% in Arunachal Pradesh; 5%-6% in Meghalaya; 5%-6% in Manipur valley and 80%-85% in Hill areas of Manipur. Elected representatives have to pay a heavy political price for winning election with the blessings, assistances and backing of insurgents outfits when the honeymoon period come to an end.

Maintenance of Political Order

Peace and public tranquility is the primary requirement of society. Manipur requires a political agenda for maintenance of peace, communal harmony, socio-political awareness and state integrity. It is the responsibility of the state Government, general public and law enforcing agencies to maintained political orders. Maintenance of peace is related to public orders, public orders is related to political stability, political stability to general public and the politicians.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Investment

Socio-economic development can only be accelerated when money is poured in a systematic and planned manner. The need of the hour is a phase investment in the region on priority basis. However, investment requires security. The present security environment in the North-Eastern region of India is not favouring massive investment plan due to insurgency, militancy and terrorism. No big business houses, corporate body and investment agencies are not going to pour money into dirty water and sunk inside the mud. The North-Easterners have to create a conducive security environment so that big business houses and corporate sector invest in the region without any inhibition.

Development

Development of Manipur and integration of its economy with the larger regional processes in South-East Asian region is the prime requirement of the hour. Development involves active participation by the general public of the state, budgetary and financial support and conducive atmosphere of law and order. Development in Manipur cannot be effected when the two National Highway (NH-39 and NH-53) remained blocked more than 100-150 days in a calendar year by the insurgent, ethnic political NGOs and the anti-national elements. Development will vibrate economy. Better economy will bring better social life. The people living in the hill areas should be able to link up with the valley area.

Human Rights

Every human being want to have a dignified, peaceful and happy life and environment on the earth. Rights rules are made by human being and violated the same by themselves. A general awareness campaign has to be launched by the state Government in conjunction with the existing Human Rights organizations, NGOs and other social groups.

Special Economic Programmes

In today world, the punching powers of a country/region/group of people are directly related to its economy. In global scenario, economic power has come up as the electrical fuse for political

power, without which there cannot have any light. Every country/state/group of people/community have to pay highest priority on socio-economic reforms with steep competition among themselves. Programmes and projects for development of infrastructures and other facilities particularly in hill areas should be implemented. Far flung areas in Manipur should be targeted for economic development in a phased manner.

Poverty Reduction Programmes

From socio-economic angle Manipur cannot be classified as a rich state. Many villagers in the remote areas are basically lived below the poverty line. They consist of all groups/communities. Poverty breed's social unrest, social unrest leads to ethnic aspiration and ethnic aspiration to ethnic crisis. By 2007-2008 AD, the growth rate of the North East recorded only 7.5 percent as compared to 12.95 percent of India. There is a need that the growth rate has to be accelerated to banish poverty, hunger, malnutrition and developmental Harakiri. Special attention should be given on this aspect by all states, not only in the North Eastern region of India but also in the entire region of South East Asia.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACHES

Good Governance

A state Government is the sum total of political parties, politicians, bureaucrats, and the people of Manipur. A sound administration is the need of the hour. The requirement is "Our state Government". Social indignation will erupt when good administration is missing from the administrative Radar.

Social Security

The issue of social security has become one of the prime agenda of all the Governments in the world. It has become more relevant and important with the emergence of insurgency, militancy and terrorism in the global security environment. Many powerful countries are trying to get an answer for the maintenance of social security: American, French, Russian and the Britishers are taking shelter behind the religious platform; south east Asian people grouping behind the Mongoloid and the Indo-Mongoloid umbrella; and the North East Indians taking shelter behind the ethnic wall. All human beings want peace and tranquility. But it does not come in actionable form. Security to ethnic, sub-ethnic, community, clans and individual have to be ensured by the Government. Social crisis will start when social security comes to an end.

CULTURAL ACTIVISM

Cultural Integration

In Manipur and generally in North East India, integration of rich culture and tradition will bring a conducive environment for living together. Manipuri and Naga cultures are the envy of the world and they can form the cementing platform of cultural integration in the entire region. Culture can be integrated, refined and improved. The valley and hill cultures and traditions can form homogeneous mixtures and produce a showcase of cultural goldmine of the region.

Community Festivals

Manipur is full of festival round the year. Frequent participation in inter-community festivals can bring ethnic homogeneity, better understanding, close sub-ethnic gap and decreased conflict tensions.

EDUCATIONAL

Nelson Mandela, the Great African leader, once said "Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world". The United Nations Literacy Decade (UNLD, 2003-2012) focused its attention to enhance collective efforts to global lieteracy programmes and reduce imbalance between the literates and the illiterates. 'Illiteracy is a catastrophe for any child but particularly devastating for girls'. India adopted its National Policy on Education (1986) and the Plan of Action (1992), where the Government chalked out programmes for Adult Education, Elementary Education and Non-formal Education to eradicate illiteracy. The National Literacy Mission (NLM) has been put into gear, refined and upgraded. The National Policy for Empowerment of Women (2001) has given ample opportunity for women to ensure their well-beings, developments, empowerments, protection and participation. In Manipur and the North Eastern region of India, Total Literacy Campaigns (TLC) have to be launched in real earnest to bring out a real positive changes and thinking among the various ethnic groups and communities. In Manipur, there is a need that, literacy should be linked to socio-economic developments; health care prospects and programmes; cultural processes and progresses; politico-social resurgences etc. Mass literacy can bring a new socio-developmental outlook and negated the social imbroglio in the state (region).

Institutions

Best education to all the children can be imparted only when there are good educational infrastructures. Best product will come out from a good factory with proper raw materials. Educated society can play an important role in conflict resolution in the world. Educational institutions like Harvard, Cambridge, Princeton, Jamia Millia Islamia, Guwahati University, Manipur University etc. can act and should act as the fulcrum for conflict resolution. University of Manipur, Jorhat and Guwahati should carry out rationale analysis of the causes of conflict and its resolution thereto. A calibrated and proper education to all the younger generation will reduce social conflict in the long run, giving a chance to the peace and tranquility.

Students Organisation/Associations

There is a need to understand that students Organisation/Associations should act as the vanguard for the youth in the field of education. In many countries, the power of the student organisation, sometimes decided the faith and fortune of a country. The world has seen such incidence in Burma, Iran, China, Philippines etc. However, the powerful punching gloves became questionable and debatable when they are involve in ethnic politics giving wrongful gains to someone and wrongful loss to some others. Most of the student organizations in North East India are acting as the mouthpiece of the society playing a multiple role for the social and educational upliftment. They should not involve in caste, creed and religious politics which normally end-up with ethnic crisis and conflict.

RELIGION

In human relationships, religion plays an important role for mankind. Religion, in true spirit, is the cementing factor for people to live together in a peaceful manner on earth. Religion is very much related to the spiritual development of every individual on earth. In Manipur, Hinduism, Christianity, Sikhism and Islam has played an effective role for resolution of conflict and crisis. Many religious leaders have dedicated their lives for peace and harmony in the insurgency infected areas. There are large numbers of religious configuration in Manipur and other States of North East India. The religious leaders, as faith accompli, should not involved in the ethnic and sub-ethnic crisis and clashes which might be termed as wrongful gains to one group and wrongful loss to some others. They should be seen by the general public as non-political, non-biased, and non-ethnic and played a role to create an atmosphere of religious interdependent. In February, 2008, India's most prominent Sunni Islamic Seminary, the Dar ul-Ulum Deoband, in Uttar Pradesh, issued an edict that 'fidayeen attack is totally un-Islamic' and came out heavily against terrorism. In March, 2008, Islamic scholar, cleric and Shia leader of India called upon leading Islamic Institutions and prominent Maulanas to discuss on the vital issues like terrorism, *fidayeen* attacks and suicide attacks. Many Islamic scholars, opined that 'suicide attacks lead to killing of innocent people and Islam firmly prohibits such activities'. There is a need of making a concerted effort to get rid the Muslim community of its images as supporters and sympathisers of terrorism. The world conference on Human Rights urges states and international community to promote and protect the rights of persons belongings to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities in accordance with the Declaration on the Rights of persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and linguistic Minorities.

"Religion is for man and not man for religion. . . .
A religion that compels the ignorant to be ignorant and the poor to be poor is not a religion but a visitation."
—Dr B. R. Ambedkar

SOCIAL MENU

North East India, particularly Manipur, has inherited a number of ethnic, sub-ethnic and social groups on its soil. These groups have got their own social aspirations, which they expressed in various forms and colour. Social aspirations are related to social justice. Social justice is an arena where the Government, the general public, intelligentsia, the NGOs and the civil societies have to contribute their share of responsibilities. A court of law can deliver a verdict for justice but implementations of the same is the duty of the Government. There are organisations/NGOs where they do not have legal powers to deliver legal verdict but have got powerful cutting edges to implement social justice.

"Social Justice cannot be attained by violence.
Violence kill what it intends to create."
—Pope John Paul II

Meira Paibis (Women Activists Group)

Meira Paibis, is a social women group, which was in existence since early days in Manipur. The literal meaning (Meira = Burning Torch; Paibi = Holders;) is the women who hold the burning torches, made out of bamboo sticks, wrapped with clothes, soaked in kerosene oil, marching from one place to another, and keeping social vigil at night. They took part in the First Manipuri Nupi

Lal (Manipur Women's War) in 1904 and the second Manipur Nupi Lal, on 12 December 1939. They also took part, in 1970-72, for the demand of statehood of Manipur, in 1990's for socio-economic upliftment and by 2000 AD became the most powerful women pressure group for Human Rights and the Rights violations not only in Manipur but also in the entire North East India. Though it does not have any legal or administrative power, it has got a deep penetrating social influences for conflict resolution and crisis management for the masses. It is one of the most excellent social platform where the conflicts and crisis among the Nagas, the Kukis, the Assamese, the Tripuris, the Bodos and the Manipuri Meiteis can be addressed and find out a solution thereto. 'The courage of Manipuri women is rare. Our women should come out and take a major role in bringing peace and normality in the state' (Ph. Parijat Singh, Health Minister; Government of Manipur; 12 December, 2009) 'Women rose against the mighty British and won the battle. We, therefore, appeal to them to use their might and intervene in the lawlessness and mediate between the Government and the militant groups' (Mr. N. Biren Singh, Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports, Government of Manipur; 12 December, 2008, Imphal, Manipur).

Social Clubs/Associations


Manipur has got a number of youth clubs and Associations which involve with social activities. Every village and towns in the hills and the valley areas, maintained local clubs, with 100-120 members each or more, involving in social activities. By 2000-2001 AD, the state has got more than 500-550 such clubs leaving aside those petty/small insignificant ones. The memberships are mostly unemployed educated and semi-educated lots, where their talents had been underutilized, sometimes wrongly guided, exploited mainly by the politicians and the insurgent outfits. However, some important associations which carries lot of socio-political weights and can called the shot at the drop of a hat are the All Manipur Students Union (AMSU); All Tribal Students Union Manipur (ATSUM); the Kuki Students Union (KSO); the Manipur University Students Union (MUSU); the Manipur Students Federation (MSD) etc. There are many associations, charged with high political doctrine and agenda, which included the United Naga Council (UNC); the United Committee of Manipur (UMC); the All Manipur United Clubs Organisation (AMUCO). Moreover, there are large number of unorganized women associations/groups who activated themselves whenever there were any social crisis and turmoil. Such associations are available in all the districts of Manipur. A common features for all of them are the formation of Joint Action Committee (JAC) against the establishment for any act of commission and omission and further for redressal of grievances. Such organizations/Associations can be fruitfully used for conflict management in the region.

MEDIA CONTRIBUTION

Media is a powerful weapon, which can sway public opinion in a dramatic manner. Che Guevara, Carlos the jackal, Abu Nidal, Osama Bin Laden etc. were immortalized by the world media. The technologically equipped soldiers of the United States of America lost the battle of Vietnam to world media and TV. But the American TV (CNN) won the Gulf war single-handed; Al Jazerra in Afghanistan and 9/11 September 2001; and BBC bogged down in the Iraq war (War against Saddam Hussain : the second Gulf war). When the question of role of media in National interest came up, media baron Rupert Murdoch, once said, "We will do what is our patriotic duty".

CONFLICT RESOLUTION : ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN MANIPUR

INGREDIENT



In Manipur and North East India, a massive news coverage is required to have a positive public opinion for a solution of ethnic imbroglio. The state Government should have a clear-cut media policy for smooth public-media interface. Press freedom has to be honoured and maintained in letter and spirit. But the fourth empire have to keep in mind, while reporting, the sensitivity and gravity of public issue like ethnic crisis and clashes. Press should consider to honour the guidances and guidelines issued by appropriate authorities, in National interest, in a balance manner. Press freedom, after all, consists of press responsibility. "The principle of freedom should be exercised in a spirit of tolerance, respect of belief, respect of religions, which is the very basis of secularism of our country" (Philippe Douste-Blazy, Foreign Minister, France, Febuary 2007). Print media and TV can play powerful role in the resolution of conflicts between the state and the anti-state stakeholders; ethnic groups Vs ethnic groups; community Vs community; inter-conflicts/intra-conflicts among insurgent outfits and fratricidal killing and clashes.

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

Ethnic imbroglio in Manipur are normally linked to external political and religious influences from Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, China, Western Christian Countries, Islamic religious institutions and many NGOs. The state Government should take a strong protective measures to nullify such activities. Some recommended measures are as under:

- (a) A holistic state policy and strategy for socio-cultural harmony to challenge the external influences perpetrated by outside elements.
- (b) A strong administrative measure to stop influxes of refugees.
- (c) Neutralisation of unauthorized foreign contribution into religious institutions inside the state.
- (d) Legal actions against tainted, unwanted and unwarranted NGOs who acted as the mouthpiece of foreign organization/institutions/country.
- (e) Strict legal actions for religious communal disharmony and act of ethnic crisis and clashes.

NATIONAL SECURITY: NORTH-EAST INDIA

In the 21st century, the focal points of global security environment changes drastically from one country to another and from one region to another on a fast track making the world very small. Globalisation of international security scenario has got a great military bearing on International and regional relations. It has brought out the important role played by political, economic, technology, ecology, information technology and energy factors in shaping the faith of world security environment. Before 11 September, 2001 (Terrorists blasting the twin towers of World Trade Center, New York), important ingredients like economic issues, multilateral agendas, bilateral cooperation amongst the Nations dominated the global environment. However, after the 9/11 incidence, unilateralism role (Supercop) of USA; war on Terrorism; Islamic fundamentalism and Terrorism; proliferation and transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the hands of terrorists; regional conflicts and Ethnic conflicts dominated the entire global security scenario giving an unpredictable outcome and positive end result.

India, the emerging giant of Asia, a likely global economic power by 2030-35 AD, is the 7th largest country in the world, with an area of 33,00,000 square kilometers; land boundaries of 15,200 kilometers, a coastline of over 7500 kilometers, 600 Island territories and an EEZ (Extended Economic Zone) of 25,00,000 square kilometres. Seven countries: China, Burma, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Nepal are having sizeable International boundaries with India. India has got the fourth largest Army in the world, and has involved in military conflicts with China and Pakistan and peace-keeping operations in UN Mission, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bhutan. The country with a strong unshakable democratic structure of Constitution, considered National security of the country as a National issue above party's politics. Parliament of India, the supreme constitutional seat of power, is the eyes and ears of the National security of India. Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and other minority groups formed the basic structure of secularism of the country. National security of India is the final converging focal point of all Indian irrespective of caste, creed, and religion.

CHANGING SCENARIO

National security of India as a thumb-rule consists of the Internal and the external security umbrellas. However, with the emergence insurgency, terrorism, fundamentalism and fanaticism, the dividing red line between the two has become blurred and leading towards obsolete syndrome. The same is applicable to many western countries also. Till early 2000 AD, USA always had a false believe that insurgency and terrorism would remain concentrated on Asian continent and never reach the American soil. Muslim countries lived in fool's paradise that Islamic Jihadis would not shed blood on their sacred soil as forbidden by the Holi *Q'uran*. But all were proved wrong by the spread of insurgency and terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, and Pakistan. In the near future, war on Insurgency and terrorism will cost western countries heavily rather than the Mongoloid Asian inhabitants. Muslim countries in Central Asia including, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, and Pakistan will be clashing amongst themselves on political, socio-economic, religious and ethnic basis. They will propagate the same to South East Asian region with the pan-Islamic banner.

It was in early 1970's, that the then Prime Minister of India Srimati Indira Gandhi took greatest care in India's National security, particularly in South East Asian Context. She refused to bend down to the caucus group of American law-makers, led by the most powerful American diplomat, Dr. Henry Kissinger, who frightened her by dispatching the Seventh Fleet of USA's Navy into the Bay of Bengal in late 1971. Militarily India won the Bangladesh Liberation war. But politically and socio-economically, USA under Dr. Henry Kissinger, ensured that India suffered miserably in global political platform. However, it did not deterred India to carry out her first Nuclear explosion in 1974 at Pokhran. Successive Prime Ministers of India, Sri Rajiv Gandhi, Sri PV Narasimhan Rao, Sri VP Singh, Sri Chandrasekhar, Sri Deve Gowda, Sri Inder Kumar Gujral, Sri Atal Bihari Vajpaye and Dr. Manmohan Singh took serious political and military measures to keep National security of India above party politics. In 1998, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), came to power, conducted a Nuclear Test and formed the National security council of India (NSC), when the entire western block countries pounced on the country for its pound of flesh. "The Central Government recognizes that National security movement requires integrated thinking and coordinated application of the political, military, diplomatic, scientific and technological resources of the state to protect and promote National security goals and objectives. National security in the context of the Nation needs to be viewed not only in military terms but also in terms of internal security, economic security, to technological strength and foreign policy (Notification for establishment of National Security Council of India; 1998-99).

India's National Security Advisers knew that, its adversaries, particularly the neighbouring countries could disrupt the security corridors of India not only by means of war, but also by organized crimes; cross-border insurgency and terrorism, militancy, Narco-ethnic war; trail blazing with religious flame-throwers and political rhetoric. In a cumulative and dignified form, it can be termed as proxy war, which cost nothing but gained tremendously to the sponsored country or non-state stakeholders.

SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

The National security measures of North East India involved both internal and the external elements on the same analogue as mainland India. The internal security problems mainly arises from past history, colonial legacy, demographic structures, geographical locations, regional and sub-ethnic

parties, and faultline on New Delhi's political approaches. External security problems involved insurgency, cross-border terrorism, terrorism, fundamentalism, fanaticism, external influences etc. Terrorism has become a global agenda, spread out in South East Asia, married up with insurgent outfits, fundamentalist groups, and fanatic organisations in Bangladesh-Burma-North East India loop. There is a strong needs that India analyse the security environment of North East India in a deliberate and concerted manner and not as a parting shot. Since India's Independence, China is claiming a large chunks of the area, along the Indo-China International border leading to the 1962 Indo-China war. For its South East Asian geopolitics, India needs a strong bilateral relations with its neighbours, particularly Burma (Myanmar)—both in political and military terms. The sanctity of the long Indo-Burma International border (1664 km) should be maintained to safeguard India's National security. Manipur and Mizoram form the launching pads for India's 'Look East-Policy', a geopolitical extravanga with a pie for earning a pound. However strong political tie between China and Burma cast a shadow on the Indo-Burma bilateral relations. China has got a strong politico-military influence on the Irrawaddy corridor, Chindwin basin and the Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal. Insurgent outfits operating on North East India are having shelters, training camps and hideouts on the Sagaing division, Kachin and the Arakan state of Burma. North East India is also having a long international border (4031 km) with Bangladesh, a country born in 1971 as a result of Indo-Pakistan war. India's National security has been affected seriously by the growth of religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh; high rhetoric political soundbite by Islamic politicians; Dacca transforming itself into an International Mecca for terrorists; migration of Bangladesh refugees to North East India; political and military supports to India's insurgents outfits and the agenda of transforming North East India into a pan-Islamic state. It is not a wishful thinking but a grand agenda for the future which may lead to the break up of India into small federal states. Politicians and the India's Chanakya (National Security Advisers) should read the security complexity of South East Asia and its effect to North East India in particular and generally to mainland India.

Internal Security Measures

The seven states in the North Eastern region of India (Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya) are facing insurgency movement, ethnic upheaval, sub-ethnic and communal clashes and crisis on its soil. Since 1950's, New Delhi is trying to solve the region's problem by handing over the issue to the military and the para-military forces without going much into its political complexities. States are crying for foul play by the Central Government. On the other hand, New Delhi is blaming the states that they have not done enough to control the law and order situations in the region. The Constitution of India demarcates the Executive and the Legislative powers of the Union and the States. The States have got the responsibility of maintaining law and orders within their jurisdictions. Article 246 (3) of the Constitution of India give exclusive powers to the states to make laws for maintenance of public order. Under Article 355, the Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of the Union (Union of India) to protect the states against external aggression and internal disturbances and to ensure that the governance of every states is carried out in accordance with the Constitutional provisions, failing which President Rule may be imposed under Article 356 till Constitutional functioning is restored. The Constitution, under Article, 352, provides for the enforcement of emergency, if the security of India is threatened by war or an armed rebellion.

The need of the hour of all states in North East India is to revamp, reorganize and restructure the functioning of the police forces. Public order and the police are closely related and they cannot divorce each other. (List II, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India). State level legal bodies consisting of police, para-military, the Intelligence Agency and the Army should be formed to tackle the violence acts of the insurgents and terrorists. Nomenclature or name does not matter: it may be called Unified Command; Combined Headquarters; Special Operation Groups or any other name which suite the environment. Assam state has established unified command for counter-insurgency operations under the chair of the Chief Minister of Assam. Manipur has got Special Operation Group, under the chair of the Chief Minister of the state, consisting of the police, the para-military, Intelligence agencies and the army. It is very important that normalcy should be restored in the region in complete unison between the security forces and the civil establishment under the overall direction of the Chief Ministers of the respective States.

External Security


External security, generally, is a politico-diplomatic military measure, supplemented by the internal security ingredients. For a viable National security measures, both have to walk simultaneously and dance together. The security environment in South East Asia will always attract the security interest of the North Eastern region of India. The political, military and diplomatic threats from China, Bangladesh, Burma and Nepal to the North eastern region of India will always have a serious hole in India's National security interests the moments India become complacents.

China and the Chinese threat perception always loomed largely on the horizon of National security of India. In spite of bilateral talks and discussions between the two Asian giants since 1980's, the political mistrust remained as high as the Himalayan wall. China, from the very beginning wanted to encircle India by means of Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma and Bangladesh for political supremacy and regional hegemony. Since 1960's, they are trying to absorb Bhutan into their sphere of political and strategic influences. However, the special relationships between India and Bhutan supplemented by the ethnic chemistry and demography, had jeopardized Peking's geo-strategic policy in South East Asia for the formation of an Independent Communist Country covering areas of Chindwin fertile basin, North East India, Bhutan, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Bangladesh. As a counter-measure to India, they claimed Arunachal Pradesh as 'disputed Areas', by showing it in various world maps and Atlases. China's political move thwarted the reported India's wishful thinking and political move, in early 1970's, of forming Bhutan a state of the Union of India, if the people of Bhutan wishes to do so. China, as a politico-strategic policy, will always play the Bhutan Card, in their South East Asian politics. That will naturally carry a special bearing on the National security of North East India.

Burma, ruled by the Military Junta (State Peace and Development Council, SPDC), with a strong political influence from Peking (Beijing), having large numbers of indigenous Chinese-Burmese on its northern and western regions (divisions) have got thaws of maintaining good neighbourly relations with India. India believed in democratic rule of law and wanted Burma to restore democracy in that country. In 2007, when the entire world, particularly the western countries, called, the Burmese Military Government, a Brute Force, India remained calm to find a political solution to Yangon (Rangoon) political predicament. India's External Affairs Minister, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee urged the

Myanmar (Burma) Government to undertake political reforms and to expedite the process of National reconciliations that had been left out of the ruling structure. On the other side, China and Russia contended that the situation in Burma, arising out between the Military Government on one side and the monks and the pro-democracy movement on the other, was an internal affair of that country which did not threatened international peace and security. "What is going on in Burma (Myanmar) is outrageous. The regime needs to stop using violence against peaceful people and get to a dialogue so that they can have reconciliation", said US Secretary of state, Ms Condoleezza Rice (September 2007, New York). In 2007-2008, India had many politico-strategic compulsions not to isolate Burma (Myanmar) and their military government (SPDC) which was hated by its own people and reviled by the International Community. Firstly, the strategic-security interest of North East India was closely related to the political interest of Burma and further to South East Asia. Secondly, India as an immediate neighbour of Burma, could not turn its back on the Burmese military Government which did not measure up to International norms. While distant nations like USA, Britain, France, Germany etc. could take pure position on the internal affairs of Burma, India had to play politics of constant engagement. Thirdly, India's economic-security stakes were too high to allow a coercive policy against Burma's Military Junta (SPDC). Finally, New Delhi could not forget the massive Chinese politico-military penetration into northern and western Burma in late 1980's, when the International communities cut-off Burma from International politics. That was the time, where India's National Security interest was seriously dented with the mushrooming of a large number of Insurgent outfits in its North eastern region, mainly with the communist doctrine of revolution. There was not doubt that New Delhi had its discomfiture while dealing with the Burmese Generals in realpolitik which defined India's Burma policy. A democracy country like India cannot compromise its political values and remained silence to the 'internal political Affairs' of Burma. India should insist and assist Burma for a credible roadmap for democracy that allows full participation of all stakeholders who were left behind in the political process. Any violent politico-strategic movement in Burma will automatically have a far reaching impact on the National Security interest of the North Eastern region of India.

Bangladesh with strong influences from China and Pakistan will always play the North East India card in its South Asia's politics. India have got great concerns with more than 120-130 militants and terrorists camps of Islamic insurgent outfits, Taliban, Laskar-e-Taiba, North East Indian's insurgent outfits, Burma's insurgent groups and LTTE sleeping modules existing on the Bangladesh soil. The external threats from Bangladesh in the form of militancy and terrorism, particularly to North East India, carry great potential liability to India's National security interest. Bangladesh militants, inspired and led by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, were involved in bomb blasts in India's cities (Delhi, Bombay, Coimbatore, Srinagar, Hyderabad and Kolkata). From the other fences, Bangladesh claimed that its militants and terrorist groups were crossing over into West Bengal and Assam, hiding in big cities like Kolkata, Shillong, Guwahati and taking shelter in other parts of India. As a strategic quid pro quo they are playing the North East India Card with political assistance from Pakistan and China. Intelligence sources reported that major hideouts of Bangladesh criminals and militants are Dum Dum, Broad street, Beckbagan, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road in West Bengal; Naogaong, Barpeta, Hailakandi, Guwahati in Assam; Dimapur in Nagaland; Kamalpur, Agartala in Tripura and Lilong, Jiribam in Manipur. A mix-match between the Indian insurgents and the Bangladesh militants and terrorists, inspired and financed by international terrorists organisations including the Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Abu Sayyaf, the Laskar-e-Taiba should be analysed and derailed at the earliest.

MANIPUR IMBROGLIO**Infiltration/Exfiltration routes of
Insurgents of Manipur**

INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION
ROUTES IN MANIPUR

1. JIRIBEN
2. CHIRIACHANBPUR
3. NOKPI
4. KOKREI
5. MAO
6. TAMENGLONG

INDEX

- BASE CAMP/
TRAINING AREA
- INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION
ROUTES

Sketch Map
(Not to scale)

DIALOGUE AND PEACE

*"War should never be thought of as something autonomous,
but always as an instrument of policy."*

—Carl Von Clausewitz; 19th Century

For the last 50 years or so, the North East India is facing a great challenge in its democratic movement. The quest for peace, tranquility, social harmony, ethnic equilibrium and socio-economic developments is eluding the region. Peace-Talk, Dialogues, Peace agreements, and peace accords with various insurgent outfits had broken down from time to time, creating a perennial politico-societal problem. In early 1950, India tried to solve the Naga insurgency movement by active military means. It failed. In 1964-65, the Mizo insurgents uprising, which almost severed Mizoram from India, was crushed by military action, including controlled application of limited air power. But the Mizo insurgency movement survived till the signing of Mizo Accord in 1986. In 1970's the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) rocked Tripura state till a peace process was applied.

In early 1974-75, in a haphazardous manner, the concept of the application of dialogue was ushered in the region for a 'lasting peace'. The result was the signing of the Shillong Accord of 1975. But the post-Accord period shows a catastrophic politico-insurgency environment in Nagaland and neighbouring states. There were serious flaws in the application of political and the administrative follow-up actions by the federal and the State government. The Accord was dumped unceremoniously by the Naga Insurgents into the political dustbin of Northeast India. The same trend was followed in Tripura in 1988. Proper political follow-up agenda and programmes did not apply to exploit the gains from the 'Homecoming of the TNV' under Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl, the charismatic and flamboyant tribal leader of Tripura. The repercussions were the breeding of more insurgent outfits based on ethnic and political lines. Today, Assam remained as the trouble state of India. God and the human beings, political parties, politicians, ethnic groups and their aspirations, incessant refugees influxes from Bangladesh; external influences, etc, created the Assam imbroglio. The Assamese pullout the 'son of the soil' concept and the ULFA rocked the state demanding sovereignty, Independent and self-determination.

The ceasefire agreement between the Government of India and the NSCN (IM) in 1997 could be termed as a correct political approach for peace in Nagaland. It was modelled on the Mizo accord of 1986. Gradually the central government, clinched a ceasefire agreement with the NSCN (K) also in April 2001. The same trend was followed with the DHD in Karbi Anglong (Assam); the Bodo Liberation Tigers (11 February 2003); the Bodo (Boro) insurgents in Assam (July 2004); and the ANVC (July 2004). However, there was no common strategy and agenda for an asymmetric political solution of the region problem as a whole. On political front, New Delhi certainly neutralized the 'Naga sovereignty' issue, the day they signed the ceasefire with the NSCN (IM). From military angle, the application of military means on the Bhutanese soil in 2003, by the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and the Indian troops (on the Indian soil along the international borders) bled the ULFA profusely. But ULFA survived politically.

PARADOX OF MILITARY SOLUTION

Application of military means for a solution to any political problems invariably produces tears, blood, toils, anger, desperations and insurmountable human agony and sufferings. In 1967-70, the concept of military means for a solution was applied in Manipur against the Manipuri and the tribal insurgent outfits. In early 1980's, General (Retired) KV Krishna Rao (Former Chief of the Army Staffs of India), Governor of Manipur, applied the concept to solve the state's imbroglio. He failed. In 1994, Lieutenant-General (Retired) VK Nair, the then Governor of Manipur, modified Krishna Rao's concept and applied politico-military means (carrot and sticks) for a solution. He also failed as he had politico-military difference in his approaches with the political leaders in New Delhi and Imphal. He quieted his gubernatorial post as political compulsion carry full marks than the minor military matters.

During 1994-97, most of the political leaders from New Delhi with rudimentary fact sheets of the region applied active politico-military solution to Nagaland but purely military means to Manipur, Assam, Meghalaya etc. An atmosphere of political imbalance was created in the region when New Delhi accorded more weightage in finding a solution to the Naga problem as compared to an easily available viable solution in Manipur imbroglio; serious, perennial and legitimate in Assam; and the sub-ethnic outcries in Tripura, Meghalaya and North Bengal. In 2000-2003, the Manipur insurgents raised their heads in the open, challenged the power of the security forces and remained as an obstinate group difficult to break by military means. So as the ULFA in Assam; the NLFT in Tripura; the NSCN (K), the FGN and the NNC in Nagaland. Later on, the security forces adopted the theory of fighting the insurgents "not just with guns but also with butter" under the theme of 'Military Civic Action Plan'. However, the image projection drill by the security forces failed to pamper the general public in Manipur. From a higher platform, the non-feasibility of military solution to Manipur imbroglio was seen by many political and defence analysts from India and South-East Asian region. "There can be no military solution to the problem of militancy hit North East. Militancy never got resolved anywhere in the world by engaging military forces only. Ultimately, it requires a political solution" (Lieutenant General Paramjit Singh, Director General Assam Rifles; Shillong; May 2008).

FRACTURED PEACE INITIATIVE

Since early 1970's, successive Prime Ministers of India called upon the North East insurgents to renounce violence and joined the mainstream of Indian society. Successive Chief Ministers of the various states followed the same political drill. In 1972-73, the first Muslim Chief Minister of Manipur, Mr Md Alimuddin, a humble, energetic and secular politician, made a peace overture by announcing General Amnesty to all insurgents in Manipur. It produced good responses but failed seriously in the follow-up actions. In 1974-75, the then Chief Minister of Manipur, Sri. R.K Dorendra Singh, point-man of valley-politics in Manipur, called upon the Naga and the Manipuri Meitei insurgent outfits for peace. He, along with other Manipuri Naga politicians, took keen interest in the signing of the Shillong Accord of 1975. In 1977-79, the United Democratic Front (UDF) came to power in the state and Sri Yangmaso Shaiza, a firebrand Tangkhul from Ukhrul district, became the Chief Minister of Manipur. He was more occupied to solve the Naga insurgency problem and the political fallout of post-Shillong Accord rather than concentrating to the territorial integrity of Manipur. In 1981-88, Mr. Rishang Keishing, Chief Minister of Manipur, focused his political attentions to Naga insurgency and tried to solve the same in conjunction with the raising Manipuri Meitei imbroglio. But no holistic political agendas and approaches were chalked out to have a political dialogue with various insurgent groups operating inside and outside the state, which affected the state's integrity. Most of the Manipuri (Manipuri Meiteis) alleged that Rishang was more preoccupied with the 'Naga cause' in a long term vision rather than the fragile and indefensible territorial integrity of Manipur and hence a 'pro-Naga'. Moreover, the seasoned politician was always suspected both by the Manipuri Meiteis and the Naga Insurgent outfits. Sri RK Dorendra Singh, who replaced Rishang Keishing again as Chief Minister, also tried to have a political peace-talk with the Naga and the Manipuri's insurgent outfits, but got a tag of "Pro-Manipuri" from the Naga insurgents and the Naga NGOs. Dorendra Singh, a complex person and a political heavyweight of Manipur was considered as 'pro-Manipuri' by the Naga insurgents and the Intelligence Agencies in New Delhi. The Congress-I Government in New Delhi thought of sending him as ambassador of India to Norway (No-way?) to clip his wings in Northeast India's politics.

In 1997, when New Delhi signed ceasefire agreement with the NSCN (IM), the Chief Minister of Manipur, W. Nipamacha Singh was not taken into confidence for political reason. Sri W. Nipamacha Singh (1997-1999) was considered as a black wooden block to New Delhi's tacit policy of extension of Naga ceasefire in Nagaland to Manipur's territory. He was put on the chopping block by the NDA Government in New Delhi and removed unceremoniously. In February 2001, Sri Koijam Radhabinod Singh (alias RB Singh), the then Chief Minister (the Samta Party leader), produced an initial political euphoria and ray of hope, by offering a month-long 'Unilateral Ceasefire' known as the 'Holi Truce' (Yaoshang Truce) to the Manipur insurgent outfits. He also refused to the extension of Naga ceasefire to Manipur's territory. The Union Home Minister (Sri L.K. Advani) did not accept his political wisdom and approaches and informed Samta Party's national leader George Fernandez (Defence Minister of India) in New Delhi. The Samta Party led state government supported by the BJP was rocked and sacked overnight and the state assembly was put on animated suspension. After 18 June 2001 Manipur's uprising, Manipur state was put under President's rule and the Governor, Mr. Ved Marwah (Ex-Delhi Police Commissioner) was totally involved on a political fire-fight rather than a political solution.

The United Committee Manipur (UCM) and the All Manipur United Clubs Organisation (AMUCO) called upon New Delhi to resolve Manipur's imbroglio "through people to people dialogue and not by New Delhi". Thus, the important public issue of peace process in the state was blown into the wind and New Delhi, on its political radar, momentarily forgot the existence of the strategic state of Manipur and likely future politico-ethnic tornado.

TURNING POINT

Since 1980's New Delhi used to invite Chief Ministers of the Northeastern region of India together for discussion and consultation for any political and socio-economic developments of the region. Prime Ministers of India Late Indira Gandhi, Late Rajiv Gandhi, Late P.V. Narasimha Rao, H.D. Deve Gowda, Sri Inder Kumar Gujral and Sri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Dr. Manmohan Singh adopted such democratic principle of political consultations, discussions, dissections and follow-up actions keeping in view the National interest of India. In 2001-2002, the BJP led NDA (National Democratic Alliances) Government in New Delhi took a politically 'deceptive approach' by adding the word '*without territorial limits*' to the text of Naga ceasefire agreement and brought Manipur and Assam to the brink of catastrophe and disintegration. Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Nagaland and coined the 'uniqueness of the Naga history' but for political reason, skipped Manipur, a 45 minutes helicopter ride from Kohima to Imphal. That tilted New Delhi's policy towards Naga peace process as compared to Manipur's explosive politico-insurgency imbroglio. The political drift and tilt of New Delhi produced deep rift between the Nagas and the Manipuris in the state and elsewhere. New Delhi saw the writing on the wall.

In 2002-2003, Manipur's imbroglio came sharply in the political radar of the Congress led UPA (United Progressive Alliance) Government in New Delhi, under Dr. Manmohan Singh, the first Sikh Prime Minister of India. In February 2002, during the state assembly election in the state, 80 percent of the state's politicians, who did not take up the issue of Territorial integrity of Manipur, were dumped into the political dustbins. Sri Okram Ibobi Singh, (Manipur state Congress Party) who was considered a political lightweight and non-controversial figure, formed and led the state's SPF (Secular Progressive Front) Government. He removed the application of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 from greater Imphal Area, when the Security Forces (the Assam Rifles) committed an operational mistake of CI Ops (Counter Insurgency Operations) leading to the custodial death of Miss. Thangjam Monorama Devi from Imphal East. In December 2004, Dr. Manmohan Singh (Manimohan Singh, 'Mani' means pearl in Manipuri language) visited Manipur and handed over the Historic Kangla Fort, the citadel of ancient Manipuri power and glory, to the people of Manipur. Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee (*Old Bengal Tiger; Political brain of India; shadow Prime Minister and the shadow-President of India*) visited Manipur (Leimakhong military station) on 21 September and did not give green signal to start Bhutan-type military operations along the Manipur-Burma international border, except some limited CI operation inside Manipur and Nagaland. The people of Manipur show the political turn of the state in the mirror of New Delhi.

It was Dr. Shivinder Singh Sidhu, the Governor of Manipur, soft spoken and a political replica of Dr. Manmohan Singh, who took the Manipur insurgents by the tails. On 31 December 2004, on his New Years-Eve Messages, he termed the Manipuri insurgents as 'dissatisfied brethren'; and called

upon them to come to the negotiating table. For the first time, in the history of Insurgency movement in Manipur, the insurgent listened and replied. By 2005-2006, Dr. Sidhu literally moved forward for peace process in Manipur but with a lot of roadblocks, constraints, desperations and setbacks. He did not succeed but not failed.

In 2005, the powerful Manipur insurgent outfit, the UNLF spoke out their mind after more than 40 years of insurgency movement or so. They raised for the first time the political flag of plebiscite in Manipur to be held under the supervision of the United Nations Organisation (UNO). For a dialogue, they demanded:

- (a) The dialogue (peace-talk) should be for plebiscite.
- (b) It should be under UN supervision.
- (c) India to remove its Armed forces from Manipur during plebiscite.
- (d) Manipur insurgents will deposit their arms and ammunition to UN peacekeeping forces only.

Other insurgent outfits of the state, the PLA, the KCP, the PREPAK, the KYKL, the KNF, the ZRA etc. kept mum for sometimes not knowing how to react to the political proposal put forward by the UNLF. They adopted the strategy of wait and see. New Delhi took sometimes to react to the plebiscite proposal put forward by the UNLF. Security forces and the Indian Intelligence Agencies took it as a political pot-shot not to be considered very seriously from politico-military angle. However, the reaction from the Central and the State Government were quite clear. In February 2005, Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India replied when the Chief Minister of Manipur put the plebiscite proposal in front of him. He said, "the door is always open for such initiative to bring about a long lasting solution". On 21 September 2005, Sri Pranab Mukherjee, Defence Minister of India, while visiting Manipur (Leimakhong Military Cantonment) expressed that, "it is impossible to have plebiscite in Manipur". He rejected the proposal. On 25 September 2005, Sri George Fernandez, former Defence Minister of India (President Janata Dal-U; young fire-brand socialist leader during early 1980's; simple, polite and polished politician; an asset to Indian democracy; the right man in the wrong boat) while visiting Manipur pointed out that plebiscite was not feasible in Manipur. 'There is no provision in the Constitution (of India) for holding plebiscite and hence it cannot be implemented'. Lasting solution requires political understanding, and holistic agendas. Political parties and politicians, particularly ethnic politicians should not feel shy to call upon the ethnic insurgent outfits to bade farewell to arms, come to the negotiating table, have a dialogue and thrash out all political problems amicably.

PEACE PROCESS

Insurgency movement in Manipur is the manifestation of anger, desperation, despair, ethnic crisis and conflicts, degenerations of socio-economic development, utter neglect of the region by New Delhi, lack of homogeneity with Indian society and anger of the younger Manipuri populace against the 'step-motherly treatment by India'. With justice in our heart and mind, some of them are right in many ways. But they (the insurgents) should not make it wrong by expressing the same by means

of force, violence, insurgency and militancy. Their political, social, cultural, traditional, human and holistic birthrights should not be allowed to be transformed into and painted as undemocratic, unconstitutional, Anti-people, Anti-Nationals and against the tenets of human right. The state imbroglio have to be solved by the Manipuri and not by the United Kingdom; United States of America; Thailand; Pakistan or even by New Delhi. The people of Manipur are responsible for a lasting solution of Manipur's imbroglio. The golden cardinal points for peace in Manipur and the North eastern region of India are peace-talk and dialogue: nothing more, nothing less. Dialogue, discussion and talk contain a marvelous capacity of healing touch. Dialogue can soften both opponents. Dialogue is an important element to bring understanding and appreciation of each other's point of view. Frame work for peace-talk will involve the following ingredients:

- (a) Formation of peace committee.
- (b) Involvement of prominent citizens; social workers; social scientists; political researchers; educationalists; women activists etc.
- (c) Ceasefire.
- (d) Peace-talk.

Formation of a peace committee is the primary necessity so that it act as a conduit and catalyst between the Government and the insurgents. It should be formed in an open and transparent manner. We have seen such process in Mizoram, J&K and Nagaland. They (the peace committee) should not act as a final authority for a solution. Rather, the aim and objective should be to facilitate and develop a political understanding amongst the different stakeholders. Ethnic and sub-ethnic questions should not impede and tamper the functioning of the committee.

Ceasefire

The first objective for peace in Manipur is to have a mutual consent for ceasefire and gradual end of violence, clashes and killings among the various ethnic groups and communities. The Government and the security forces should not feel shy to call to the insurgent outfits for a ceasefire in a holistic and justified manner and not for lip service. In the larger interest of a peaceful solution of Manipur imbroglio, the Manipur insurgent organizations should consider declaration of ceasefire in a serious and holistic manner, keeping in view the interest and integrity of the people of the state. That will enable all the stakeholders in joining the bandwagon of peace process in the state. The Government should frame a ceasefire ground rules keeping in view the interest of the people of Manipur; its territorial integrity; the national interest of India; and the honour of the Constitution of India. A good ceasefire agreement will pay rich dividend for a lasting solution. Opinions of the hawks and the doves; ethnic political parties; politicians; defence officials; bureaucrats; social organizations and the insurgent outfits should be taken into consideration. There is no need of harping on petty political rhetoric and dichotomic constitutional and legal matters. The deck has to be clear for a meaningful dialogue. A ceasefire in Manipur should involve the following stakeholders:

Ceasefire in Manipur (Elements to involve)

Government of India	Government of Manipur	• United National Liberation Front (UNLF). • People's Liberation Army (PLA). • People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK). • Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL). • Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP). • Naga insurgency groups (Those not yet sign but operating in Manipur's soil). • Kuki insurgent groups (already signed suspension of operation agreement)
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PEACE-TALK

The Government of India is continuously trying for peace in the Northeastern region of India by applying multi-pronged political and military action. Insurgent outfits like the NSCN (IM), the NSCN (K) the ANVC, the DHD, the Bodo insurgent outfits, the Kuki and Zomi insurgent outfits are already on the political nets of New Delhi. In Assam, one woman's Army, Mrs Mamoni Goswami, blended the spine of the ULFA and now one step behind the negotiating table. The Manipur Meitei insurgent outfits cannot be far away from the ongoing peace process in the state and in the region.

New Delhi has not tried holistically to have a peace-talk with all insurgent outfits in the state, except giving a clarion mandatory call for political necessity. There is a tendency among the politicians to depend too much to the military for a solution of the imbroglio in Manipur as well as in North East India. For a peace talk, there is no need to go to the Logjam whether a group is a revolutionary, terrorist, militant, or freedom fighter. The aim is to understand the points of conflict and how to arrive to a viable solution. On the part of New Delhi, politically, it is a blunder and aberration, administratively a bureaucratic bungling and militarily a costly drain of security personnel that a strategic state like Manipur has been put on fire without any substantial and holistic political attention. There is a pressing need for tranquility and socio-economic development of the state, which occupies the central position in the India-Myanmar-China triangle. The peace talk in the state will involve the following ingredients (Table 37.1).

Table 37.1: Manipur Imbroglio: Critical Issues for Peace-Talk In Manipur

Sl. No.	Stake holders	Core/critical Issues
1.	Core issue of the central/state government	• Safeguard the sovereignty and constitution of India. • Peace, tranquility and prosperity of India. • Safeguarding the secular democratic institution of India. • Equal socio-economic and cultural development of the people of India. • Rule of law

Sl No	Stake holders	Core/critical Issues
2.	Core/critical Issues of the General public	• Peace, tranquility and prosperity. • Socio-economic development. • Territorial Integrity of Manipur. • Human Rights. • Rule of law.
3.	Issues/Agendas of ethnic/sub-ethnic groups/ politicians	• Ethnic supremacy and ascendancy. • Ethnic and community politics and their problem thereto • Fear psychosis of smaller ethnic groups of losing their existence gradually.
4.	Core Issues of Insurgents	• Sovereignty, independence, self-determination, self-rule and autonomy. • Plebiscite.

FAREWELL TO ARMS

For a guerilla, insurgent and militant, the word 'surrender', is just like a cyanide pill. Banner like 'Surrender ceremony', 'Handing over of Arms', 'Home coming' etc. are considered by them as coffin wrapped with red or green clothes, ready for lowering into the pit for an honourable burial. They feel that it is a dirty word used by the politicians and security personnel against them to shatter their psychological courage and wisdom during the war of nerve. The mentioning of the word brought out the connotation of a 'winner' (security forces) and the 'loser' (the insurgents) in a conflict environment with many stakeholders having different political flag-poles. In such political environment, the main political strategy of the government should be firstly, to bring them to the negotiating table, secondly, have a dialogue process; thirdly, ushered in peace and tranquility; fourthly, collected arms and ammunitions; and finally, integrated them into the societal fold with due honour and dignity. The government have to support them actively on their march from the blazing jungle lanes to the mainstream society and encouraged them to lead a useful life.

In 1983, late N. Bisheshwar Singh, the dreaded China-trained leader of the PLA of Manipur, hang up his gun (arrested by troops of 8 Mountain Division), joined the mainstream of the society; fought state Assembly election (Manipur), won the same and contributed handsomely to the political movement in Manipur. Late Laldenga, MNF chief (Ex-Chief Minister of Mizoram), Mr. Lalthanghawl, Ex-MNF

Gun is No Solution

All insurgent group must recognize that the only road open to them is to lay down arms. We will never compromise with those who never compromise with those who believe in the use of the gun to get a solution to their real or imaginary problems. Once they lay down arms as Indian citizen, we are willing to talk to anybody.

— Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India,
31 December, 2008.

cadre (Chief Minister of Mizoram); Mr. C. Zoramthanga, former commander-in-chief, MNF (ex-Chief Minister of Mizoram); Mr. BK Hrangkhawl, TNV chief etc. baptized with insurgency movement, fell out midway, got married with democracy and settled down with the flag of democracy. In 1964 and 1975, the Naga insurgents bade farewells to armed insurgency movement and deposited a small token of their arms and ammunition at Chedima (Near Kohima). However, political imbroglio; political dissensions; ethnic and sub-ethnic interests, lack of political solutions, strategy and wisdom; and active external influences failed to resolve the Naga insurgency problem, leading to the rise of old insurgent outfits with new colour and flags. In 1997, New Delhi-NSCN (IM) cease-fire brought some respite in Nagaland and adjacent areas. The same drill was followed with the NSCN-K. The DHD (Nunisa) Group in NC (North Cachar) Hills in Assam, the ANVC group in Meghalaya and the Kuki insurgent outfits in Manipur also joined the peace process in the region. Some Bodo insurgents in Assam, a few tribal insurgents in Tripura; Bru (Reang) insurgents in Mizoram-Tripura Sector and a small portion of the Assam insurgents (Alpha and Charlie Companies of 28 Battalion, United Liberation Front of Assam) bade farewell to insurgency movement and joined the democracy bandwagon of India. Though all of them promised to shun violence, no one bade farewell to arms. In spite of having peace-talk and cease-fire, they are holding more than 15,000-16,000 arms and other assorted weapons in their custody to be used as a political leverage in the near future. This is not acceptable.

However, many insurgent outfits of Manipur (UNLF, PLA, KYKL, KCP, PREPAK); Assam (ULFA, BNLF, Muslim terrorist outfits, DHD-J) Meghalaya (HNLC); Tripura (NLFT, ATTF, ATPLO, CNLF) and Mizoram (BLFM) are still outside the cease-fire loop of New Delhi. In Manipur and Assam, there is a need for correct application of restorative justice. Political rhetoric like "They should come for talk or first they should surrender arms" will not help in breaking the deadlock. "Whichever group comes for ceasefire will have to lay down arms, lived in designated camps and not indulged in extortion and intimidation" (Assam Government Official; *The Telegraph*; Guwahati; 25 June 2008). Political aggressiveness is a good strategy in counter-insurgency warfare. But the government should apply an acceptable and viable yardstick for all insurgent outfits in the region for a ceasefire and dialogue process, and not a selective dichotomic political policy. They should not allow some ethnic insurgent groups to retain their arms, forming 30-35% of the total illegal arms floating around in the region after executing cease-fire agreement. On the other hand, calling other insurgent outfits, who are holding 65-70% of the illegal arms and ammunition, to surrender their arms and assorted weapons as a first step for peace-talk will tantamount to faulty political approach. The same cannot be termed as a justifiable democratic political policy of the government. There is a need to maintain general balance of justice in the region.

We believe that New Delhi should send strong messages to the insurgents in the region, that they have got the full democratic rights and privileges to raise their voices against the federal and the state government by means of democracy and democratic weapons. Insurgency movement and terrorism with a hazy horizon in sight with no benchmark and end-point, and uncharted and unpredictable road-map, with ten of thousand human skeletons cannot be the dream flag for the future generation of North East India, particularly in Manipur. The gross national happiness of the region should not be transformed into a horrifying gross national violence leading to a tragic end result. Insurgency, terrorism, fundamentalism and ethnic war-cry are worthless weapons of war for a decent human survival.

We also believe that a pan-North East India dialogue process, though easy to say, but consists of several pitfalls and crossing of more Berlin Walls, involving all Insurgent outfits, regional and ethnic political pied-pipers, and other stakeholders should not be left out from our political vision, strategy and approaches. Piece-meal peace processes with one ethnic group, community or sub-ethnic group, may not—bring the desired result in the overall National political objective and interest of India. NSCN-IM / NSCN-K has got pockets of influences in Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh; ULFA has got in Nagaland, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur; PLA/UNLF has got in Assam, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya and Nagaland etc. Considering the geo-political environment in south East Asia; gradual Chinese political hold and influences in Northern Burma (Shan and the Kachin States); a friendly Government in Dhaka (Awami League, Sheikh Hasina Wajed), a non-hostile Burmese Military Government (SPDC, senior General Than Shwe), Nepal Government, neutral to India and China (Sri Prachanda), ushering a composite dialogue process by New Delhi will be in the right direction for a solution of the region's problem. With special to the National security of India, it is imperative that, the Assamese, the Naga, the Manipuris, the bodos, the dhimasa, the Kuki, the Garos, the Khasi and Islamic insurgent groups bade farewell to armed insurgency movement for full democratic political benefits by the people of the region. In the present day global conflict scenario, burning down of own house will be considered as a classic human mistake. At the same time burning down of your neighbour's house, will bring no solace as the flame will invariably destroyed everybody including your own house. Farewell to arm is the golden opportunity in the region.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT



[Parliament Building of the Republic of India: The World's Largest Democratic Country]

You must not lose faith on humanity. Humanity is an ocean; if a few drops of the ocean are dirty, the ocean does not become dirty.

—Mahatma Gandhi

In 1947, India became independent from the British yoke. On the midnight of 14 August, 1947, Pandit Jawarharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, spoke to the Nation, which surged India towards a democratic movement. He said:

"Long years ago, we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At the stroke of midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when

the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still larger cause of humanity. . . . To the people of India, whose representatives we are, we make an appeal to join us with faith and confidence in this great adventure. This is no time for petty and destructive criticism, no time for ill will or blaming others. . . ."

India is the largest democratic country in the world, with population touching a magic figure of 1000 crores (2008 AD), consisting of the Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and many other ethnic and minority groups. It is a secular state, with a number of religions existing on its soil independently. It is a real mind boggling and puzzling environment to see thousands of cultural heritages, traditions, customs, habits, castes, creed, languages and dialects criss-crossing the entire landscape and co-existing so comfortably on its soil. On 26 January, 1950 the people of India took pledge to constitute India as a Sovereign Democratic Republic. A number of countries which won Independence after World War II, particularly third world countries, South East Asia and African countries slipped into military dictatorship; military rule; fundamentalists states, and communists states. But India survived the political trial in spite of occasional attempts to subvert its democratic foundation by snatching its democratic rights and liberties; gagging and choking of freedom of the press and the media; attempts to shackle the judiciary; clamping down emergency power; sound of sovereignty, separation and independent; insurgency and secessionists movement. Several attempts were made by external agencies and neighbouring countries to destabilize the country by means of terrorism, cross-border terrorism, Jihad and acts of religio-ethnic upheaval. But the country is still standing as one of the tallest democratic country in the world. One of the reason behind this success story is the Indian Democracy.

CHALLENGES AND ROADBLOCKS

Democracy (*Demo* means people : *Kratia* means Government, in Greek) defined in the best form as 'for the people, of the people and by the people', still hold good. It is one of the finest human institutions for mankind. Abraham Lincoln, the great president of the United States of America, said that *"If there is anything which is the duty of the whole people to never entrust to any hands but their own-that thing is the preservation of their own liberties and institutions"*. Even, some of the die-hard communist patriarch believed the sacred cardinal principle and political doctrine of democracy for humanity. *"Democracy is the whole-some and pure air without which a socialist public organization cannot live a full-blooded life"* (Mikhail Gorbachov, former President of USSR).

In democracy, there will be many challenges and road-blocks in the march towards the destiny. Countries like the United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Philippines, South Africa, and many South East Asian countries sacrificed their blood to achieve democracy. India's southern neighbour, Sri Lanka, devastated by the ethnic Tamil, led by the powerful Tamil insurgent group, the LTTE, is trying to hold the democracy flag intact. The hot and cold blow between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government for a solution of the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis posed a challenge to democracy and its principle value for humanity. Nepal, with a lot of bloodshed, transformed itself into a democratic form of government, bringing, the Maoist communists insurgents, led by the communist ideologue, Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal, who goes by his nom de guerre Prachandr (meaning terrible or fierce) into the governance system of the country. On 24 April, 2007, Mr Girija

Prasad Koirala, the then Prime Minister of Nepal, announced that, *'It is a historic day achieved through the courage, resolve and sacrifice of the people'*, when the Maoist communists guerillas laid down their arms and joined the mainstream of Nepal. Nepal is no more a Monarchical country. Now, the country need to make a strong democratic foundation, like in India and to percolate down to the villagers in the far flung areas, the benefit of democratic form of governance by hanging up arms and guns. The political process have to be kept alive by many stakeholders—political parties, politicians, Maoist insurgents and the people of Democratic Republic of Nepal. Pakistan, a Muslim state, who believed in Shariah Law; separated from India by destiny; now sandwiched between terrorism, fundamentalism, militancy influence, Jihad and democracy. Throughout its political history, since 1947, Pakistan never enjoyed democracy. At the present juncture, the people of Pakistan have to select one from among the three—Fundamentalism, Militarism and Democracy. We, the people of India recommended democracy. Pakistan selected democracy with lot of tears, blood and sacrifices. They are facing many challenges on its march towards a democratic form of Government. Bangladesh, born in 1971, with a revolution by the East Pakistani people under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, has been shattered by the Islamic fundamentalists, world Jihadis groups, reckless military politicians and external interventions from rich Islamic countries. The country is now facing problems to adopt democratic form of government and drifting slowly towards the Shariat law and the Islamic tenets by denouncing the Hindus and the Christians. Pakistan, South East Asian, and the Central Asian Islamic countries have converted

Bangladesh as the most instable region in South East Asia by means of religion, Jihad and proxy war, affecting Indian democracy. To maintain political stability in South East Asia, Bangladesh should come out from the global Jihadi net. Burma, a gold mine of ancient culture and religion of South East Asia, with a hiddened and unexplored natural resources, is trying to join world democracy club, though Senior General Than Shwe crushed, in a brutal manner, the rebellion by the barefoot Burmese Buddhist monks against the Military Junta. However, the Burmese people have to negotiate the challenges while transforming themselves from a Military Government (State for Peace and Development Council, SPDC) to a viable democratic form of Government. The Burmese can do it. Global terrorist Al Qaeda group, the extremist Abu Sayyaaf group (ASG) and its Indonesian based ally, Jemaah Islamiyah, threatened the Philippines democracy and even plotted to assassinate President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in February 2008, during her planned visit to Philippines Military Academy, in Northern Baquio city. Philippines Military Chief of Staff, General Hermogenes Esperon, said, in Manila, that it was not only the president who was the target, but also many other people and staffs



National Library of The Hindu

(Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Qaid-i-Azam)).

Indian Democracy - A dream for all countries on the globe; and the only weapon for socio-economic development of North East India. Democracy belongs to Manipur destiny. No need to choose some other political route.

of various embassies. One glaring point is that South East Asian and India's neighbouring countries should not consider Indian Democracy as a politico-strategic threat to their country.

INDIAN DEMOCRACY: A TESTING TIME

Mahatma Gandhi, the great torch-bearer of 'Ahimsa' (Non-violence) of the world, strongly believed and said:

"there is no human institution that has no dangers. The greater the institution, the greater the chances of abuse. Democracy is a great institution and therefore it is liable to be greatly abused. The remedy therefore is not avoidance of democracy but reduction of the possibility of abuse to a minimum".

Indian democracy is now on a strong foundation difficult to be uprooted by easy political means. However, there are many occasions and incidents where lack of political harmony came up in the functioning of the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. Political parties and the politicians may fume with the judiciary for judicial activism where the judiciary 'overstepped their limits'. They occasionally raised the question of judicial delinquency, citing the example of a large number of court cases piling up in various courts of India. On 23 February, 2008, in New Delhi, during her address on 'Judicial Reforms', Mrs. Pratibha Devisingh Patil, President of India, said that the 'Time has come when we need to seriously introspect whether our judicial machinery has lived up to its expectations of walking the enlightened way by securing complete justice to all and standing out as a beacon of administration is not without its own share of inadequacies and blemishes'. The Chief Justice of India, KG, Balakrishnan joined the healthy discussion on the important public issue for snail-paced justice movement in India and opined that the root of the malaise lay in governance deficit. In Indian democracy, it is seen that in many occasions, the Judiciary acted as the saviour of the Legislature and the Executive (ban order imposed by the Honourable Supreme Court of India for felling of trees in the North Eastern region of India). Indian judiciary, sometimes encroached, inadvertently, on the turf of the Legislature and the Executive, "because of inaction on their (the Legislature and the Executive) part in performing their Constitutional obligation" (Justice G.B. Pathak, Former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of India). In a democratic society, confrontation and act of supremacy amongst the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary will always remain in a healthy atmosphere, which is the essence of Indian democracy.

In democracy, the Legislature and the Executive are responsible for public policy and accountable for the same. Public accountability involved both vertical and horizontal dimensions. The Legislature makes the Laws, the Judiciary interprets them, and the Executive implements them. In a democratic country like India, a judge cannot substitute his wisdom for that of the Legislature and the Executive. 'If there is a law, judge can certainly enforce it, but judge cannot create a law and seek to enforce it.' (Justice AK Mathur and Justice Markandey Katju; Supreme Court of India; case of a gardener in a golf club run by the Haryana Tourism Corporation; December 2007). At the same time 'parliamentary dictatorship' will be equally bad for the society, the citizenry and the nation. Mob rules and mob violence in the name of supremacy of the Legislatures are undesirable and unacceptable in Indian society. Legislatures are accountable and answerable to the general public for their acts of commission and omissions. Therefore, an independent legal infrastructure is necessary to check and balance Indian Legislatures and the Executives who cross the thin red line of democracy inadvertently.

"It is incumbent on all members of the Legislative bodies in India to maintain order and decorum in the house. This is important for maintaining the stature, dignity and respect for democratic institutions. The element of promoting a responsive administration is the need of the hour. In a democracy, this is possible only through greater and effective participation of people in governance at all levels." (Mrs. Pratibha Devisingh Patil, President of India, 30 April 2008; Thiruvanthapuram, Kerala).

Today India is facing many challenges which included farmer's suicide; Maoist insurrections affecting more than 180-190 districts; unpleasant infant mortality rate; effective use of the Right to Information for better governance; Greater transparency and accountability in Government's functioning; Implementation of performance audit; caste and gender oppression; Energy crisis, cross-border terrorism, militancy and insurgency movement. But India is still marching ahead. The country had done well in international fora in the socio-economic field. 12% of all American scientists are of Indian origin and 38% of doctors are Indians. 34% of Microsoft employees are Indians (2007-2008 AD) and are likely to increase to 50% by 2010-11 AD. Indian scientists are sharing the bulkworks of NASA space programme in USA. 36% of scientists are Indian or Indian origin. In the near future, IBM is going to depend on Indian human resources ban twagon for their global expansion. 28% of the IBM employees are Indian (2007-2008 AD). (Figure given in a statement in parliament of India by India's Minister of State, Human Resource Development Ministry, Mrs. D. Purandeshwari, in an effort to defend India's higher Education system. However, some leading newspapers in India expressed that the figures presented by the Honourable Minister 'are far from truth.' (*The Times of India*, 13 March 2008, Editorial). India has got a large number billionaires, leaving behind many countries in South East Asia.

Finest hour of India's Parliamentary Vote

*'No-confidence Motion' Against the Ruling Government,
17 April 1999, New Delhi, India.*

- | | | |
|------------------------------|---|--|
| 1. Ruling Government | : | NDA (National Democratic Alliances) |
| 2. Prime Minister | : | Sri Atal Bihari Vajpayee |
| 3. Opposition parties | : | INC (Indian National Congress) and others. |
| 4. Total parliamentary seats | : | 544 |
| 5. Effective strength | : | 541 (3 absentees) |
| 6. <u>Vote for</u> | | <u>Vote against</u> |
| 269 | | 270 |
| 7. Result | : | NDA Government fall |

One positive salient point in Indian democracy is that, someone can express his views and opinion without bothering much about the consequences—Freedom of expression. In most of the countries, like Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh, China, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, someone have to think thrice and look left, right and back before opening their mouths. People in India are the pivot of decision-making and they elected their representatives to bring out their opinion and views in various Legislative Assemblies and the Parliament of India. India's Parliamentary system strongly upholds the rule of law and the principle of majority in decision making. On 17 April 1999, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), under Sri Atal Bihari Vajpayee (India's Chanakya; great parliamentarian of the world; great orator) lost the famous 'No Confidence

Motion', raised by the Indian National Congress (INC) and others, on the floor of India's parliament. The NDA government lost its majority by a single vote—269 in favour of the Government and 270 against them. No governments in India have lost its majority by a single vote in India's parliamentary history and to repeat the same is going to be very unlikely. The democratic concept of one person, one vote was followed strictly with full respect to parliamentary principle. The democratic federal government of India came tumbling down by the magical power of one single vote against the government. Indian democracy won the day, though the government lost the vote.

CHANGING PARADIGM

Democracy contains many critical dimensions. Fundamental changes are likely to occur in the nature of conflicts between Nations, States, organized crime syndicate, insurgent and militant outfits. Political differences will lead to concept of strategic confrontations, then further to non-standard conflicts and low-intensity/high intensity warfare. Turbulent regional scenario will automatically affect internal security scenario of India.

In the near future, Democracy is going to face serious challenges from demography, demographic movement, floating human population and migration of human beings from one place to another. The democratic state government should not be made a victim to demography and the ethnic populations. The essence and principle of demography should be to integrate the entire populace in any region, instead of dividing them. India's adversaries, particularly the neighbouring countries can disturb the security of India not only by means of war but also by means of demographic invasion. Cross-border insurgency and terrorism, militancy, Narco-ethnic war, will form the main ingredients of the world security environment.

In the near future, North Eastern region of India, western region of Burma, Eastern part of Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal will play a decisive role in the geo-political movement in South East Asia. Fractured in any part, will affect the entire region. Thus, India as a nuclear power country, and champion of democracy should ensure that the region hold the democracy flag and not drifted towards insurgency, militancy, terrorism and fundamentalism.

A strong yearning and wind for National awakening for a sound democracy is blowing in the North Eastern region of India. A close and holistic scrutiny will inadvertently show that parliamentary form of Government has not failed in the region as well as in Manipur. Democratic form of Government have to be handled by rightful, efficient, qualified and honest representatives of the people. The people of the region are responsible for the rightful selection of their representatives through ballot boxes. Regarding insurgents, militants, guerillas, extremists, anti-national elements (ANEs), whatever terms people used against them, they are the proud citizen of this country and not one from any alien state. The representatives of the people have to accept this as faith accompli in the most lucid manner. The responsibility to solve Manipur insurgency movement rest with the political parties, politicians, general public and last but not the least, the insurgents. Though it is an uphill task, Manipur Insurgency is soluble and will come to an end within a few years.

BOUNDARY TREATY OF BURMA AND MANIPUR APRIL 1834

(English Version of the Treaty)

(SECRET CONS : 24 APRIL 1924, NO 11)

- First:** The British Commissioners, Major Grant and Captain Pemberton, under instructions from the right honourable the Governor General in Council, agree to make over to the Woondouk Mahamengyan Rajah and T. Saradaungee Nimyookyawthoo, Commissioners appointed by the king of Ava, the towns of Tummoo, Khumbat, Sumjok and all other villages in the Kubo Valley, the Ungoching hills and the strip of valley running between their eastern foot and the western bank of the Ningthee (River Chidwen) or Khyendwen river.
- Second:** The British Commissioner will withdraw the Maneepooree Thanas now stationed within this tract of it to the Burmese Commissioner **on certain conditions.**
- Third:** The conditions are that they will agree to the boundaries which may be pointed out to them by the British Commissioners, and will respect and refrain from any interference, direct or indirect, with the peoples residing on the Maneepooree side of those boundaries.
- Fourth:** The boundaries are as follows:
- 1st The eastern foot of the chain of mountains which rise immediately from the western side of the plain of the Kabaw valley. Within this line is included Moreh and all the country to the westward of it.
 - 2nd On the south, a line extending from the eastern foot of the same hills at the point where the river, called by the Burmahs Nanwaweng and by the Maneepoorees, Numsaeelung, enters the plain up to its source and cross the hills due west down to the Kathe Khyoung (Maneepooree River).
 - 3rd On the north, the line of boundary will begin at the foot of the same hills at the northern extremity of the Kabaw valley and pass due north up to the first range of hills, east of that upon which stand the villagers of Choectar, Noongbee, Noonghur, or the tribe called by the Burmahs Lagwensoung, now tributary to Maneepoor.

- 4th The Burmese commissioners hereby promise that they will give order to the Burmese Officers, who will remain in charge of them, not in any way to interfere with Khyens or other inhabitants living on the Manipurees side of the line of boundary above described, and thus the British Commissioners also promise that the Manipurees shall be ordered not in any way to interfere with the Khyens or other habitants of any description living on the Burma side of the boundaries now fixed.

Seal F.J. Grant, Major

Seal P.B. Pemberton, Captain

Commiss

Seal F.J. Grant, Major

Seal P.B. Pemberton, Captain

Woondouk Haman Mengau Rajah

Sunmyachit Chaut, Ninghee Tsayedagyee Memyoorauthoo River

9th January 1834

Signed, West of Matkwon on
9th January 1834

APPENDIX B

THE MANIPUR MERGER AGREEMENT

Agreement made this twenty-first day of September 1949 between the Governor General of India and His Highness the Maharaja of Manipur.

Whereas in the best interests of the State of Manipur as well as of the Dominion of India it is desirable to provide for the administration of the said State by or under the authority of the Dominion Government.

IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS

ARTICLE I

His Highness the Maharaja of Manipur hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on the fifteen day of October 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "the said day").

As from the said day, the Dominion Government will be competent to exercise the said powers, authority and jurisdiction in such manner and through such agency as it may think fit.

ARTICLE II

His Highness the Maharaja shall continue to enjoy the same personal rights, privileges, dignities, titles, authority over religious observances, customs, usages, rites and ceremonies and institutions in charge of the same in the State, which he would have enjoyed had this agreement not been made.

ARTICLE III

His Highness the Maharaja shall with effect from the said day be entitled to receive for his lifetime from the revenues of the State annually for his Privy Purse the sum of Rupees three lakhs free of all taxes.

This amount is intended to cover all the expenses of the Ruler and his family, including expenses on account of his personal staff and armed guards, maintenance of his residences, marriages and other ceremonies etc., and the allowances to the ruler's relations who on the date of execution of this agreement were in receipt of such allowances from the revenue of the State, and will neither be increased nor reduced for any reason whatsoever.

The Government of India undertake that the said sum of Rupees three lakhs shall be paid to His Highness the Maharaja in four equal installments in advance at the beginning of each quarter from the State treasury or at such other treasury as may be specified by the Government of India.

ARTICLE IV

His Highness the Maharaja shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him on the date of this agreement.

His Highness the Maharaja will furnish to the Dominion Government before the first January 1951 an inventory of all the immovable property, securities and cash balance held by him as such private property.

If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of His Highness the Maharaja or State property, it shall be referred to a judicial officer qualified to be appointed as a High Court Judge, and the decision of that officer shall final and binding on both parties.

Provided that His Highness the Maharaja's right to the use of the residences known as "Redlands" and "Les Chataignes" in Shillong, and the property in the town of Gauhati known as "Manipur Basti" shall not be questioned.

ARTICLE V

All the members of His Highness' family shall be entitled to all the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by them whether within or outside the territories of the State, immediate before the 15th August, 1947.

ARTICLE VI

The Dominion Government guarantees the succession according to law and custom, to the gaddi of the State and to His Highness, the Maharaja's personal rights, privileges, dignities, titles, authority over religious observances, customs usages, rites and ceremonies and institutions in charge of the same in the State.

ARTICLE VII

No enquiry shall be made by or under the authority of the Government of India, and no proceedings shall lie in any Court in Manipur, against His Highness the Maharaja whether in a personal capacity or otherwise in respect of any done or omitted to be done by him or under his authority during the period of administration of that State.

ARTICLE VIII

1. The Government of India hereby guarantees either the continuance in service of the permanent members of the Public Services of Manipur on conditions which will be not less advantageous than those on which they were serving before the date on which the administration of Manipur is made over to the Government of India or the payment of reasonable compensation.
2. The Government of India further guarantees the continuance of pensions and leave salaries sanctioned by His Highness the Maharaja to servants of the state who have retired or proceeded

on leave preparatory to retirement, before the date on which the Administration of Manipur is made over to the Government of India.

3. The Government of India also undertakes to make suitable provisions for the employment of Manipuris in the various branches of Public Services, and in every way encourages Manipuris to join them. They also undertake to preserve various laws, customs and conventions prevailing in the State pertaining to the social, economic and religious life of the people.

ARTICLE IX

Except with the previous sanction of the Government of India no proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be instituted against any person in respect of any act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duties as a servant of the State before the day on which the administration is made over to the Government of India.

In confirmation whereof Mr. Vapal Pongunni Menon, Adviser to the Government of India in the Ministry of States, has appended his signature on behalf and with the authority of the Governor General of India and His Highness Maharaja Bodhchandra Singh, Maharaja of Manipur has appended his signature on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors.

Bodhchandra Singh
Maharaja of Manipur

V.P. Menon,
Adviser to the Government of India,
Ministry of State

Sri Prakasa
Governor of Assam, Shillong
September 21, 1949

APPENDIX C
(Manipur Imbroglio)

**THE ARMED FORCES (ASSAM AND MANIPUR) SPECIAL
POWERS ACT, 1958 (NO. 28 of 1958)**
(11 SEPTEMBER 1958)

An Act to enable certain special powers to be conferred upon members of the Armed Forces in disturbed areas in the State of Assam and the Union Territory of Manipur.


Be it enacted by Parliament in the Ninth Year of the Republic of India as follows:-

1. (i) This act may be called the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act, 1958.
- (ii) It extends to the whole of the State of Assam and the Union Territory of Manipur.
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,
 - (a) "Armed Forces" means the military forces and the air forces of the Union so operating.
 - (b) "Disturbed area" means an area which is for the time being declared by notification under section 3 to be a disturbed areas.
 - (c) all other words and expressions used herein, but not defined in the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Army Act 1950, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in those Acts.
3. If the Governor of Assam or the Chief Commissioner of Manipur is of the opinion that the whole or any part of the State of Assam or the Union Territory of Manipur, as the case may be, is in such a disturbed or dangerous condition that the use of Armed Forces in aid of the civil power is necessary, he may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the whole or any part of the State or Union Territory to be disturbed area.
4. Any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the Armed Forces may, in a disturbed area,
 - (a) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any

law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons or the carrying of weapons or of things capable of being used as weapons or of fire-arms, ammunition or explosive substances;

- (b) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, destroy any arms dump, prepared or fortified position or shelter from which armed attack are made or are likely to be made or are attempted to be made, or any structure used as a training camp for armed volunteers or utilised as a hide-out by armed gangs or absconders wanted for any offence;
 - (c) arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a cognisable offences or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may use such force as may be necessary to effect the arrest;
 - (d) enter and search without warrant any premises to make any such arrest as aforesaid or to recover any person believed to be wrongly restrained or any arms, ammunition or explosive substances believed to be unlawfully kept in such premises and may for the purpose use such forces as may be necessary.
5. Any person arrested and taken into custody under this Act shall be made over to the officer in charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay, together with a report of the circumstances occasioning the arrest.
 6. No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the Central Government against any person in respect of any thing done or purposed to be done in exercise of powers conferred by this Act.
 7. (1) The Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance 1958 is hereby repealed.
 - (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have done or taken under this Act, as if this Act had commenced on the 22nd day of May, 1958.


**INSURGENT ORGANISATIONS:
HOW A RUPEE IS SHARED BY INSURGENT GROUPS IN
NORTH EAST INDIA (2004 - 2005 AD)**



(Extortion, Demand, Taxes, Forced Collection, Looting, Arson etc.)
(2004-2005)

ANNEXURE II

**INSURGENT ORGANISATIONS:
HOW A RUPEE IS SHARED BY INSURGENT GROUPS
IN MANIPUR (2004-2005 AD)**



(Extortion, Demand, Taxes, Forced Collection, Looting, Arson, Intimidation etc.)
(2004-2005)

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
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Manipur Insurgency & Insurgent Groups




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
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Lt.-Col. T. Hemo Singh, was born in Imphal, Manipur. Like other thousands of children in the state, he did his schooling under the shadow of hurricane lamp and candlelight. He is a graduate (B.Sc., Physics Honours) of DM

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During his military career, the Author served more than 15 years in North East India (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland) between 1981 to 2008. He saw the active insurgency movement; politico-military conflicts; devastating ethnic, sub-ethnic and communal crisis in the region. He is a keen observer to the intense politico-ethnic conflicts and killings among the Nagas, the Kukis, the Assamese, the Manipuri, the Meetei Pangals and other floating refugees in the region, particularly in Manipur-Nagaland-Assam triangle.

After retirement, Lt.-Col. Singh is living in Imphal, Manipur with his wife, three daughters and one son.